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The rise of the natural sciences is supposed to have rendered the medieval
worldview that regarded humanity as the center of the universe completely obsolete.
However, a high view of human significance continues to be inherent in much contemporary
ecumenical theology, insofar as it is Trinitarian and incarnational. This thesis defends the
concept of critical anthropocentrism, which seeks to acknowledge a theological sense of
human significance while being sensitive to contemporary scientific issues and perspectives
on human nature.
In part I, three modern theologians - Lutheran Wolfhart Pannenberg, Roman
Catholic Karl Rahner, and Greek Orthodox John Zizioulas - are examined for their
understanding of human significance. The twin doctrines of the imago dei and the
incarnation provide the focus for the investigation, which shows that human beings are
significant because in them, certain eternal purposes and values are realized in creation. This
is not accidental, but is part of the divine plan in creating the world. Human nature uniquely
images God in the cosmos, most clearly and profoundly in the person of Jesus Christ. The
incarnation is for various reasons a focal point in cosmic history, and so humanity, as the
locus of the incarnation, occupies a position of vital cosmic significance. This becomes even
clearer in eschatological perspective. While nuances of approach are evident in the three
theologians, the analysis of their thought, coming as it does from three separate traditions,
indicates that ecumenical theology is deeply and intrinsically critically anthropocentric.
In part II, some epistemological boundaries are established for the dialogue between
theology and science, with regard to the limits of the science and the scope of theological
explanations. Some of the traditional arguments that are supposed to show that humans are
insignificant in the cosmic scheme are examined. The investigation shows that modern
natural science agrees that in human beings something very special has appeared in the
universe. Contemporary science highlights unique features of human nature in relation to
the non-human creation. This is evident in, among other things, the comparison of human
with animal, hominid, artificial, and extra-terrestrial intelligence. The anthropic principle
and related concepts in cosmic evolution also suggest a contemporary version of the
teleological argument with respect to human existence as a pinnacle of sequential
complexity. The resulting understanding of human significance is also sensitive to
contemporary ecological and environmental issues.
In light of the theological doctrines of the imago dei and the incarnation and the
scientific portrait of human existence and uniqueness, it remains reasonable to hold a
position of critical anthropocentrisrn in the contemporary setting. Ecumenical theology and
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"What are human beings that you are mindful of them, mortals that you care
for them? Yet you have made them a little lower than God, and crowned
them with glory and honor. " - Psalm 8:4-5
1.1. Introduction and Statement of Thesis
Since the success of the Copernican revolution in astronomy, humanity's cosmic
self-understanding has been undergoing radical revision. While the medieval worldview
generally thought the earth was the center of the universe, and humans the pinnacle of
creation on earth, the Copernican revolution began a process completed with Darwin of
decentering humanity on the cosmic scale. The earth circles the sun, which is just a medium
size star, 2/3 of the way out from the center of a medium size galaxy composed of billions of
stars, just one among billions of other galaxies in the universe.1 Darwin's evolutionary
theory extended the process to biology, seeming to eliminate humanity's categorically
unique position among living creatures. The dominant paradigm of special creation gave
way to the evolutionary paradigm of human existence rising from 'chance and necessity'2,
seemingly transitory, impermanent, and meaningless. With the loss of these centering
references, humanity has had its self-image gravely altered. Paul Davies observes that these
scientific revolutions 'had the effect ofmarginalizing, even trivializing, human beings.
People were no longer cast at the center of the great scheme, but were relegated to an
incidental and seemingly pointless role in an indifferent cosmic drama, like unscripted
extras' on a vast movie set.3
This project proposes however, that this 'Copernican' stereotype is problematic: that
in fact humans are cosmically significant in some clear and precise ways that are visible to
both theology and the natural sciences. While the former medieval alliance between
theology and Ptolemaic-Aristotelian thought in support of anthropocentrism is obsolete, it is
the contention of this thesis that a related form of anthropocentrism is still viable and can be
maintained in the face of the theological, scientific, and ecological objections.
Contemporary theology and natural science will each be explored to support this
contention, with a goal of coherence rather than cross-disciplinary proof. The aim is to show
1 Russell Stannard, The God Experiment (London: Faber & Faber, 1999), 103-104.
2 To use Jacques Monod's phrase: Chance & Necessity (London: Penguin, 1971).
3 Paul Davies, The Mind ofGod (London: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 20.
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that it is reasonable to believe, on the basis of theological and scientific considerations, that
humanity is special in some specific and non-trivial ways in the cosmic scheme, that the
universe may be said to be critically anthropocentric. This is not meant to
anthropomorphize the universe, or to divinize humanity. Rather it is to suggest that in a
theological framework, it is reasonable to believe that human beings are cosmically
significant because in some sense they enable certain values to be expressed in creaturely
terms in the cosmos. This is not accidental, but is part of the divine plan in creating the
world. Further, this is consistent with contemporary science. It will be argued that critical
anthropocentrism is intrinsic to many streams of contemporary Christianity, and is coherent
with the scientific portrait of human significance. It will also be argued that this
understanding is sensitive to some contemporary issues in epistemology and ecology. If
true, it should help revise the modem self-understanding of what it means to be human.
1.2. Definition of Terms
1.2.1. Uses ofanthropocentrism in scholarly literature
Anthropocentrism has been defined and used in a variety ofways in scholarly
literature. In order to frame a more precise definition of critical anthropocentrism, other
uses of the terms will be demarcated here. This is a representative rather than exhaustive
study, limited in scope to theological, ethical, and scientific discourse, and intended as
descriptive, not evaluative.
A few basic dictionary definitions are in order. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines anthropocentrism as 1. A view or doctrine centering in man; 2. 'The assumption that
man is the center of all things', and 'to which all surrounding facts have reference'.4 The
Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary adds, 1. 'Considering human beings as the most
significant entity of the universe; 2. Interpreting or regarding the world in terms of human
values and experiences'.5 The Dictionary ofScience and Technology adds, 1. 'Of or relating
to the belief that humans are the center of the universe'.6 TheMacquarie Dictionary adds
the following: 1. 'regarding human beings as the central fact of the universe'. 2. 'Assuming
human beings to be the final end and aim of the universe'.7
4 The Oxford English Dictionary (OUP, 2003). http://dictionary.oed.com.
5 Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 3rd Edition (2000). http://wmv.m-w.com.
6
Dictionary ofScience and Technology (Academic Press, 1992), 126.
7 The Macquarie Dictionary (2000). http://wwvv.macnet.mq.edu.au.
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The scholarly literature generally uses anthropocentrism in some variation of these
definitions. It may refer to anything having to do with humanity, the human world, or the
by-products of human existence. The 'anthropocentric environment'8 or anthropocentric
architecture means here, more or less, 'that which pertains to or concerns humans'.
Anthropocentric is sometimes used in theological and historical literature to refer to
aspects of the medieval synthesis, which found a three-fold support for its elevation of
humanity in theology, philosophy and contemporary science. Theological support came
from Christianity's high view of human status in light of the incarnation, philosophical
support came from Aristotelian philosophy's high regard for humanity, and proto-scientific
support came from widespread belief in the Ptolemaic geo-centric universe. The earth was at
the center of the universe, humans the focus of earth's history, and all things revolved around
them in the cosmos. The synthesis was not simplistic: human status, centrality, and
dominion were subservient, guarded against hubris by the relationship of humans to God.9
Human self-confidence was tempered by an awareness of the limitations imposed by human
sinfulness and the need for illumination and revelation from God, yet humanity remained
central in the cosmos and in God's plans. Ernst Haeckel pejoratively described this
worldview as 'the anthropocentric error, that Man is the premeditated aim of the creation of
the earth, for whose service alone all the rest of nature is said to have been created'.10
Abraham Heschel comments, 'in science the anthropocentric view of the earth as the center
of the universe and ofman as the purpose of all being has long been discarded'.11
Anthropocentrism may denote a philosophical frame of reference for understanding
reality, located on humanity. Wolfhart Pannenberg uses the term in this sense when
describing 'the growing anthropocentrism ofmodern theology', which is shaped by 'the
philosophical concentration on the human person as subject of all experience and of
philosophical reflection itself.12 Kevin Vanhoozer refers to the shift that took place
following the turn towards human subjectivity by Rene Descartes and Immanuel Kant:
"There is no knowledge ofGod except through knowledge of self."13 Here, the word
represents the conscious choice of a human frame of reference on which to anchor all
knowledge. It describes a chosen perspective, centered on human subjectivity.
8
Chemosphere: Chemistry, Biology and Toxicology as Related to Environmental Problems 39 (July,
1999).
9 Rosino Gibellini, 'The Theological Debate on Ecology', in Leonardo Boff & V Elizondo, eds.,
Ecology and Poverty (London: SCM, 1995), 126.
10 Ernst Haeckel, The History ofCreation Vol. 1 (London: H.S. King, 1876), 38-39.
11 AbrahamJ. Heschel, Man Is NotAlone (New York: Octagon, 1951), 186.
12
Pannenberg, A TP, 12.
13 Kevin Vanhoozer, 'Human Being, Individual and Social', in Colin E. Gunton, ed., Christian
Doctrine {CUP, 1997), 159.
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Anthropocentrism may describe a belief in the ultimate superiority of humanity, and
of human reason and empirical experience. Alfons Auer describes the 'radical
anthropocentrism inaugurated by Descartes' and followed by other thinkers all the way
through the end of the 19th century.14 Rosino Gibellini says that view 'subordinates nature to
human beings and generates an anthropocentric arrogance and an imperialistic conception of
nature'. Following Bacon and Descartes, human knowledge and the foundation of the
human sense of self were established independently from theology, finding their justification
in experience and self-reference.15 For instance, John Morgan uses anthropocentric to
describe the theological milieu of liberal nineteenth-century-theology, 'which placed man
and culture at the center of attention at the expense of God's deity'. He says the atrocities of
world wars and genocides in the Twentieth Century caused the decline of this type of
anthropocentrism with its ideological optimism, and shattered belief in humanity's inherent
goodness and the infallibility of its knowledge, and disintegrated the illusions of human
ethical and religious superiority.16 Here, anthropocentrism indicates an ideological sense of
human superiority and self-confidence.
Anthropocentrism may designate any judgment made by a human being that is
necessarily dependent on 'human values, interests and preferences'.17 A judgment is
anthropocentric if it reveals any evidence of dependence on these, on human location in the
cosmos, or on human scale. This has been called 'epistemic anthropocentrism,'18 'cosmic
anthropocentrism,'19 as well as 'inevitable anthropocentrism'.20 Because of our nature as
human beings, we are limited to an understanding of the cosmos that is from the human
perspective, in contrast to some other perspective that might exist, such as God's, that of
another animal - a bat for instance21, or that of the natural order. Bruce Morito describes this
as 'a limiting condition,' a boundary from which all human activity must proceed.22 This is
not necessarily a negative concept, but simply describes the inevitable result of the human
14 Alfons Auer, Ethics of the Environment, quoted by Gibellini, 'TDE', 127.
15 Descartes' 'I think, therefore I am/ cogito ergo sum' inaugurated this non-theological
anthropocentrism (though himself viewing human reason as evidence for God), which de-absolutized
theology, and made human subjectivity supreme. Gibellini, 'TDE', 126-127; Rene Descartes,
Discourse on the Method ofRightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences, 1637
(Edinburgh: Sutherland & Knox, 1850), Part IV, 75; Pannenberg, ATP, 11.
16 John H. Morgan, 'Karl Barth in Pursuit ofGod's Humanity', Religion in Life 45 (1976), 327-329.
17 W. Grey, 'Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy 71 (1993),
473.
18 M.A. Kazlev, http:/Avww'.kheper.auz.com/topics/worldviews/anthropocentrism.html.
19 Val Plumwood, 'Androcentrism and Anthropocentrism', K.J. Warren, ed., Ecofeminism: Women,
Culture, Nature (IUP, 1997), 329.
20 Lori Gruen, 'Revaluing Nature', in Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature, 369.
21 See Thomas Nagel, 'What is it like to be a bat?', inMortal Questions (CUP, 1991), 165-180
22
Bruce Morito, 'Value, Metaphysics, and Anthropocentrism', Environmental Values 4 (1995), 31.
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perspective.
A related use, however, is negative, signifying not only this sense of human
knowledge limits, but also the understanding that this judgment is one-sided or flawed.
Some of our observations of the universe are necessarily flawed, according to John Barrow
and Frank Tipler, because of our unique position as Homo sapiens. These observations are a
matter of appearance only, and are to be separated from those features that 'are genuinely
determined by the action of physical laws.'23 This observational limitation results from the
finite, local, and relative position of human beings on the earth. For instance, to the ordinary
observer, the Sun appears to go around the Earth. This perspective offers problems only
when making detailed observations of planetary and stellar motion. Copernicus'
achievement was to disengage from an anthropocentric perspective in order to contemplate a
simpler explanation of planetary motion: the Earth and planets went around the Sun.
• Such a limited or prejudiced view of things is similar to the anthropological concept
of ethnocentrism. Paul Hiebert explains: "Human beings are at the center of their own
perceptual worlds, resulting in a basic egocentrism in which everything is judged in terms of
the self... On another level, people everywhere seem to look on their own culture as most
suitable or best and on that of others as less civilized. This becomes the source of
"ethnocentrism," the tendency of people to judge other cultures by the values and
assumptions of their own culture."24 Val Plumwood, representing the ecofeminist position,
refers to this as 'the liberation model of anthropocentrism, based on extending to the
human/nature case the understanding of centrism drawn from liberation concepts such as
androcentrism, ethnocentrism, and Eurocentrism'.25 John Templeton describes this as
'egotism'. "Egotism caused men to think that the stars and the sun revolved around them.
Egotism is still our worst enemy."26 John Seed has labeled this 'human chauvinism' or
'homocentrism'; it is 'the idea that humans are the crown of creation, the source of all value,
the measure of all things'.27 Here, note that he has conflated several uses of
anthropocentrism, which in this analysis will be separated. The 'selfish' dimension denotes
the tendency to judge the universe and other living species by values and assumptions from a
biased, self-centered human perspective.
In related use, anthropocentrism may denote 'a system of thought which emphasizes
23 John Barrow & Frank Tipler, TheAnthropic Cosmological Principle (OUP, 1986), 4.
24 Paul G. Hiebert, Cultural Anthropology, 2nd Ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983), 38.
25
Plumwood, 'Androcentrism and Anthropocentrism', 335.
26 John Templeton, The Humble Approach (London: Collins, 1981), 11.
27 John Seed, 'Beyond Anthropocentrism', in his Thinking Like a Mountain - Towards a Council of
all Beings (London: Heretic, 1988), 35, 37. He says of his own 'non-anthropocentric' position, 'we act
because life is the only game in town, and actions from a disinterested, less attached consciousness
may be more effective'.
5
the priority of humans over other species'.28 This prejudicial perspective reads onto the
universe or other creatures a false human character, or a false prioritization of humanity. For
example, humans sometimes treat animals and computers as if they were 'human-like'
entities, as opposed to living beings or machines 'that happen to possess human-like
characteristics'.29 It may represent 'the attitude that only humans matter, or only humans
have intrinsic value, while everything else in the world is valued only insofar as it serves, or
may serve, human interests'.30 Lori Gruen calls this 'pernicious anthropocentrism'.31 Lynn
White, Jr. describes Western Christianity as 'the most anthropocentric religion the world has
seen'32, seeking to lay the blame for the ecological crisis at the feet of the church and
Christian teaching in medieval Europe. A variation of this definition is apparent in A.B.
Masao's comments from an eastern religious perspective. He contends that western
[pernicious] anthropocentrism is rooted in the western religious conception of the self.
Eastern religions such as Buddhism offer a corrective by seeking to reduce or eliminate the
'self in favor of the communal, of the natural order, or of nothing at all.33
Used neutrally in ethical discourse, anthropocentrism may represent intentionally
choosing a course of action that is most favorable to humanity, in contrast to some other non-
human creature it might favor (e.g., Earth, or another animal species). For example, Michael
Northcott examines the ethical implications of animal extinctions caused by humans.
"Looked at purely anthropocentrically, the more pressing import of accelerated humanly
originated species extinction may be the significance of the reduction of biodiversity for the
human use of the environment, for example in the quest for new pharmaceutical preparations
or new genetic strains of staple foods."34 This type of anthropocentrism has been divided into
strong and weak forms. In strong form, human interests alone are valuable; in weak form,
human stewardship of other non-human beings (who have intrinsic value) is emphasized.
Environmental political policy that reflects decisions for reasons of human economic,
spiritual or psychological good fit either usage. Strip-mining might represent strong
28
Christopher Southgate, et al, God, Humanity and the Cosmos (TTC, 1999), 203.
29 C. Nass, et al, 'Anthropocentrism and computers', Behavior & Information Technology 14 (1995),
229.
30
Eugene Troxell, 'Phil 322: Environmental Ethics', class overheads, San Diego State University
http://www.rohan.sdsu.edii/faculty/troxell/332-f97/o anthropo.html
31
Gmen, 'Revaluing Nature', 369.
32
LynnWhite Jr., 'The historic roots of the Ecologic Crisis', in Ian G. Barbour, ed., Western Man and
Environmental Ethics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1973), 25-26.
33 A.B.E. Masao, 'The Problem of Self-Centeredness as the Root-Source ofHuman Suffering',
Japanese Religions 15 (1989), 15-25.
34 Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (CUP, 1996), 21-22.
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anthropocentrism. Conservationism and preservationism are examples of the weak form.35
Such views are contrasted with 'ecocentric' philosophies like Seed's, which reverse 'the
man-nature relationship and make... nature the dominant or predominant actor'36, or
'biocentric' philosophies, which emphasize the priority of life in general.
In animal-rights ethics, anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism are flags
indicating a position on the moral standing of humans and non-humans. Per Ariansen uses
the term to discuss the nature ofmorals. Recognizing morals as intrinsically human is
anthropocentrism, or what Stan Godlovitch calls 'normative anthropocentrism'. Non-
anthropocentrists hold that 'certain classes ofnon-humans hold rights that are on a prima
facie level with human rights. Accordingly, by proxy or guardian, nature can and ought to be
represented on the moral scene. The direct moral standing of (some parts of) nature should
be recognized and respected'37 (see chapter 8).
Finally, the anthropocentric hypothesis is an expression referring to a somehow
justified and privileged position for Homo sapiens in the cosmos. Carl Sagan says on the
possibility of extra-terrestrial life: '[IfETI is not found], it would be the first instance in the
long series of historical scientific debates in which the anthropocentric hypothesis had
proved even partly valid' (italics added).38 This hypothesis comes quite close to the
anthropocentrism of the medieval synthesis, although with unstated rather than explicit
theological implications. The hypothesis, if validated, implies that humanity is unique in the
universe, that we are the only physical intelligence in all the vast reaches of space, or more
simply: 'we are alone'. John Leslie is using the phrase in this way when he says the
anthropicprinciple (see below, §1.2.2) is 'not anthropocentric'.39
To summarize, anthropocentrism has a variety ofmeanings and nuances in the
scholarly literature, with modifiers like 'radical', 'cosmic', or 'pernicious'. In the medieval
view, it describes the central importance attributed to humanity in the cosmos and in God's
plans. In philosophy, anthropocentric may describe a chosen perspective: that of 'a
concentration on the human person.' It is sometimes used in scientific discourse to mean
35 Keith Landa, 'Humans and the Environment: Environmental Ethics', lecture outline,




Michaels, 'Ecocentrism vs. Anthropocentrism'.
37 Per Ariansen, 'Anthropocentrism with a human face', Ecological Economics 24 (1998), 154; Stan
Godlovitch, 'Descriptive & Normative Anthropocentrism',
http://www.lincoln.ac.nz/emd/subiects/phil302/notes/1998/anthcent.htm
38 Carl Sagan, Discover 4 (1983), 30, quoted by Barrow & Tipler, ACP, 601.
John Leslie, Universes (London: Routledge, 1989), 19-21, 223. The anthropic principle concerns
not 'the nature not ofmanhood [(anthropos, Homo sapiens, mankind)] but ofobserverhood.. .The key
point is .. .that intelligent life ofany plausible kind seems crucially dependent on [certain] natural
conditions'.
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that which pertains to or concerns humans or human culture. It may denote the tendency to
judge the universe and other living species by values and assumptions from a biased, self-
centered human perspective. In ethics, it may describe a course of action that is most
favorable to humanity for pragmatic reasons, or may be a flag indicating something about the
moral standing of humans vs. non-humans. 'Radical anthropocentrism' describes belief in
the ultimate superiority of humanity, and of human reason and empirical experience.
'Cosmic' or 'epistemic' anthropocentrism refers to dependency on a human location in the
cosmos, or on human scale, preferences or values. 'Pernicious anthropocentrism' indicates a
prejudicial, 'egotistical' perspective, which falsely prioritizes humans, or reads onto the
universe or other creatures a false human character. In what might be regarded as a modem
scientific incarnation of the medieval view, the anthropocentric hypothesis asks whether a
privileged position for humanity in the cosmos is justified by scientific research.
1.2.2. Types ofanthropocentrism that will not be defended.
A spectrum of meaning is evident in these uses of anthropocentrism, ranging from a
positive or justifiable focus on humanity, to a negative judgment regarding human arrogance.
Most of these variations are not particularly contentious, and will not be defended in this
thesis; these include the neutral, purely descriptive, and pejorative variations. Hence the
philosophical concentration on the human person as subject, and the technical scientific use
referring to whatever has to do with humans or human culture, are not of interest. The
descriptive sense in pragmatic ethics of a course of action that is most favorable to humanity
is not relevant. 'Radical anthropocentrism,' with its belief in the ultimate superiority of
human reason and experience, and 'pernicious anthropocentrism', with its self-centered
perspective, will not be defended. Indeed, an awareness of the dangers of these types of
egocentrism should help correct whatever form of anthropocentrism one may care to support.
The concept of 'cosmic' (or 'epistemic') anthropocentrismwill not be defended. As
it stands for a conception of human knowledge and understanding which seems inevitable for
human beings, it might be said that this acknowledges the limits of objectivity. There is a
school of thought, represented by such works as Seeds' Think Like a Mountain, which seeks
to make the world part of a non- or anti- anthropocentric dialogue, particularly in ecological
discourse. But as Lori Gruen observes, 'While it may be useful in certain instances to speak
metaphorically of the subjectivity of nature, the literal suggestion to "think like a mountain"
only serves to obfuscate and confuse'.40 No matter how hard we may try to put ourselves in
40
Gruen, 'Revaluing Nature', 368-369.
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the shoes of whatever other entity or reference frame we choose, it will still be us doing the
trying, with all our limitations. "To know the world from another species point of view is
beyond us, although sympathetic imagination may help to bridge that gap. Human language
and experience are the sources of both our opportunities and our limitations, our possibilities
and our constraints."41 Cosmic or epistemic anthropocentrism gives label to this limitation,
and no effort will be made here, even if it were possible, to overturn it. At the same time,
this calls for wariness of the type of anthropocentrism characterized by the geocentric
observation error: faulty perception based on a limited perspective.
A note on the anthropic principle: the focus of the thesis is not simply on
observerhood, as most versions of the anthropic principle seem to imply. Rather it is upon
humanity - Homo sapiens, mankind. On the other hand, the anthropic principle may have
much to contribute to some form of legitimate anthropocentrism. As Barrow and Tipler
elaborate: 'Although we do not regard our position in the Universe to be central or special in
every way [viz. the Copernican Principle], this does not mean that it cannot be special in any
way'.42 John Polkinghome emphasizes the point when he says, 'the anthropic principle
represents a kind of anti-Copernican revolution in our cosmological thinking. We do not live
at the center of the universe, but neither do we live in just "any old world." Instead, we live
in a universe whose constitution is precisely adjusted to the narrow limits that alone would
make it capable of being our home'.43 This principle will be examined in more detail in
relation to human significance in the course of the thesis.
1.2.3. Critical anthropocentrism defined
We are now in a position to define critical anthropocentrism. It includes aspects of
the medieval synthesis combined with the modem idea of the anthropocentric hypothesis. It
is explicitly theological, though sensitive to contemporary scientific issues. The thesis is that
human beings {Homo sapiens, mankind) do in fact occupy a significant position in the
cosmos. They are cosmically significant because in them, certain eternal purposes and
values are uniquely realized in creation. This is not accidental, but is part of the divine plan
in creating the world. If human existence is not the goal of the universe, something like it
may at least be regarded as a goal of the universe. While acknowledging that the support
that made anthropocentrism reasonable in the medieval synthesis is now absent, critical
anthropocentrism postulates that a related but contemporary version of that synthesis may
41 Ruth Page, God and the Web ofCreation (London: SCM, 1996), 111.
42 Barrow & Tipler, ACP, 1.
43 John Polkinghome, Serious Talk: Science and Religion in Dialogue (London: SCM, 1995), 39-40.
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still be justified.
Why retain 'anthropocentrism' as part of the definition at all? Why not 'human
centered' or some other formulation? 'Human centered' is included in the intended meaning
of critical anthropocentrism, with some qualifications to be developed later. However, the
term 'anthropocentrism' is chosen because it is commonly used in the scientific and
ecological literature to talk about the supposedly outmoded view, as in Sagan's theory of the
'anthropocentric hypothesis.' The phrase has historical depth. Though criticized, reformed,
and cleaned up, what is nonetheless being offered is a position that has an ancient heritage,
going back at least to the ancient Greeks. In Protagoras' dictum, 'man is the measure of all
things', we have an early expression of the concept, which has continued in use and
understanding through much ofWestern history, granted the errors and arrogances of the
position that must be addressed. Anthropocentrism is retained in deference to this lineage.
However, this conception will not be a reworking of Greek philosophy. Rather, the
essential milieu for establishing the contemporary truthfulness of an anthropocentric
universe will be modem Christian theology in dialogue with modem science. This thesis
will seek to show that humans are significant on a cosmic scale in both contemporary
disciplines. On the other hand, Judeo-Christian theology must be uncomfortable with any
conception of humanity that puts it at the center of the universe without qualifications. Only
in light of and subordinate to God does humanity find any place at all. So Jtirgen Moltmann
suggests giving theology and ethics a theocentric focus as a solution to the problems of
anthropocentrism.44 From a theological perspective, this concept of theocentric dependence
will be acknowledged as valid and helpfully corrective.
This brings us to the use of the modifying term 'critical'. Several sensitivities are
intended by the use of this word. First, as just mentioned, it acknowledges the centrality of
God to any adequate theological approach to human being. Second, the physical or scientific
naivety of the pre-Copemican vision will be avoided. While there are scientific and hence
'physical' considerations that play a role, they may not be amenable to simplistic
interpretations. Third, the critical approach acknowledges that in the past, theology has
sometimes been guilty of an uncritical anthropocentrism. This is evident in post-
Augustinian thought that tends to under-emphasize nature and dichotomize it from humans.
It is found in Thomas Aquinas' extreme elevation of human rationality and relative
denigration of the animals, which are 'naturally enslaved and accommodated' to our use.45 It
44
Jiirgen Moltmann, God in Creation: the Ecological Doctrine ofCreation (London: SCM, 1985), 31.
45 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Vol. 3, Part 2b, English Dominican Trans. 1911 (AGES,
1997), Q64-A1-R02; Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 1994), 23ff
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is evident in the 'radical anthropocentrism' of post-Enlightenment theology, which accepted
with Scholasticism and Descartes 'the idea that the imago Dei consists in the reason of
man'.46 It is present, according to Gibellini and Ruth Page, even in the modern tendency to
prioritize humans ahead of the rest of creation47, which brings us to a fourth sensitivity: the
excesses and errors that have become especially clear in recent decades in the human
relationship to the environment. A careless attitude toward the environment may lead to
frightening developments beyond our control, possibly dangerous or even lethal to humanity.
Douglas John Hall notes the theological ambiguity that Christianity historically has tended to
have towards the world, who governs the world (God or humans), and about what aspects of
human nature constitute the image of God and place them 'above Nature'.48
Sensitivity to ecological issues is coupled with the need to avoid what has often been
a barely disguised androcentrism, manifest in the systematic under-privileging and
oppression ofwomen in a majority of cultures throughout the world. As Michael Welker
puts it, 'ecological concerns and feminist consciousness have brought to an end the naive or
self-satisfied assumption of the preeminent position of 'man".49 The thesis will attempt to
engage with these objections, and seek to incorporate appropriate sensitivities, criticisms,
and nuances into any justified form of anthropocentrism.
The project will attempt to show that theology can regard the cosmos as critically
anthropocentric because humans play a vital role in the cosmos, forming a key part of God's
plans for the universe. Consider a metaphor. The lead role in a play is the center of physical
attention on the stage, wherever he or she happens to be. Now whether humanity really has
the lead role, is a co-star, plays a supporting role, or just has a bit part, is something that
bears closer scrutiny. Uncovering this role will engage the heart of the theological research.
A vital role for humans, if it is found, does not exclude the possibility of other divine plans
and goals for the cosmos. Consider another metaphor: the importance parents place on their
children. Do parents only join together to have children? Can the family be said to exist
solely for the sake of the children? Are they its 'goal'? Children clearly are an important
part of family life. But other important functions and goals could be elucidated. Similarly,
evaluating humanity's cosmic priority may be difficult or impossible. It will be enough to
discover that humanity plays a vital role in God's plans for the universe, without insisting
that they have the only role, in order to justify critical anthropocentrism.
46 John Zizioulas, 'Preserving God's Creation: Three Lectures on Theology and Ecology: Lecture
One', KTR 12:1 (1989), 3-4.
47
Gibellini, 'TDE', 126-128; Ruth Page, 'Theology and the Ecological Crisis', Theology 99 (1996),
109-110.
48
Douglas John Hall, Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship (WmE, 1986), 16, 25-58.
49 Michael Welker, Creation and Reality (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 60.
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1.3. Epistemological Foundations
The epistemological model of this thesis might be called postfoundational50, in that it
accepts the philosophical critique of foundationalism, without resorting to postmodern
relativism, which remains rooted in the foundationalist rejection of the transcendent realm
(see chapter 5).51 My epistemology can be outlined in terms of the four couplets of F. LeRon
Shults' postfoundationalist model. A) Experience and belief - belief informs experience,
and interpreted experience informs belief. B) Truth and knowledge - there must be an
objective unified truth in reality to make the search for knowledge intelligible, but our
knowledge is fallible and subjective. C) Individual and Community - rationalities are
defined by communities that use them, and are used by 'socially situated individuals'. D)
Explanation and Understanding - explanation aims for cross-disciplinary universal
understanding, while understanding is dependent upon the particular context of
explanations.52
A) Since foundational assumptions in human knowledge are by their nature not
provable, the epistemological model of this thesis accepts the 'fiduciary rootedness' of all
explanations and understanding.53 In this sense, the thesis accepts that belief is a
precondition to understanding. I take as my absolute starting points the assumption of God
and faith in God revealed in Jesus Christ, as witnessed in Scripture, what Nicholas Lash
describes as 'a standpoint shaped by recognition of God's uttered Word and outpoured
Spirit'.54 Miracles are therefore regarded as possible, and the authority of Scripture as the
written Word ofGod and normative boundary of Christian theology is accepted. Following
Joseph Ratzinger, final faith is not placed in human reason apart from God; rather faith is
regarded as a gift of God.55 Such faith is not simply categorical and epistemological, but
first and foremost relational and personal, initiated by God himself.56 It is therefore 'basic'
and foundational.37 It informs experience, and allows it to be interpreted, while itself
50 J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology (WmE, 1997); F. LeRon Shults,
The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality
(WmE, 1999).
51 Without a transcendent or 'absolute' source of truth, relativism seems inevitable. See Gordon
Graham, 'Playing God', Theology and Ethics lecture, 22 October, 2002, New College, University of
Edinburgh.
52
Shults, PTT, 43, 38-76.
53
van Huyssteen, Essays, 44; Shults, PTT, 38-43, 81.
54 Nicholas Lash, The Beginning and the End of 'Religion' (CUP, 1996), 170.
55
Ralph Del Colle, '"Person" and "Being" in John Zizioulas' Trinitarian Theology: Conversations
with Thomas Torrance and Thomas Aquinas', SJT54 (2001), 82.
56Eph. 2:8.
57 Alvin Plantinga, 'Reason and Belief in God', in Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds.,
Faith and Rationality (UNDP, 1983), 16-93.
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growing through experience.
B) The model accepts that there is an objective reality outside of human mental
construction, but that this reality is only accessible to humans via their own subjective
knowledge apparatus, colored as they are by cultural limitations and parochial worldview
assumptions. Acknowledging that science is gradually uncovering more and more of the
truth about material reality, it also supposes that science is unable to access those features of
reality that are beyond its methodological and cultural perceptual limits, since it is apriori
seeking to describe reality within those limits.58 Thus science does not engage with certain
facets of reality that are visible to theology, nor is it able to disprove basic theological
presuppositions, such as the possibility of miracles, the truthfulness of Jesus Christ as God's
revelation, or the scriptural witness to God's acts in history (see chapter 5). Since human
knowledge is imperfect and fallible, a form of 'critical realism' is also appropriate in
theology: we see 'through a glass, darkly'. While some theological truths are foundational,
and form part of the accepted faith structure of reason59, critical realism implies that in
general theological truth is subject to investigation, critical analysis, possible refutation, as
well as possible confirmation. Therefore, with J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, John
Polkinghorne, and others I agree that a 'critical realist' approach is to be preferred in both
science and theology.60
C & D) It will already be clear from the faith presuppositions that the epistemology
of this thesis stands in a certain community stream within contemporary Christian theology.
At the same time, this stream is not isolated. Because of the unity of truth, it must be able to
engage in reasonable interdisciplinary dialogue. For this reason, an apologetic approach to
dialogue with the natural sciences will be undertaken. Though neither discipline is expected
to prove conclusions in the other discipline, coherence between the theological and the
scientific views will be sought, with the aim of a cross-disciplinary universal integration of
understanding. It is acknowledged that theological and scientific criteria for explanation are
not the same. Further, theological explanation is about more than simply understanding and
meaning. With van Huyssteen, the model accepts that 'both the scope and content of
theological explanations may set them apart from explanations in other areas' (see chapter
5).61 It may have things to say about objective reality that move between explanation and
581 agree with Karl Rahner that theology transcends science, because it can already show the
limitations of scientific methodology in the human orientation towards the transcendent or infinite.
Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations 21: Science and Christian Faith (DLT, 1988), 42.
59 In contrast to the faith structure of naturalism or atheism. See Plantinga, 'Reason', 73-91.
60
van Huyssteen, Essays, 41-44; Polkinghome, Science & Theology: An Introduction (London:
SPCK/Fortress, 1998), 16-17.
61
van Huyssteen, Essays, 4-5, 23If; Shults, PTT, 68-72.
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understanding. The dialogue will, for these reasons, attempt to go beyond mere coherence to
some level of integration.
This summarizes the epistemological approach of this thesis. I take my starting
point as faith in God in Jesus Christ, and believe this faith is coherent with the unity of all
truth. A critical realist approach to reality will be used in both theology and science,
admitting the need for ongoing and continual correction and refinement of beliefs and
knowledge in both domains. Coherence between and within the two domains will be sought
as the data from each are evaluated for evidence of human significance.
1.4. The Theological Perspective - criteria, problems, representatives
Many Christian doctrines might provide evidence for human significance. Here, two
key doctrines will be examined for this evidence. 1) The imago dei: the doctrine that God
has created human beings in his own image and likeness. 2) The incarnation: the doctrine
that God has taken on human form, and fully become one of us in the human being Jesus of
Nazareth. These two closely related doctrines will be examined together for evidence of
human significance in theological perspective. The doctrine of the image dei is chosen
because, as Hall notes, it is the shorthand encapsulation of all Christianity believes about
what is 'essential as distinct from existential' to humanity: humanity is meant to image
God.62 The doctrine of the incarnation is chosen because it is the shorthand expression in
Christianity for the meaning of the life of Jesus Christ to humanity: God has become one of
us, with all that implies. This project will attempt to deduce a renewed or critical
anthropocentrism from the contemporary ecumenical interpretation of these two doctrines. It
will not be suggested in any way that human significance transcends God's own
significance. The former can only be derived from the latter. Therefore, a theocentric
universe is assumed from the beginning, with humanity located within that context.
The two doctrines will provide the focus for examining the work of three theologians
representing different traditions, in order to obtain an ecumenical perspective: Lutheran
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Roman Catholic Karl Rahner, and Eastern Orthodox John Zizioulas.
These theologians have been chosen for investigation because each wrestles with the subject
ofhuman nature in Trinitarian and incamational perspective, and each is sensitive to related
issues in contemporary thought and in the natural sciences. The investigation is not intended




anthropocentric character. To that end, the accompanying critical analysis will focus on
problems related to the question of human significance and the validity of their
anthropocentric conclusions. It is hoped by this to show that ecumenical Christianity, at
least as represented by these three leading modern thinkers, remains very much critically
anthropocentric.
There are several theological problems that might possibly threaten the thesis. To
many theologians, the Sabbath rest of Genesis 1 appears to be the crown of creation, not the
creation of humanity. Some believe the image of God is to found elsewhere than in the
totality of human nature, perhaps in the human mind or in Nature, as they image rationality
or creativity. Is the image of God separable in creation from human nature? Others suppose
that humans cannot be alone in the universe - that there must be many other sentient species
with rational consciousness. Would these creatures also be an image of God, in need of their
own incarnation for salvation? Is the revelation of God in Christ just about our local human
needs, or does it have larger scope? Many believe there can be no conceivable connection
between the origin and fate of the universe and human existence. Does theology really make
a sound connection between these two? Some believe human beings are an artifact of
nature, a product of purely natural processes, however complexly and non-reductively
understood. Does this picture measure up to a theological portrait of the transcendent human
spirit? Is that portrait just fluff on top of 'what we know to be true' from science? Some
see human dominion of nature as an ecological problem motivated by bad theology. Is this a
fair assessment? These issues will be examined primarily in the Part I of the thesis, though
Part II may give them some consideration.
1.5. The Scientific Perspective - foundations, issues, problems
Part II will consider human significance from the perspective of the natural
sciences. The fields of science to be considered include cosmology, comparative and
evolutionary biology, the cognitive sciences, and some related fields, but not the social
sciences. The discussion will be introduced with an examination of the boundary of science
with theology, where the use of science's methodological naturalism impinges on the
question of theological rationality. This section will attempt to establish some boundaries
for dialogue between the two disciplines (chapter 5). Then human uniqueness will be
assessed in relation to the non-human creation, with particular reference to animal and
(extinct) hominid intelligence, artificial intelligence, and extra-terrestrial intelligence
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(chapter 6). The anthropic principle and the processes of cosmic evolution will be examined
to determine if these could be coherent with the theological dogma of God's providence
leading to human existence (chapter 7). Finally, some arguments purporting to show that
ecological concerns require us to 'de-anthropocentrize' our theology will be examined
(chapter 8). It will be suggested that critical anthropocentrism is coherent with
contemporary science's position on human significance, and is sensitive to ecological
concerns.
There are several scientific problems that might conceivably threaten such a
conclusion. Some suppose that modem humans can no longer believe in foundational
features of theology like incarnation and resurrection in any realist sense. Is this modem
reductionistic naturalism the ultimate rationality it claims to be? Is human significance
purely metaphoric or symbolic? Some insist that humans are only different in degree from
animals, and that natural science has eliminated the absolute barrier separating humans from
the non-human creation. Has humanity lost its unique cosmic status in any substantive
sense? The natural sciences are supposed to show that humans are nowhere near the 'center
of the universe', either physically or metaphorically. Is this the real import of contemporary
science? Science suggests to some that humans are just a cosmic accident, a fluke of nature
occurring in a remote and unimportant comer of the universe. Is human being a cosmic
triviality, a universal inevitability, or some third option? Can science be interpreted in any
way as supporting the idea that God's providence has led to human existence? Finally, do
contemporary ecological concerns require us to abandon any anthropocentric conclusions?
Throughout, the investigation will engage with the position of key writers in the
science-theology dialogue, such as Polkinghome, Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, and others.
While the limitations of space prohibit their perspective being given the same depth of
analysis as the ecumenical theologians, an effort will be made to give them representative
voice. The project intends to show that, despite the objections of former generations,
contemporary science is coherent with the theological conclusion of critical
anthropocentrism.
1.6. Summary
This thesis proposes that human beings are of vital significance in the cosmos, and
that this significance is visible to both theology and science, though in respectively different
ways. If this is true, there should be some measure of coherence between the theological and
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scientific views, despite stereotypes to the contrary. The scope and nature of human
significance will be unpacked in what follows, suggesting that contemporary theology may
reasonably hold a position of critical anthropocentrism, and that though this is not
necessarily required by a scientific viewpoint, it is coherent with one. There should be





Wolfhart Pannenberg: The Human Divine Representative
"It is when we look at Jesus Christ that we know decisively that God's deity
does not exclude, but includes His humanity ...[In Jesus Christ] thefact is
oncefor all established that God does not exist without man. Karl Barth1
2.1. Introduction to Pannenberg's Thought
Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928 - ) is one of the preeminent German Lutheran
theologians of the Twentieth Century. He is now retired, though continuing to write and
engage with contemporary issues. A brief introduction to his thought will serve to illuminate
his specific approach to the anthropological theme. After analyzing his theology for its
support of the thesis of critical anthropocentrism, a critique of aspects that might endanger
the thesis will be undertaken.
Pannenberg's basic position is that all truth is one. All components of truth, whether
theological, historical, philosophical, or scientific, must ultimately be coherent with each
other, or else they are rendered self-negating. These components must also correspond to
reality - they must be shown to be valid in the actual world. Thus coherence and
correspondence to reality are Pannenberg's tests of truth.2 He believes the truth of all reality
comes from God, and that this truth is testable. Theological truth in particular is testable
using the method of historical research, rather than the scientific method of theory,
experiment and observation. Because of its testability, he believes the Christian
understanding of truth can show itself to be true in the context ofmodem thought.3 He
insists that theology must be able to listen to and synthesize the insights gained by the
secular sciences in nature, history and life: truth from those realms must ultimately be
coherent with theological truth. Christian theology must have a 'sound claim to universal
validity' - that is, be true for everyone, everywhere - if it is to be credible at all.4 In keeping
with such universal claims, Pannenberg maintains that the idea of God, if true, must provide
1 Karl Barth, The Humanity ofGod (London: Collins, 1961), 49-50
2 Wolfhart Pannenberg, An Introduction to Systematic Theology (TTC, 1991), 8.
3 Cornelius A. Buller, The Unity ofNature and History in Pannenberg's Theology (Lanham, MD:
Littlefield Adams, 1996), 48.
4 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective (TTC, 1985), 15, 18.
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the 'unity of all reality'.5 Human truth claims are provisional, and subject to revision short
of their ultimate confirmation at the end of time, so that an open and critical approach is
essential.
According to Pannenberg, history is the main medium of God's revelation to
humanity. The truths of Christian faith are in the historical events ofGod's interaction with
the world, particularly in Israel, and focused and consummated in the life, death, and
resurrection of Jesus Christ, the final revelation ofGod, and the center of Pannenberg's
theology. He contends that the history of Jesus has to be real history, 'not in its details, but
in its core,' ifChristian faith is to be regarded as valid.6 The core event of that history is the
resurrection, which verifies him as God's final revelation.7 It is Christianity's central truth.
It is so important that it even establishes for humanity the reality ofGod the Father:
[It is as] constitutive for the Godhead of the Father, as it is for the divine Sonship of
Jesus. Without Jesus being raised from the dead, the one whom Jesus announced as
his father would not be God.8
Only in light of Jesus' actual resurrection are his divinity verified and the Christological
doctrines of the incarnation and God's fulfilled revelation in him disclosed and made
credible.9
Since history is the domain ofGod's self-revelation to humanity, Pannenberg
proposes that the events of history recorded in Scripture cannot be regarded simply as stories
about spiritual or moral truths whose facticity [s/c] is secondary. They must be seen as
intending to capture the real historical events of God's actions to and for the cosmos, the
world, and humanity, in the creation, the history of Israel, and especially the history of Jesus
ofNazareth.10 The remembrance of these may have been passed on in a flawed manner,
subject to historical and critical investigation, but the record nevertheless points to real
history. Pannenberg maintains that divine revelation is historically testable, in sharp contrast
to 'fideistic' theologians such as Barth, Brunner, or Bultmann. In the previous generation,
these had posited a kind of salvation history that is accessible only through faith, either
separate from or unrelated to the secular history accessible to all.11 Pannenberg insists that
5
Stanley J. Grenz, Reason for Hope: The Systematic Theology ofWolfhart Pannenberg (OUP, 1990),
8.
6
Pannenberg, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 5.
7
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol. 1 (TTC, 1991), 213.
8
Pannenberg, 'Der Gott der Geschichte, der trinitarische Gott und die Wahrheit der Geschichte',
Kerygma undDogma 23 (1977), 87 (my translation).
9 Allan D. Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973), 71, 77-78.
10
Pannenberg, Jesus — God andMan (London: SCM, 1968), 99.
11
Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg, 43, 44; Buller, UNHP, 47; Pannenberg, 'Response to my
American Friends', in Carl E. Braaten & Philip Clayton, eds., The Theology ofWolfhart Pannenberg:
Twelve American Critiques (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988), 316.
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revelation history is real history, universally accessible and testable using the critical
methods of the historian. Hence, historical-critical study of the scripture is vital to
discovering the real events of revelation that took place in the human history they record or
attempt to remember: those human events were the revelation.12
The resurrection is verified by 'the historical evidence yielded by a rigorously
critical use of the documents,' and could only be dismissed by someone who has decided on
a priori grounds that a resurrection is inherently impossible.13 This event has validity in both
the real world of facts — the supposedly hard 'what' of the scientist - and what has
sometimes been characterized as the 'subjective' world of faith. It destroys the separating
prejudice that has mistakenly isolated the theologian in the soft realm of values, beliefs and
interpretation, and provides the objective grounds for Christian faith. In support of his
position, Pannenberg sites what he believes are the evidences and proofs for the resurrection
that stand up to rigorous historical-critical scrutiny. The witnesses of the event, recorded by
the gospels, and listed by Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:3ffprovide the weightiest testimony. The
empty tomb is another evidence, although less weighty than the eyewitnesses. The post-
resurrection appearances of the risen Lord and the change in the disciple's character from a
depressed state following the crucifixion, to a confident and joyful state after seeing the risen
Lord, are otherwise inexplicable. Since it is difficult to categorize the resurrection using
ordinary language because it belongs to the new creation, Pannenberg describes it with
metaphorical or spiritual language. He does not mean by this that the event is untrue,
ghostly, or simply a matter of faith. Neither vision, nor physical body, nor any other this-
worldly description is adequate to capture its meaning, because words are insufficient to
12
Pannenberg modifies the historical-critical method to allow supernatural events. He inverts its
'principle of analogy', which defines the boundary of past experience by analogy with present
experience, excluding miraculous events a priori. Pannenberg insists that since present experience
often contains unique and particular events, by analogy, the historical study of the past must be open
to the presence of the unique and particular in any part of human history. To hold otherwise conflicts
'with the nonexchangeable individuality and contingency of individual events'. Nature need not be
violated during the occurrence ofmiracles, because contrary to the Enlightenment belief in a closed,
mechanistic cosmos, Nature in contemporary understanding is elastic, open, and contingent. Miracles
can happen as unusual cases within the bounds of as-yet-unknown and provisional natural laws. The
historian, not the scientist, must determine the truth of historical events. The historicity of the
resurrection is thus intelligible in the contemporary context. William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1994), 168; David Holwerda, 'Faith, Reason, and the Resurrection in the
Theology ofWolfhart Pannenberg', in Faith andRationality, 283-84. Pannenberg, BQT\, 42-47;
JGM, 98; 'Resurrection: the Ultimate Hope', in Kenneth Tanner & Christopher A. Hall, eds., Ancient
and Postmodern Christianity: Paleo-Orthodoxy in the 21s' Century: Essays in Honor of Thomas C.
Oden (IVP, 2002), 259; 'The Concept ofMiracle', Zygon 37 (2002), 762.
13
Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg, 75-76. He insists we must reject the assumption that 'the dead do
not rise'.
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describe this cosmically crucial yet next - worldly event.14
Pannenberg maintains that fact and interpretation are inseparable, and believes the
proper interpretation of historical events is objectively available to all, given sufficient
information and research into events. The resurrection's occurrence within the apocalyptic
milieu of inter-Testamental Judaism thus forms part of its interpretation. With the
resurrection, the special character ofGod's revelation in Israel and finally in Jesus is
revealed and verified. It is contained in the historical events themselves, 'not in the attitude
or inspiration with which one confronts them.'15 'Revelation as history' is therefore a key
motif for Pannenberg.16 Jesus ofNazareth is revealed by the resurrection as the incarnate
Word of God active in history, the ultimate historical revelation of God. The resurrection is
an actual event in history, subject to investigation like any other historical event. There are
enough witnesses and evidences to support its facticity that, though doubt is possible,
Pannenberg believes we are rationally justified in accepting its truthfulness, and therefore
also justified in putting our faith in the risen Lord Jesus. This is the heart of his theology.17
He desires to reintroduce critical rationalism into theological thinking, to replace what he
perceives as the irrational subjectivity of faith divorced from facts, with reason, critical
inquiry, and historical investigation. This corrects the modem privatization and
marginalization of Christian theology that comes from the fideist dichotomy between fact
and faith.18
Pannenberg believes that all events in Jesus' life should in principle be open to the
same historical and critical investigation given to other non-religious historical events.
'Lesser' events such as the virgin birth are regarded as peripheral and dispensable non-core
details, secondary because everything is secondary in light of the resurrection.19 He is not
convinced the evidence requires us to accept the facticity of these secondary events, nor that
they are crucial for verifying the truth ofChrist as God's revelation in the same way that is
true of the resurrection. He views the Scriptures as participatory in witness of God's
historical acts, while subjecting them in their entirety to historical-critical research. For
instance, he believes the Genesis creation account is in mythological and archaic language
with some now outdated scientific features20, while acknowledging the truthfulness -
14
Pannenberg, JGM, 75. For some objections to Pannenberg's proof of the resurrection, see Grenz,
'The Appraisal ofPannenberg: A Survey of the Literature', in TWP, 22-23.
15
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16 Also the title of his book: Revelation as History, Pannenberg, ed. (S&W, 1969).
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20 Ibid. 116f. For example, Pannenberg regards some features in the account as scientifically obsolete:
the creation of fixed creature types, the separation ofwaters from the firmament, or the stars' origin
21
particularly the historical truthfulness - of the core theological ideas. Those core truths are
that God is 'the normative and abiding basis of creaturely reality' - he is responsible for the
creation of the world, humanity is made in God's image, and humanity is estranged from
God.21 Pannenberg is willing to accept evolutionary processes as the scientific explanation
for life22, even for human life, while affirming the theological truth that God is the creator
and sustainer of the cosmos.23 Evolutionary causation does not ultimately guide the cosmos
to its fulfillment, but rather the eschatological rule ofGod. This rule of God guides all
history from and to its end.24
Truth in general and theological truth in particular has this eschatological character:
history will only be completely understandable at its fulfillment and end. God's revelatory
truths in the life of Jesus Christ are to be confirmed at his return, though his resurrection is a
down payment on that confirmation. The end of history guarantees its final verification.
Thus Pannenberg holds that the anticipatory expectation of the end of history with the final
Judgment, when all the dead will be raised, is an essential part of Christianity. Likewise, the
historicity of the resurrection and its promise for redeemed humanity are of central
importance. Apart from this promise, the event of Jesus as God's ultimate revelation
remains incomprehensible.25 Pannenberg supposes this eschatological understanding in
Christianity's truth claims demonstrates a realization of the disputability of religious truth
claims in general, and acknowledges the need for proof of those claims, which requires the
attempt to verify them in the actual world.26 Because the medium of this verification is
history, its final seal of authenticity will come at the end of history. Truth is contingent upon
history, open-ended in the sense that the final meaning of reality is contestable and
on the forth day. These were consistent at the time of their writing with the theological milieu of
ancient cosmology to which they were addressed, but are now obsolete (e.g., the creation of stars on
day four was aimed at countering the obsolete Babylonian tendency to divinize the stars, by placing
their creation nearer the beginning).
21 Ibid. 34.
22
Pannenberg appears to follow Augustine on God's Sabbath rest, supposing it means an end to the
creation ofnew creature types rather than a cessation from labor (ST2, 36). Why he bothers to deal
with the Sabbath as a 'proto-scientific' description is unclear, since he rejects the story's claim to be
real history. See A TP, 57.
23 The Genesis creation accounts need not be in complete enmity with evolutionary theory. Welker
points to the fecundity of the created order called forth by the word of God: the land and sea produce
living creatures at God's command (Gen. 1:11-12, 20-21, 24). Genesis does not say how the land or
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provisional until the end of history.27 Thus Pannenberg argues for the 'ontological priority
of the future' in disclosing the fullness of truth.28 Truth encompasses facts and meaning,
explanation and evaluation, the 'what' and the 'why' of understanding.
Throughout much of his career, Pannenberg has been concerned to bring theology
and science into constructive dialogue with each other, based on his belief in the unity of
truth. He rejects the dualism that exists between nature and history in modern thought, as
evidenced in the problematic discussion between the natural sciences and the historical
sciences: he believes the Christian conception of creation decisively unifies them.29 He
rejects the Greek notion that truth is something to be discovered behind and transcending the
events of history in unchanging essences and constants. All truth is essentially historical in
its character. Even the truths of nature have about them a contingency that binds them to
history (see §2.7). While he does not believe scientific data must prove the existence of
God, or believe God's activity will necessarily be evident scientifically, he is willing to
admit God's acts may be open to scientific confirmation.
Since God is only indirectly detected in history30, theological and scientific
statements are essentially made on 'different methodological levels'.31 He is 'dubious about
turning to scientific data, instead of religious experience, tradition, and scripture, for primary
theological evidence for God.'32 His larger agenda is to show that scientific and theological
truths are coherent with each other: 'there need be no rivalry between scientific and
theological statements.'33 He wants to show that Christian theology has a significant
contribution to make to a holistic understanding of reality, even for the modern scientist.
That contribution is real knowledge, though perhaps of philosophical or metaphysical rather
than physical kind.34 A universal understanding requires theology, and cannot be achieved
solely with the natural sciences.35 §2.6 will take a closer look at his engagement with
science as it bears on the anthropocentric focus, in such issues as the 'anthropic principle',
the possibility of extra-terrestrials, and the significance of human rationality.
27 Ibid. 14. 'Eschatology' is the theological study of the end of all things, the end of history.
28
Buller, UNHP, 66.
29 Ibid. 48. When the laws ofnature are given ultimate truth status, their intelligibility is unexplained.
The Christian concept of creation provides them a rational metaphysical foundation. See §2.4, and
chapter 7.
30
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To summarize, Pannenberg maintains that revelation is God's action in history.
Truth is fundamentally historical in character, and is now provisional and contestable. All its
dimensions, whether theological, scientific, philosophical, or otherwise, must ultimately be
coherent with each other, for truth is a unified entity. Truth can only be understood in its
entirety, and its provisional and contestable nature disappeared into certainty, at the end of
the historical process. The man Jesus ofNazareth is the ultimate manifestation ofGod's
historical action and therefore the ultimate word of God. His truth-claims, including his
authority and divinity as incarnate Son, are verified by his resurrection. That event verifies
not only Christ's own history and person, but also 'every event of history.'36 This is because
Christ's resurrection is the breaking in now of the end of history, from whence history's
meaning is finally and completely verified. The confirmation of incontestable Truth at the
end of history is the eschaton, when the kingdoms of the world become God's kingdom, and
the specific resurrection of Christ becomes the general resurrection of all.
Pannenberg's theory of theological tmth may thus be described as Christocentric,
critically historical, eschatological, and requiring coherence with other branches of human
truth. This introduction to his thought has been necessarily brief and preliminary. It is
hoped, however, that this gives sufficient background for understanding aspects of his
theology relevant to this thesis.
2.2 Incarnational Anthropocentrism
Is it reasonable to suppose that humans are the 'goal of creation,' the final aim of all
God has done in creating the cosmos? Pannenberg believes both the Old Testament creation
stories and the incarnation imply this. The incarnation reveals that humanity can be called
the goal of creation only because in it, 'or more precisely in Jesus ofNazareth,' the
fellowship of the Creator with his creatures is fully realized, as the Son of God becomes a
human being. From this perspective, the history of the entire cosmos is 'a prehistory to the
coming of humanity.'37
Pannenberg speaks extensively on humanity's place in the universe in his
Anthropology in Theological Perspective (Eng: 1985) and in Systematic Theology, Vol. 2
(Eng: 1994). His position is rooted in his reflections on the incarnation:
The growing anthropocentrism that has marked the development of Christian
theology has [had a] genuinely theological cause: the fact that Christian theology is a
36




response to the human questions of salvation. The foundation for a concentration on
the human person was already laid in the early Christian faith in the incarnation of
God.38
He does not suppose that salvation is just about humanity. But humanity does occupy a
primary role in the salvation of the cosmos. He addresses the question ofwhether humanity
could be the goal of the creation directly, wrestling with both theological and scientific
issues related to the subject. The incarnation is the strongest theological evidence for a
human-entered creation. The goal of creation, according to Christian Theology, is the
sharing of creatures in the divine Trinitarian fellowship. This is seen plainly, actualized and
fulfilled in the incarnation in Jesus ofNazareth of the divine Logos. The goal of the
incarnation is that all creation might be reconciled to God through the Son. This is achieved
in and through humanity, though it will not be completed until the end of history.39
Cornelius Bullcr notes that for Pannenberg, just as there is a unity between the
natural and theological sciences, so salvation and natural history are unified.40 Salvation
history and actual natural and human history coincide. It is not that one describes mythology
(a story of symbolic rather than historical truth), and the other historical reality (such as is
accessible to the secular historian). They are one and the same. A secularized history is
therefore one-dimensional, blind to the reality of God at work in salvation history.
The Son ofGod is central to the entire creation in Pannenberg's unified vision of
nature and history. While acknowledging that the Christian church has always credited God
the Father as the Creator, he believes, also with the broad sweep of Christian tradition, that
creation has always been mediated through the Son. Christoph Schwobel sees here
Pannenberg's development ofHegel's insight that the Son is the principle of otherness or
difference in the Trinity, although Pannenberg rejects the logical necessity of God's action.41
The Son's origin in and then distinction from God the Father provide the ground for all that
is distinct from God, including the origin and existence of all creaturely reality. Further, the
Son's relation to the Father is the model for the intention of all creaturely being for
fellowship with God. In the human incarnation, Jesus' recognition of the Father as God in
distinction from himself gives validity to 'the independent existence of other creatures
alongside himself.'42 When the Son surrenders his participation in the non-incarnate unity
shared within the Trinity, and takes on creaturely form in the man Jesus, in whom his self-
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of creaturely existence from God himself. "The Son in his self-differentiating love for the
Father is in eternity both one with the Father and the source of finite reality."43 He is thus
both the origin of the self-distinction of creation from Creator, and the link between them.
Ifnot for the continued existence of this self-distinction of Son from Father in Jesus
ofNazareth, there would be no eternal basis for the continuation of the creaturely world.
"Creaturely reality would.. .be no more than the emergence and extinction of a tiny light in
God's eternity." Hence, the preservation of the cosmos is especially related to the Son. It
maintains its continued existence only by participation in God. The incarnation brings the
eternal life ofGod down into the otherwise finite and doomed life of the created cosmos, and
allows it to share in eternity. It is through the Spirit that this life is communicated, but the
Spirit comes to the world only through the Son. Since the lasting self-distinction of
creaturely reality from God, accompanied by fellowship with God, is finally accomplished in
the incarnation of the Son in the man Jesus, the whole history of creation can be said to
converge upon the incarnation. "Because the Logos who permeates the world of creation
came to full manifestation in this man, all things in heaven and on earth are summed up in
Him (Eph. 1:10)." Thus the Logos is the 'principle of unity' of the created order, and the
incarnation provides the 'integrating center of the world's historical order'.44
Because of the cosmic centrality of the incarnation, creation may be said to find its
fulfillment through the history of the cosmos, as it is a history ofpreparation for the
incarnation. This is so from the laying of the cosmos' physical foundations, to the
development of all life from simplest to most complex, to the 'full manifestation of the
divine likeness in humanity'.45 In this light it is impossible to see the incarnation as some
kind of afterthought of God's, as if it were a reaction to Adam's sin, an 'ornamental
addition,'46 or some kind of 'external appendix' to the created order. Instead, it must be
viewed as ' the crown' (Pannenberg's own phrase) ofGod's created world order from the
very beginning, the supreme concrete manifestation of 'the active presence of the Logos in
creation. '47 As will be apparent in chapter 4, Pannenberg is here following the Orthodox
tradition. All of nature, all of the cosmos, have been engaged in a unified process, first in
inorganic physical forms, then in the evolution of life, leading up to and centering upon the
emergence ofhuman history. Buller summarizes Pannenberg's position: the creation of
reality is the process 'of realizing the incarnation of the image of God, proleptically realized
43 Buller, UNHP, 45. He is the Logos ofGod, the 'Author of life'. John 1:3-4; Acts 3:15.
44
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in the life and destiny of Jesus'.48 Humanity is not a separate feature independent of this
unified cosmic process, but of one piece with it, so that the meaning of human history is
inseparable and indeterminable apart from its place in the rest of creation.
So it may be said that creation finds its fulfillment in humanity, more precisely in the
incarnation of God in the human being Jesus. The universal process of history can only be
'understood in anthropocentric terms.'49 There is no
history of nature by itself apart from the human being; rather, it is a history of nature
directed to the human being. The fact that the connection of the sequence of forms
of the world process is demonstrated as a historical connection only from its end,
from the human being backward, would correspond only to the manner in which
historical connections as such can be constituted, that is, from the end.50
As new events illuminate earlier relationships and events, the arrival of humanity on the
stage of cosmic history, and then the arrival and completed mission of Jesus ofNazareth on
the stage of human history, reveal the unified whole history of nature directed to this human
end. Colin E. Gunton agrees that the background scriptures of Genesis 1-3 and Romans 8
demonstrate that the natural realm has been ordered for or to the human race. "Whether or
not this is 'anthropocentric' and ecologically incorrect, and whether indeed that matters, it
seems to me the clear message of scripture."51 The ontological pnority of the future gives
coherence and meaning to the entire past ofnature's history, as it culminates in humanity,
and in a certain sense comes to its end in the incarnation and the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
To be sure, the eschatological end of all history has not yet come - an end that shall be
fulfillment for the whole of creation, not just humanity. But that eschatological end has
already been exposed for what it is in Jesus' resurrection, which is the proleptic end of
history already revealed. Paul M. Van Buren wonders if this marginalizes history
subsequent to the resurrection.52 But rather than causing history to fade, the resurrection
imparts to history as a whole its abiding significance, as the eschatological 'end breaking in'.
Humanity is neither the unity of history, nor its sole focus: the nature and unity of history are
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2.3. The Imago Dei, Human Uniqueness & Dominion
The imago dei developed in Genesis 1:26ff reveals, according to Pannenberg,
something ofhumanity's cosmic significance. According to the Scripture, 'Then God said,
"Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over
all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth'"
(Gen. 1:26). The command is embellished further: 'God blessed them, and God said to
them, "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the
fish.. .the birds.. .and over every living thing that moves upon the earth'" (1:28). The
psalmist echoes the idea: "You have given them [(human beings)] dominion over the works
of your hands; you have put all things under their feet, all sheep and oxen, and also the
beasts of the field..." (Psalm 8:6-7). Pannenberg claims the capacity for dominion and
mastery of nature is particularly human, a unique feature of the imago dei. Though now
deformed and mired in sin, this capacity prepares humanity for its cosmic role.
2.3.1. Human uniqueness and mastery ofnature
Dominion is evident, according to Pannenberg, in humanity's ability to name things
external to themselves. Such naming, first described in Genesis 2:19-20, is part and parcel
of human mastery of nature. Adam names the animals and finds in them no suitable partner
for himself. Pannenberg suggests this human ordering and rational capacity is part of the
imago dei. There is clearly no other creature like the human: they are 'set-apart' from the
rest of the created order. This locates humans in some measure on the side of God. Humans
reach beyond the immediate horizon to which the other creatures are confined, and grasp the
widest possible 'horizon ofmeaning': this is 'exocentric self-transcendence'. They embrace
all finite reality in their quest for meaning, and desire to reach beyond it towards the infinite.
This process of defining the individuality of things has become the basis for all
human mastery of nature. Precisely because human beings reach beyond the given,
and therefore ultimately because human exocentricity is characterized by an impulse,
inconceivable except in religious terms, to the unconditioned do they have the ability
to rule over the objects of their natural world.54
Human rule over nature is coherent only in a religion that sharply contrasts the divine reality
with the reality of the world, not confusing God with the forces of nature. By placing




Exocentric self-transcendence is uniquely human. Humans are open to and beyond
the world (Weltoffenheit), to the transcendent, the contingent, to what is novel in and beyond
the world.55 Animals seem to be aware of and respond only to their immediate environment,
generally lacking the cognitive capacities to symbolically envision the future. Human beings
live in a dynamic that encompasses the whole world, and are fundamentally open to the
possibilities of the future: they can hope for, long for and strive for that which is beyond
experience.36 Francisco J. Ayala notes that humanity's unique capacity for language and
symbolic thinking enable this openness to the future. Without symbolic and representational
reasoning, alternate potential future paths and true freedom of choice are impossible.57
Pannenberg suggests 'it is because man, in distinction from the beasts, has an open world
that the question of God arises for him. The given world can never satisfy him'.58 Robert
Jenson also identifies this as uniquely human, describing Homo sapiens as the first hominids
who 'were embodied' and open towards God and one another: we are 'the praying animal',
constituted corporately from the beginning with the 'traces of the Trinity' in our capacity for
'self-transcendence'.59 Van Huyssteen suggests that in light of modern oppression and abuse
of persons, the concept of imago dei as embodied relationality must fully incorporate the
justice theme in its core to be legitimate. With that correction, embodied, exocentric
relationality can be fairly acknowledged as uniquely human.60
Some challenge this claim to human uniqueness in the animal kingdom. This theme
will be addressed systematically in chapter 6, but for now, it is sufficient to note that
Pannenberg, writing during the upswing of hope in primate cognitive research prior to the
1990s, had already identified the uniqueness of human linguistic capacity at which that
primate research has reluctantly arrived.61 Humans are uniquely capable of responding to
and fulfilling a call to exercise dominion. Linguistic capacity seems to be a foundationally
55 Ibid. 69; What is Man? Contemporary Anthropology in Theological Perspective (Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1970), 3ff; Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologic der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie
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unique feature of the imago dei, supporting a suite of features that together comprise the
totality of human uniqueness. This symbolic reasoning capacity is, according to Ayala, at
the heart of humanity's unique capacity for moral choice and responsibility.62 As will be
apparent in §2.5. The imago dei in Canonical perspective, this moral capacity figures
prominently in the New Testament presentation of the imago dei. Van Huyssteen concludes
that the modem sense of human uniqueness must acknowledge self-consciousness, moral
responsibility, and yearning or capacity for religious fulfillment.63 Ayala points to religious
belief and ethical behavior, along with 'art, science, technology, and sociopolitical
institutions' as distinctly human, 'epigenetic outcomes ofhumankind's enhanced
intelligence'.64 Humanity's relational exocentricity contributes to its unique role on the
earth, and may suggest a unique role in the cosmos.
2.3.2. Dominion as stewardship
The connection between the image of God and the dominion ofhumanity over the
earth has been challenged on ecological grounds.65 Typical objections include the apparent
excuse this offers for the human rape of nature, and the patriarchal and imperialistic
tendencies it appears to legitimate in the human treatment of the non-human world.66
Gibellini and Page blame the problem in part on Christian theology's inclination to
desacralize the world67, although Hall responds by reminding us that 'refusal to consider the
world divine does not necessitate ignoring or rejecting its sacredness'.68 Most famously,
White attempted to show that the biblical concept of dominion has been a source of the
current ecological crisis by giving to humanity permission to have a domineering and
enslaving grasp of nature.69
Jacqui A. Stewart accuses Pannenberg ofhaving small regard for ecological
concerns, or for the place of animals and non-human creatures in his systematic theology.
She claims that 'the natural world appears to have little value in itself for Pannenberg, and he
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while Pannenberg's writings are not substantial on the ecological theme, he has given some
attention to the issues raised, and his position is clearly delineated in light of the life of
Christ. Buller suggests Pannenberg's theology addresses the ecological crisis because it is
aimed at countering the destructive modem dualistic splitting of nature and spirit.71 Nature is
approached with a reductionistic and abusive attitude because spirit has been isolated and
abstracted from nature. Pannenberg explicitly refutes White's critique by pointing out that it
is precisely in the abandonment of worship of, and submission to, God that the command of
dominion has been perverted into tyrannical domination. "Only the emancipation of the
modern West from commitment to the God of the Bible has replaced the thought that we are
God's stewards in our rule over his creation by the idea that we have a right to unrestricted
exploitation of nature. It is illegitimate, then, to make the biblical picture of humanity
responsible for the unrestricted exploitation of the earth by humanity today."72 Fergus Ken-
similarly notices the deeply anti-Christian causes of the environmental crisis: with the
decline of the Christian worldview, 'nature is no longer manifestly ordered and sacred.. .we
no longer regard our natural environment with reverence, we treat it as raw material for
technological exploitation.'73 It is not 'dominion' in and of itself that must be seen as
ecologically or morally insensitive and evil, but rather the perversion that it has undergone in
fallen and rebellious humanity. As van Huyssteen notes, dominion has degraded into
oppression in both the human and non-human realms.74
In light of the Christological character of human destiny, the human calling to
dominion as part of the imago dei can only be understood as it has been realized in Jesus
Christ. Plis rule consists 'in reconciling to God what had been separated from God.' His
ministry is specifically directed to humanity, and not the non-human world. "Nevertheless
we have to think about the cosmological dimension of his rule along the same line. The
realization of the image of God in Jesus Christ calls for responsible stewardship ofman in
the creation...."75 The servant life of Jesus illuminates and typifies the true nature of
dominion as he surrenders himself in the care of his creatures. Dominion means acceptance
of duty and responsibility in a sphere beyond one's own self-interest, rather than
'unscrupulous exploitation and oppression' in rule over another sphere, purely for selfish,
self-interested reasons.76 As given by God, human power over nature implies responsibility
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Pannenberg calls attention to John Cobb's idea ofChristian responsibility in the
environment as faith that needs to 'substitute a vision of a healthy biotic pyramid with man
as its apex for the absoluteness ofman'. Cobb's vision emphasizes human continuity with
the biosphere in contrast to a position of absolute autonomy and tyranny. While Pannenberg
points out the need to beware of obscuring the difference between the divine and nature in
such responsibility, he notes that the advantage of Cobb's perspective is that it reminds us of
the actual nature of the divine commission to be master in Genesis 1-2. Human
representative rule on behalfof the creator is modeled after God's creative will.78 Hall
agrees that we are neither completely above nor completely within nature; our nature and
vocation demand limits to mastery yet also indicate 'special responsibility' for nature.79 The
command of dominion is not an excuse for the wholesale and wanton abuse of nature, nor
have humans been given 'carte blanche for the selfish pillage and exploitation' of the
nonhuman realm. Rather, dominion is a call to the opposite: nature's care and protection,
God's appointment of his image to exercise responsibility for the preservation of creation.80
2.3.3. Humanity as God's representative in the world
This balanced understanding of dominion reveals an important characteristic of what
it means to be human. Humanity is not just made in the image ofGod, and then given a job
to do: "rule over the .. .earth." Rather, humanity is made in the image ofGod, and as such it
represents God in the creation. E. Frank Tupper notes this feature in Pannenberg: human
beings are to mediate the rule of God to the world.81 Gunton agrees that humanity represents
and mediates the rule ofGod to the rest of creation: this is their vocation in the command of
dominion.82 The Old Testament teaches, according to Pannenberg, that 'within the entire
creation, man represents the sovereignty of God over against the other creatures of the
earth'.83 Only as the image ofGod is humanity able to represent God in the creation. This
nuance is illuminated by the preposition 'in' from Genesis 1:26: "in our image, in our
77
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likeness". The preposition 3 (Hebrew)84 or koct ' (Septuagint)85 may be translated as
'according to' or 'corresponding to.'86 Moltmann's translation is helpful: "Let us make
human beings as our image, as our very form" (emphasis added).87 To be in the image of
God is to be his image on the earth: to represent or correspond to God, to display his glory
on the earth. Moltmann's insight is worth noting. "As his image, human beings represent
God on earth; as his similitude, they reflect him... To be an image of something always
means letting that something appear, and revealing it."88 Claus Westermann concludes the
'image' in Genesis 1:26 means the 'concrete representation'.89 He insists that Genesis
emphasizes the uniqueness ofGod in contrast to his non-divine created universe. Humanity
created in God's image is the unique expression of the unique God. This special emphasis
enables us to understand 'how this history leads ultimately to God becoming human. '90
Joseph Ratzinger proposes a similar idea: 'in the human being God enters into his creation.'
For humanity to be imago dei means that it images and represents God to the world. This is
not to impute incarnational status to general humanity, but rather to suppose that in
humanity, God has a fitting ambassador for himself to his creation .91
Pannenberg's position on dominion and representation support this understanding.92
Humans not only aspire to 'that which infinitely transcends the world,' but also are
representative of it.93 Barth suggests that humanity is the place where, in and for all the
cosmos, 'the thoughts of its Creator are disclosed' .94 God has culminated his creative cosmic
work in a creature that will be his image and his representative in and to the cosmos. This is
what it means theologically to be human.95 Westermann insists that the image of God 'does
not consist in any particular detail of the person but describes the human being as a whole
without limiting itself to anything taken in isolation'.96 This holistic theological approach
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encompasses human spirituality, relational capacity, rationality, creativity, moral freedom
and freedom ofwill, among other things. Cosmic significance is found in all of these put
together, because humanity is the unified platform that is 'personhood' come into being in
the cosmos, the image of God's personhood reflected in and into the universe. Human
cosmic significance is entailed in its cosmic representation of God.
2.4. Human and Cosmic Destiny in light of the Incarnation
Human cosmic status as the image ofGod must be qualified. The fullness of the
imago dei is lost, marred, or never fully realized because of the fall. God's solution is the
incarnation: it not only redeems humanity but also demonstrates their cosmic importance.
Jesus Christ has come as the complete image of God, the last vestiges of that image's
fallenness redeemed in his resurrection. Furthermore, he comes as 'the firstborn within a
large family', the firstborn among many children ofGod (Romans 8:29). He reveals what it
means to be truly human. His perfected humanity is to be communicated and shared by the
humanity he has redeemed, 'the new humanity.'97 Only through communion with him does
humanity achieve its true destiny.98 Humanity obtains the fullness of the image of God when
it is in Christ: "Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we will also bear the
image of the man of heaven" (1 Cor. 15:49). This is not only significant for the earth; the
whole ofcreation 'waits with eager longing' (Romans 8:19) for the sons ofGod to be
revealed. Christ is the cosmic redeemer, not merely the savior of a small planet (see
§3.4.3.1. Christ as Cosmic Redeemer). His resurrection 'is the forerunner both present and
to come, of the fulfillment of all creation with and in God'.99
Being created as the imago dei prepares humanity for a unique and vital role in the
cosmos. First, this is the creature prepared for and with the potentiality to receive the
incarnation. To be human is to be the vehicle wherein God may become one with his
creation. No other creature, angel, or sphere is constituted as the form of God within his
creation. Thus humanity is of central significance for the whole of the cosmos, because only
it is the image ofGod wherein God can decisively incarnate himself. Further, humanity in
Christ is of highest significance, because the cosmos cannot be fulfilled except in and
through redeemed humanity. Barth also links the imago dei and the incarnation to an exalted








Christ by the creation of humanity in the image of God. Humanity was created as a being
capable of real partnership with God even in its non-deity. Human beings are 'capable of
action and responsibility in relation to Him; to which His own divine form of life is not alien;
which in a creaturely repetition, as a copy and imitation, can be a bearer of this form of life.
Man was created as this being'.100 Thus humanity is a repetition, copy and reflection of the
life of God in the created realm, God's counterpart in the cosmos. It is because humanity is
so imaged and called by the grace ofGod that it is capable of receiving the incarnation of the
Son of God, ofGod himself. According to Pannenberg, this is made possible because
'openness to God is the real meaning of the fundamental structure of being human, which is
designated as openness to the world in contemporary anthropology, although this designation
means an openness beyond the momentary horizon of the world'.101 Hence the definition of
humanity as imago dei, verified by the incarnation, guarantees an exalted and vital cosmic
role. The incarnation confirms and guarantees humanity's cosmic importance by fulfilling
the cosmos' destiny.
2.4.1. Humanity as creation 's representative to God
Humanity represents God in the cosmos, but it also represents the creature and the
cosmos to God. Pannenberg insists that the conviction that creation culminates in humanity
can only be held as a result of the biblical insight that humanity is destined to fellowship
with the Author of creation. This destiny is a fellowship meant for all creatures, but only
realized and mediated through humanity, which is thus distinguished from all other
creatures.102 Similarly, Thomas F. Torrance maintains that humanity is 'the focal point in the
interrelations between God and the universe'.103 Ray S. Anderson describes this distinction
as 'a spiritual orientation to and personal relation with God as Creator'.104 Humans alone
have such an orientation between the creation and Creator. Just because humanity is most
able to consciously acknowledge God does not mean that they are separate from the rest of
the created order; they can best represent the cosmos because they are part of the creation.
Buller points out that as the representative of the rest of creation, humanity has the unique
role of acknowledging both the difference from and dependence on God of creaturely
existence.105 It represents the independence of creaturely existence from God, as well as





103 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (OUP, 1981), 129.
104
Ray S. Anderson, 'On Being Human: The Spiritual Saga of a Creaturely Soul', in WHS, 180.
105 Buller, UNHP, 48.
35
being able to bring to full expression the 'creaturely recognition ofGod as God.'
Fellowship and relationship with God are realized only in light of the incarnation.
Human beings discover who they were meant to be in relationship to God through the
incarnate Son. He validates the claim that the creation's relationship to the Creator 'finds its
supreme and final realization in humanity', because only in humanity is intimate fellowship
with God realized and fulfilled. This human participation in incarnate relationship with God
can be legitimately regarded as ultimate, because no other form of relationship to God can
transcend the relationships between the persons of the Trinity. So Pannenberg says,
As the eternal God took form in man, and through him made acceptance as children
of God accessible to all other men and women, the relation of the creature to the
Creator has found in principle the highest fulfillment that we can possibly
106
imagine.
The creation has no self-contained powers of persistence apart from the Son's
mediation of the love of God in the Spirit. Neither does human existence attain to the self-
transcendence central to it apart from that mediation.107 The creation finds its fulfillment
only by the full manifestation of the divine likeness of the incarnate Son in humanity.108
Galloway describes this eschatological fulfillment of the eternal essence of humanity as the
disclosure of the glory of God.109 Christ's union with humanity confers upon them both
individually and corporately their destiny of fellowship with God. This fellowship raises
humanity above the natural world, including its concomitant social relationships, and confers
upon each human life a sacred inviolability and 'inalienable dignity'.110 The good creation
of humans as both body and soul, irrevocably joined, yields the 'eternal value of the
individual', in contrast to the view offered by other religions or philosophies in which the
soul or person is detachable from his or her bodily existence.111 Thus the incarnation
illuminates the eternal worth and dignity of every human person founded on the imago dei.
Jesus Christ opens the way for the divine union of fellowship of Creator and
creature. It flows from him, through humanity, to the rest of creation. Scripture makes clear
that the redemption that Christ has accomplished, which will be fully realized at the end of
the age, is not just for humanity. The destiny of the entire creation is at stake. The cosmos is
therefore dependent upon the completion ofhumanity for its own fulfillment. So
Pannenberg says, "All creation waits for the manifestation of divine sonship in the human
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race, for thereby the corruptibility from which all creatures suffer will be vanquished
(Romans 8:19ff)" (emphasis added).112 The entire creation depends upon humanity in this
sense: unless humanity is complete in its eschatological realization as children ofGod,
neither is the cosmos complete. Unless humanity's sonship is fulfilled, the cosmos can but
wait with 'eager longing.' Until humanity is fully redeemed, the rest of creation is
'subjected to futility' (Romans 8:20), groaning and longing in frustration. Though the
thematic scriptural focus is upon Christ as cosmic redeemer, humanity is central to cosmic
redemption.
2.5. The Imago Dei in Canonical Perspective
A deeper look at the scriptural meaning of the imago dei will be helpful here. The
concept is largely an underground or indirect theme in the Old Testament after the opening
chapters ofGenesis, though the dimensions of relational righteousness and holiness are
there. The concept comes into clearer focus in the New Testament in the person and work of
Jesus Christ. The analysis of human dominion and transcendence has already uncovered
some of its features. This section will briefly examine some Old Testament themes related
to the image, and then focus on Jesus Christ and the nature of the community founded upon
him as typifying the image.
2.5.1. The imago dei in the Old Testament
The Old Testament concept of the imago dei has relational dimensions that are both
vertical and horizontal. The creation account of Genesis 1 and 2 portrays the fullness of the
image of God in both these dimensions, neither divisible from the other, each realizable only
in conjunction with the other. The first humans are created male and female. Anderson
notes that only with the joint existence of these complementary forms 'is there a sense of
completeness' of the human being.113 Francis Watson suggests this is primarily a paradigm
for human relationality rather than gender difference as constitutive of the imago dei.U4 He
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maintains that a significant aspect of the image of God lies in the human ability to 'engage in
dialogical communication with one another and with God.'115 However, noting the
complementarity and differences between the sexes need not endanger the concept of the
imago dei. Michael Novak insists that our human sexuality, however imperfectly (because
we violate the will of our Creator by using each other, 'wishing to put self in the place of
God'), models the self-giving communion ofGod. The 'experience of communion between
woman and man, self-giving, in mutuality, and without either's dominance, is more like the
inner life of God than anything else that we encounter in creation'. Novak finds this insight
in the thought of Karol Wojtyla, who insists that 'God is more like the communion of
persons than He is like anything else we know of. That, at least, is the way He has revealed
Himself to us, not only in Scripture and in His Son, but also in the way our embodied selves
are joined in matrimony.'116 The corporate creation of human beings as male and female
indicates this essential fact: the image of God is a relational image, and God himself is a
relational being. Whether or not one sees Trinitarianism in God's self-address in Genesis 1
('Let us make humans in our image'), created human relational and corporate nature
supports such an interpretation.117 Stanley J. Grenz and Derrick Sherwin Bailey both insist
that 'for the Christian, the imago Dei must have a Trinitarian reference.... Man in the image
of God is essentially a 'being-in-relation', and human existence is essentially 'existence-in-
community'.'11
Anderson notes the relational capacity opens up in two directions in humans
expressed by the 'two great commandments': to love God, and to love one's neighbor.119
The vertical relationships of the image are constituted between human beings and God, and
between human beings and the rest of creation as typified by the charge of dominion. The
symbol of the imago dei and of God's relational nature: e.g., the union of humanity and God at the end
of time is depicted as the marriage between Christ and his Church (Eph. 5:32; Rev. 19:7-9).
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horizontal relationships of the image are between themselves: in the initial instance male and
female. The vertical relationship between humanity and the rest of creation is underlined in
the Genesis account by the contrast between the method of creation for humanity and that
used for all other living creatures. The earth, sea, and land bring forth the other creatures at
God's command (Genesis 1:11-12, 20-21, 24-25); God, planning a creature in his own
image, determines to make this particular one, as 'a new and transcendent event.' They are
related to the earth, for they are made of its dust. Yet humans are made directly by God,
rather than springing indirectly from some other feature of creation as the other living
creatures do.120 Further, as Walther Eichrodt points out, humans alone among the creatures
are made alive when God breathes into them the breath of life (Gen. 2:7).121 So Anderson
observes that 'their origination as human creatures is qualitatively marked off from
nonhuman creatures by the endowment of the divine image and the divine inbreathing.'122
Martin Buber unpacks the significance of the image ofGod in terms of an 'I-Thou'
relationship. The 'I-Thou' dialogue between human persons establishes the world of
relation, in contrast to the 'I-It' form that establishes the world of things and experience.
Humans become persons because of a 'You' with whom they relate. God is the source of
personhood, the eternal 'You/Thou' of relationship for the human 'I'.123 Barth holds the
analogy between God and humanity is evident in the 'I and Thou' of God's creative fiat 'Let
us' (Gen. 1:26), and also in the 'confrontation and conjunction ofman and woman'.124 As
Welker puts it, to remove the 'face to face existence of I and Thou., .is tantamount to
removing the divine from God as well as the human from man'.125 Alistair McFadyen notes
the archetypal relationship thus made possible between Adam and Eve. Only in Eve does
Adam find another 'Thou' with whom he can relate as a human 'I'. Without their mutual
belonging to one another, with Eve as an equal 'I', Adam's 'isolation would not be broken.
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He would then have only another animal being and not one for whom he may also become a
Thou. Adam can only say 'I' in the recognition that Eve is a human Thou before him and
therefore an 'I' for herself.126 Human relationships are characterized by this mutual
recognition of each other, by dependence upon and yet independence from one another as
'related but distinct Thou-Is'. God's image in humanity is distorted unless this individual
and communal incompleteness is recognized.127 Further, this relational dimension makes the
ethical paramount, as relationships are essentially constituted by love. Humans are given
freedoms, duties, responsibilities, and limitations in relationship to God, each other, and the
creation that flesh out this ethical dimension.
2.5.2. The imago dei in the New Testament
The New Testament is rich with references to Jesus as the full image of God, and the
church as called to conform to that image. Pannenberg maintains that true humanity that
displays the image of God 'has been fully realized only in Jesus ofNazareth,' who is the
perfect image of God.128 The Old Testament trajectory of meaning for the image is 'brought
to focus in the person of Jesus Christ'.129 Thus of all human beings, only Jesus is fully and
unbrokenly human. His full humanity surpasses even that of his pre-Fall ancestors, since
Christ is in type superior to the first Adam, having humbled himself, as St. Paul and others
(e.g., Athanasius) note, to become one of us.130 His complete and whole humanity is part of
his qualification to manifest the perfect image ofGod in the creation.
The Gospels contain numerous references to Jesus as the image of the Father.
John's gospel emphasizes Christ as the image or representation of God, in such typical
passages as John 12:45 - "Whoever sees me sees him who sent me," or John 14:9 -
"Whoever has seen me has seen the Father." This view pervades much of the New
Testament. Christ is 'the image ofGod' (2 Cor. 4:4). He is the image of the invisible God,
and the firstborn of creation (Col. 1:15). Further, the Church is described as the community
of those being conformed to the image of God. The disciple will be like the teacher (Matt.
10:25). The elect are those who are 'predestined to be conformed' to the image of the Son
(Romans 8:29). 'All who are lead by the Spirit of God are children of God' (Romans 8:14).
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Believers are to put on 'the new self, created according to the likeness ofGod in true
righteousness and holiness' (Eph. 4:24); they are to clothe themselves 'with the new self,
which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator' (Col. 3:10).
The most comprehensive statement of the imago in Christ is found in Col. 1:15ff.
He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; ...all things have
been created through him and for him. He himself is before all things, and in him all
things hold together. He is the head of the body, the church; he is the beginning, the
firstborn from the dead, so that he might come to have first place in everything. For
in him all the fullness ofGod was pleased to dwell, and through him God was
pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by making
peace through the blood of his cross. (1:15-20)
In this passage, the image andfullness ofGod in Christ is not simply a fulfillment of his
humanity, as if in him we have a second human Adam who happens to have luckily escaped
a fall into sin. Rather, this is the Logos of creation of John 1:1, the divine Son of God, the
only-begotten Son of the heavenly Father. Christ is the image of God because he is one
person of the Trinitarian God, perfectly representing to the creation the God who cannot be
seen by humans. The fullness ofGod dwells in him, so that in him, God is physically
present in his creation. As Son ofGod he exercises the full dominion of God over all
creation, heaven and earth: a realization and fulfillment of the familiar Old Testament
concept; the dominion over the earth given to humanity in Genesis is a pale reflection of this
cosmic dominion exercised by the Son. Christ is 'before all things,' present at and an
essential part ofthe creation process, having priority in both time and rank before the rest of
creation.131 The universe was 'created through him', and 'holds together' in him. Though
part of the Godhead, he has appeared in the world as a human being, and so is the image and
essence of God in the domain ofhumanity.
The vertical and horizontal brokenness of humanity's relational nature is only finally
redeemed in the person and work of Christ. As the fullness of the imago dei - God himself
inhabiting his own image in humanity - Jesus brings to human beings a share in God's self.
Jesus' existence in and for the world proclaims that God is Love.
Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love. God's love was
revealed among us in this way: God sent his only Son into the world so that we
might live through him (1 John 4:8-9).
The imago dei is fulfilled in Christ in both vertical and horizontal dimensions. Relationships
are restored: first between God and human beings, then within the human community.
Christ exercises not just earthly, but universal dominion, and redeemed humanity becomes
131 Marcus Barth & Helmut Blanke, Colossians: The Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1994),
200,203,212-213.
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his co-rulers and heirs of the kingdom. They will reign with him (2 Tim. 2:12, Rev. 5:10,
22:5); they will sit as judges even of angels (1 Cor. 6:3). Since the image of God in Christ is
the image of Love, then the restoration of that image in humanity must also include the
restoration of love in them. So the image of God as it is restored and fulfilled in the church
has a particularly relational and moral dimension. The new self, as conformed to the imago
Christi, is the moral opposite of the rebellious old self, justifying van Huyssteen's insistence
on recovering justice into the core of the imago dei.132
In Colossians 3:10, the believer is called to put off that old self:
But now you must get rid of all such things— anger, wrath, malice, slander.... Do not
lie to one another, seeing that you have stripped off the old selfwith its practices and
have clothed yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge
according to the image of its creator. In that renewal there is no longer Greek and
Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but Christ
is all and in all! As God's chosen ones, holy and beloved, clothe yourselves with
compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, and patience.. .Above all, clothe
yourselves with love, which binds everything together in perfect harmony.
(Colossians 3:9-14; emphasis added)
This contrast of opposites between the new and the old self highlights the relational and
moral nature of the image of God. Compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, patience,
forbearance, forgiveness, and love are to replace anger, wrath, malice, slander, abusive
language, and lying. Such human measures of identity and separation as ethnicity (Greek,
Jew, or Scythian), religious commitment (circumcised and uncircumcised), socio-economic
status (barbarian or civilized, slave or free), or even sexual identity (male or female: Gal.
3:28) are to disappear before a unified identity as children ofGod.
The church is the community destined for the fellowship of love 'for which human
beings, made in the image of the triune God, are intended and destined.'133 The Church is
the gathering of those among humanity who are becoming the image of their Creator in
Christ. They are to show forth the loving relational potential that may be realized in Christ.
Those members ofhumanity who are being conformed to his likeness share in his imaging of
God (Col. 3:15). The image has been frustrated and ruined by sin, but now in Jesus Christ,
redeemed humanity is being renewed in this hitherto lost image of God.
This brief study illuminates some prominent features of the imago dei in both Old
and New Testaments, and especially in Jesus Christ and the Church. While the Old
Testament hints at the meaning of the concept in vertical, horizontal, and moral dimensions,
its thematic development occurs in the New Testament, where the person and work of Christ
132




unveil its fullness. According to Stewart, this is the basis of 'Pannenberg's interpretation of
the image as destiny to fellowship with God'. It is found in 'the idea of Jesus Christ as the
image ofGod in which believers share through the spirit (2 Cor. 3:18)'.134 Personhood,
relationality and righteousness, expressed as love of God and neighbor, justice, and
authority, are its hallmarks. It is concrete, bodily, dependent upon human rational and
linguistic capacity (naming, dominion, 'I-Thou' dialogue), and involves both vertical and
horizontal relationships with God, creation, and other persons. Christ is the fullness of the
image, and calls the church to share in it. The imago dei might be summarized as the
manifestation of the character and personhood of God in the cosmos.
2.6. The Sabbath Day as Crown of Creation
Barth disputed somewhat a high position for humanity by claiming that humanity
cannot be regarded as the crown of creation, since this honor belongs to the Sabbath Day.
Others have more recently expressed similar misgivings.135 Claus Westermann maintains
that in the sweep of the entire Scripture, rooted in Genesis 1, the apocalyptic texts do not
give a goal merely for human history, but point to a goal for the whole of the created realm.
This is captured in the idea of the Sabbath, in which God's work does not come to an end
with the creation - or even with the redemption - of humanity, but rather with the
completion or redemption of the whole cosmos.136 According to Barth, "it is only with
reservation that [humanity] can be described as 'the crown of creation.' Strictly speaking,
creation is crowned only when God in His joyful Sabbath rest looks back upon it and down
on what He has created. But it is the work concluded and terminated on the sixth day with
the creation ofman that is the object of this completing divine rest and joy."137 Gunton also
says the creation ofhumanity cannot be claimed to 'represent the goal of creation.' That is
to be found in the seventh day rest 'and its ultimate goal in the reconciliation of all things'.138
David Fergusson echoes the point when he says, 'the crowning moment of creation is not the
creation ofAdam and Eve but the Sabbath day of rest on which the whole creation glorifies
134
Stewart, RST, 9; Pannenberg, ST2, 208.
135
E.g., Walter Brueggemann, Genesis (Atlanta: John Knox, 1982), 35-36; Moltmann, God in
Creation, 6, 197; David Fergusson, The Cosmos and the Creator (London: SPCK, 1998), 17; Gunton,
'The SpiritMoved', 8.
136
Westermann, Genesis 1-11, 177.
137 Barth, CD III: 1, 181.
138
Gunton, 'The Spirit Moved', 8.
43
its maker'.139 Walter Brueggemann elaborates on the significance of the Sabbath day as
reflected in the year of Jubilee, that symbol of a future time when justice between all is
perfect, when 'God's way is fully established'.140 Moltmann has similar ideas of the Sabbath
as a 'prefiguration of the world to come,' and as 'crown of creation'.141 His theocentric
version of the world forbids any anthropocentrism, and he insists that human beings are not
the meaning and purpose of either the world or of evolution. He claims that the fulfillment
of the creation is not to be found in humanity, but rather humanity will find its destiny in the
fulfillment of creation, at the Sabbath 'feast of creation.'142
On purely literary grounds, it might be said that the description given of the creation
in Genesis 1 seems to place the events of the sixth day culminating in the creation of
humanity at the climax of the creative process.143 The seventh day is more like an epilogue
to what has gone before than anything else. Christ's words, 'The Sabbath was made for
humankind, not humankind for the Sabbath' (Mark 2:27), seem to place an ordering on the
relative value ofhumanity in relation to the simple Mosaic legal day of the Sabbath, and so
perhaps in the larger overall concept of Sabbath. Brueggemann recognizes this, writing,
"Sabbath as rest for God is the ground of a sweeping humanism. It exists for the well-being
of humankind."144 However, the Sabbath has several symbolic meanings within the
Scripture beyond simply the last day of creation. Some of these symbolic meanings, such as
the mle or peace ofGod, or the end of all labor at the consummation of the kingdom ofGod,
deserve special emphasis.
A Sabbath priority does not necessarily compromise the key importance of humanity
or the crowning status ascribable to the incarnation. A case can certainly be made for the
Sabbath rest as the telos or crowning purpose of creation. But this is a Sabbath that is
celebrating only in light of the fullness of the creation, which includes humanity as
completion of all that has gone before. It includes the entire created order, and not just
human beings. At the same time, this does not contradict the vital status of humanity. The
worship of God offered by humans remains essential to the Sabbath. God creates everything
and calls it good. But only after the creation of humanity on the sixth day is all the created
order (not just humanity) declared 'very good' (Genesis 1:31). Only then does God declare
the Sabbath rest. What is not being claimed in this thesis, contra Moltmann, is that humanity
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is the meaning and the purpose of the world (and of evolution). Nor is it being claimed here
that because humanity in the incarnation is the crown of creation, that therefore the rest of
creation is irrelevant and not 'good'. Human praise of God 'is also a participation in the
whole of creation'.145 A vital role can be maintained for humanity in the cosmos, but need
not imply that the cosmos can be entirely explained by the presence of humanity.
The best answer to such basic 'meaning of the universe' type questions, must, in
theological perspective, be God himself. Sarna observes that while humanity is the pinnacle
of creation, the Genesis seventh day is about God, the 'solo performer' who has
accomplished all that has gone before.146 If the Sabbath is taken as a symbol of God, of his
being the 'beginning and end' of all things, then it would have to be the crown of creation
since there is no creation without God. If, as in Pannenberg, the creation is only completed
at the end of history at the fulfillment of all things in Christ, then the Sabbath might be taken
as a symbol of that completion. The end of history has already broken into the present
through Jesus' resurrection. He will bring creation to completion. Therefore it is
appropriate in some sense to say that Jesus is the Sabbath in the new creation, expanding the
meaning of his words, 'the Son ofMan is lord even of the Sabbath' (Mark 2:28).
The Sabbath as Jubilee is a related theme. The justice and love of this 'day' have
their consummation and fulfillment in humanity, albeit redeemed humanity. The fulfillment
has cosmic dimensions, and includes the angels and other beings of the universe. The will of
God shall be fully accomplished only in Christ; God's will fully done only when humanity is
complete in God's love. The Sabbath may describe God's perfect will for his creation, but
that creation is only completed and fulfilled when God's family is completed and in order.
The perfect way of justice and rest is not completed in the created order except in and
through humanity. From this perspective, the perfect justice and will of God as imaged by
the Sabbath/Sabbath Jubilee are not goals of creation separate from or in contradiction to the
importance of humanity itself. In fact, the glory of the Sabbath does not imperil the vital
priority of humanity in the cosmos, but is rather fulfilled when humanity is realized in its
eschatological glory. These are interdependent, rather than contradictory or mutually
exclusive categories of importance.
Thus the Sabbath as a teleological concept does not endanger human significance,
nor is there a unilateral case for the priority of the Sabbath over humanity. Jesus Christ as
the Lord of the Sabbath does not diminish the critical place of humanity in the whole of
creation, but rather establishes the order and boundaries of its fulfillment in the human story.
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Since the worship ofGod offered by humans is an essential part of the Sabbath, even if the
Sabbath is the telos of creation, a type of anthropocentrism is still implied.
2.7. Pannenberg's Response to some Scientific Issues
As outlined in the introductory section, Pannenberg sees coherence between
scientific and theological knowledge, and holds that 'there need be no rivalry between
scientific and theological statements.'147 A constructive dialogue is possible between them
on the philosophical common ground they share. He aims to show that theology has a
necessary contribution to make to a holistic view of reality even for the natural sciences.
For example, Pannenberg believes the current understandings in modem science of
nature's open character and the contingency of its laws are coherent with the Christian idea
of the contingent creative activity of God. "There is agreement that the laws of physics, as
well as the reality [those] laws seek to describe, are contingent.... From a theological point
of view, the philosophical concept of contingency can be regarded as the creative activity of
the God of love."148 The modem understanding of reality emphasizes 'the elasticity and
openness' of the natural order. This understanding leaves room for such transcendent and
miraculous events as the resurrection, in contrast to the closed, deterministic and mechanistic
worldview of the Enlightenment already rejected by science. Thus theology can escape from
the Enlightenment's materialistic naturalism.149
This is not to say that the different ways of describing reality in physics and in
theology are the same, but rather that they are describing the same reality, from different
points of interest.150 Ifwe admit that the descriptions offered by science are not 'exhaustive
explanations of events,' and causal relations in reality are only possible because events are
contingent, then a description ofGod's activity within the open systems of the laws of nature
does not compete with the scientific description, but operates on a different level.151 God's
activity need not violate scientific laws, nor can God disappear as 'gaps' in the
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understanding of those laws close. This is because God is not operating only in the gaps thus
far unsolved by human understanding, but in all aspects of operation of those laws, from
their origin to their maintenance and preservation. Contingency and historicity mark all
aspects of reality and attest to its creatureliness, and this demonstrates that God is the
Creator, and continues to be so, not in the gaps, but in all of reality describable by science.
Pannenberg's point is that God never did occupy the gaps, but resides in the entire
contingent process from beginning to end.152
Pannenberg holds that the two views of reality are traceable to the same root
philosophical origin, the same 'metaphysical intuitions,'153 with root motifs expressed on the
one hand in theological statements, and on the other hand in formalized mathematical
language in the realm of physics. The physicist seeks to discover the natural laws in the
structure of reality. However, the existence of such laws and the intelligibility of the
universe require explanation. Science, as Peacocke observes, cannot explain 'why there are
laws - why there is anything',154 The physicist who has described the 'how' of the 'big bang'
has not provided the whole picture of reality until it is combined with the theologian's
knowledge of the 'who' and 'why'. God remains a coherent - and for many the best —
metaphysical foundation upon which to build all knowledge, including that of science.155
Theology contributes meaningful knowledge to the provisional understanding of the
physicist, in that the physicist's cosmological descriptions are only partial until they are
linked with the theological understanding.156 A comprehensive picture of reality thus
requires both disciplines.
Another fruitful example of coherence lies in the comparison of the Christian
concept of the eschatological meaning of history with science's method for uncovering
natural laws. Natural laws only become understandable from the endpoint of observation
looking backward. The meaning of the data can only be discovered after it has all been
collected and analyzed: if there is a relationship from A leading to B, it only becomes
evident after B. Once a law-like feature of the universe has been uncovered, it seems that
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the future. Yet the actualization of these laws in the real world depends in every case on
contingent conditions that must always be stipulated to describe their unfolding.
Furthermore, while theoretically the laws appear timeless, in fact, time is irreversible - the
universe only moves forward. This means that the laws which provisionally describe the
universe, A to B, Aj to Bj, A2 to B2... are not the self-contained timeless descriptions that
some glosses on scientific knowledge suppose, but are rather always contingent and
temporally bound. Their unfolding in reality always depends on the contingencies of the
historical moment.
Since reality cannot be described non-historically or non-contingently, Pannenberg
insists that 'nature ought to be understood as historical.'157 Since reality is everywhere
understood to be an ongoing and incomplete process, even partial projections of reality such
as those in scientific descriptions are at best of only provisional value. As a result, the
comprehension of reality 'is open to continual revision until such time as reality is
temporally completed'.158 This is the 'ontological priority of the future': the fullness of the
meaning of history can only be verified eschatologically at its end.159 When combined with
the contemporary understanding of nature as 'elastic and open', such an approach permits
Pannenberg to rationally posit the reality of such a unique event as the resurrection.160
Pannenberg suggests science is here indebted to theology for its metaphysical foundations,
since it contributes a foundation for understanding what the natural sciences must otherwise
accept a priori, in the concept of the ontological priority of the future.
Pannenberg has made other forays into the science-theology dialogue, such as
comparing the Holy Spirit to unified field theories in modern physics, and attempting to
develop his anthropology from the social sciences. Some of these are problematic, but
pursuing them is beyond the scope of this thesis.161 His engagement with the question of
extra-terrestrial intelligence, the anthropic principle, and the relation between human
personhood, body and mind - three themes that will recur throughout this thesis - are
somewhat less contentious, and bear on the question of human cosmic significance.
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2.7.1. The Possibility ofExtra-Terrestrial Life
Pannenberg asks whether the discovery of non-human intelligences in the cosmos
would affect the key status of humanity. He observes that there is no consensus as to
whether non-terrestrial life and intelligence will ever be found, some researchers supporting,
others refuting the possibility, with no hard-data available to decide the case. Further,
Christian theology has always been able to address the issue of non-human intelligence in
the creation, particularly in the angels, which assume many and varied forms. Some of
these non-human intelligences have no need of redemption, while others are incapable of
attaining to it, having rebelled against God. Christian tradition developed humanity's central
place in the cosmos on the basis of the incarnation, despite acknowledging the existence of
these other beings with superior intelligence. Pannenberg admits that the discovery of extra¬
terrestrials would require a theological appraisal of their relationship to Jesus as the incarnate
Logos, and therefore also to humanity. But given the currently questionable possibility of
their real existence, he sees no threat to the traditional Christian interpretation.
The as yet problematic and vague possibility of their [ETI] existence in no way
affects the credibility of the Christian teaching that in Jesus ofNazareth the Logos
who works throughout the universe became a man and thus gave to humanity and its
history a key function in giving to all creation its unity and destiny.162
Human cosmic uniqueness may be a provisional claim, in that time may disclose
higher life forms on other planets. But with no consensus as to the likelihood of its
discovery in the future, the current SETI search yielding a null conclusion, and other
scientific considerations suggesting no ETI will ever be found (see chapter 6, §6.4. Human
Uniqueness and Extraterrestrial Intelligence)^, it is hard to see why theology ought to
make significant changes based on speculation.
2.7.2. The Anthropic Principle
Pannenberg asks whether humanity's lofty position can be maintained in light of
scientific objections such as those raised by the Copemican principle. Recall that the
Copernican principle is 'the idea that we are not in a special place'164 in the universe, that we









understanding that have only been recently achieved, which can be seen as 'anti-Copernican'
in their import.166 "Only the scientific cosmology of the 20th century and its calculations of
the age and development of the universe have shown us what cosmological data are
indispensable for the emergence of life, and therefore of human life, in the world." These
data are collectively known as 'anthropic principle'. It expresses, in its various versions, the
'otherwise inexplicable' correlation of the constants ofnature required for the universe's
particular form, and for life and particularly human life to have emerged.167
While the anthropic principle is about intelligence, rather than humanityper se - the
kind of intelligence that reflects upon the universe and through which the universe becomes
conscious of itself- the anthropic conditions may suggest a more specialized focus upon
human origins and significance. Since human beings are currently the only known
intelligent beings of this type in the physical universe, and represent the highest known form
of physical and rational complexity, there may be a connection between the principle and the
significance of humanity. While Pannenberg admits that the anthropic principle is not an
explanation for the phenomenon it observes, he points to the fact that it reveals a very tight
connection between the large and small-scale structures of the universe. Humanity, once
thought insignificant in the overall scheme of cosmic things, may have tremendous
significance in light of this connection. The serious discussion 'devoted to the idea that the
goal of the universe and the normative details of its construction are the producing of human
life' reveals that there is room in science for the truth revealed by the incarnation, that
humans are the goal of creation.168
While many theologians and scientists are willing to see God only as the cosmic
initiator or sustainer, Pannenberg insists on God's involvement with creation throughout
cosmic history. He maintains that cosmic processes, whether described by fine-tuning, self-
organizing principles, or by various evolutionary pathways, have an underlying causation in
the form of the eschatological rule ofGod. The creation is not simply the beginning of
things, but an entire process with a beginning, ongoing upholding, and final realization or
fulfillment at the end ofhistory. Natural processes appear to be incomprehensible (or
meaningless) until the resurrection of Jesus breaks in to reveal a foretaste of the
eschatological end, disclosing the whole of creation for what it is - a creation destined for
consummation and fulfillment. Therefore with the resurrection, naturalprocesses can no
longer be taken simply as brutefacts unrelated to cosmic destiny. God's eschatological rule
guides the cosmos to its fulfillment, leading it towards an incarnational and therefore human
166 Phrase by Polkinghorne, Serious Talk, 39-40.




climax.169 Thus the idea that humanity might be the goal of the creation is coherent with
scientific discourse on the anthropic principle, though itself a theological conclusion.
Page, whose thought will be explored in detail in chapter 8, maintains that this
incamational reading of the creation process makes the created order too dependent upon
humanity, and ignores the fact that God had a real relationship with that creation apart from
humanity. Humans are, after all, only recent arrivals on the stage of universal history.170
Pannenberg agrees that the rest of the cosmic order with its living creatures is not simply a
means to the end of humanity. But taken 'as a whole, they form the basis for [human]
emergence'. The rest of creation has a relationship with God, but that relationship only finds
its fullness in humanity, specifically in and through the incarnation.171 Biblical eschatology
portrays an ultimate cosmic purpose and destiny for the whole creation: it is to be redeemed,
to be saved from its slavery to decay and death. But the incarnation is the direct and
principal means whereby this redemption takes place. God's ongoing relationship to the
cosmos, as its evolutionary history unfolds in the life-friendly matrix of finely tuned physical
laws, is not at odds with a fulfillment of the cosmos mediated by humanity.
Stewart summarizes Pannenberg's theological anthropology as largely dependent on
the theological datum of the incarnation, with little help from the realm of science. "Biology
can do no more than hint; only a biblically and religiously based knowledge can reveal the
purpose and direction of humanity."172 Pannenberg's analysis of the anthropic principle
shows some possible scientific themes that run contrary to the Copernican principle, and
partially overturns the marginalizing of humanity implied by that latter principle. He agrees
that ultimate meaning is to be found theologically, not scientifically.173 But if the scientific
data is coherent with that ascribed meaning, theology is strengthened.
Many others have commented on the significance of the anthropic principle as a
point of contact between theology and science. For instance, T. F. Torrance concludes that
its real import is 'not only that the universe is a home for humanity, but that the personal
nature of humankind belongs to the very nature of nature'. Human personhood that
comprehends the intelligibility of the cosmos is reflective of the 'personal Author', God the
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cause of the universe's 'existence, nature and structure'.174 Gunton observes that 'at the very
least [the principle] suggests a necessary relatedness of the cosmos to human intelligence'.
"Recent discussions encourage us to conceive a positive relation between human rationality
and the structure of the universe." He thinks it is a mistake to take the principle as 'evidence
that the world is created for the production of human life', yet he admits that this 'may as a
matter of fact be the case'. In theological perspective, because of God's intention to bring
creation into fellowship, the exact ordering of creation through time - described by the
scientific concept of the anthropic principle - can be seen as the way to make humanity, and
hence the incarnation, possible.175 The relationship between the anthropic principle, human
existence and God's providence will be examined more fully in chapter 7.
2.7.3. Rationality, human nature, and the imago dei
Is the universe's fine-tuning for life simply about consciousness or mind, rather than
humanity? Some take this as an implication of the anthropic principle, which Brandon
Carter explicitly claimed was designed to illuminate the rise of conscious life, rather than
specifically human life.176 The word anthropic has been regarded as unfortunate and
misleading, since it seems to indicate a special status for humans not intended by the
principle.177 A thought experiment might posit something analogous to the imago dei in
some other speculative intelligent creature type. Could Neanderthals, for instance, if they
had survived and dominated instead ofHomo sapiens, have become the imago dei and
therefore also the creaturely vessel for the incarnation? What if another evolutionary path
had yielded a creature quite different from humans that was nevertheless self-conscious and
'humanly' intelligent? Would that creature have been the image of God, the goal of
creation?
There are several related issues here that will be addressed in other chapters. The
question on Neatiderthal capacity will be examined in chapter 6. The historical contingency
of human existence in relation to the anthropic principle and God's providence will be
examined in chapter 7. This section will examine whether the imago dei and the incarnation
could have been realized in the universe apart from particularly human form. The question
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will be framed in terms of rationality: is the image ofGod reducible to rationality? Could
only humans represent God in creation and the creation to God, or could any rational being
do the job? It will be suggested here that Pannenberg's concept of the embodied nature of the
imago dei in humanity, with some corrections, helps put rationality in perspective.
It is clear that rationality is critical and foundational to the imago dei. This is
implied at least by God's own rationality in the creation account (as Logos, or ordering
principle), by the command of dominion, and by Adam's naming of the animals. It is
evident in human symbolic reasoning (see chapter 6). The New Testament analysis of the
imago has already shown the importance of ethical capacity and responsibility, each rooted
in human reason (§2.5.2). Symbolic and moral reasoning enables a unique level of
communication, grounding the ability to be in personal relationship, in communion. A
purely material or bodily interpretation of the imago dei is therefore inadequate.178 The
human physical body alone cannot be proffered as the image of God, as ifGod could be
described in physical terms without reference to his character, nature, and personhood.
Umberto Cassuto insists such a physicalist interpretation is deficient because it does not do
justice to the lofty spiritual and non-corporeal nature of God revealed by the Genesis 1
context. The God of Israel cannot be reduced to physical imagery, a habit common to the
ancient pagan religions, but ultimately shown to be idolatry. He maintains that what
delineates us as closest to God in distinction from the animals is our thinking and our
conscience.179
But while rationality is an important part of the image, it cannot be taken in
isolation. Cassuto's vision of human thought fails to take into account the bodily and social
rootedness of the human mind. Even the natural sciences have come to understand that
human rationality arises within its bodily and social context, intimately bound to the physical
nature and development of the brain and body.180 Gregory R. Peterson notes that as the
cognitive sciences have developed, it has become clearer 'that a full understanding of the
human person requires a radically integrative approach'. We must acknowledge 'not only
178
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that we have minds and brains but that the brain/mind is itself intricately tied to the biology
of our bodies as well as to our physical and social environments'.181 In other words, human
rationality itself arises in the context of embodied relationships with other persons.
Pannenberg does well to emphasize human embodiment, insisting that we cannot separate
the soul from the body, as if one could exist without the other: 'the soul (nephesh) is not
another component part of a human being over and above the body, as in Cartesian or
Platonic dualism. It is simply the bodily being as living'. The body is the person, not simply
some kind of dispensable or temporary shell through which reality is experienced by the
imago dei resident in the mind. An adequate description ofhuman being must reject such
dualism.182 Anderson agrees that human nature can only be understood as a holistic physical,
spiritual, and personal unity.183 It is an integrated 'psychophysical' unity, according to David
Braine. He suggests that both dualist Cartesian and modem materialistic philosophies of
human nature suffer from the same flaw of isolating mental states from the physical body.184
Philip Mellor and Chris Shilling describe 'the stubborn enfleshment of humans; they cannot
be dissolved into thought, nor can they be reduced to a Foucauldian notion of
"discourse"'.185 A. Synott suggests that because the Cartesian heritage separated mind and
body, Western philosophy has been unable 'to deal comprehensively or consistently with the
human body'.186
The judgment of a supreme value for rationality has a long history in the West.
Descartes' redefinition of being in the perspective of 'cogito ergo sum' has an older
theological root, in the 3rd century theology of Origen, who described the nature ofGod as
infinite mind (nous), or intellect and will. Origen's concept can in turn be linked to the
Hellenistic cosmology that maintained the superiority ofmind over matter, which Maurice
Wiles insists must be rejected by Christian theology at least on the grounds of the goodness
of creation (Genesis l).187 Origen's description of God as mind or nous has some significant
problems. Pannenberg suggests it is overly anthropomorphic, and does not properly capture
181
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the biblical Hebrew and Greek concept of spirit.188 The emphasis on rationality has led to a
kind of'intellicentric' arrogance, rendering a flawed and incomplete picture ofGod's image
that neglects its moral dimensions. Humans can act with great rationality to perpetrate great
evil, such as in the methodical engineering of genocides, or the systematic rape of nature.
Indeed, the most rational and clever creature in the creation account might well be seen as
the serpent. So Pannenberg insists that the biblical picture of God's rationality focuses on
wisdom, not mere intellect. The one who displays the image ofGod is the one who is
oriented towards the transcendent, who seeks after God; it is the one who does good, whose
deeds are holy, in contrast to the abominable.189
Liberation theology also critiques Western theology for overemphasizing rationality:
true Christian spirituality must be a spirituality of experience and action, not just words and
reason. Theology that is doctrinal, deductive and purely explanatory - i.e., a theology of
mind - is inadequate: it simply has not captured the fullness of the imago dei, either in
Christ, or in the church as it is to be molded to the image of Christ. Jon Sobrino blames this
error on the Enlightenment spirit, which reduces to and defines everything by Descartes'
cogito plum-line.190 A proper theology of the imago dei, if it is to be realized and displayed
in creation in a way that does justice to the biblical concept, must also be more than talk and
reason, the fruit of the focus on mind. The full biblical understanding of the imago dei must
be taken into account to arrive at a balanced understanding of its significance.
Such a holistic approach to God's image emerges in both the Old and New
Testaments (§2.5). Human beings created male and female relate to each other not merely
dialogically, but bodily, emotionally, and intimately: 'This at last is bone ofmy bones, and
flesh ofmy flesh' (Gen. 2:23). The man relates to his rational creator God, but is lonely
without the woman. In New Testament perspective, Jesus is the primary model of the full
image ofGod. His life is a union of words and actions: in his praxis he not only preached
the gospel, he is the good news, he is the gospel. This was manifest as he laid hands to heal
the sick, freed the demon-possessed, gave sight to the blind, died for humanity, and
ultimately conquered death on their behalf. Pannenberg insists the gospel as the revelation
of God stems not primarily from what was spoken, but from what happened.'91 In his body,
Jesus is the ultimate medium of the restoration of a right and whole relationship between
humanity and God, irreducible to mental states or communications.
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Lars Thunberg observes that many early Church fathers noticed the problem of
neglecting the bodily dimension of the image, rejecting both Origenian tendencies to see
something 'lacking in created humanity as such,' and to see the mind as alone carrying 'the
divine image' as if it is 'bound down through its relationship to the body and has to free
itself through ascetic efforts in order to gain the divine likeness.192 In Wojtyla's terms, the
human 'person' is inseparable from the body: we are 'embodied selves'.193 A Platonic ideal
of disembodied pure thought or mind as the ultimate form of existence is also contrary to the
Christian hope for the resurrection.194 Jesus' own resurrection demonstrates that the
embodied, social, and ethical dimensions of God's image in human nature remain in the new
creation. He is embodied not merely on Earth, but for all eternity in a recognizably human
body complete with his stigmata.195 The Christian promise is that all human beings will
share in the bodily resurrection in the eschaton - some in everlasting life, others in
everlasting contempt. Thus human personhood is embodied both in this world and the next.
If there is a failure in Pannenberg, it is his limited interaction with the social and
communal aspects of human nature and mind. Stewart notices that he evades 'emotion,
affect and mood', and he tends to avoid the psychology of human relationships in favor of
individualist and rationalist leanings, blaming this on his 'lack of emphasis on the relational
aspects of the cross'.196 Welker criticizes the modem understanding of personhood as
autonomy because it fails 'to grasp the authenticity of the unique corporal and sensual
person. It also underestimates the contextuality ofmorality and the mutability of rationality'.
Since modernity has been fixated on the 'disembodied person behind the mask', it has been
unable to categorize the way in which humanity is shaped by social and cultural processes of
differentiation. As a result, modem concepts ofmorality and rationality have been 'unable to
prevent entire societies that appealed to these governing powers from being possessed by
chauvinist, fascist, racist and ecologically brutal mentalities'.197 Jay Budziszewski criticizes
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rationality-centered and functionalistic definitions of human nature for being inadequate to
protect the whole meaning of 'person' in the categorical thinking of natural law. He
observes that the modernist's 'functional method allows him to know only what he wants
[human beings] to be - and different modernists want them to be different things':
One thinker has greater regard for sentience, another for cognition, another for self-
awareness. One thinks the important thing is sociality, another the capacity to make
plans. With each different criterion of personhood, a different set of beings is
welcomed through the gates of other's regard. This writer says that higher mammals
are persons, but human babies are not. That one says that human babies are persons,
but Grandma not. The one over there says that some human babies are persons, but
only if their mothers think they are.198
Redefining humanity in reductionistic terms does violence to the imago dei. It must
be found in the totality of human nature, not in a singular feature. As God's character and
nature are inviolable, so human nature made in his image is inviolable. All aspects
contribute to the holistic unity of human being: upright posture and the socially mediated
mind, face-to-face communication and moral capacity, freedom from instinct and the
capacity for intimate male-female sexual union, artistic creativity and the biological
necessity of live birth, symbolic reasoning and emotional-physical bonding needs, even the
simple abilities to take a walk, kneel in prayer, embrace, and hold hands. This is not to say
that speculative versions of disembodied or 'alternately' embodied rationality are impossible
(e.g. God, biblical angels). It does suggest that these fall short of truly imaging God in
creation. When God as transcendent mystery becomes incarnate, uniting once and forever
with his creation, it is not as an angel or other sentient being, but as a human being. So
Barth insisted that because of the incarnation, we could decisively assert the humanity of
God.199 Thus Pannenberg maintains that the imago dei, the incarnation, and the divine
fellowship offered humanity in Christ provides the grounds for a sweeping humanism: they
guarantee the dignity and inviolability of all human beings.200
Pannenberg insists that human nature is what it is by God's intention, to reflect
Godself in the cosmos. It can only be known for what it is in light ofGod's own nature and
being. The imago dei in Jesus is more than rationality: it is an inviolable whole representing
and experienced and built in community. God 'constitutes the complex unity of the person and the
complex interdependence of the creatures. Without addressing God's creative activity, appreciated by
faith, we do not gain a perspective on the unity of the public person and the unity of creation'.
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God's self in the cosmos. Fergus Kerr observes, 'being the image of God is not something
extra added on from outside to a life lived in accordance with natural or secular principles.'
Such a dualist view is a byproduct of secular humanism.201 Without its holistic, embodied,
social and essentially theological meaning as the imago dei, human personhood and dignity
inevitably suffers violation and degradation.202
2.8 Some Relevant Problems in Pannenberg's Theology
Several problems that are relevant to this thesis surface in Pannenberg's theology.
Some of his philosophical presuppositions may be problematic, including an excessive
reliance on questionable Hegelian notions. Also, his attempt to establish rational grounds for
faith may be vulnerable in a postmodern setting. His hermeneutic appears to have some
inconsistencies. His historical version of the resurrection has been attacked. His
presentation of Jesus' divinity is contentious: he has been accused of presenting Jesus too
much 'from below,' neglecting the transcendent aspects of the Christ revelation: those 'from
above'. These accusations, if true, might compromise the thesis of dependent or critical
anthropocentrism. Are his philosophical presuppositions too uncertain to sustain his
program? If Pannenberg's hermeneutic is flawed, is the version of Jesus he arrives at
reliable? Can the resurrection be held as a true event in either a modem or postmodern
rationally critical setting? IfChrist's divinity is improperly portrayed, is his cosmic
significance challenged? These issues will be addressed in what follows.
2.8.1. Philosophical challenges
There are several philosophical challenges to Pannenberg's thought. These include a
detrimental reliance upon Hegel, a challenge from philosophical (materialistic) naturalism,
and an examination ofPannenberg's rationalism in light ofpostfoundational issues.
Gunton proposes that because of his use of historical-criticism, Pannenberg is too
reliant upon Hegel's thought to establish a meaning for the resurrection. His hermeneutic
leads to the rejection of the traditional gospel picture that establishes the pre-incarnate
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divinity of Jesus as the Son of God. Pannenberg's critical hermeneutic forbids him to follow
Scripture's assertions about Jesus' divinity. Gunton insists that Pannenberg's rationality is
not thoroughgoing, because it begins with a divine premise in the Hegelian assumption that
there is a universal horizon ofmeaning. Therefore his theology must operate from the
beginning in an unfounded 'Hegelian matrix'.203 Paul Molnar agrees that Pannenberg's
reliance on Hegelian and Heideggarian anticipation, and his grounding reality in 'limited
human experience (the idea that there is 'a mysterious ground of all reality transcending
one's own and all other finite existence'), leads to subjectivity rather than ultimate
rationality.204 Gunton insists Pannenberg's interpretative use of the apocalyptic milieu only
works by insisting historical facts and their interpretation are inseparable. But what if the
witnesses were simply wrong in their apocalyptic interpretation, as a given culture's take on
any historical event may be rejected or reinterpreted by succeeding generations?205
Roger Olson and others point out Pannenberg's indebtedness to Hegel206, which
Pannenberg acknowledges, insisting all modem Christian theology is similarly indebted:
Indeed, none of the great thinkers ofmodernity has done half as much as Hegel to
put the Christian religion back on the throne it lost because of the Enlightenment.207
He uses Hegel's idea of the 'field of universal truth' as the only domain in which the idea of
God could last.208 But he agrees that Christian theology for the most part bypassed Hegel
because of various perceived flaws in his program, and insists on his independence from
Hegel.209 Philip Clayton suggests Pannenberg's program of 'anticipation' (the anticipation
of the 'apocalyptic horizon') is not just a Hegelian inspiration, but is a natural derivative of
the resurrection, which is the anticipation of God's ultimate future. The resurrection, in its
apocalyptic milieu, points to and demands a reckoning with the end of history. This
anticipatory vision moves beyond Hegel's 'insistence on truth and reality as the final whole
of experience'.210 For Pannenberg, there is a 'strictly theological root of the concept of
anticipation... if Jesus' person and history are to be understood as final revelation of the
203
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divine Logos'.211 He accepts Julius Midler's critique of Hegel's insistence upon the logical
necessity of God's creation of the world, as well as his concept of God as Mind. Hegel's
thought leads to a type of pantheism, in that God and the world are inextricably bound by
God's dependence on the creation for his self-realization. Proper contingency also
disappears from Hegel's version of the freedom of God and human beings, and cannot do
justice to Christianity, which is - among all religions - the religion of freedom.212 He rejects
Hegel's version of history as overly deterministic; the historical notion of being is freed from
rational necessity and embedded in the actual changes of human history. Thus Clayton
concludes Pannenberg is not fatally Hegelian.213 Merold Westphal even suggests that
Pannenberg is the 'most articulate anti-Hegelian since Kierkegaard'.214
Galloway and Buller note the flaws in Hegel's dialectic of the historical process with
the triune life ofGod, which particularly in Feuerbach led to the conflation ofhumanity and
the infinite, and the replacement ofGod by Hegel's eternal human spirit.215 Pannenberg is
influenced by the original dialectic, but moves beyond it in his concept of the eschatological
futurity of God and of history in their mutual distinction. Humanity's finiteness is preserved,
while the potential relationship with the infinite in the persons of God is maintained, hence
humanity's essentially religious or spiritual nature. Because of this correction to Hegel, he
has an answer to the Feurbachian atheistic tendency in such thinkers as Nietzsche, Marx, and
Freud. Pannenberg's notion that God only becomes God at the end of history is not
Hegelian, because God is eschatologically realized only in relationship to the creation, not in
his inter-Trinitarian relations. The invisible and transcendent God exists independently of
creation and history, and becomes the visible and present God in relationship to creation at
the eschaton. He is the hidden God of Israel's faith; yet even in his hiddenness [vie], he has
revealed himself in Israel and in Jesus.216 Stewart also notes that Pannenberg moves away
from Hegel by accepting Gadamer's assertion of the provisional, time-conditioned nature of
knowledge.217
Another dispute arises over the issue of philosophical naturalism. Martin Buss
regards 'apocalyptic expectation' as belonging to a mythical category. He says the expected
end ofhistory, both in Christ's resurrection and in the general resurrection, cannot be
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something claiming to be within history.218 Those like Buss who continue to adhere to
materialistic naturalism will be unsatisfied with Pannenberg's modification of historical
criticism to allow unusual events such as resurrections. They will insist on philosophical
grounds that human beings simply do not conquer death. Pannenberg's rejection of absolute
naturalism and his insistence on the possibility of unusual past events that are outside our
normal experience anticipates contemporary postfoundationalist thought (see chapter 5).2'9
Although he rejects naturalism in his evaluation of the resurrection, he often tacitly returns to
it in his evaluation of other events in the Scripture.
David Holwerda wonders ifPannenberg's definition of revelation as history, rather
than as verbal transmission, can really hold up, given that he uses Israel's verbal apocalyptic
expectation to ground the meaning of the resurrection. He suggests that Pannenberg's claim
to historical objectivity may in fact have some subtle faith precommitments hidden within it,
so that the success of his effort to establish the resurrection solely by reason is dubious.220
Molnar notices a similar problem in Pannenberg's philosophical approach, which grounds
faith in God ultimately in human subjective experience and rationality.221 Shults observes
that in the postfoundational setting, every epistemology has an element of 'fiduciary
rootedness', even those taking a critical realist stance.222 Pannenberg in later writing admits
his own subjectivity before the Christ event, in the sense that he believes it to be so all-
determining for the meaning of history, that everyone must be subjective before it.223 This
suggests vulnerability or the need for qualification in his program of critical rationalism.
2.8.2. Pannenberg's Hermeneutic
Pannenberg's hermeneutic of the resurrection differs from his treatment of other
aspects of Jesus' life. The resurrection confirms that in Jesus, the end of the world has
begun, that Jesus 'is the "Son ofMan" who will come again', that God confirms Jesus' pre-
resurrection ministry, and that Jesus is God's final revelation. The witness of the early
church 'is to be understood as an exposition of the significance of the resurrection'. The
resurrection is more than 'brute fact': there is a 'unity of event and word in the resurrection
218 Martin Buss, 'The Meaning ofHistory', in J.M. Robinson & J.B. Cobb, Jr., eds., Theology as
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appearances' that helps establish faith.224
John Hick observes that modern New Testament scholarship takes it as basic that our
access to the life of Jesus comes only through the memories and interpretation of the post-
Easter church.225 Even though a true resurrection seems to entail a fairly high view of the
gospel testimony, Pannenberg does not consistently follow this conclusion. His method
often seeks the historical truth behind the resurrection witnesses and their record. Although
theoretically he believes in miracles, his analysis often looks very much like that of his
naturalistic colleagues, even at times relying upon them.226 He mles many other significant
supernatural gospel events and presuppositions invalid in the name of rationalism, using the
original historical-critical filter. The miraculous often continues to be legendary, even
including actual resurrection appearances in the gospel. This appears to be bait-and-switch
tactics, claiming freedom from naturalism, but submitting to it for much of the analysis.
For example, he rejects the virgin birth, the pre-incarnate existence of Christ, Jesus'
foreknowledge of the cross, and his self-identity as messiah or Son of God. Some of the
resurrection accounts are deemed 'legendary' because of their corporeal aspect.227 In
practice, the resurrection is the main transcendent event to pass through Pannenberg's
historical-critical filter. By accepting the part of the apostolic witness touching directly upon
the resurrection while rejecting much of the rest, he calls into question the connection that
allows us to know the same Jesus the apostles knew. Why should the resurrection, for
example, be seen as any less 'mythological' than a pre-incamate existence? If the
resurrection was a bodily phenomenon, a real historical event with some aspect occurring in
space and time, why should a 'corporeal' description of it be deemed 'legendary'? If the
resurrection is true, why is Pannenberg in a better position to judge the nature of the
resurrected Jesus than the gospel witnesses? Why should a virgin birth or a messianic self-
understanding or prophetic predictions of future events be regarded as any more incredible or
224
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unlikely than a man conquering death?228 If the modern historical and scientific
consciousness can be induced to swallow the one, then why not the rest? Or if not the rest,
why the one?
Pannenberg offers a system theoretically free from the limitations of naturalism. By
expanding the bounds of possibility, and recognizing the provisional understanding of reality
in contemporary science as open and elastic, he opens the way to establish the resurrection as
a real transcendent event in history through critical historical investigation. He begins from
the historical-critical method as an apologetic move, in an effort to make the resurrection a
credible basis of faith for a critical generation. To that extent, his use of those
methodological tools is a submission to the needs of his target audience: he wants to answer
for them why, in the midst of the currently contended details of Jesus' life, they should put
faith in Jesus because of his resurrection. He develops a theological program built
throughout with this approach, which Schwobel has called 'rational orthodoxy.'229 This is a
reasonable move to the extent that it answers the problem of subjective experience as the
basis of scriptural authority.230 It appears, however, to be internally inconsistent; for while
Pannenberg agrees that the nature of the resurrection is truth establishing, at the same time he
forbids that fact to demonstrate the tmth of Christ's whole life.231 It may also mean
Pannenberg's claims of critical rationalism are over-stated in light of his own admission of
fiduciary subjectivity. While admitting the failure of Enlightenment rationality, he is
frequently bound by it.232
2.8.3. The resurrection as ground of truth
Does the importance Pannenberg places upon an objective resurrection leave his
theology vulnerable? This is the position ofBuss and others, who see in the violation of
naturalism an irrational return to pre-modern thinking. A deeper analysis ofjust how
rational materialistic naturalism of this type actually is will take place in chapter 5, though as
noted previously, many philosophers reject naturalistic epistemology as fundamentally
irrational. If a faith stance is taken based upon naturalism, then no amount of evidence will
be adequate to prove a resurrection. Without a real resurrection, Pannenberg's historically
228 Stewart notices the disjoin here sometimes extends even to the rejection ofNew Testament ethical
teaching (e.g., on the valuation of people before property) in the interest ofphilosophical coherence.
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rooted theology would likely collapse.
Postmodern thought sometimes suggests that events like the resurrection can only be
relevant to the particular community that has accepted them a priori.233 In this critique,
however, there is no objective reality independent of particular communities available to
anyone. Every community is dependent upon its own subjective narrative, and objectivity is
a myth. The gospel and resurrection phenomenology would therefore be acceptable as the
narrative of the church, but would have no intrinsic authority over the narrative of any other
community. If the resurrection was merely an idea, an ideology, or a philosophical concept,
then it might thus be relevant only to its own community. Then the arguments presented
here for critical anthropocentrism would have a similar status to that given the resurrection.
At best, it could have only metaphorical, symbolic, or mythical meaning, or be important
only within its own 'narrative community'.
Such a relativistic. conclusion ought to be questioned on the grounds that postmodern
relativism continues to be based on the Enlightenment rejection of the transcendent realm.
This is anticipating arguments to be developed later, but the contention of this thesis is that
such naturalism must be set aside as an 'absolute' worldview, even by post-moderns
(§5.3.4). Further, Pannenberg would sharply disagree with the idea that the truthfulness of
an event applies only to the particular community that constitutes the given historical record.
This is the opposite of the meaning of history. Some events are only locally interesting,
while others have universal significance, but all are universally true to the degree that they
actually happened. The modem historical sensibility even of relativists is that 'there are
basic facts which are the same for all historians.'234 While the resurrection is unique, trust in
its authenticity could be based on a critical evaluation of basic facts pertaining to it,
particularly if the naturalistic bias against it were set aside. When historical-critical research
rejects the resurrection, it is on the grounds of philosophical naturalism. As William P.
Alston observes, such findings are ideological in character, not 'a result ofhistorical
investigation'.235 If one accepts miracles as possible, there is in principle nothing barring the
confirmation of the truth of the resurrection.
Pannenberg is explicitly not interested in scriptural authority for its own sake.236
Rather, he appropriates the scriptural record as a flawed historical document, yet one which
the historian must take seriously, and which has enough data to verify the historicity of the
233 This is very similar to Barth's position.
234 E. H. Carr, What is History? (New York: Random House, 1953), 8; Carr is a historical relativist.
2jj William P. Alston, Perceiving God: the epistemology of religious experience (Ithaca & London:
Cornell University Press, 1991), 244-245.
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resurrection, which it turn places Jesus in a unique category. Other religions have claimed
divinity for various persons throughout history, but those claims are not offered as
objectively verifiable events such as Pannenberg claims for the resurrection.237 It happens
decisively in history, thus making God's claims open to doubt, possible refutation,
investigation, and ultimately to the possibility of historical verification.238 So Pannenberg
claims that Judeo-Christian revelation is as testable as any other historical event. The
resurrection, witnessed by doubting, incredulous, ordinary women and men who nevertheless
became convinced of its reality, is the watershed event that defines - or redefines - all
history. If true, it confirms the deity and incarnation of God in Jesus Christ.239 No
competing claims to ultimate authority can be successful without equivalent credentials.
2.8.4. The nature ofJesus' divinity
Pannenberg's version of the incarnation differs from the traditional understanding
offered by patristic and classical Christology. This is clear already in his hermeneutic
separation of the resurrection from other events that might confirm a different type of
divinity for Jesus, e.g., with a pre-incarnate existence. Jenson agrees that the early
Pannenberg has followed Rahner's move of declaring that 'the immanent Trinity is the
economic Trinity.'240 Jesus' earthly relationship to the Father is the content ofhis
relationship as Son of God to the Father. Galloway sees something similar: the eternal
Father - Son relationship seems reduced to just what happened between God and Jesus in the
history recorded by the Gospels.241 His presentation in Jesus - God andMan does seem to
underemphasize the existence of the Son of God independently of the man Jesus of Nazareth.
Jesus is the Son of the eternal Father only in his complete dedication to the will of
the Father... The absolute, real unity of Jesus' will with the Father's, as was
confirmed in God's raising him up from the dead, is the medium of his essential
unity with God and the basis of all assertions about Jesus' divine Sonship.242
It is precisely in and through Jesus that the Son of God manifests that relationship to the
237 Hindu avatars, claims for divine inspiration by prophets such as Muhammad, Joseph Smith, or Sun
Yung Moon, or the divinity ascribed to Buddha (in certain traditions, e.g., Theravada & folk
Buddhism), are faith claims effectively beyond historical investigation, and are philosophical,
subjective or experiential in their method of verification. See J. Bowker, ed., The OxfordDictionary
ofWorldReligion (OUP, 1997), 171-177; J. Powers, A Concise Encyclopedia ofBuddhism (Oxford:
Oneworld, 2000), 134; R. Carlyon, A Guide to the Gods (London: Wm Heinemann, 1981), 121.
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Father that characterizes him as the Father's Son. The Son seems to exist only within the
temporal order, and the creation's origin in the Son as Logos are neglected, as if he does not
become the Son ofGod until he appears in the man Jesus.243 How can the Son be the co¬
author of creation in this understanding? Ted Peters maintains that this makes the Logos
contingent upon history, rather than vice versa, because it is found in the concrete and
contingent order of the creation, rather than in the abstract laws of nature.244
If the Son of God's existence is so contingent upon historical reality, does this
threaten our understanding of the Trinitarian nature of God? To put it crudely, how can the
Son be begotten in this framework, rather than made? Roger Olson asks whether the
character of Jesus Pannenberg derives from his bounded version of the resurrection is in fact
a type of 'adoptionism', rather than the classical understanding of Jesus' incarnation.245
Pannenberg has, according to Olson, rejected the traditional doctrine of the immanent trinity
as flawed because it violates the contingency and openness of history. An immanent trinity
'thought of as previous to all historical relations of God to the world [implies] that the
incarnation was something supplementary and exterior to the eternal life of the Trinitarian
God'.246 Nicholas Lash sees in this position a departure from classical Christology to the
extent that it no longer takes the pre-incarnate existence as a given of faith.247
Pannenberg suggests the idea of Christ's pre-incarnate existence is to be rejected as a
'Hellenistic infiltration'.248 But Gunton notes that St. Paul's pre-incarnation references show
that belief in a divine and co-eternal Christ was an early phenomenon in the church, already
taken for granted by Paul and the Corinthians at an early date, and not a gradual
development, as some have portrayed the Johanine material to represent. In classical
incamational theology both Old and New Testament references are regarded as part of the
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unified witness to Christ's pre-incarnate existence. Although shaped by awareness of
Hellenistic culture, and the need to make the gospel comprehensible to it, both John's logos
Christology and Paul's kenotic Christology are parts of the general New Testament
acknowledgment of Jesus' equal divinity. Gunton observes that as a result of his position,
Pannenberg is forced to rely upon a dubious philosophical model to ground his incarnational
theology. He suggests that what Pannenberg really offers in his Christology is a 'divinized
man', rather than the eternal and only-begotten Son of God.249
James Cone objects that Pannenberg's version of Jesus not only cuts him off from a
pre-incarnate existence, but from an ongoing post-resurrection presence in the church.
Speaking from the Black-American church tradition, Cone insists that the contemporary
experience of 'the historical Jesus as the Crucified and Risen Lord who is present with us in
the struggle of freedom' must be taken into account in any holistic portrayal of Jesus. He
cannot accept Pannenberg's delineation of such experiences as untestable, purely subjective
or emotional.250 Stewart agrees he overemphasizes rationality and neglects love, emotion,
experience, and aesthetic sensation. Here, she may have indirectly uncovered the parallels
between Pannenberg's version of Trinitarian relations, and his approach to human nature as
individual rather than communal or social (blamed on neglecting the cross).251 Daniel Hardy
observes that social Trinitarian thought helps ground and explain the 'being-with' condition
of humanity. Human social nature, including in the church, ought to be traced to the truth of
the Logos 'of God present in creation'. 'This divine ordering is what ultimately implants in
the human condition the 'being-with' which is natural to it', which itself reflects 'the
sociality ofGod present for humanity in created society'.252 Pannenberg's philosophical
rationalism fails him for being unable to properly acknowledge either divine or human social
nature.
Pannenberg's later writings do not seem to restrict the life of the Son of God solely
to his existence in the historical man Jesus ofNazareth. He agrees the Logos must have
some kind of eternal character to be internally consistent. He says a complete Christological
doctrine cannot be developed 'solely from the perspective of Jesus' humanity,' because
truths about God 'can never be derived from anthropology alone.' He suggests that the
Logos as organizing principle and Word of God is the origin of the information which
science reveals to be present throughout the cosmos.253 Jesus' recognition of the Father as
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God in distinction from himself gives validity to 'the independent existence of other
creatures alongside himself; he provides the ground for all that is distinct from God,
including the origin and existence of all creaturely reality. 254 In more recent writings, he
maintains that Jesus' communion with the eternal God, confirmed by Easter, 'is itself
eternal', and appears to tacitly agree with the early church's belief in Jesus' preexistence as
'immediately following' from this eternal communion.255
Pannenberg's version ofGod's relationship to time attempts to reconcile views from
'below' and 'above'.256 If God is present in eternity to all time, then the appearance of the
Son of God only in the particular space-time of Jesus of Nazareth is still not inconsistent
with his co-presence in eternity.257 The Logos stands with God on the side of eternity, and so
in direct relationship to all time, not just the time beginning with the historical birth of Jesus.
So the world can be said to have been created through and by the Logos, the Son ofGod. lie
is then manifest completely as the Son of God in Jesus of Nazareth without either
compromising his deity or denying his humanity, because of his all-time-embracing
character. The Logos will be shown to have been the founding principle and cause of
creation all along, as revealed from the retrospective position of the eschatological end of
history.
That 'all things and beings are created through Jesus Christ means that the eschaton
that has appeared beforehand in Jesus represents the time and point from which the creation
took place. Pannenberg insists that in Biblical understanding, the essence of things will be
decided only in the future. What they are is decided by what they will become'. So
'creation happens from the end, from the ultimate future'.258 It is a three-fold process: origin
or beginning, ongoing maintaining through 'immanent divine self-involvement,' and
completion or perfection from and at the end.259 Pannenberg thus asserts the predestination
of all things toward Jesus: 'their eschatological summation' through him 'is identical with
their creation through' him.260 The universe is contingent, not the persons ofGod. The
Trinitarian relationships are eternal, hidden until revealed by the resurrection. Here there
seems to be room for a richer Trinitarian understanding of the Son's divinity, transcendent
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and immanent, rather than purely economic.261
2.8.5. Conclusion
Despite what might be perceived as 'de-anthropocentrizing' flaws, Pannenberg still
arrives at the unique divinity of Jesus and at a clear version of the incarnation. This must be
credited to the strength that the resurrection has for Pannenberg: once having accepted it as
historical fact, he must find some way to make sense of it. He insists that to understand the
real meaning of Jesus requires wrestling with the real history: its meaning is to be found
within it, and there is something objective there to be found. In turn, this search for the
objective puts Pannenberg on a track that takes him away from Hegel, for Hegel's
Christology 'tends to swallow up into philosophical abstraction the historical reality of
Jesus'.262 Pannenberg, like the gospel writers, moves first from the objective fact of the
resurrection to the conclusion that 'Jesus is Lord.' Though he may have difficulty with other
important features of Christology due to his methodology, he nevertheless is able to see
those key aspects. Perhaps his could be described as a 'core theology' of the incarnation and
resurrection, reliable for the broad sense, rather than the detailed exposition.
Pursuing this discussion into a deeper critique is beyond the scope of this project.
The fundamental importance of the incarnation for all of cosmic reality is not compromised
by these potential problems. Whether the Son of God has an independent existence in
relation to creation and time 'prior' to Jesus of Nazareth, or only appears with certainty in
him, the incarnation, as demonstrated by the resurrection, is the decisive event of cosmic
unity and destiny, and is the fulfillment ofGod's revelation through the whole history of
Israel. Pannenberg's essential and positive point is that the appearance in history of the
loving relationship of the Father to the Son in the person of Jesus is the 'actual mode' for the
drawing of creaturely existence into the divine love of the inner-Trinitarian relationship.263
Therefore, even if it is only revealed to the cosmos for what it is at the end of history, the
incarnation is the keystone of the cosmos. The creation is still ordered to the Logos in his
incarnation, and ordained to fulfillment in and through his humanity, appearing in history as
it does in Jesus Christ. From the retrospective position of the eschatological end of history,
all things are created through and by the Son ofGod, the Logos made flesh in Jesus of
Nazareth. The history of creation from its beginning to its ending receives its meaning,
fulfillment, and crowning in him.






If anything, Pannenberg's 'rational orthodoxy' leads him to understate the scope and
significance of the incarnation. The fact that his hermeneutic tends to reduce everything to
the least common denominator, and yet he nevertheless arrives at a strong doctrine of the
incarnation in light of the resurrection, is an indication of the strength of the claim. Thus a
critical evaluation ofPannenberg's thought does not undermine its anthropocentric aspects.
2.9 Summary of Pannenberg's Perspective
This analysis of Pannenberg's thought has shown just how deeply anthropocentric is
his theological program. According to him, God has created the universe with incarnation as
its chief crown and goal. The universe is focused towards and comes to fruition in the
incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. It derives its reality and creaturely independence from
Jesus, the Son ofGod, who is also the model for creation's dependence upon God and the
means for the cosmos to transcend its mortality (confirmed by the resurrection). Humanity
is of highest significance within the created realm, because only it is the image ofGod
reflected there. It represents and portrays God himself in the universe. No other creature,
angel, or sphere is constituted as the form of God within his creation, nor was prepared to
receive God into itself in the incarnation. The history of the universe is, in this incamational
perspective, 'a prehistory to the coming of humanity'. So 'we humans can be called the goal
of creation', particularly as that goal is realized in the incarnation. Humanity's destiny is not
off in one comer. On the contrary, in them, 'the destiny of all creation is at stake'. All
creation waits 'for the manifestation of divine sonship in the human race', for only then will
it find eternal life. Here, humanity represents God to the cosmos, and the cosmos to God.264
This understanding is not contradicted by science, which offers some coherent data
in the anthropic principle and in its recognition ofholistic nature of socially embodied
humanity. Pannenberg maintains that the Copernican principle and the possibility of extra¬
terrestrials do not threaten human cosmic significance. The eschatologically mediated
predestination of all things towards Christ allows the theologian to maintain that humanity is
not an accident of history, but rather its goal and destiny. In incamational perspective, the
scientifically discemable anthropic conditions are coherent with this position, though science
will be unable to arrive there on its own or supply its meaning. The creation as it culminates
in humanity expresses this providential ordering towards Christ. The theologian can assert
the humanity of the cosmos, in the sense that cosmic history comes to focus and salvation in
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human beings. Because of God's intention to bring creation into his fellowship, the ordering
of creation through time partially described by the anthropic principle can be seen as the way
to make humanity possible (see chapter 7).265 Thus, the universe has been designed to
culminate not just in conscious being, but also in human being, and finally in God's being in
humanity. As created, the universe is theocentric; in light of the incarnation it is also
anthropocentric.
Pannenberg's realist approach to history and the resurrection gives rise to a theology
that intrinsically entails human significance. The resurrection verifies the incarnation, the
cosmic significance of Christ, and ultimately the cosmic significance of humanity. Even
with the various flaws in Pannenberg's thought that might undermine human significance,
his theology still supports it because it rests on the person and work of Jesus Christ. Insofar
as Pannenberg represents realist Protestant theology, such theology will be inevitably
anthropocentric. It must conclude that humanity occupies a place of central significance for
the whole of the cosmos, representing or 'imaging' God therein, realizing in Trinitarian
fellowship the goal of creation, acting as the key upon which the fulfillment of the cosmos
depends. This critical anthropocentrism is an inherent feature of Pannenberg's thought,
woven into the entire structure of his theological program. It is an outworking of
foundational Trinitarian and incarnational truths, part of the grammatical shape and the core
constitution ofChristianity itself, and enduring despite philosophical, methodological or
analytic flaws. Any attempt to remove this focus seems likely to require major distortions to
Christianity's inherent structure.
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Human Evolutionary Transcendence and Its Incarnational Fulfillment
"Man is a personal subject from whose freedom as a subject the fate of the
entire cosmos depends. " - Karl Rahner1
3.1 Introduction to Rahner's Thought
Karl Rahner, SJ (1904-1984), was perhaps the most influential German Roman
Catholic theologian of the twentieth century. His theological agenda arose as a partial
response to his contemporary philosophical milieu, and shows particular sensitivity to the
theological issues that have arisen from the modem scientific endeavor.
Rahner's theological method has been described as embodying 'a dialectic of the
transcendental with the historical.'2 From its beginning, this theology is grounded upon a
transcendent anthropology: a vision of humanity open to the possibility of God's own life.
Humanity is his starting point: humanity defined in a specific way, centered on this concept
of the transcendent. "Dogmatic theology today has to be theological anthropology.... Such
an anthropology must, of course, be a transcendental anthropology... [because] every
theological question must also be considered from a transcendental point of view."3 Rahner
maintains that the human search for the transcendent is the foundation of all theological
quests for truth. This search explains why humans are never satisfied with any final and
finite explanation for existence and reality. This is evidence of the orientation of the creation
towards God, the infinite, expressed in humanity as a gift of grace,4 so that God is the
'foundational impulse behind every attraction to know truth and to love goodness.'5
Theological anthropology finds its warrant in the fact that all 'transcendental awareness'
exists, even as a possibility, in dependence upon and in reference to the absolute mystery.6
Tracing some of the philosophical and historical influences upon Rahner will serve
to introduce his thought, while at the same time illuminating this concept of transcendence.
1 Karl Rahner, 'Theology and Anthropology', in T.P. Burke, ed., The Word in History (S&W, 1966),
15.
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Thomas Sheehan identifies Aquinas as the philosopher from whom Rahner, by
'reinterpretation' for the modern mind, derived his thought, particularly the 'transcendental
turn to the subject' as the basis for metaphysics. This metaphysic of subjective human
cognition underlies Rahner's theological program.7 George Vass identifies Kant, Marechal,
and Heidegger as other leading philosophical influences. Stephen Fields adds Hegel to the
list. Rahner's overall philosophical approach is in its historical origins 'a combination and
continuation of Kant's criticism of human knowledge, Marechal's correction of the same in
the light of Thomistic analysis and Heidegger's presentation of the Kantian problem in
ontological terms'.8 According to Karl Weger, Rahner has taken up Kant's theory regarding
human transcendental knowledge, which questioned the validity ofhuman knowing,
emphasized its subjective aspects, and denied the possibility of true knowledge of the
noumenal divine realm, and modified it by adding Joseph Marechal's vertical extension of
the transcendental to include the divine realm: for Rahner, there is the possibility of real
knowledge ofGod.9 Kant established the 'Copernican turn' in his transcendental philosophy
ofhuman knowledge, restricting knowledge to the 'objectivity of objects.'10 In Marechal,
human judgments of the affirmation of given concrete truths point to real knowledge of
being; in turn the absolute character of these affirmations confirms the presence ofAbsolute
Being: which is a sign post pointing towards God.11 Thus Rahner uses Marechal's insight to
modify the Kantian limitations on human knowledge and the Kantian definition of
'transcendence' to include the possibility of the knowledge ofGod, based on this capacity of
the human mind for the absolute and infinite.12 Rahner takes this route because for him,
'God is the presupposition, the "condition of possibility" which Kant ultimately simply left
unexplained'.13
For Rahner, human transcendentality is its openness to mystery, to the divine. He
makes use ofHegel's dialectic of Spirit, in which the perfection of reality is sought, and
modifies it to allow a hierarchy of difference between 'infinite and finite modes ofbeing.'14
Absolute being is both the immanent cause ofmodes of becoming, as well as being distinct
7
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from them. Hegel is further evident in Rahner's doctrine of finite substances, which 'entails
the immanence of absolute Being.'15 He takes up Heidegger's question on the 'Being of
beings' and transforms it into a defining spiritual characteristic of humanity: humans are in
search ofBeing because they are open to the source of Being who is God, and hence to the
possibility of religious faith in God.16 This existential openness to God forms part of the
foundation of Rahner's 'phenomenology of the experience ofGod.'17 At the same time,
Rahner's turn to the subjective entails a rejection of the otherworldly 'spiritual beyond,' in
favor of the world of the senses, while maintaining this possibility of a metaphysics of being.
Human beings have an intuition of this infinite, a pull towards the absolute of God, which is
never realized in the world, but is only approached asymptotically. This 'projective
anticipation' of the divine is what constitutes human 'spirituality.'18 Michael Purcell locates
the deeper significance of Rahner's transcendental theology here, in human existence as a
'response to that mysterious other', which even supercedes 'being' as we know it.19 Human-
transcendentality is a key concept for Rahner's entire theological system, and will be
examined in more detail in §3.2.
The 'unsurpassable climax of revelation' is, for Rahner, the incarnation of God in
history in the person of Jesus Christ, when God's self-communication reaches its highest
point.20 It is here that God's love for the world is fully and finally revealed, and here can be
found the true heart of Rahner's theology. If human yearning and uncertainty form the heart
of his anthropology, then his theology is an outworking of God's loving answer to this
situation. That answer can be summed up in Rahner's faith that God in Jesus Christ loves
us: our journey 'always ultimately ends in the arms of an eternally good, eternally powerful
God'.21 This is revelation in 'the absolute sense': God has declared himself decisively and
finallyfor humanity as salvation, forgiveness and love. In Christ, revelation is closed,
because in him, 'the definitive Reality which resolves history proper is already here.' The
incarnation is the final word ofGod, because in it, God and the world 'have become one,
forever without confusion, but forever undivided.'22 This closing of Revelation is positive,
not negative, because in this decisive event, all the plenitude of God is included for the
world, and nothing of it is excluded. Prior to Christ, the utterances ofGod were an
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anticipatory shadow of the things to come. In Christ, the fullness of reality has arrived.
The closed nature of revelation in Christ does not preclude the possibility of new
insight. Rahner's idea of human transcendentality as an orientation to the absolute explains
why he is not satisfied with any purely dogmatic or authoritative statement of doctrine,
because such would attempt to seal up and complete all that could be said theologically on a
topic, thus limiting the potentially infinite by the finite. He supposes that human words
alone cannot capture all that this transcendent yearning implies, so that human words and
doctrines will always fall short of the truth they are intended to embody. While rejecting
historical relativism by accepting that God has truly revealed himself in the acts recorded by
Scripture, and most especially in the life of Christ, Rahner insists these words remembering
the events cannot capture all the truth the events contained, because human words are simply
not able to capture all truth. This allows for the possibility of the development of doctrine
and dogma over time, as further insight into the truths of a particular event are gained by
people of different times, languages, and cultures.23 Historical, cultural, and scientific
developments are therefore important for uncovering the fullness of truth in any given event
ofGod's action in the world, because they may reveal aspects of a doctrine previously
unavailable.
This attitude towards the importance of history and culture in interpreting truth
allows Rahner practical flexibility in his approach to revelation and dogma, while granting
ultimate authority on what is orthodoxy to the church.24 Though he has a high view
Scripture as the 'absolute norm' for the theologian25, maintaining that God has revealed
himself in the 'scripturally normed teaching authority' of the church26, his conceptual
framework is largely built upon the philosophical worldview of his transcendental
anthropology. This framework plays a key interpretative role in his program, sometimes
seeming to eclipse the Scripture, though acknowledging that the end of the apostolic witness
completes revelation in Christ.27 Louis Roberts points to Rahner's use of the witness and
theological technique of the early church as a model hermeneutic.28 The apostles




Rahner, Till, 110. Rahner says, 'For theologians Scripture is indeed the absolute norm. But it is
not because the revelation imparted by God takes place originally and for the first time in these human
statements as such, but rather because in them the original experience of the Spirit and of its
eschatological address to man in Jesus Christ has been objectified in a form which has abiding validity
and with a purely normative force.'






reality in words. But they were not left with words alone: the Spirit was also given to them.
By that Spirit they continued to wrestle with the mystery of God's love in Christ. So the
church is ever dependent upon both Spirit and Word. As the gospel and the living reality of
Christ continue to encounter new cultures and new philosophies, they have ever-new things
to say, more of transcendent reality to illuminate. Thus a kind of evolution of truth takes
place as history proceeds, which continues to explicate those past experiences ofGod's
interaction with the world, as new insights are added to old. Some of these might even
eclipse older valued insights. Rahner does not use modern presuppositions or transcendental
arguments to try to prove the tenets ofChristian faith. Rather, he presupposes faith, and tries
to show that it is sufficiently grounded in the depths of human transcendental experience to
be credible to, and coherent in, the modem age.29
Sensitive to the theological challenges posed by the rise of science, Rahner has
sought to interact creatively with these. In fact, he insists that modem theology 'must
engage consistently in direct dialogue with the modem natural and social sciences', to be
heard in today's culture.30 His use of evolutionary theory provides an example of both his
general epistemological method and this interaction. He combines his Christology with an
evolutionary worldview, supposing that all of history is a 'divinely energized unfolding of
.. .reality' moved along by God's transcendent causality. History is significant for the person
of faith, and allows one to affirm Christ's role in the process of evolution, and Christ as end
goal of that evolutionary process. God's creative Spirit transcendently directs the process in
which the human spirit, 'drawn to the divine Spirit, reaches toward and actually becomes
itself the goal of historical development'.31 Evolution allows the created possibility of that
communion between God and humanity that is realized in Christ. As such, evolution
demonstrates how human existence takes place in unity with the rest of the cosmos, and
individual histories take place within the history ofChrist and humanity as a whole.
Rahner's theological use of evolutionary theory will be examined further in §3.4.1 & §3.5.2.
This approach to contemporary culture is typical of Rahner.
Rahner addresses the possibility of the existence of extra-terrestrials and the related
idea ofmultiple incarnations as possible implications ofmodem science that theology must
take seriously. He is open to the possibility that an evolving and creatively fruitful universe
might have given rise to other rational beings besides humans. He even finds a place for
angels in such an evolutionary perspective. He is aware of the difficulties posed by modem
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that seeks coherence rather than absolute correspondence between science and theology.
These issues will be examined in §3.2, §3.4, and §3.5.
This introduction to Rahner's thought has been necessarily brief and selective. His
approach may be summarized as a Christocentric theology engaged in transcendental
anthropology. Significant features of his overall program have been set aside in the interest
of the main anthropological theme. For instance, this analysis will largely bypass his
devotional or mystical writings, his theology of the 'anonymous Christian,' and his
engagement with eschatology and the Church, among other things. Those issues germane to
the subject will occupy the central focus, particularly Rahner's assessment of human nature
and the incarnation, and his engagement with related issues from modem science.
3.2 The Uniqueness of Human Nature
3.2.1 The definition ofhuman nature
Rahner's defines human nature as that which is indefinable: humanity is 'an
indefinability come to consciousness of itself.32 No 'categorical definition' is sufficient to
encompass the bounds of human nature, because that nature has no bounds33: its bounds
could be limited only if there were a limit to what humans are concerned with, and to what is
concerned with humans. But there is no such limit - human concerns are boundless and
unlimited. Because even in relation to knowing itself human nature is not able to grasp this
unlimited boundlessness, that nature is fundamentally a mystery. This mystery must be seen
in the context of the wider horizon of the absolute mystery of God, because of human
openness to God. "When we have said everything about ourselves that can be described and
defined, we have still said nothing about ourselves, unless we have included or implied the
fact that we are beings who are referred to the incomprehensible God." Rahner defines
'mystery' as that which is ultimately incomprehensible, not merely that which is now
unknown but one day to be revealed. Even to the beatific vision - the state of the fullness of
knowing in which the knower will 'know as he is known' - God will yet remain
incomprehensible, more than can ever be grasped or understood.34
32 Rahner, T14: More Recent Writings (DLT, 1966), 107.
33 Michael J. Walsh, The Heart ofChrist in the Writings ofKarl Rahner (Rome: Universita
Gregoriana Editrice, 1977), 69.
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Rahner elaborates his definition of human nature in terms of transcendence, and
begins to frame a background from which to perceive the place of humanity in the cosmos.
"Human beings are bodily creatures who have a fundamentally unlimited transcendentality
and unlimited openness to being as such in knowledge and freedom." Even though it may be
possible to compare various features of general animal and human life (some animals may
use rudimentary tools, some may have rudimentary speech, etc.), that human beings are
uniquely different from animals in theological perspective in that 'human consciousness
possesses that unlimited transcendentality in which there is present an openness, capable of
legitimizing itself, to the absolute reality ofGod'.35 Rahner terms this openness and capacity
for the life ofGod, which will ultimately take the form of a call to communion with God in
Christ, the supernatural existential.36 Human beings are the only creatures within the
cosmos that possess this absolute openness to the reality of God distinct from the cosmos.
Purcell identifies this as Rahner's essential theological orientation to 'the Other'.37 Humans
are unique in that they are constituted in such a way as to be able to hear God: they are able
to receive the revelation ofGod's self because of their openness to the Absolute. In contrast
to Barth, who maintained the complete dependence of human beings upon the grace of God
for any perception ofGod whatsoever, Rahner's transcendental anthropology defines
humanity as already oriented towards the open-ended infinite - already having the capacity
and potential for this divine self-communication.38 If this were not so, humanity would not
have been the appropriate vessel for the incarnation. For if God becomes human, 'there must
be some characteristic of [human being] that enables him to be assumed by God as his own
reality in the world.'39 At the same time, this is a grace-dependent situation, because it is
God's grace that moves at every level of the development of the cosmos to move it closer to
the place where it may engage in full communion with God.40 Humanity is not the enemy of
grace, but is utterly dependent upon grace for its very being and existence.
It is the potential for 'immediacy to God' that characterizes human nature that
requires theology to have an anthropological emphasis.41 This transcendental anthropology,
though theologically apprehended, finds warrant from certain objective features of human
35 Rahner, 7727, 42-43; Purcell, MM, xiii.
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nature. Human beings are oriented towards the infinite, evident in religion, mathematics,
and the human imagination. They are never satisfied with a merely instinctive life, nor with
the given of their Tot.' They are always striving, even after 'vanity' (Ecc. 2:22-23). The
theologian may assert that God 'has set eternity in the hearts of humans' (Ecc. 3:11), but this
is universally visible as human yearning. All this natural world is and has to offer is not
enough for the human, cannot answer the need of his deepest being. Thus, 'man is a
question to which there is no answer'.42 Perhaps for this reason, only humans wrestle with
the specter ofmeaninglessness. The theological conception of the correspondence of the
human being to God, revealed in the 'relational-dynamic conception of the imago deV in
humanity, indicates that theology must have such an anthropocentric focus.43
The sense of being lost in the cosmos is, according to Rahner, an important signpost
that marks human beings as unique. In retrospect , it is an inevitable result of being
contingent creatures created in a finite universe by an infinite God. Formerly human beings
might be able to fool themselves that their world was a relatively small place, and so they in
perspective relatively large and hence the 'center' of things. But what natural science has
done for us is show us in the physical analogy of the vast cosmos what we already knew
theologically: in relation to the infinite God, human beings will always be and feel finite,
contingent, lost. It is this 'very recognition and acceptance of the fact of being lost in the
cosmos [which] actually raises them above it and enables them to realize it as an expression
and a mediation of that ultimate experience of contingency which they, in virtue of their
ancient faith, must perceive and accept before the infinite God as finite creatures'.44
Rahner marks this sense ofhuman awareness of, and displacement before, the
vastness of the cosmos as an aspect of the spiritual component of human nature: it is a mirror
of their cognition of themselves in relation to the infinite, and is manifest in the efforts of
modern physics to measure the universe. These efforts demonstrate again the difference
between matter and spirit, which is able to 'reflect upon itself and its world, and then again
place its world over against itself.45 It is in human awareness of itself, and hence through
humanity in nature's awareness of itself, that nature begins to be seen as being oriented
towards humanity. "[If] Nature does become conscious of itself in him, then Nature is
planned for him, since 'chance' is a word without any real meaning for the natural scientist
42
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who concludes from the result to a movement orientated towards it." Rahner makes this
teleological conclusion of the 'plannedness' of nature as a theological rather than scientific
move: he is clear that he is making a statement of faith.46 Yet he sees a coherence of the two
views, because 'theology sees man as the crown ofGod's creation, while evolutionary theory
interprets hominization as the breakthrough to a new level of being'. That new level is
achieved because in humanity, Nature attains to self-consciousness.47 Keith Ward posits a
similar anthropocentric focus in nature. Humanity possesses a special dignity and status in
the cosmos, because in it the universe becomes aware of itself and because human reason
brings to light truth; in it, 'reason thrives and grows, and understands itselfmore fully by its
own activity'.48
Rahner maintains a unity ofmatter and spirit that is evident in the entire creation,
and particularly in human nature. He opposes a platonic dualism that would rend asunder
the spiritual (yet also physical) nature ofhumanity and the material essence ofNature. He
insists that the spirit must be regarded as a goal ofNature. The human spirit in particular is
the concrete manifestation of that goal. "Nature found herself in him, in spite of all the
physical powerlessness of the individual man." A dualism that separates the spiritual and
material will lead to the unacceptable result of spirit being seen as the enemy ofNature, as
existing separately from Nature, or ofmerely using 'the material world as a kind of exterior
stage'. Even the spiritual consummation of human nature at the eschaton only takes place in
the context of the redemption of the rest of the material cosmos: they are inextricably
bound.49
3.2.2 Humanity in relation to the rest ofNature
Rahner raises the question of the human in relation to the animal kingdom, and asks
whether we could even know if a similar ability to transcendence existed in the animals. His
conclusion is that although there may be a degree of transcendence in the animals, the fact
that this degree is surpassed by humanity means that we can be fairly treated in a separate
category from animals by theology. Rahner is particularly concerned here to address the
issue of the distinction of humanity raised by the theory of evolution. It is his answer to the
attempt of the natural sciences to reduce human being to what is otherwise only accessible
from that (natural science) realm. "Because of the transcendentality of human beings, they
46
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possess an element in their nature which forbids us simply to reduce them to that reality
which otherwise appears in natural science and which limits its area."50 Ward concurs that
while evolutionary processes may physically describe the origin ofhumanity in a natural
science sense, they cannot describe that origin in a religious or ultimate ontological sense.
That is because such a level of origin is beyond the purview of the natural sciences.51 Yet
even taken from the physical evolutionary point-of-view, the process has climactically
produced in humanity beings with rational souls. The idea of 'soul' is contentious in the
modern materialistic context, but Rahner's use of the term can be affirmed without going
into the intricacies of that argument because he uses it to emphasize the rational and
transcendent qualities of human beings. In Rahner's system, other beings in the cosmos
may or may not have this same rational quality, but 'the important point is that all rational
souls do possess a special dignity and status' in the entire evolutionary scheme.52 This is
because they are conscious toward the infinite.
It is because human beings are part spirit that they can never be completely
identified with nature. Rahner believes this is affirmed by philosophy as well as theology.
There is an 'absolutely fundamentally legitimate development of the philosophical
understanding of the human person, in which the latter gradually came to be seen, not so
much as part of a cosmos, but as a transcendental subject with a world ofhis own which he
projects in thought and action'.53 The mystery of human being is that it is both nature and
spirit. The human spirit is that aspect of human nature that is oriented towards the infinite
and transcendent, that is aware of 'what is beyond the physical,' yet in a way that is
embedded in the natural world of sense experience.54 Humans 'cannot deny themselves and
become merely a part of nature, an animal with technical sophistication; nor can they so act
as if the spiritual center of the person in its autonomy and freedom were somehow elevated
above, and free from, nature'. Human beings are part of nature, and yet apart from it. As
such they have a role 'as the measure of all things'. Yet they are not the answer to their own
question; neither is there an answer to human transcendentality anywhere else within the
purely natural realm. "Those who [have] attempted to ground themselves in themselves have
fallen into an unfathomable abyss."55 Only orientation towards God, only in God, is there
any hope of a resolution of this unanswerable question. God, the infinite, the eternal, the
50
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transcendent, the incomprehensible and yet immanent in Christ, is that answer. He is the
'answer to the question ofmeaning ofman in his wholeness'.56
Transcendentality and unlimited openness to God, the subjectivity of the human
person, make humanity the center of the cosmos. Leo O'Donovan comments that in light of
the Christian beliefs that evolution has intentionally and actively culminated in the presence
of the redeeming creator in the universe (Christ bom of woman), and that humans can
therefore now look forward to union with God, humanity cannot adequately be described by
natural processes or 'Nature' alone. "On the contrary, nature can only be fully understood
with reference to humanity."57 Humanity in its own nature and history provides the key to
understanding the cosmos. Rahner elaborates on that significance: "A personal and free
subjectivity oriented in unlimited transcendentality to being purely and simply (and
consequently, to the ground of being which is God) is the center of the cosmos, even though
this human subjectivity rests on a materiality which as such cannot be regarded as the center
of all that is material, even if it made sense at all to speak of a material center of this material
cosmos."58 Such cosmic centrality is based upon humanity's unique (apparently - until such
time as some other being is discovered with a similar property) mental orientation to the
infinite. He dislocates the materiality of human subjectivity from that center as a response to
the Copemican principle as well as to the possible dualism ofmental vs. physical.59 It is not
the material substance or 'substrate' of human beings that reveals their uniqueness, but the
cognitive orientation towards the eternal that has arisen on that substrate.
Humanity would be doomed to be frustrated in its attempts to realize its
transcendence, if it were not for the grace ofGod: the goal is 'unattainable for the natural
powers ofman.' Nevertheless, because of God's grace, 'the Christian knows that this history
of the cosmos as a whole will find its real consummation despite, in and through the freedom
ofman, and that its finality as a whole will also be its consummation'.60 Barth described this
as God's covenant with humanity extending to embrace all of the cosmos. "It is man in
covenant with God who reveals this plan. He does so representatively for the whole
cosmos.... He alone sheds light on the cosmos. As he is light, the cosmos is also light. As
God's covenant is disclosed, the cosmos is shown to be embraced by the same covenant."61
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The soteriological reality of the incarnation, and the eschatological hope provided by that
reality promise to humanity and to the cosmos a redemption of consummation, rather than
annihilation. That future fulfillment of the cosmos is the point at which God, as the
'absolute future', will be all in all.62
3.3 The Significance of the Incarnation
Rahner believes that in the incarnate Jesus, 'God has uttered himself to man
victoriously and unsurpassably' as the blessed and ultimate response to that question which
humanity is in itself.63 His approach to the incarnation significantly elevates human nature.
He analyzes the relation between the Logos and human nature in the incarnation, asking
whether human nature is simply 'a mask assumed from without, from behind which the
Logos hides to act things out in the world'. His conclusion is that no, human nature 'is the
constitutive, real symbol of the Logos himself. The Logos is the Father's Word, and in the
incarnation, it has emptied itself into the non-divine, but when this happens, 'that precisely is
bom which we call human nature'. Hence, 'man is possible, because the exteriorization of
the Logos is possible'.64
Furthermore, the creation itself reaches a climax in the incarnation. "For the fact
that God himself is man is both the unique summit and the ultimate basis of God's
relationship to his creation, in which he and his creation grow in direct (and not in converse)
proportion. This positive nature of creation, not merely measured in relation to nothingness
but also in relation to God, reaches its qualitatively unique climax, therefore, in Christ."66 In
other words, creation and incarnation are not two separate and unrelated moves of God in
relation to the cosmos, but are of one and the same initiative: the initiative ofGod's self-
communication. The creation is a portion of the movement in which 'God becomes world'
in the event of the incarnation: God creating material reality because it will one day be 'the
environment of his own materiality.'66 Thus Jesus has not become human as if the
incarnation were a divine after-thought to the 'fall'. Rather, human being is what it is
because it is predestined to be like Jesus, predestined to be conformed to his likeness, and
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prepared ahead of time as human being for this purpose. It can be formed into the image of
God precisely because of that preparation. This and no other nature are ready to such union.
Braine agrees that from the beginning of creation, God intended to become
incarnate, and 'in the very act of creation set what it would mean for a created being to be by
adoption and grace a son of God.'67 The Scripture witnesses to this unified intention of
creation towards incarnation and the saving work of Christ. Braine maintains that the
incarnation is the only possible route to a real satisfying communion between God and his
creatures. This is because without God taking upon himself creaturehood, the created realm
can never transcend its finiteness, and so can never deeply and satisfyingly relate with its
infinite Creator. Only in the sharing of the divine nature made possible by the incarnation
does the finite being receive the gift of transcending its finiteness. Though humans are
inherently beings of transcendentality, they cannot achieve the realization of this nature until
they are in Christ: and even then, only in the Spirit as a sort of down payment on what will
be fully realized in the eschatological future. The incarnation of the Son of God was planned
first, and then suitable beings were created to make possible the incarnation: beings that by
virtue of all that took placed in the incarnation would become capable of the type of infinite
relationship which already exists among the persons of the godhead. This is the meaning of
their adopted 'sonship': that they are capable of and invited into infinite personal relationship
with the infinite God, characterized by the love of the Father for the Son, and the Son for the
Father, whose love together gives rise to the fruitfulness of the Spirit.68
Rahner believes creation can be considered Christocentric because it is from its
beginning made for the eventuality of incarnation. "The creation occurs in the Logos and the
Logos has always been ordered toward the assumption of a material nature, a humanity, the
concrete personality of Jesus ofNazareth."69 Vass describes Rahner's centering of human
salvation from creation as the 'precondition' in grace of human partnership with God.70
When God takes on human nature in Christ, the final consummation and goal of the cosmos
comes to fruition. The cosmos transcends itself and reaches it 'final consummation' not just
in the created spiritual creature humanity, but when it
receives the ultimate self-communication of its ultimate ground itself, in that
moment when this direct self-communication of God is given to the spiritual creature
in what we call.. .grace and glory. God does not merely create something other than
himself - he also gives himself to this other.71
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It is in a particular human nature, a single human person, that God displays 'his own
reality to the world'.72 This is the essence of the incarnation: God giving himself to
humanity in the person of Jesus Christ. This may give cause for the 'scandal of
particularity,' but is justified by the dogma of the Word become flesh.73 The cosmos comes
to fruition in him, and human nature is by this 'enfleshment' of God given a unique honor
and glory. 'It is a fact of faith that when God desires to manifest himself, it is as a man that
he does so', a man with a physical body, just like the rest of humanity. "If we want to know
what man is, or what flesh means, then we must, so to speak, choose this theological
definition of the statement 'And the Word became flesh,' saying: flesh, man as a bodily,
concrete, historical being is just what comes into being when the Logos, issuing from
himself, utters himself. Man is therefore God's self-utterance, out of himself into the empty
nothingness of the creature."74
Rahner insists that God the immutable may be thought of as taking on the mutable
nature of humanity. While God is immutable in himself, he may become mutable when he
becomes something in another. The non-divine reality of the creaturely realm becomes the
'grammar ofGod's possible self-expression \75 God can express himself in the Logos as a
creature: the possibility of that realization becomes the ground upon which creaturehood
itself becomes possible. As Rahner puts it, 'the possibility that there be men is grounded in
the greater, more comprehensive and more radical possibility of God to express himself in
the Logos which becomes a creature'. He insists this is so, because otherwise, the humanity
ofGod in the incarnation would be reduced to a kind of docetic disguise for the real God.76
The humanity of Christ is not just a facade for God's appearance, as if his humanity were
some kind of 'vaporous and empty apparition' that has no value in comparison to the nature
of God that it manifests. Rahner insists, "Since God himself 'goes out of himself, this form
of his existence has the most radical validity, force and reality."77 In Trinitarian perspective,
God as the giver becomes the same as God the gift in Jesus.78 In him, the immutable Word
ofGod, the eternal Logos becomes human.
Rahner rejects the tendency to monophysitism and docetism ofmuch traditional
Christology, which gave lip service to the hypostatic union, but ended up downplaying the
humanity of Christ, and over-emphasizing his deity. He interprets the incarnation based on
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the hermeneutical principle of the Council of Chalcedon which balanced the two natures of
Christ, and insists that to be faithful to that principle, Christ must be seen as a real human
being, with experiences that are essentially one with humanity in all ways, except sin.
Maintaining the balance between the two natures becomes possible only if human nature is
already in its bodily essence fit for that union prior to the incarnation. That the Word could
and did become human flesh (John 1:14) does not just elevate humanity, but reveals that
human nature was already elevated and prepared: the correct nature in which God might
appear. "The being ofman is what comes into existence when God utters himself into the
otherness of nothingness; and that means man, in so far as he is sarx."79 The incarnation
becomes possible because humanity as such is ready for it; God can take on human nature
because it alone, unlike other creatures definable apart from transcendence, 'can exist in total
dispossession of itself, and comes therein to the fulfillment of its own incomprehensible
, 80
meaning .
In light of the incarnation, the creation itselfmust be regarded as Christologically
anthropocentric. Creation, as freely decreed by God and taking a Christocentric form, is
organized and aimed at the creation of humanity.81 This is so because it is created with the
incarnation as its goal. For the incarnation is what happens when 'God wills to become non-
God.'82 The Logos is the abbreviated code word for God in the god-less universe, whose
form is human being: the human being who is the Son ofMan, and humanity that exists in
the final analysis because it was destined to be the vehicle of that incarnation. The cosmos
was created with the goal of this ultimate self-revelation of God, which takes place in
humanity, specifically in the Logos, the Son ofMan. In Vass's words, 'Jesus must be the
highest realization of all creation'.83 For this reason, Rahner maintains that anthropology
finds its beginning and ending in Christology. Anthropology must ultimately be theology, if
it is to capture the proper truth of human nature.
What Christ has accomplished exalts humanity further in God's grace. Barth
observes that the incarnation ofGod exalts humanity, not to the status of deity, but rather in
fellowship of life with God, to the 'status of children'.84 No other beings in the cosmos,
whether angels or animals, are given or expected to have this status. The incarnation is a
manifestation ofGod's desire to enter into relationship with humanity. It is this desire that
makes theology inherently anthropocentric, because God has willed it so, through His
79 Walsh, The Heart ofChrist, 75, 80-81.
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grace.85 At the same time, humanity can only discover what it was meant to be when it
surrenders itself to the worship ofGod, and transforms its anthropocentrism into
theocentrism. As such, God is the actual meaning of human life.86
[Man's] is a Christ-centered being, i.e. his being possesses an ontic and spiritual-
personal capacity for communicating with Jesus Christ in whom God has forever
made the countenance ofman his own and has opened the reality ofman, with an
unsurpassable finality, in the direction ofGod; only thus was the real possibility of a
direct communion of all men with God established with finality. Hence we can only
speak ultimately ofGod by engaging even in the midst of all this [theology] in
anthropology; and ultimately any information about anthropology, about the nature
and dignity ofman, can be given only when we engage in theology about God and
from God.87
Not only is man's meaning and destiny fulfilled in Christ, it can only be fulfilled in Christ.
One could imagine the situation if the Son of God had determined not to become
incarnate, so that humanity remained, as it were, an experiment at a distance, an objective
event among many events initiated by God. From such an imaginary point of view,
humanity's theological status in the cosmos would seem to be indeterminate. But the
incarnation confers a dignity and importance to humanity because it is precisely for them
that the Word of God has become one of them: yet not only for them, but also then through
them for the whole of creation. God has stepped down from pure objectivity to become
subjectively involved with his creatures, and so conferred upon them supreme nobility: he
will always be one of them. He is only Christ in and for humanity, the meaning of his
mission in his incarnation only fulfilled as he suffers, dies, and is raised to life on behalf of
human beings. The rest of creation receives the benefits: it will find its consummation in
redeemed humanity. But it is on the salvation of the children of God that his mission is
focused. Christ incarnate allows us to speak, with Barth, of the 'humanity of God'.
Rahner's version of human nature prepared as the proper vehicle for incarnation
leads to a more highly 'divinized' version of the 'children of God' than Barth's. These
created beings receive an adopted sonship in that they receive this infinite capability for and
relationship with God as a gift of grace, in contrast to Christ's 'native' sonship. The union of
divine and human nature becomes potentially almost equivalent to the hypostatic union in
Jesus Christ, whenever a person accepts God's love in the body of Christ. This is because
the 'bestowal of the Spirit...works an "assumption" of our human natures into the divine life
that is at least analogous to the Logos' assumption of a human nature bom ofMary.'88 The
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difference between human potential to realized divinity as children of God and the hypostatic
union in Jesus of Nazareth is that his godhood is 'perfect and irreversible,' so that he both
receives and offers God's gracious presence to the rest of humanity; we, on the other hand,
only receive.89
Vass points out that despite the confusing nature ofmany of Rahner's statements on
the subject, he nevertheless holds to an actual historical resurrection by Jesus Christ from the
dead.90 Rahner famously said, 'Jesus has risen into the faith of his disciples',91 which can be
read as a kind ofpsychological interpretation of the nature of the resurrection. But that is not
all that Rahner meant by the resurrection. He posited that there were two necessary events.
First, the historical event of the man conquering death, though not exactly historical in the
sense of all other historical events, since it involves 'rising into the inconceivability ofGod'
- something not shared by other historical events.92 Second, the event of the faith it inspired
in his disciples. The resurrection is a necessary feature of his metaphysical system, in that it
correlates with the already-present transcendentality of human nature. Human beings
already have this (subconscious) drive or hope for eternal life, and finding it fulfilled in one
particular person (Jesus Christ) is a natural extension of reality that matches this given
interiority of the human situation.93 Rahner's system of transcendental anthropology allows
him to 'expect' the resurrection in this sense. Thus his metaphysical system is not entirely
dependent upon the scriptural account, though the biblical evidence remains for him part of
fundamental theology. Rahner does not insist that historical investigation can prove the
resurrection: 'It can be said that by "historical" means we would not reach the resurrection of
Jesus, but only the conviction of his disciples that he is alive'.94 But our own transcendental
expectations allow us to grasp that resurrection as a foretaste of our own, and so accept the
witness of the Apostles.95
Rahner moves from the resurrection to comment on the implications ofChrist's
uniqueness, and describes the character of that infinite possibility of relationship as, among
other things, being freed from death. The Resurrection is the sign of this freedom.
Humanity is unique in creation in that it is the object ofGod's love in such a way that it
already, if only in part, 'stands beyond death's demarcation line, which distinguishes God
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allows Christian orthodoxy to 'start unabashedly with man, with his experience ofhimself,
with his existence. And... allow[s] us to end with man, too'.96
3.4 Rahner's Response to some Scientific Challenges
The typical view held by many in the name of natural science is that humanity is
weak, hapless and an accidental product of nature, and is doomed to be indifferently
swallowed up by it.97 Humanity has no purpose in the cosmos, 'for the simple reason that
the universe has no purpose.'98 In language reminiscent of Sagan regarding humanity's
apparent insignificance in the cosmos, Rahner expresses the dilemma in which modem
Christians find themselves.
Nowadays the Christian has to live on a tiny planet in a solar system which in its
turn is part of a galaxy of a hundred thousand light years with thirty billion stars and
whereby this galaxy is estimated to be only one of a billion such galaxies in the
universe. In such a universe it is certainly not easy for human beings to feel that
they are the ones for whom this cosmos ultimately exists. In [such] a cosmos .. .it is
quite possible for human beings to feel that they are an accidental, marginal
phenomenon, particularly when they know themselves to be the product of an
evolution which itself has to work with numerous and improbable accidents.99
Such a perspective - Rahner's restatement of the Copemican Principle - may easily give rise
to an 'existential dizziness,' to being 'lost in the cosmos.'100
Yet Rahner does not conclude that the pessimism of this modem mindset is justified
or, indeed, even scientific. He calls this view of humanity as a 'marginal phenomenon' pre-
scientific, pre-philosophical, and pre-theological. Though modem Western thought typically
accepts this 'Copemican anthropology', Rahner has already begun to show how actual
human nature contradicts this view (§3.2). He makes a strong case for recognition of human
capacity that transcends the interpretive confines supposedly offered by 'chance' and 'blind'
nature. It is not enough to judge the matter on the basis of the physical geographic of a tiny
location in a small comer of the overall universe. This Copemican geographic fails to note
the acutely scientific fact ofhuman self-consciousness, of the directedness of natural
processes that must be taken to make this possible, and of the human capacity that has
developed in the history of the cosmos to begin directing those natural processes. It is
96 Rahner, 7777, 63, 67.
97 Rahner, FCF, 188.
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because in humanity, matter becomes conscious of itself, and by being self-conscious
humanity begins to stand over and against matter, that natural science must recognize the
unique and cosmically vital importance of humanity. Rahner concludes that both science
and theology must recognize that human beings have some unique characteristics that set
them apart from all other creatures.101
The idea of human origins as a 'directed' product of nature suggests teleology that is
unwelcome to many scientists.102 But Rahner argues that because humanity is recognized as
a product of nature by natural science, and not as a being alien to those processes forced into
the cosmos by some artificial transcendent cause, therefore human nature must be seen as the
directed product of nature itself. Though this idea of 'directedness' in a teleological sense is
primarily a theological conclusion, it can be shown to be coherent with the scientific
perspective.
Understanding Rahner's intention here yields an important insight into his overall
method. In general, rather than using science to prove theological positions, Rahner is
seeking to express the coherence of scientific and theological ideas. Faith and theology
stand on their own as independent sources of the truth of reality. The methodological limits
of science forbid it from making extensive statements beyond its naturalistic limits, since it is
a priori seeking to describe reality within those limits. Theology transcends science
epistemologically, because it can already show the limitations of scientific methodology in
the human orientation towards the transcendent. Therefore Rahner is seeking to demonstrate
that some of the scientific data and its provisional conclusions can be taken as coherent with
theological truth, though their method and limits are fundamentally different.
The idea of evolutionary directedness is a specific example of Rahner's method.
Since the end result of natural processes is humanity, the scientist can 'infer from the result
at least a movement directed towards it.'103 Rahner's rejection of 'meaningless chance' as a
valid scientific explanation for this circumstance has already been highlighted.104 Such
explanations are rejected as a theological move, acknowledging that science is limited in
what it can say on the matter. The concept of 'directedness' in relation to evolutionary
history deserves more careful analysis, especially as more elaborate scientific theories have
been sought in recent years to explain the apparent 'directedness' of the evolutionary process
without appealing to God.
101 Rahner, FCF, 188.
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3.4.1. Theology and evolutionary theory
Rahner presupposes an evolutionary worldview, and seeks to make incarnation and
Christology coherent and compatible with such a view. He does not force that compatibility,
as if the incarnation could be regarded as a necessary product or goal of evolution. The
incarnation must in a certain sense stand in 'direct and simple contradiction' to human
knowledge of evolution, because otherwise the theologian would be turning faith and
revelation into philosophy and rationalism.105 Rather he wants to show that there is an
affinity between the incarnation and an evolutionary worldview.
Rahner makes a case for an ontological interpretation of the scientific data, without
too strongly binding himself to the technical details of that data of evolution. This is not to
say that divine action could be discerned at the microscopic level at any particular stage of
the process.106 The divine process is describable on the ontological, rather than the scientific,
level. Rahner maintains that from the retrospective position offered by the incarnation of
Christ, one must look back theologically and say that God has been guiding the process to
this incarnate end from the beginning.
Just as lower orders were the prelude to human transcendentality, so other successive
self-transcendent moments in the evolutionary process had preceding lower orders. Human
nature is the end result of evolutionary history, but is itself the prelude to the highest order of
all in the incarnation. If evolution is regarded as the process ofnature's 'inward unfolding',
taking place as a drive to self-consciousness on the part ofmatter, then human beings can be
regarded as the summit of the process, in which self-consciousness has finally come to
fruition. Human transcendentality is the conscious, 'deliberate version of what all material
existence strives after'.107 But if humanity is the actual 'breakthrough point' of this
evolutionary drive towards inwardness, 'then in human nature one can find the cosmos
"disclosed" in a fundamental way', and 'find a central revelation of what the evolutionary
eons have been up to.'108 From the perspective of consciousness, human nature is a
crowning achievement of the evolutionary process; however it is more than this: it is the
fulfillment of an inner dynamic of ever-increasing complexity and ever-increasing
transcendence evident in the cosmos from the beginning of time. That human self-
consciousness is a cause for wonder is not particularly contentious. But Rahner insists that it
105 Rahner, FCF, 179.
106 Rahner is not wrestling with the scientific data in any kind of technical sense such as that suggested
by Intelligent Design (ID) theory (see William A. Dembski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between
Science & Theology (IVP, 1999). See §7.3.3.
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can be seen as the ultimate version of the drive to increased complexity evident in the entire
evolutionary process. That it should be regarded as the ultimate climax of the process is
indicated by the fact that in humanity, self-awareness and transcendentality open material
reality directly to conscious relationship with the Absolute. In theological terms, human
beings have the highest capacity in creation for direct personal conscious relationship with
God.
How is the evolutionary process able to result in beings that have become 'more'
than earlier beings? Rahner identifies this as the problem of 'becoming'.109 He describes
this process, evident at each stage of evolution, as the process of self-transcendence. Self-
transcendence is possible and explicable, according to Rahner, only by an empowering
provided by the Absolutely Transcendent. Otherwise there is no source within the finite
order that could 'inspire' it to this self-transcendence. God is the 'cause and primordial
ground' of this process of self-transcendence, in the sense that it is God who actively
upholds and enables the material cosmos to transcend itself in this way.110 He enables the
world to move in the direction of self-transcendence, having designed the cosmos to make
that process possible."1 Rahner emphasizes grace as the key to understanding God's
relationship to the entire cosmos. God's grace enables the cosmic process from its beginning
to its end in finite humanity's capacity to self-transcendence. At each stage of cosmic
evolution, grace is the actively sustaining presence of God's love and self-communication
enabling created matter to become more than itself. The human characteristic of
transcendentality is likewise only made possible by grace: a grace finally illuminated and
fulfilled when God's 'self-communication' becomes complete in the incarnation.112 There,
the full grace of God is completely realized for the creation.113
Rahner does not believe this requires God to 'meddle' with the process of evolution,
interfering with it at given stages in some manner that might or might not be detectable to
science."4 Rather, the natural process unfolds freely and independently in a 'basic cause-
effect pattern', while being subject to transcendent causality, as God constantly upholds,




111 This approach to transcendent causation 'built into' the structure of creation has the advantage of
being able to incorporate either direct or indirect divine causality, for instance in such concepts as ID
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Rahner posits God as the 'ultimate "environment" to which all of the changes that arise
within the independent process' of becoming must orient themselves', perhaps analogous to
a magnetic field that orients iron filings. So he avoids the typical dichotomy between natural
causes and causal 'acts' of God.115 Hans Urs Von Balthasar agrees that the appearance 'of
humanity is written into nature from the beginning.'116 Michael Schmaus says that though
humanity might be the goal of cosmic processes, natural science could not be called upon to
prove such a thesis.117 Rahner's system has the advantage of giving God's causality a
considerable degree of flexibility, so that science need not be called upon for justification of
an ontological thesis. Oliver Rabut argues - with Teilhard de Chardin's phyletic principle -
that whether or not all God's preparation of the process takes place in time or only from
eternity, 'nothing appears that has not been eternally in preparation'.118 Rahner's position is
similar. It might incline towards deism; except for Rahner the incarnation includes a
decisive move by the transcendent God into the creation.
Rahner calls this gradual development of self-transcendence the history of the
development of spirit out ofmatter. It is an evolutionary history of 'matter discovering itself
in spirit'.119 The culmination of this process is the full emergence of spirit in human nature.
The unity ofmatter and spirit culminates in the transcendent capacity of human beings, such
that when the incarnation finally takes place in the God-Man, that evolutionary history of the
development of spirit is complete. Human nature provides the backdrop for this
development, containing the full realization of unified matter and spirit. Rahner rejects
Platonic spiritualism and naturalistic materialism as monocular, because each confuses its
understanding of the parts of the world with the whole, a whole that is only comprehensible
to holistically understood human nature.120 He insists that dualisms that separate unified
nature are particularly unacceptable to the modem mindset.121 The 'spiritual' aspect of
reality is understandable in modernity in terms of transcendence. Human nature illuminates
the inner structure of reality, and demonstrates that matter and spirit are not enemies or
radically opposed to each other, but form a single unified world.
While Rahner's evolutionary Christology is not as strong as that of Teilhard, he does
present a picture of the appearance of Christ in history that is akin it. Christ is the
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from Teilhard's method, he is not averse to arriving at his conclusions. "If we really
postulate a single history of the whole of reality.. .it would have to be shown how even the
very highest, although essentially new, can be understood as a variation ofwhat existed
previously." Rahner insists that the Logos ofGod has become present in the human nature
of Jesus. He is the asymptotic goal of the evolutionary development ofmatter towards spirit.
In Christ, the world in its graced development reaches out to God, and accepts the 'self-
bestowal ofGod,' such that the limit of the asymptote is reached in the actual presence of
God in human flesh. Rahner maintains that the hypostatic union is something 'that must
occur once and only once when the world begins to enter upon its final phase'. It is the
realization of the ultimate mystery ofGod in flesh, the initiation and 'triumph of the
movement of the world's self-transcendence into absolute closeness to the mystery ofGod'.
The incarnation is 'the necessary and permanent beginning of the divinization of the world as
a whole'.122
John A.T. Robinson agrees, seeing in the Logos the 'principle of the evolutionary
process', fully realized in the incarnation.123 It is a material process, but it culminates in
'spirit' in humanity, and finally in Christ as the highest or fullest expression of spirit.
Rahner's definition of spirit as transcendent rationality allows this. From within the
immanent processes of evolution has emerged that which makes the transcendent destiny of
humanity possible. Humanity is granted a share in that destiny through participation with
Christ. The goal of the evolutionary process may therefore be described theologically in
light of the incarnation as its 'divinization'. In the event of the incarnation, 'matter and
matter's temporal saga come to a glorious term: union with their Creator'. In this way,
Rahner blends Christology and evolutionary theory, and presents a theology consistent with
incarnation and evolution. Christ is the 'absolute savior', the realization and guarantee in a
person of the success of human history and of evolution: in him, God's self-communication
is irreversible.124 Creation and incarnation are part of one single act of God's self-giving and
self-expression to the cosmos. Cosmic history proceeds through ever-fuller self-
transcendence towards that moment when God's self-giving 'can be and is accepted as such.'
Humanity is the being capable of receiving this incarnate self-giving of God.125
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3.4.2. Angels and extra-terrestrials
That God has made a universe suitable for life leads Rahner to the possibility of
extra-terrestrials. While not committing to any view as to the likelihood of their existence, he
believes that extra-terrestrials are at least in principle possible. Since subjectivity and
transcendence are the goals of the cosmos, it might be present elsewhere than in humanity.
"Ifwe imagine the cosmos as a world coming to be, and as oriented in its becoming to
subjectivity, then it is really not to be taken for granted that this aim has been successful only
at the tiny point [in the cosmos] we know as our earth."126 He sees difficulties with the view
that God might develop some other world to the point where intelligent life was possible,
and then 'arbitrarily break it off.' Traditional angelology indicates a theological awareness
that there are other personal beings besides humans in creation. Without committing to
whether angels are an actual reality of the physical realm, or simply required by faith in
revelation, Rahner is amenable to the possibility that they may be an ancient result of
universal evolutionary processes. Thus the angelic activity recorded by Scripture and
affirmed by the church magesterium could be that of beings that have emerged elsewhere in
cosmic history. In other words, angels are in reality extra-terrestrials.
Here Rahner diverges from Pannenberg. While Barth goes so far as to eliminate
angels from consideration by removing them from the material to the spiritual 'heavenly
realm127, Rahner locates them within material reality. He assumes that angels have an
essential connection with the created material cosmos, and are more relevant to us than
'possible "human beings on other planets'" (sentient beings ofmatter and spirit). He grants
that his understanding of angels presents a problem in light of the traditional and biblical
understanding that the angels were present at the creation of the cosmos. Resolution is
sought by comparing the function of angels to principles at the beginning of creation that
have become in some fashion self-conscious, localized, or almost incarnate into the later
cosmos. Or possibly angels might be like the 'unifying themes' apparent in different epochs
of evolution on earth, or the principles of order and unity behind nations described in the
book ofDaniel as the angels of the nations.128
3.4.2.1. Evaluation ofRahner's angelology
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with the implications of extra-terrestrial intelligence. It is unclear whether his angelology is
to be taken literally or metaphorically. He maintains his commitment to Catholic dogma,
including the dogma of angelic reality, yet does not confine himself to the classical dogmatic
picture of angels as transcendent spiritual beings. For example, redefining transcendent
angels as principles present at the beginning of creation does not necessarily result in a
clearer conception more acceptable to the modern mind. Are these principles the laws
governing the unfolding of creation, such as those of basic physics or math? Are they divine
attributes, since otherwise it is difficult to account for their pre-material existence without
resorting to a transcendent heavenly domain? If so, positing such self-conscious
'localizations' of divinity seems perilously close to attributing divinity to the cosmos itself.
Does this mean a whole pantheon of divine attributes inhabits the universe?
Conceptions of angels as unifying themes of evolution or ordering principles of the
nations also seem shaky. Are these themes also personal beings? Which themes in
evolution are the unifying ones? Natural selection? Emergent complexity? Entropy? Are
mathematics, gravity, and the anthropic conditions God's servants, angelic principles of
divine rationality reflected in the cosmos? Are some of these 'angelified' principles
demonic? How do these themes fulfill the role of God's servants in the account of
revelation? How did they speak to Abraham and Mary? Rahner's scheme offers an uneven
fit with the scriptural data, which is by his own admission at the heart of the authoritative
norm of the church's teaching office, and so the primary and most reliable source of
information on angels.129 For instance, Scripture offers an interpretive rule for the meaning
of the symbolic animals as nations in Daniel 7:16-17130, but these creatures are not the same
as the personal beings that visit Daniel and war with each other.131
While Rahner admits theology has a greater grasp of reality than the materialistic
naturalism of science132, he seems to be attempting a definition of angels from within that
methodological limit. As a result, there is no clear and meaningful picture of their
relationship to either material or transcendent reality.
There are parallels here with Rahner's Christology. Although it can be shown that
129 Marshall, TAT, 63.
lj0 In fact, it is angels who deliver these internal rules of symbolic interpretation. John Collins
believes these mles are loose, and the beasts could either represent nations, or rulers/kings of nations
(Daniel: A Commentary on the Book ofDaniel (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993) 312, n306); see also
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his Christology is not simply 'from below',133 it often overlooks the transcendent and pre-
incamate life of the Logos. Rahner admits the Son's divine life has a valid transcendent
existence outside the immanent domain, but his theology has trouble thematically integrating
that existence with the main data of revelation because of his methodological deferral to
modern culture. He reduces the spiritual and material to a single unified domain to avoid
dualism, but in action this appears to cut off the transcendent realm. His angelology is
restricted to the immanent universe in the same way that his Christology avoids that
transcendent realm. Gunton calls this effort to escape from the scriptural worldview to
accommodate the modem mind its own form of dualism.134 Further analysis of this issue
will follow in §3.5.3.
Rahner's ideas on angels are creative theological speculation. He finds non-human
intelligence easily imaginable in a vastly rich universe, and suggests that such might relate to
us differently from our expectations of human communication. The biblical portrayal of •
angels and demons might describe from its contemporary cultural perspective what it looks
like when these highly evolved servants or enemies ofGod move in human affairs. While
the Scripture does not give a complete description of these beings, Rahner's redefinition to
accommodate the modem worldview seems to stretch the concept far beyond the original
scriptural meaning. In contrast to Rahner's immanent approach135, the biblical tradition
seems to indicate that angels are from a transcendent realm, serving God in the cosmos.136
However, if the only reliable data we have on the nature of angels - even in shadowy form -
is in the teaching of the church, then an explanatory model that ignores much of that basic
data might be seen as unwarranted.
3.4.3. The possibility ofmultiple incarnations
Rahner believes that in light of our understanding of the immutability of God and the
identity of the Word (the Logos) with God, that 'it cannot be proved that a multiple
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the existence of extra-terrestrial intelligence (ETI) and the attendant possibility ofmultiple
incarnations has had a long, if not very extensive, history in western thought.138 George
Coyne observes that the possibilities inherent in the consideration of ETI are today some 'of
the most poignant topics on which scientific and religious thought interpenetrate'.139 Is it
possible that Christ has visited other sentient worlds and there shed his human body to
become incarnate, returning to some primal form of the Logos each time?140 Peacocke
insists that modern theology must be able to address the prospect, since it is possible, in a
universe constructed to make the emergence of life and consciousness likely, sentient beings
will have arisen in other solar systems. "Would ET, Alpha-Arcturians, Martians, et ah, need
an incarnation and all it is supposed to accomplish, as much as Homo sapiens on planet
Earth?"141 Ernan McMullin wonders 'how we can dare' to limit the ways the God who
created such an immense universe might relate to such other creatures.142
Since the incarnation plays such a key role in establishing an anthropocentric
cosmos, does human cosmic significance fade before a melange of rational beings spread
across the universe, each with its own incarnation of God?143 This possibility will be
evaluated by examining its coherence with Rahner's internal position on the cosmic
significance of the incarnation. Are multiple incarnations coherent with Scripture? Does the
idea make sense philosophically? Does the immutability ofGod really imply that the
universe is open for multiple incarnations? Does the one known incarnation ofGod in Jesus
138 John Davis, 'Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence and the Christian Doctrine ofRedemption',
Science and Christian Belief 9 (1997), 23-30; Steven J. Dick, 'Cosmotheology: Theological
Implications of the New Universe', in Steven J. Dick, ed., Many Worlds: The New Universe,
Extraterrestrial Life & the Theological Implications (Philadelphia: Templeton, 2000), 197f.
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stake in the 16th century for, among other things, believing in infinitely many worlds. In the 18th
century, Thomas Paine believed the existence of other worlds rendered Christianity obsolete (The
Complete Writings ofThomas Paine Vol. 1, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: Citadel, 1945), 498ff). At
the beginning of the 19th century, Thomas Chalmers wondered whether other beings on other possible
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Christ give sufficient information to rule out the likelihood of other incarnations?
Rahner takes the position that sentient beings on other planets are irrelevant to the
human question. "At the present time it is not only unanswerable, but refers to living beings
which at least up to now have not been incorporated in our own existential and theological
sphere of life and thus existentially and theologically have no more relevance for us than any
sort of "dead" star anywhere in the universe."144 Theologians will be able to say nothing
more about such creatures, and must stick to affirming that the purpose of revelation in
Christ gives them what they need for their own (human) salvation, and doesn't deal with
questions that have no relevance to that purpose.145 This approach appears to set the
question aside; but it has the effect of decentralizing not only humanity, but the whole of
theology in the cosmic scheme, since it surrenders theology's right to infer from known
revelation consequences beyond the human realm. Since by the advance of science and
technology we are able to observe the universe billions of light years away, almost to the
beginning of time, any theology that is unable to engage with reality with such cosmic scope
will soon seem too 'parochial' and antiquated to be credible.
Rahner considers multiple incarnations possible, even though he says theology need
not engage the issue of ETI. But his internal doctrine of the incarnation supports a unique
and cosmically singular event with significance for the history of the whole universe. It is
Jesus Christ, 'in whom God has forever made the countenance ofman his own'' (emphasis
added).146 The incarnation is the 'unsurpassable climax of revelation', when God's self-
communication reaches its highest point.147 It is revelation in 'the absolute sense', so that in
Christ revelation is closed because 'the definitive Reality which resolves history proper is
already here'. Why would such a 'definitive Reality' resolve only human history? For
Rahner, the incarnation is the final word ofGod, because in it, God and the world 'have
become one, forever without confusion, but forever undivided,' and in it, all the plenitude of
God is included for the world, and nothing of it is excluded.148 If there is nothing ofGod
excluded for the world, and the world is part of a unified cosmic history ofmatter and spirit
reaching its climax in Christ, in what sense can 'more' of God be required for some other
part of the cosmos? Rahner maintains that the incarnation we know in Jesus Christ 'appears
as the necessary and permanent beginning of the divinization of the world as a whole'.149
How could such a divinization be limited to the Earth, since Earth is part of the unified
144 Rahner, Til9, 263.
145 Rahner, 7727,52.
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cosmos? By implication, this divinization must be for all material reality. Rahner believes
that 'Man is a personal subject from whose freedom as a subject the fate of the entire cosmos
depends'.150 Clearly he sees humanity as having pan-cosmic significance. Humanity in
Christ already stands 'beyond death's demarcation line'151, and in so doing represents the
rest of creation. Why should another event be required to further an already accomplished
cosmic effect? Such a comprehensive and universal view of God's self-disclosure in the
incarnate Christ seems to exclude the need for other incarnations. Thus speculative multiple
incarnations are not coherent with Rahner's own internal view of the one verified
incarnation.
There are other philosophical and scriptural problems with the notion. An
incarnation of God in the universe requires, by definition, some kind ofmaterial and bodily
existence. Braine draws attention to the distinction between an incarnation as God taking
bodily form, and an indwelling as an occasion in which the spirit ofGod inhabits another
separate (non-divine) bodily being. While an incarnation is unique and specific, an
indwelling may occur in multiple times and places. The witness of the Scripture, the
resurrection, and the church is that Christ came as God incarnate, not simply as an
indwelling ofGod in a person similar to other persons. His incarnation is eternal: 'he will
reign over the house of Jacob forever, and ofhis kingdom there will be no end' (Luke 1:32-
33). It is very specific in its human particularity — of such and such race, tribe and family.
What becomes available to the rest of humanity at Pentecost as a result of Christ's work is an
indwelling of God's presence, not a further incarnation.152 Since there is only 'one eternally
begotten' Son of God (Jn. 3:16), begotten before all worlds (the Nicene Creed), and his
assumption of human form is eternal, his human incarnation precludes incarnations
elsewhere in any other bodily form.
Johannes Brenz had observed this property of the incarnation as long ago as the 16th
Century, a consequence of the doctrine of the union of the divine and human nature. "Since
deity and humanity are inseparably joined... in one person of Christ, it is necessary that
wherever the deity of Christ is there also is his humanity... For if the deity of Christ is
anywhere without his humanity, there are two persons, not one."153 The doctrine of the
resurrection proclaims that even in heaven, full human personhood entails a bodily existence,
not some kind of disembodied spiritual state (I Cor. 15:42-44). Jesus' resurrection is notably
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human, not a return to some primal form of the Logos (John 20:27; Revelation 5:6; see
§2.7.3). His resurrected body shows that even in eternity, the Son of God is embodied as
human, and subject to certain restrictions of singular personal expression. Ifwe accept the
Son ofGod's unique begotten status, then a 'poly-incarnational' existence is a logical
impossibility, for the bodily nature of personhood requires that one person correspond to one
body (otherwise a kind ofbodily schizophrenia results if the singular Son of God exists in
more than one body in the same time and place, destroying the meaning of personhood).
This would not preclude the human Jesus from visiting other worlds, but this is slightly
different from being incarnate into them.
Brenz also suggests that it is a basic confusion about the nature of heaven to suppose
that it is simply another physical sphere related to the present one, to which Jesus goes to
join God. We cannot attribute to Jesus' body an 'extension or diffusion in space, but [must
instead] elevate it beyond...all location.'154 If Jesus in the unity of his full divinity and
humanity is thus elevated 'beyond all location,' he has from there the same relation to all
reality that God the Father has: a relationship of 'all in all.' Robert Jenson describes it thus:
'Christ has risen to be in God's place. God, however, is in no place but is his own place; and
over against God, the created universe is therefore just one other single place'.155 So Paul
says Christ 'is the same one who ascended far above all the heavens, so that he might fill' the
whole universe (Eph. 4:10). As he holds this eternal position, there is no reason to suppose
such a move from God to the cosmos need occur more than once.
3.4.3.1. Christ as cosmic redeemer
The universal salvation offered in Christ also suggests the singularity of the human
incarnation. This is explicit in several biblical passages. The ingathering of the redeemed is
heavenly, not just earthly. "Then they will see 'the Son ofMan coming in clouds' with great
power and glory. Then he will send out the angels, and gather his elect from the four winds,
from the ends of the earth to the ends of heaven." (Mark 13:26-27). The crucifixion binds
the Son ofGod decisively to the doom of death that causes all creation to groan in
frustration. His death - and by implication his resurrection - is not only for humanity, but
also for the entire cosmos, declared 'from the creation of the world' (Rev. 13:8). John Davis
highlights Paul's cosmic Christology in Colossian156: "For in him all the fullness of God was
pleased to dwell, and through him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things,
154
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whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace through the blood of his cross" (Col. 1:19-
20). This cosmic reconciling and ingathering is accomplished only through Jesus, the Son of
Man. Angels will worship the Son in human form (Heb. 1:6), who is far superior to them,
whose origins are from eternity, begotten not created.
The Scripture indicates that Jesus contains all the fullness ofGod, enabling the
reconciliation of all things. God's presence in him is so vast, powerful, and all embracing
that it will reach out to include all things, whether in heaven or on earth, accomplishing
God's purposes for the entire cosmos. The human arena set here in this tiny local time and
space, seemingly a minor sideshow, is revealed as the center of the entire cosmic drama, not
because ofhumanity per se, but because of the human incarnation. God need not repeat
himself in multiple incarnations, because what has been done in Jesus Christ is enough for
the whole creation. Cosmic fulfillment is revealed in its majesty at the end of the age,
precisely in and through humanity:
For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of
God... [It] will be set free from its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of
the glory of the children of God. We know that the whole creation has been
groaning in labor pains until now. (Romans 8:19-22 - emphasis added)
In the unified scriptural vision, the redemption of the entire cosmos is thus connected with
the human redemption at its heart}51 That redemption goes so far as to replace the existing
laws of physics with new laws freed from death and suitable for eternal life, as human,
divine and cosmic history reach their unified fulfillment. Thus human cosmic redemption
would seem to make other incarnations redundant.
George L. Murphy suggests cosmic Christology is evident in the idea - logically
independent of Scripture though coherent with it - of the Logos as the universe's pattern¬
maker. Jesus as the Logos cannot be just one aspect of the divine nature, one actualized
pattern among many potential patterns, or he could not be regarded as the fullness of God
incarnate. Similarly, his nature as fully incarnate Logos must be the foundation for the
whole universe and for all other potential universes.158 As the fullness of the cosmic pattern
for this actualized universe, Christ is both its foundation and its conclusion. That is what it
means to be the Logos of God. Therefore he can rightfully be called 'the Alpha and the
Omega'. Since he is in himself the foundation and fulfillment of the whole cosmos, the need
157 Barth, CD HI: 2, 4.
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for multiple incarnations is eliminated.
Is there a scriptural counterfoil to such cosmic Christology? Hebrews is full of
references to the universal salvific effect of Christ's finished work - a cosmic Christology
encompassing the whole of creation (Heb. 1:3; 2:5-9; 5: 8-10; 7:26-28; 9:25-26). He
sustains 'all things' by his powerful word; the world to come will be 'placed under his feet';
he does not need to offer himself 'again and again', but has appeared 'once for all' at the end
of the ages. Having suffered to learn obedience, he is 'now made perfect'. On the other
hand, Scripture might hint at another possibility. Jesus says in John 10:16a, 'I have other
sheep that do not belong to this fold', which could be taken as a reference to extra-terrestrial
'sheep'.159 Hebrews emphasizes Jesus' human nature as necessary for his priesthood on
humanity's behalf. He is only fit to be high priest because he is fully one of them (Heb.
2:14-18; 4:15; 5:1-7). On its face, this seems to imply that he must share their humanity
completely if his suffering, death, and resurrection are to count on their behalf. Gregory of
Nazianzus' words might well have expressed this sentiment: 'That which he has not
assumed, he has not healed'.160 In order to accomplish salvation for extra-terrestrials, would
Christ necessarily need to become fully whatever they are: incarnate in their possible
alternate form. Is there a dilemma here for either the incarnation or the fate of extra¬
terrestrials?
There are some solutions that avoid the need for multiple incarnations. 1) There are
no other 'human-like' creatures in the cosmos - no other material creatures that are made in
the image of God but with non-human form. 2) If there are such creatures, they do not need
or are incapable of such incarnate redemption (e.g., fallen angels). 3) If there are such
creatures, they must be fully human already, somehow sufficiently like Jesus in his human
divine creaturehood to be encompassed in his single terrestrial incarnation.
The third alternative is coherent with a picture of humanity created as the being that
is based on the divine pattern ofChrist. As Edmund J. Rybarczyk notes, 'We do not have
something(s) within us that constitutes the imago Dei; we are an image'. He points out that
in Eastern thought, it is not Adam who is the 'great archetype after whom the rest of the
human race was fashioned', but rather Jesus Christ himself.161 Thunberg agrees, noting that
in Christian tradition 'the Logos is seen as the prototype, which God used in creating humans
159 This is an unlikely meaning in context, and is probably a reference to the god-fearing gentiles.
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in his image, and Christ is seen as the archetype ofwhat it is to be human'.162 IfChrist the
Logos is the cosmic pattern of God's image, then the material version of that image might
well have the same human form everywhere in the cosmos.
If non-human creatures 'ofmatter and spirit' were discovered, the definition of
humanity might have to be broadened to include such new creatures, whether they are Homo
sapiens or not. Davis defends this view, maintaining that Christ's death and resurrection is
valid for the whole cosmos, all space and time, and so for sentient beings everywhere.163
Braine suggests that if extra-terrestrials are found, then the incarnation of Jesus Christ will be
relevant to them in the same way that it was relevant to more than just the Jews. It had to be
manifested in a particular time, place, and people such as the Jews, but is relevant to the
entire human race. McMullin likewise supposes that if Christ's redemption is a unique event
restoring the balance on a cosmic level, it can have a universal scope for creatures with or
without a direct connection to Adam's sin.164 In context, the passage sited in John reinforces
a conclusion of a single and sufficient cosmic incarnation, for Jesus continues, "I must bring
them also, and they will listen to my voice. So there will be one flock, one shepherd" (John
10:16b - emphasis added). Though the human race may be the species in which the
incarnation is manifest, its effects will be relevant to all beings everywhere in time and
space, even to the angels.165
3.4.3.2. God's immutability
Rahner believes the immutability of God lends itself to the possibility ofmultiple
incarnations. Is this position sound? God in his immutability has taken on the mutable
nature of humanity.166 Having made an eternal decision regarding their creation and
redemption, a decision anchored in cosmic plans encompassing the beginning and end of
time, is it logical that God would require another and different program to further that
redemption in some other part of the unified cosmos? Coyne observes that the 'universality'
ofGod's salvation is deeply embedded in Christian theology, appearing throughout the
Scripture. The creation and redemption of the universe is grounded in the Logos. It is
portrayed in Genesis and Revelation, in the Old Testament prophetic promises of the new
creation, in the Johanine writings, Romans, I Corinthians, Colossians and Hebrews. It is
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evident in the New Testament presupposition of the pre-incarnate divinity of the Son ofGod.
While Coyne admits that God is completely free to choose his methods, and cannot be
constrained by us, nevertheless we do know what he has already chosen to do: freely 'send
his Son to us.'167
God has declared himself unchangeably for humanity in Jesus Christ. He has
likewise declared himself unchangeablyfor the cosmos of which humans are a unified part.
Human redemption can only be complete if it is in the context of the redemption of the rest
of the cosmos, since otherwise redeemed humanity would be trapped in a cosmos that is
condemned to death. IfChrist's work ultimately destroys death, then there is no need for
another such work elsewhere in the cosmos. Through him, 'all things will be reconciled' to
God (Col. 1:20). Since Christ's cosmic salvation comes from the unity of his divine and
human nature as the self-communication ofGod, another incarnation elsewhere in space and
time is no longer necessary. The human incarnation fulfills the yearning for transcendence
of the entire universe. Since God has given himself completely to the cosmos in Christ, a
single incarnation would appear to be most compatible with God's immutability. So if Barth
is right in saying that in Jesus Christ, 'God does not exist without man'168, then God's
immutability does not easily lend itself to the possibility ofmultiple-incarnations.
3.4.3.3. Conclusion
On the basis of these arguments, it seems reasonable to maintain that despite our
lack of knowledge and our inability to conclusively prove the singularity of the human
incarnation, that there are some things that work against the need for multiple incarnations.
There have been no ETI found yet. As shall be addressed in chapter 6, §6.4, there is some
scientific evidence to suggest that ETI will never be found. The philosophical (or logical)
and scriptural arguments suggest the sufficiency of a single incarnation. Redemption in
Jesus Christ is cosmic in scope, encompassing all beings 'in heaven and on earth'. The size
of this small earthly stage is not relevant to the cosmic scope of Jesus' incarnate mission,
which serves as a kind of cosmic 'moment of inertia' for the consummation of the whole
universe, including all possible ETI. In light of these arguments, there seems to be no need
for multiple incarnations. Until concrete evidence emerges of ETI and alternate incarnations,
it seems prudent to remain skeptical about the need for other incarnations, and prudent to
resist wholesale changes to our theology based on speculation.
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3.5 Some Relevant Problems in Rahner's Theology
3.5.1. Transcendentality, rationality, and the human spirit
Rahner's conception of 'spirit' can be somewhat confusing. According to Weger,
the human dimension of transcendental experience is for Rahner the 'supernatural, divine
order of being.'169 The transcendent realm seems to be that of the traditional three-tiered
universe. God is the eternal being beyond the material realm, and humanity's openness to
God marks them as transcendent, as spiritual. Spirit is that which enables humans to engage
in personal conscious relationships with others, both human and God. Humans are spiritual
beings because they can relate to God, particularly to God in Jesus Christ.170
On the other hand, Rahner sometimes uses 'spirit' simply to mean self-
consciousness, as if human rationality actually constitutes the human spirit and separates it
from the animals. 'Spirit' is the 'inner world of thought and action', primarily apprehended
by reason. Humans are 'spiritual' because 'Nature does become conscious of itself in
him'.171 Charles Stanley summarizes Rahner's position: the human unity ofmatter and spirit
is a 'moment of cognition'.172 This unity then seems identical with the 'unity ofmind and
matter' that occurs in it, 'with all its consequences: salvific importance of history as such,
incarnation of the Logos, resurrection of the body, etc.'173 The union ofmatter and spirit in
humanity points to the unity and commonality ofmatter and spirit in the entire cosmos.174
Fields notes that for Rahner, 'Sublation can occur only in human reason, which Spirit
constitutes as its own medium in order to bring itself dialectically to conscious
realization'.175 This appears to make Rahner's understanding of 'spirit' largely a Hegelian
reduction of spirit to reason. So Purcell identifies the 'convertibility between being and
Weger, Karl Rahner, 142.
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knowing' in Rahner, and a tendency to value 'intellect over sense, spirit over world'.175
Appropriating another Hegelianism, history is for Rahner the immanent stage of preparation
for the development of spirit.177 "The peculiarity of the spirit in contrast to matter [is that it]
can reflect upon itself and its world, and then again place its world over against itself."178
Even though human transcendence is open to the realm of God's transcendence, the
emphasis remains on human rational capacity. As Anne Carr phrases it, 'supernatural
transcendence is operative wherever one has achieved the conscious use of reason'.179
Is this an adequate presentation of spirit in humanity? Certainly when God is spoken
of as 'spirit' in Christian context, it is in part a reference to his being distinct from the world,
Creator not creature, not another material being alongside the material cosmos. Even in such
process theologies as Peacocke'spanentheism, in which the world is thought of as 'God's
body', God's being is still 'distinct from that of the world'.180 In fact, God must in his being
be independent for the contingent world to even exist, unless the world itself is divine. As
Jenson observes, 'God does not transcend creation, since he does not start from it'.181 It
seems reasonable to suggest human nature would need some type of transcendent spiritual
capacity in order to have real fellowship and communion with God. Belief in such an aspect
does not require belief in the immortality of the soul or in the Platonic superiority of spirit
over body. But if human nature and spirituality are understood to be like the animals except
for the extent of rational capacity, then it is difficult to discern how human 'thinking
animals' could reach beyond this realm of dust to be in relationship with the transcendent
God. What is it that gives them their orientation to the transcendent? Is 'spirit' for Rahner
simply an end result of material processes in the form of rationality, without giving an
adequate account of the human spirit or spirit as transcendence?
There is some debate on what relation Scripture intends between the human body
and spirit. Joel B. Green and Ray S. Anderson argue that the dominant view of the New
Testament is ontological monism, and believe Scripture does not support the concept of a
disembodied spiritual component of human nature. Aubrey R. Johnson says that in the Old
Testament worldview, 'man is conceived not so much in dual fashion as "body" and "soul",
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organism'.182 Similarly, Pannenberg sees dualist notions as unbiblical remnants ofGreek
Platonic or Cartesian dualism.183 Anderson insists human nature can only be understood
holistically as a body-soul unity, and suggest the Christian doctrine of the resurrection shows
there is no human existence apart from the body.184
On the other hand, James Barr argues that while there are evident strands of 'totality
thinking' in the Hebrew tradition, these are not the only ones. God's creation ofAdam as
'dust from the earth' and his 'breathing into his nostrils the breath of life' look.. .in spite of
all that is written.. .awfully like two ingredients, of which Adam is a sort of compound'.
Barr also sees the preacher's use of 'ruah' (spirit) in Ecc. 12:7 for humans as highly
significant: 'for this word could not bear the highly physical components which people have
attached to the 'totality' concept of nephesh' [(soul)]. [The preacher] meant the human spirit
which went in a different direction from the flesh which returned to dust'. Barr suggests the
paradigmatic opposition usually posited between Hebrew and Greek thought on this matter is
'crude and questionable'. Even the New Testament concept of the resurrection of the body is
not as clearly monistic as some writers want to maintain.185
There are some Scriptures that support the idea of a non-corporeal aspect of human
nature. Jesus explicitly warns, 'Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul;
rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell' (Matt. 10: 28). He is described
as descending to the realm of the dead during the three days in the grave to preach to
imprisoned spirits (1 Peter 3:18-20; the Apostle's Creed). James describes death as the
separation ofbody and spirit (James 2:26), and Paul reports that to be 'absent from the body'
for a Christian, is to be 'present with the Lord' (2 Cor. 5:8). He exhorts the Corinthians to
pray with their minds as well as with their spirits in such a way as to draw a clear contrast
between the two (1 Cor. 14: 2, 14-15). Christ's words to the thief on the cross, 'Today you
will be with me in Paradise' (Luke 23:43), and his statement that God is not the God of the
dead, but of the living: 'for to him, all are alive' (Luke 20:38) also suggest some mode of
personal existence independent of the body.186
Whatever view one holds on the state of the person between death and the general
resurrection, these passages seem to imply that there is an immaterial aspect of human
nature, however attenuated, that exists apart from the body. Explanations that suggest the
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dead only exist as memories in the mind of God until the eschaton187 hardly fit a vision of
satisfying 'presence to the Lord'. This need not entail a simple form of Platonic dualism for
it does not imply that human existence at its fullest is a purely spiritual phenomenon. As
noted previously (§2.7.3), embodiment is central to the Christian hope. Yet it would be a
mistake to regard the doctrine of the resurrection as alone supporting a purely material body.
Fraser Watts notes that mainstream Christian tradition has seen the bodily resurrection as a
compliment to the survival of the soul, not as an alternative. He also reminds us that in
science, the 'jury is still out' on the issue of non-reductive physicalism.188 Medical research
into near-death experiences may even provide evidence of such an immaterial aspect to
human nature (see §6.3.4), which idea cannot therefore be ruled scientifically invalid.
Eliminating a transcendent aspect of human nature seems to reduce the medium of
human relationship to God to rationality. But humans need more than physical and
intellectual sustenance; they require the life and love ofGod to be complete. Henri Nouwen
notes that since Seneca defined humanity as the 'reasoning animal' {rationale animal est
homo), we have been tempted to think that what makes humans unique is our mind.
Nouwen insists that it is primarily the heart that makes us human: 'the center of our being
where God comes to dwell with us and bring us the divine gifts of trust, hope, and love'.189
The scriptural distinction betweenflesh (which may include rationality) and spirit
also helps highlight this contrast between rationality,per se, and spirituality.190 If the only
effect of the Spirit's indwelling is to change the believer's thinking pattern, then the
regenerated person seems to be different from the unbeliever only in terms of their
knowledge. Here, the spiritual man is the one who has somehow attained a secret
knowledge, a superior rationality that may be judged on the same plain as 'fleshly'
rationality. This type of Gnosticism presents problems for salvation similar to those
encountered in Pannenberg. Gunton points out that instead of guilt and the awareness of sin
and separation from God underlying the human need for salvation, there is the need for a
type of knowledge, for rational training, for a salvation that is ultimately mental and
philosophical rather than material. Those who are saved will be those who are able to
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manage some kind of 'God-consciousness.' "Humanity is saved by a kind of Christological
triumphalism, by successful religiousness rather than by the 'failure' of the cross."191 Yet
the cross is central to Christian redemption, as Paul notes: 'For the message of the cross is
foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power ofGod'
(I Cor. 1:18). Rahner himself rejects such Gnostic versions of 'psychotherapeutic' salvation,
wherein the absolutely transcendent mental spirit of God simply comes alongside the mental
spirit in humanity without entering into the cosmos, insisting the Logos of God has truly
entered the cosmos in Jesus Christ.192
A fuller definition of 'spirit' seems to be implied in the idea of incarnation itself, else
how can Jesus be anything but a mere man? From whence comes his connection to the
transcendent, if his nature, like ours, is entirely a product of the finite world? His
resurrection nature must also be transcendent if it is to be thought of ultimately as anything
more than resuscitation (1 Cor. 15:35-49). If Jesus in his humanity has divine
transcendentality, then native humanity would seem to require some reflection of it.
Otherwise, we have an artificial joining of the natures in Christ - Rahner's objection based
on the results of the modern exegetical enterprise - rather than a true hypostatic union.193
We would have in Jesus a combination of physical and spiritual nature, a 'ghost' in the
machine, while all the rest of humanity would be just physical, plain machines.194 Rahner
himself rejects such docetic Christology for compromising the humanity of Jesus.
Herbert Vorgrimler claims that Rahner offers a fuller and transcendent version of
spirit as the drive for absolute being. Human beings are spiritual because they are
metaphysically constituted so as to be open to transcendent revelation from God.195 The
Spirit of God 'is the inner force of the spirit's self-movement'.196 While Rahner attempts to
be coherent with the dominant monistic paradigm, perhaps there is room for a 'richer' view
of spirit as more than a purely mental and immanent phenomenon. He claims that our Age is
correctly more material than the Greek Age, and that the Logos 'establishes this corporeal
part of the world as his own reality... in such a way that this very materiality expresses him,
the Logos himself, and allows him to be present in his world'.197 By positing a materiality
that expresses the Logos, he has tacitly admitted that the Logos is from outside that
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girding of his fundamental theology, even though he leaves much of it unspoken for the sake
of emphasizing what will seem most coherent to the modern mind.
3.5.2. Difficulties in Rahner's evolutionary theology
There are some difficulties in Rahner's use of evolution, some from the perspective
of science, others from theology. The typical view in evolutionary biology rejects any form
of external guidance or 'directionality' imposed upon evolution.198 How then can Rahner
maintain God's guiding presence in the process? This critique can be unpacked into a range
of problems. Is God's part in the process redundant, so that it should simply be dropped by
the principle ofOckham's razor? Can a Christocentric pattern exist in the evolutionary
process that can be scientifically discerned? Does even the theological proposal of such a
pattern not miss the fact that the human stage is transient: in the future, humanity will either
'disappear or evolve' to something else?199 Also, does not such a Christocentric and
anthropocentric pattern in evolution miss the value that other living creatures and the non¬
living cosmos must have for God?200 Finally, can the apparently chaotic and often-violent
natural process of evolution be reconciled with a high view ofGod's love leading to his own
presence in Christ at the end of the process? Does an evolutionary Christology give
adequate recognition to the 'absurdities and uncertainties' of life?201
Rahner admits that the incarnation stands in 'direct and simple contradiction' to
human knowledge of evolution, because otherwise the theologian would be turning faith and
revelation into philosophy and rationalism.202 He is clear that the incarnation is a statement
of faith, not science. This is an important proviso in Rahner's approach. He is not trying to
say that evolution must be perceived Christocentrically, or that scientific details of the
process will have a guaranteed theological meaning.203 Rather, he is trying to show that
incarnation and Christology are coherent even in an evolutionary worldview.204 The
presence ofGod enabling the process by grace to move in the directions it has taken, and to
arrive at its ultimate destination of absolute grace, might or might not be scientifically
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discernable. Even if the current theory of evolution is superseded by some other scientific
theory, theology will still be able to maintain grace as the divine backdrop upon which the
cosmic processes unfold. It will be able to say that the transcendent is what emerges when
grace interacts with matter. Theology will always need to look for new points of contact
with culture, as worldviews change, in order to make the good news ofGod's love in Jesus
Christ accessible. This missional purpose illuminates several problems in Rahner's thought.
The cosmic processes leading to mind open up potentially to the infinite in humanity,
but actually achieve union with that infinite in the particular human being Jesus ofNazareth.
In this sense a Christological pattern can be said to be present in the evolutionary process:
that Christological pattern is the horizon of the planned within which the universal processes
of chance and necessity leading to God's realization in the cosmos occur. While chapter 7
engages this question more fully, an overview of the perspective is appropriate here to justify
Rahner's thought. Although the directedness of the process to the human end is a
theological statement within this Christological 'horizon of the planned', it may be coherent
with the data of science. If mind is an emergent property ofmatter, its potential genesis must
also be built into the laws of nature that science simply accept as given. Since humankind is
the one example ofmind in the cosmos that is objectively verifiable, it is also coherent to
maintain the ontological directedness of the process to mind realized in humanity. Even if
Homo sapiens are regarded as utterly contingent and accidental in terms of local origin, they
cannot therefore be regarded as ultimately accidental. From a theological perspective,
human existence is the fulfillment of a requirement for incarnation that was in the divine
plan from the beginning, and must be seen for that reason as providential. Therefore the
question of human transience in the evolutionary stream becomes moot. In them, mind has
already opened up to the infinite Absolute, and reached fulfillment through the incarnation.
Cosmic destiny coalesces decisively in humanity.
Every moment in the entire evolutionary process is thus of importance and worth. If
it all occurs within the Christological horizon, then even if it reaches a climax and
fulfillment in humanity, it is a fulfillment that promises to sweep up all within that horizon -
the entire cosmos - into salvation. For this reason the human realization of God can be
rightly described as a realization of servanthood on behalf of the entire cosmos. God enjoys
humans, but according to the psalmist, he also cares for all his creatures, and satisfies them
with good things (Psalm 104). He defends the earth against, and ultimately judges, the
wickedness of human beings: he will 'destroy those who destroy the earth' (Rev. 11:18).
Yet God finally brings this creation he loves and serves over from death to life in human
form. Rahner's evolutionary Christology contains an implicit ecological consciousness.
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Is the sometimes-vicious natural process compatible with this high view of God's
love? Moltmann argues that Rahner's evolutionary Christology is simply too optimistic and
positivistic, and ignores the reality of evil and the cross. IfGod as spirit is the world's
'innermost life', how can this be reconciled with the 'victims the process actually costs'?
The modern destruction of the world that comes from reducing nature to material, evident in
the ecological crisis and in global 'atomic peril', makes Rahner's uncritical presupposition of
the 'evolutive world view' problematic.205 Niels H. Gregersen's critique of religious
Darwinist Henry Drummond's Ascent ofMan (1894) might equally be applied to Rahner.
According to Gregersen, Drummond failed to come to terms with theologically difficult
aspects of evolutionary theory, such as 'the wastefulness of nature, the neglect of the
individual, the disappearance of love in the selection process, and most importantly, the
absence of guarantees of an overall evolutionary progress.'
Drummond's position implies that God is not only omnipresent but also manifest
everywhere. The Christian conviction of the ultimate good of salvation is conflated
with inner-historical progress, eschatological hope with expectations for the
immanent future to come.206
Moltmann suggests that an evolutionary Christology is incomplete if it focuses only
upon Christ as pinnacle of human nature, and 'not the humanity put to death on the cross'.
Christ's 'self-transcendence through his active obedience (potentia oboedientialisf needs to
be replaced by 'his rising from the dead'. The problem is not just moral evil, but physical
evil. Moltmann argues that Rahner's uncritical Christology, as 'completion of nature's
evolution', must be corrected by a focus on the new creation and the 'raising of nature'. 207
Such a 'cross-conscious' Christology seems more in accord with actual human and
natural history. The often-violent vicissitudes and vagaries of human history form the
backdrop for the divine unfolding of grace in the history of Israel and Jesus ofNazareth.
This is so even to the extent that crucifixion and death form the essential matrix from which
redemption is wrought, the pit out of which resurrection triumphs. Since human history
shows this type ofparallelism with evolutionary history, theology should in principle find no
problem maintaining that a redemptive Christology is coherent with a pattern of suffering in
evolutionary history. It is love that pulls the creation on towards a redemptive, 'happy,' and
victorious conclusion, even through suffering and what looks like defeat and death. It is for
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this reason that Christianity must have an eschatological doctrine of resurrection and
redemption, not just a doctrine of gradual, ever-upward and continuous consummation and
fulfillment, as ifGod need not join in with the death of the cosmos to bring it ultimate life.
So it is reasonable to believe that God's love is present in 'nature, red in tooth and claw.'208
This is a presence in the midst of suffering leading on to a future of glory, consistent with the
fact that even the Son 'learned obedience through what he suffered' (Hebrews 5:8).209 So in
light of the crucifixion and resurrection, creation can be declared 'good' in its mortality, and
even with humanity 'very good', but not in any ultimate sense. That is reserved for the
eschaton, when all things will be made 'perfect' in liberation from death.
Thus an evolutionary worldview may begin to be reconciled with a theological
understanding of God's redemption of creation.210 Though suffering in evolutionary history
has a parallel in Christology, there is a certain sense in which Christian redemption moves in
the opposite direction from evolutionary and human history. The redemption of the cross
and resurrection breaks in upon the status quo, standing in stark contrast to all that the world
expects and anticipates. Christian redemption is compatible in the sense of being coherent
with evolution, but it is not something that science would likely arrive at of its own accord.
Can an evolutionary worldview be reconciled with a theological understanding of
original sin and the fall? The traditional picture ofAdam and Eve, the serpent and the
garden seem difficult to reconcile with modem science. Rahner suggests, along with Barth,
that it is Christology and the cross that enable humanity to look within and understand its
essential fallenness and brokenness. Barth insisted that the Christian doctrine of sin could
not be done apart from Christ.2" It is possible for this reason to 'decentralize traditional
claims about Adam and Eve.' The absolute redeemer highlights our own condition as mired
in sin and death, a 'bizarre antitype' to the life of God in Jesus Christ.212 For Rahner, the
story of the fall seems to be an archetypal story of the human moral situation in relation to
God. If there was a day of moral dawning in the genesis of humanity - and even a purely
naturalistic account would have to admit that there was - then humanity has refused to live
up to the potential of that moral dawn. It is in rebellion against the love ofGod, and has
been for its entire history since then. This may be only a partial solution to the problem, but
suggests categories offall and sin remain valid in the contemporary context (see also §4.5.3).
208 Alfred Lord Tennyson. See Peacocke, 'CSET', 97.
209 So Paul can write that 2 Cor. 4:17: "For this slight momentary affliction is preparing us for an
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3.5.3. Christologyfrom below or above?
Rahner's Christology has typically been represented as a theology 'from below,'
starting with the humanity of Christ and his historical life and moving towards the divine.213
While he refuses to reduce Christ to a product of evolution214, his reduction of 'spirit' to
rationality and his general method of avoiding the transcendent realm again lead to some
difficulties. His approach tends to make the difference between Christ and other human
beings one of degree rather than of kind. His insistence on the absolute solidarity of Jesus'
nature with all humanity, so that Jesus as a man is not lost in the glory of Jesus as Son of
God, is such that 'degree Christology' seems inevitable.215 Ifhumans have transcendentality
in their nature, Christ is the ultimate version of that transccndentality. Ifhumans are capable
ofmoral good, then Christ is the ultimate instantiation of that goodness. But if Jesus' divine
significance really comes down to the unique degree to which he attains to certain human
qualities, then this causes the divine transcendent to disappear. Christology becomes the
achievement of a unique degree of 'humanity' in Jesus. Christ's transcendence is
accomplished by its rise in the immanent: he is still the culmination and crown of the
immanent process of evolution, but in him we discover that which is ultimately transcendent.
If the incarnate Christ arises from this-worldly processes, then humanity is lifted to
divinity by the proverbial 'bootstraps'. If Christ is only different in degree from other
humans, how can the true nature ofGod in this particular human be accounted for? Gregory
ofNazianzus had already observed this problem in his opposition to Apollinaris. "For that
which has a beginning or a progress or is made perfect is not God."216 Rahner opposes a
simplistic Teilhardian evolutionary Christology with Jesus as the physical end result of
natural processes, the 'next and final stage' in human evolution. But his leaning towards
degree Christology seems to lead there.
If the process arrives at perfect God and perfect man in the incarnation, without
adding something from the outside ofnature, then another problem surfaces. If God is
utterly transcendent, then how can an immanent evolutionary process, even one culminating
in humanity oriented to transcendent mystery, produce his nature? If God is wholly
213 Lash, 'Up and Down in Christology', 31-46. Lash objects to further 'up' and 'down'
classifications in Christology as unhelpful to the ongoing theological dialogue.
214 Rahner, FCF, 177f.
215 Hick implies, somewhat approvingly, that all degree Christology is 'Arian by definition' in his
'Christology at the Cross Roads', in F.G. Healey, ed.., Prospectfor Theology: Essays in Honour of
H.H. Farmer (Welwyn: James Nisbet, 1966), 140.
216
Gregory Nazianzus, 'To Cledonius Against Apollinaris', 218.
115
transcendent, an immaterial being entirely 'disengaged' from the material cosmos, then how
can an immanent aspect of the cosmos properly reveal him as anything but a shadow or
reflection? If God's presence in the person of Jesus arises in the universe as a result of
independent natural processes, then either the universe or humanity itselfmust be divine.
Otherwise there is no source for his divinity. In this system, Jesus is the perfect human, the
one special example of the realization of a possibility potentially available to all human kind.
If the divine nature of Christ is understood in this way purely immanently, then it is a short
step to divinizing humanity without reference to Christ. Whether the cosmos or humanity is
regarded as divine, the cosmos arrives at the presence of God without God's presence. This
is a logical fallacy: the finite cannot produce the infinite, nor can the immaterial arise from
the material as an emergent property without destroying contingency.217
Further, if the universe is divine, then there is no longer any basis for asserting that it
must be rational or reasonable. When the universe ceases to be contingent and created, it
also loses its intelligibility, since there is nothing beyond it to guarantee its rationality.
Gunton argues that this returns us 'to a pre-scientific view of the divinity of the cosmos'. He
insists 'unless the logic of the eternal is in some way distinct from the logic of the temporal,
we can understand on their own terms neither the one nor the other'.218 It may be extreme to
accuse Rahner of this position, since he emphasizes that the natural processes are embedded
in God's transcendent grace, and that in the incarnation, the universe attains to an infinite
asymptote of that grace at which it could not have arrived on its own.
Rahner's degree Christology leaves open the question of whether Jesus has ceased to
be human altogether. If Jesus is the crown of the evolutionary process, bringing to
perfection the potentiality already present in humanity, then it might almost appear that he is
a new species. Otherwise, there is no basis for claiming that he is a physical crown of
evolution, or that he has something substantially different to offer humanity than it already
has by virtue of its own place in the evolutionary scale or its own potentiality for divinity. If
Christ is not one with humanity in his human nature, is the salvation he offers fully
applicable to humans? How can his experience of life, suffering, and the cross serve in a
priestly capacity on humanity's behalf? How can his resurrection be regarded as the
resurrection of a human being, and therefore ofprimary significance for all human beings?
Rahner believes the bringer of salvation must have 'absolute solidarity' with
humanity and they with him.219 He also insists that the Scripture as carefully examined by
modern historical and exegetical study clearly demonstrates the full humanity of Christ. If
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Jesus is one with humanity in his biological nature, then his differentiation from them must
be accounted for by other means. This is not a problem in classical Christology, because
Jesus' differences are attributed to his transcendent deity - his preincarnate existence as Son
of God. Gunton maintains that this can be portrayed adequately even to the modern mindset
as the being in whom God and human are both fully present, neither destroying the other, the
basic statement ofChalcedonian Christology. Rahner also tries to remain faithful to
Chalcedon, while responding to the modem mindset in degree Christology to maintain
Christ's essential humanity. But his presentation of the perfect man in Jesus Christ seems to
separate him from the rest of humanity.220 This produces a Jesus who is so different from
humanity (in his perfections of human potentiality) that he can hardly be regarded as human
any more. He is too different to be 'one of us.'
Murphy's insight on the pre-existent Logos, besides making multiple incarnations
unlikely, also leads to the conclusion that the Logos must represent the transcendent realm,
or else it cannot be the whole Logos. The issue is not simply the Logos' pre-existence before
the birth of Christ, nor even the theophanies and cosmic Christology in Scripture, but his
'activity in creating the pattern of the world.' Since the Logos is identified as God's pattern-
making capacity in general applied to all possible worlds, that capacity must 'pre-exist' this
world, both in terms of time and causality, or else this world cannot come into existence.
Therefore, for the incarnation to be the Logos of God, it must be this pre-existent Logos.221
Apart from this transcendent contact, there is no feature of the temporal order that could
elevate it to eternity. Gunton believes Rahner's system bars the transcendent God from
acting in the world, since the world is closed or self-sufficient.222 The one locus of
transcendence Rahner acknowledges is in the orientation of human nature. However, this
orientation to the infinite does not mean the transcendent has breached the gap. Here the
problem presents itselfmost acutely: in knowing Christ only 'from below', and rejecting the
numenal or any form of an upper/lower tiered universe, the eternal transcendent would have
to be excluded even in the nature of Christ. Yet if the cosmos is mired in death, then there
must be some contact with the eternal transcendent that is not already present in the cosmos,
for instance as a potentiality for divinity in human nature, in order for death to be overcome.
While Rahner is accused of 'from below' Christology, and often speaks from such a
perspective, some of his writings suggest that in Christ, that gap between the transcendent
and the immanent has been breached. The potential to human divinity is not the same as
outright divinity. Humans do have capacity for the eternal and transcendent, which is a
220
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precondition for the coming of Christ. This is an improved anthropology that asserts the
vital and unique role of humanity in the cosmos, but that role is only fulfilled in Christ.
Humanity is tending towards the infinite, but that asymptote is only reached in Christ.
Rahner insists Jesus is fully human and fully divine: fully human, but at the same time more
than a mere man. Because he is human, Jesus does not know everything, but can grow in his
knowledge: he can 'tremble before the inconceivability of God'. This must be so to avoid a
monophysite Christology, to properly acknowledge the humanness of Jesus; it is not just a
product ofmodern exegesis. But Christ is also fully divine, the full revelation ofGod in his
life, self-awareness, death and resurrection. Jesus mission was/is not just a religious
message about God: Christ himself is the message, and must have known himself to be so for
the Easter event to have been meaningful to the early Church. God's revelation in the life
and resurrection of Jesus guarantee the reality of the incarnation; for with the resurrection
one has reasonable grounds to hold that Jesus is the 'absolute savior' of the world.223
Losinger insists Rahner never was entirely an immanentist, even in the foundations
of his transcendental anthropology. "Because God Himself, by revealing Himself and at the
same time graciously making possible the act of grasping Him, thus becomes the fixed point
of the anthropological point of departure in theology, any question about the ambivalence of
the starting points "from above" and "from below" ultimately becomes superfluous.
Theology and anthropology have lost the appearance of being opposites."224 Vass says that
in Rahner's thought, the human Jesus is not just one among many human subjects, but must
also be seen as an intimate aspect of the 'life of the Triune God: God's self-utterance, his
Logos'.225 Purcell says that for Rahner, human relationality is modeled after the relationality
of God's being, 'immanent within the Trinity'.226 Rahner explicitly acknowledges that in
Christ, God has reached down into the world in a move from above, tacitly making room for
transcendent reality.227 From the beginning, he assumes the mystical and transcendent as the
hidden foundation of all being and search for being. His apparent degree Christology may
be a linguistic artifact of dialogue with the modem naturalistic mind. He respects the
methodological limits of science, yet clearly sees these limits as an artificial restriction of all
reality. The scientist may pursue his science using a priori naturalism, but he does not and
cannot live his life by that method alone, since his existence and his moral choices already
go beyond it.228 So Rahner's theology is not purely immanent, though at times it appears to
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be so. Transcendent anthropology provides one approach to the human nature of Jesus
Christ; but there is another and equally valid angle from above: a 'descending' Christology
that acknowledges the Logos ofGod.
3.6 Summary of Rahner's Contribution
Rahner's view of human cosmic significance can now be summarized, and some
general theological conclusions drawn. Transcendentality and the incarnation give humanity
a crucial status and importance in the cosmos. Human nature alone is ready and adoptable to
become God in Christ, because it alone is indefinable 'without transcendence.' Humanity is
the one material creature (aside from speculative ETI) that transcends the material cosmos,
and who can be regarded - as the material spiritual being - as the 'goal ofnature', the
culmination of evolutionary history. In them God has become incarnate once and for all
time into his created universe. In them, properly located within the life of God given by the
incarnation, the cosmos finds 'final consummation.' In Christ, humanity alone already
stands beyond 'death's demarcation line'. The ultimate freedom ofhumanity will be the
consummation of the cosmos, for 'the Christian knows that this history of the cosmos as a
whole will find its real consummation despite, in and through the freedom ofman, and that
its finality as a whole will also be its consummation'.229 Clearly, humanity has cosmic
significance in Rahner's systematic theology, despite qualifications.
Even with his somewhat speculative and controversial use of evolutionary
Christology, Rahner nevertheless arrives at a cosmic and preeminent role for both humanity
and the incarnation. He makes a serious effort to achieve a modem Christology that is still
within the bounds of Chalcedonian Christology and his own Roman Catholic Church.
Though with some problems and inconsistencies, Rahner has interacted significantly with
the issues ofmodernity in light of the unique events of Christian revelation. While his
position is not always convincing (multiple incarnations, degree Christology), his overall
thought shows to what degree Trinitarian and incamational theology will be necessarily
anthropocentric. A type of critical anthropocentrism is clearly present there, particularly as
a result of his theological interaction with human nature and the reality of the incarnate
Christ.
Rahner's interaction with science is humble enough not to venture very far in terms




theology and science, rather than using scientific data to prove theological statements. Faith
and theology stand on their own as independent sources of the truth of reality.
Theologically, the incarnation shows that ontologically, transcendent causality has guided
the creation and evolutionary processes towards their human end from the very beginning.
The scientist may not admit this teleological and theological conclusion, but must admit the
unique significance of the end result of the natural processes in the rational consciousness of
humanity. At this interface, the scientific and theological views are coherent.
Even though Rahner believes theology has an epistemological position that
transcends science, he is frequently at pains to make sense of theological data within the
methodological confines of scientific naturalism. This is not always helpful to his theological
structure, as in his extra-terrestrial angelology or his 'degree' Christology. This later seems
indebted to his anthropology, and sometimes overemphasizes the immanent at the expense of
the transcendent. These problems do not present a serious threat to a larger theological
affirmation of humanity's vital role in the cosmos. Indeed, a critical analysis ofRahner's
thought has shown that even taking into account possible objections, a high view of human
significance remains an essential part of his incarnational theology.
Insofar as Rahner represents Roman Catholic Theology after Vatican II, it is
reasonable to conclude that branch of Christian theology remains deeply anthropocentric,
maintaining humanity's key significance in the cosmos. The uniqueness of human nature
and the fact of the incarnation as an aspect of the life of the Triune God occurring in and for




John Zizioulas: the Correlation ofDivine and Human Personhood
"It is in the human being that we must seek the link between God and the world, and it
isprecisely this that makesMan responsible, in a sense the only being responsiblefor
the fate ofcreation.... Man is the glory ofGod. " - John Zizioulas1
4.1 Introduction to Zizioulas' Thought
John Zizioulas (1931 - ) is Metropolitan ofPergamon, in the Ecumenical
Patriarchate of Constantinople. Born in Great Britain, Zizioulas was raised in the Greek
Orthodox Church, and was a scholar and teacher at various divinity schools in London and
Scotland. Zizioulas body ofwriting is much smaller than either Pannenberg's or Rahner's,
and the amount of secondary material on him also small in comparison. However, he does
interact significantly with relevant issues in theology, anthropology, ecology, and science
from the Greek Orthodox perspective, and provides an adequate base from which to engage
various themes in this thesis.
Zizioulas bases his epistemology on his understanding and conviction that all
Christian truth flows from Christology. This is particularly expressed as the eschatological
reality of God's presence entering history now to fulfill it in a 'communion-event.' This
'event' is both a reference to the Christian sacrament, and an emphasis on the close
interpersonal relationships thus made possible eucharistically in Christ. His theological
program is dependent upon the concept ofpersonhood, which shall be enlarged upon shortly.
The truth of being can only be experienced through and in the event of communion,
communion with the Eikon, or perfect image of God, who is Christ. The ultimate truth of
being is this type of communion for Zizioulas: communion is truth.2 In this sense, truth is
not just cognitive or prepositional in nature, though rationality is present. Rather, truth is
ultimately personal and relational. Zizioulas founds his theology upon communion and the
relational reality it expresses, particularly within the church. His theological reflections are
primarily concerned with ecclesiology, and his discussion of the nature and status of the
human person takes place in that context.
Zizioulas develops his theology in the context of what might be called a sacramental
worldview. In some ways his thought attempts to traverse through the minefield of
1 Zizioulas, 'PGC: Lecture Two', KTR 12:2 (1989)', 45.
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modernity by a return to the ancient view of the world as a 'mysterious, sacred reality
broader than the human mind can grasp or contain'. At the same time, he wrestles with
many significant issues of modernity, including theological issues raised by the natural
sciences and the relationship between the human and non-human creation. He rejects the
scientific naturalism that regards reality as closed off from the transcendent realm, and
departs from the Enlightenment vision of the supremacy of human rationality, insisting that a
sacramental worldview must acknowledge the supra-rational and supra-human dimensions of
reality.3 In this vein, he holds to such traditional doctrines as the literal virgin birth and the
resurrection of Jesus.4 He rejects the dichotomies between 'nature and history, the sacred
and the profane, reason and myth, art and philosophy' that have characterized so much of
Western thought. He posits a 'cosmic liturgy' like that of St. Maximus the Confessor, the
seventh century Greek Father, suggesting a sacramental aspect to reality, and a necessary
sacramental approach if humans are to more fully comprehend reality.5
Zizioulas' theological anthropology is developed in the context of deeply Trinitarian
themes, particularly the personhood of the Trinity, the doctrine of the incarnation, and
ecclesiology. His cosmic Christology, expressed eucharistically through the ecclesiological
priesthood of redeemed humanity, suggests a cosmos that has a Christ-centered as well as a
church-centered focus and destiny. His theological anthropology, his doctrine of creation
and fall, and his incarnational and ecclesiological work on the relation between humanity and
the cosmos provide some solutions to otherwise problematic issues in the dialogue between
theology and the natural sciences. Several areas in that dialogue will receive special focus in
this chapter, including human uniqueness, humanity's relation to the non-human world,
original sin in evolutionary context, and the limitations of naturalism in theological
perspective.
Finally, some potential weaknesses in Zizioulas' doctrine of the Trinity, in his
emphasis upon divine and human personhood, and in his version of human cosmic
priesthood will be explored. Several authors suggest that non-human and non-personal
versions of the imago dei should be preferred in the modem context, and their perspectives
will be evaluated in light of his overall program. It will be suggested that the sweep of
Zizioulas' theology is critically anthropocentric, and that engaging the natural sciences from








4.2. Human significance in Trinitarian context
Zizioulas' analysis of personhood and human nature in the church is based on his
conviction that all authentic personhood comes from God's own personhood. He holds that
the triune God's most fundamental and essential nature is that of personhood: the persons of
God the Father, God the Son, and God the Spirit. It is their personhood, their being persons,
which is the foundational substance of their divinity.
Zizioulas identifies personhood as the strand ofmodern thought, having its origins in
ancient Christian theology, which most clearly demonstrates human uniqueness. The
concept is derived from the Cappadocian Church Fathers' analysis of the persons of the
Trinity. Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. describes this patristic understanding of divine personhood
as 'a subject with distinct, non-parastic life; with soul, mind, choosing, and willing'.6
Trinitarian personhood is what is reflected or imaged in created human beings. Thus the
origin of personhood is God; to be a person is the very nature of God. Cause and freedom
originate in the persons ofGod, specifically in the person of the Father. As Zizioulas
phrases it, 'what causes God to be is the Person of the Father'.7
Personhood as such is prior to and defines the general nature ofGod; it is not a
secondary conception within all that is, but is theprimary mode of existence for God, the
very essence or being of God. Catherine Mowry LaCugna interpreting Zizioulas describes it
thus, 'an ontology ofGod that treats divine substance apart from divinepersons is a
contradiction in terms'.8 Personhood is so essential to God that according to Zizioulas, not
only can we say that God is a person, but also that person is God. In other words, to be a
person is something that ultimately can be said only ofGod.9 There is no general, somehow
amorphous, divine nature that is subsequently expressed as the three persons of the Trinity.
Rather, the personhood contained within the Trinity is the divine nature.
This personhood is only realizable and expressible within a community - in God's
case, the community of the Trinity. Personhood is only possible in a corporate or communal
context. Persons are who they are not individualistically, but only in relation to each other.
This in the Trinity is the relation of'ek-stasis' - a relation ofmore than just 'openness of
being', but of actual communion 'which leads to a transcendence of the boundaries of the
6 Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., 'Gregory ofNyssa and the Social Analogy of the Trinity', The Thomist 50
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'self and thus to freedom\10 Zizioulas believes a key insight of Trinitarian theology is that
the divine life is social; the life ofGod subsists in Community.11 Hall develops a similar
concept in his relational interpretation of Being: being means 'being-withl,12 C. Plantinga
also points out this relational emphasis in the Cappadocians.13 John O'Donnell concludes
that the persons ofGod are relational realities, defined by intersubjectivity, shared
consciousness, faithful relationships, and the mutual giving and receiving of love.14 For
Zizioulas, this ecstatic communal openness does not destroy the totality of the divine nature
found in each person of the trinity. The persons are each hypostatic - 'the bearer of its
nature in its totality'. This is true for God and for humanity. Thus while humans are made
for communion, 'in every human person we see not part but the totality of human nature' -
in both the first Adam and in the last Adam Christ. So also in each person of the Trinity is to
be found the totality of the divine nature.
Ekstasis and hypostasis represent two basic aspects of Personhood, and it is not to be
regarded as an accident that both of these words have been historically applied to the
notion of the Person. Thus the idea of Person affirms at once both that being cannot
be 'contained' or 'divided', and that the mode of its existence, its hypostasis, is
absolutely unique and unrepeatable. Without these two conditions being falls into an
a-personal reality, defined and described like a mere 'substance', i.e. it becomes an
a-personal thing.15
4.2.1. Personhood and the Imago Dei
Human beings are unique within the created order in that they alone among all
creatures are an image of this personhood ofGod. They have a general nature - a fallen
nature - which is typified by individualism, mortality, sin, etc., expressed specifically in
each living human who lives and dies, and which falls short of reaching this communitarian
personhood. But they also have another calling: to exist the way God exists, in personhood
that is part of the community of God, made possible by the work of Christ. Zizioulas draws
a distinction between the individual and the person as they occur in the human situation.
Personhood is only realizable in communion with other persons, something that the
individual may circumscribe from his existence. "True personhood arises not from one's
individualistic isolation from others, but from love and relationship with others, from
10
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communion."16 Joseph Ratzinger picks up on this idea, agreeing that 'to be the image of
God implies relationality', and suggesting that this image is the source of the human capacity
for relationship and for God.17 Zizioulas identifies this as the calling to live as the icon
(eikona) or image of God.
Zizioulas insists that the word 'dei' in the expression imago dei implies a Trinitarian
and relational God, rather than the rational or mechanical God of deism.18 He suggests the
term imago Trinitatis is appropriate, because the nature of the image is relational and hence
Trinitarian. The image of God in human beings includes this capacity for personhood, which
is itself divine. This means that human personhood is not of this world: it is divine.19
Walther Eichrodt agrees that for humans to be created in the image of God means that upon
them, 'personhood is bestowed as the definitive characteristic of [human] nature. He has a
share in the personhood of God; and as a being capable of self-awareness and of self-
determination he is open to the divine address and capable of responsible conduct.
Personhood is that which comprises the essentially human, and distinguishes him from all
other creatures' (emphasis added).20 Christ's prayer for the unity of his disciples (John
17:21-22) indicates that the type of relationship shared among the persons of the Trinity is
potentially available to Jesus' disciples, his 'brothers' and 'sisters', as children of God.21 In
all creation, humanity alone has this capacity, this element of the divine. Humanity's unique
personal nature as the icon of God confers upon it an important role on behalf of the rest of
the cosmos, which will be discussed shortly.
Zizioulas insists that Christian theology, through the Cappadocians, has contributed
the unique concept ofpersonhood to the prevailing modem understanding of human being as
personal.22 Humanity has a share in personhood because it is made in the image of God
through the free love the persons of the Trinity have for one another. This allows humanity
to rise above the necessity of the natural, biological and instinctual order. Personhood, as it
comes from God, 'proves to be in this world - through man - but not o/this world'.23 The
key to human uniqueness and likeness in the image ofGod is its creativity, its freedom, and
above all its personhood - realizable only within community. Zizioulas focuses upon
16 Zizioulas, 'CCCT', 37.
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general personhood rather than particular features of human existence such as rationality,
intelligence, linguistic capability, psychological content, or morality. He believes all these
other kinds of features are observable within the other animals, though in a lesser degree (see
chapter 6).24 Orthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky also stresses the importance of human
freedom from nature. Personhood is only possible on the grounds of such freedom.25 An
emphasis on the corporate and communal nature of personhood is also evident in Moltmann.
"Within the network of relationships, the person becomes the subject of giving and taking,
hearing and doing, experiencing and touching, perceiving and responding.... The "person"
emerges through the call ofGod."26
For Zizioulas, there is no separate nature of either God or humanity's being apart
from personhood. A representative passage is worth quoting at length:
The raison d'etre .. .of each one's being .. .is not to be found in the nature of this
being but in the person, in the identity created freely by love, not by the necessity of
nature. As a person you exist as long as you love and you are loved. When you are
treated as nature, as a thing, you die. And if your soul is immortal, what is the use?
You will exist, but without a personal identity; you will be eternally suffering in the
hell of anonymity, in the Hades of immortal souls. For nature in itself cannot give
you existence and being in this unique and irreplaceable sense in which the person
exists; the immortality therefore of one's soul, even if it implies existence, cannot
imply trulypersonal being. Now that we know, thanks to the Patristic theology of
personhood, how God exists, we know what it means truly to exist. As images of
God we are persons - not natures: there can never be an image of the nature of God,
nor would it be a welcome thing for humanity to be absorbed in divinity. Only when
in this life we exist as persons can we hope to live eternally in the true, personal
sense. But as is the case with God, so with us, too: personal identity emerges only
from the exercise of love as freedom and of freedom as love.27
Zizioulas proposes in this vision of the quintessentially human a type of freedom that
is derivative from the freedom ofGod. God's freedom is expressed in the freely loving way
the persons of the Trinity relate to each other. Similarly, fate or destiny does not bind
humans. Nor are they destined to have their personality dissolve into non-being while
retaining a soul or essence, which might re-appear in some other time or place as another
individual or even as an animal (as in reincarnation or the transmigration of souls). The
transcendence of human personhood from this world towards the divine indicates that, to
24 Ibid. 406.
25 Vladimir Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary
Press, 1978), 72f; Alar Laats, Doctrines ofthe Trinity in Eastern and Western Theologies (Frankfurt:
Peter Lang, 1999), 117.
26 Warren S. Brown, 'Conclusion: Reconciling Scientific and Biblical Portraits ofHuman Nature', in
WHS, 225. Brown quotes Moltmann, 'Christianity and the Values ofModernity and the Western
World', lecture at Fuller Theological Seminary, April, 1996.
27 Zizioulas,'CCCT', 35.
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paraphrase Zizioulas, 'man does not exist for the world, but rather the world for man.'28
4.2.2. The Eschatological Character ofHuman and Cosmic Destiny
Zizioulas describes human personhood and destiny as being essentially
'eschatological' in character. The tragedy of human existence lies in the desire and drive to
freely transcend the creation, coupled with the inability to do so. "Who am I?" is a question
only a human being can ask. It is a question whose answer is wrapped up in the personhood
of the human being, a question that no animal can ask. "It is thus the question par excellence
that makes us human and shows personhood to be an exclusive quality of the human being in
the animal world."29 No animal is dissatisfied with its existence, strives to be something
other than what it presently is, seeks to create its own world through whatever means so that
it also changes in the process. Only the human being has the capacity - the freedom - to
choose to go against the given necessity of nature, even so far as to engage in the destruction
of the given.30 Lossky also notes the importance of human freedom from nature, insisting
this is what allows the human being to love 'someone more than himself. This possibility
for love also entails 'the possibility of refusing and thus the freedom which makes the fall
possible'.31 Zizioulas notes that freedom in human nature opens up to more than simply evil
potentialities. This freedom may not be absolute, in that humanity is still bound by being
part of what is given. But while the human being cannot reach this absolute freedom, yet it
still strives to do so.
There is not yet a definitive present answer to the question 'who am I?', because the
personhood of human beings is not yet fully realized and will not be until the end of all
things in Christ. This is why human personhood must be ultimately considered in its
eschatological form. We are persons now - or perhaps the beginning of persons - but we
will not be fully realized in unbroken relationship as the complete persons we are intended to
be until 'God is all in all'. It is now in process, only 'in part'. Then, it will be realized 'in
full'.32 The eschatological character of human personhood is crucial for understanding the
28
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ambivalent position the church and baptized believers have in relation to the fulfillment of
God's promises in and through them. They are the community of the 'already but not yet'.
The full realization or proof of their hypostatic personhood can never be offered in this world
or age, nor be accomplished using its tools and weapons. That fulfillment must wait for the
end of the age, for the return of Christ.33
4.2.3. Humanity as the Priest ofCreation
Some of the distinguishing features of authentic personhood are already present in
humanity. The ability of human beings to relate with each other, to the world, and beyond
the world to the ultimately transcendent - to God - in such a way that they rise above the
ordinary pull of necessity, is one of the things that delineates them as superior to the rest of
creation. This is not because ofhumanity's rationality, but because of its ability to be in
relationship as persons.34 The type of relationality possible to humans is unique in the
material sphere, manifesting itself in personal relationship with God and other humans, and
also with the rest of creation.35 Gunton similarly suggests that creation 'requires persons in
order to be itself. It is unable to achieve its destiny, the praise of its creator, because it is
non-personal. "That is why it awaits with eager longing the revealing of the children ofGod
(Romans 8:19)."36 Vatican II also highlighted the idea of humanity as summary and summit
of creation through which the creator is praised. "Through his bodily composition [man]
gathers to himself the elements of the material world. Thus they reach their crown through
him, and through him raise their voice in free praise of the Creator."37 Humanity's ability to
relate in this transcendent, 'eucharistic' fashion is a type of priesthood on behalf of the rest
of creation before God. There is thus interdependence between humanity and the creation,
and the human being is not fulfilled until it becomes the 'summing up of nature,' as priest
referring the world back to its Creator.38 Moltmann expresses a similar thought with his idea
of the imago tnundi (image of the world): humanity as a microcosm represents the cosmos as
macrocosm; humanity is the summing up of the cosmos in itself. As the image of the world,
humanity represents the world to God as a 'priestly creation and eucharistic being'.39
Zizioulas is aware of the 'ecological problem' - the imminent danger of
33
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environmental catastrophe at the hands of human beings. Ratzinger describes it as humans
'sawing off the branch on which they sit'.40 Zizioulas suggests that humanity, in light of the
destiny it has in Christ, is nevertheless still at the heart of the destiny of the cosmos. The fall
of humans from their position as potential mediators between God and creation has had
among its other consequences the selfish, thoughtless use and abuse of the world. At the
same time, the ability to abuse and defy the given of its natural surroundings is one of the
things that marks humanity as unique among created beings. One might not suppose that
this commends humanity to a special place in the cosmos. Air is polluted, species are
destroyed, and oil tankers spill as consequences of human action. Yet it is humans who have
the capacity to do something about it, to clean up the mess and restore environmental
harmony, to care even for an environment in which they have no personal stake. This is the
flip side of human freedom that enables it to transcend nature. Only humanity has the ability
not only to abuse its surroundings, but also to rise above itself, above necessity, above the
given of nature for the good of the natural order, to exercise responsibility.
Zizioulas points to the Eastern Orthodox tradition's insistence that the image ofGod
in human beings has spiritual and physical aspects: the imago dei is not just to be found in
mind, but also in the body. He believes the West has fallen into an abusive posture towards
the environment partly because of its over-emphasis upon reason and rationality in the
image. Humans are not simply rational spiritual beings in isolation from the world, destined
to leave it behind and so ultimately unconcerned for Earth's fate. Rather, the bodily
dimension of the image of God emphasizes human continuity with the physical world and
concern for the environment. Zizioulas sees the asceticism of the Early Church as breaking
the selfish individualism behind the desire to dominate the external world.41 He believes the
redemption of not only the immediate world, but also the entire cosmos hinges upon
humanity, as it brings God and the world into communion through itself. More will be said
on these themes shortly.
4.3. The Significance of the Incarnation
How can humanity be the link between God and the cosmos if it has already failed,
due to the abuse of its freedom, to unite them? The answer is in the person of Jesus Christ.
Humanity is an organic part of the natural world, and this constitutes the necessary condition
40




for it to represent the cosmos to God. At the same time it strives to transcend the given
natural world. This striving towards transcendence is a feature of the imago dei, which
qualifies humanity to represent God to the cosmos - not by itself, because it has fallen short
of that transcendence, but in Jesus Christ. He is the human of all humans, the savior of the
world, the ultimate priest, and the one upon whom the final fate of the cosmos rests. In
Christ, and then in humanity in Christ, the universe is united in communion with its Creator,
and freed from ultimate doom and death. Christ bestows upon the universe life and the
infinity of possibilities that are open to God.42
The incarnation is particularly important for human identity and cosmic destiny in
Orthodox thought. The human capacity for the possibility of personhood is God's plan,
seemingly frustrated in the fall, but realized and fulfilled in Christ. Edmund J. Rybarczyk
maintains that the West has tended to regard 'the incarnation as a remedy for fallen
humanity, but the East interprets the incarnation as God's eternally intended and perfect
plan, and not a kind of accident (in the philosophical sense) due to sin'.43 Not only is the
incarnate Son ofGod the original pattern after which humankind is fashioned, but the
incarnation was God's eternal intention for the Son. Thunberg agrees, noting 'Christ is
always the true image ofGod (both as identical with the creative Word, the Logos, and as
incarnate in humanity), and actual human beings are only according to this image.... The
Logos is seen as the prototype, which God used in creating humans in his image, and Christ
is seen as the archetype of what it is to be human'.44
There is some scriptural support for this notion, as indicated by the discussions on
the image in the New Testament and cosmic Christology (§2.5.2, §3.4.3.1). God creates
humanity as a preparatory component of a cosmos pre-destined for the 'perfect paradigmatic
figure' Jesus.45 In this sense, incarnation and humanity as imago dei are two sides of the
same coin: the ultimate divine purpose for the destiny and fulfillment of the cosmos. Jesus
Christ alone makes humanity able to rise above the ontological necessity of its biological,
individual nature, and able to partake in free loving relationship with God as genuine
communitarian persons.46 In Christological perspective, only humanity has been so prepared
by God so as to be assumed by his Son in the incarnation. This is the source of human
capacity for personal, relational, and eternal existence. Miroslav Volf summarizes Zizioulas'
position: 'What gives us an identity that does not die is not our nature, but a personal
42 Zizioulas, 'PGC: Lecture Three', KTR 13:1 (1990), 5.
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relationship with God'.47 Christology illustrates on behalf of humanity and then guarantees
to humanity as a whole its hypostatic destiny beyond what its general nature could otherwise
have produced.48 Christ is the human being who, by restoring the communion of natures in
and through his personhood turns the cosmos into a realm where God is present rather than
absent. "The world acquires thus its ecstatic catholicity as it is lifted up to communion with
God through man."49
Zizioulas observes that the non-human cosmos is dependent upon the church for its
future, in that only in and through the salvation of the church (the corporate Christocentric
humanity which comprises the church) will the salvation of the cosmos be effected. Since
humanity has a full share in the material world, simultaneously transcending it through the
freedom God has given them, humanity becomes, in the church, the priest of all creation.
This is possible because the church is a corporate person with Christ as its head, and its
priesthood is a share in the priesthood that Christ has as the incarnate Son, the priest of
creation. Through the sacraments, the church brings all of creation - not just human bemgs
- into relationship with God. "The church becomes in this way the very core and nucleus of
the destiny of the world."50
The mystery of salvation hidden before all the ages is that humanity is to be
incorporated into the eternal filial relationship that exists between the Father and the Son. It
is only the church that holds this place of unity with Christ, and through him, with God the
Father. This is a unity that is not yet fully realized — an eschatological unity - in which the
church presently partakes as a kind of down payment on the future. In the church, humanity
becomes the 'focal point' of unity between God and creation in Christ.
The survival of the world is dependent upon its communion with God, but that
communion takes place in and through humanity. Only human nature is able to contain the
incarnation ofChrist. Only human nature is able to open up towards God; only in humanity
are 'the creaturely conditions of space and time [able] to open up towards infinite capacity as
they become bearers of the ekstasis of humanity in Christ'.51 Only this redeemed and in-
Christ humanity, which has participated sacramentally in baptism with Christ in his death, is
able to have communion with God; but through them the entire creation also participates in
that communion. Thus humanity is fundamentally responsible for the survival of nature and
of all creation.
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4.4. The Destiny of the Cosmos
It is clear that Zizioulas places great importance upon humanity in the cosmic
scheme of things. It is not too much to say that in his thought, the cosmos has a human-
centered destiny. The church is the vessel through which the incarnate work of God in
Christ comes to fruition, not only for humanity, but also through humanity for the rest of the
cosmos. The creation is subject to mortality, and doomed to frustration and death apart from
this incarnate work. In this context, the fall of Adam represents a failure of potential to unite
creature and Creator. That failure is anticipated, taken up, and ultimately redeemed in Jesus
Christ. This redemption has both an earthly and cosmic scope as humanity in Christ
represents and brings the entire created order to God.
4.4.1. TheMortality ofthe Cosmos
Zizioulas brings fmitful ideas from Orthodoxy on the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo to
the analysis of humanity's relationship to the cosmos.52 Christian teaching has generally
held since the 2nd Century A.D. that the universe was created from nothing - that it had no
progenitor of any kind, whether of eternal matter or immortal soul - and that God is alone
responsible entirely by his own free will for the existence of what is. Some see a definite
affinity between this doctrine and the scientific theory of the 'big bang' (see chapter 7).
Because the creation is from absolute nothing, there is no component of nature that is
everlasting; otherwise, it would have qualities that only belong to God, making nature and
God the same in a substantial way (Pannenberg has a similar idea in his belief that 'God
alone has unrestricted duration'53). If nature is not everlasting, then death for nature is
inevitable: not only the death of all individual created entities, but the death of the entire
cosmos itself. The cosmos is mortal by nature.
This mortality is entailed in the creation of the cosmos from nothing. Its mortality is
not just a consequence of the human abuse of freedom; rather, that abuse frustrated the hope
of uniting God with his creation and thus allowing the creation to transcend its mortality,
until the advent of Christ. For Zizioulas, the significance of the fall does not lay in the





realm, but rather in this tragic inability to unite an already mortal world with God, hardened
into permanence by the abuse of human freedom. Humanity's fall does not represent a false
dichotomy of freedom over against obedience to God, but rather the abuse or perversion of
its given freedom.
Among other things, the universe's natural mortality suggests a partial solution to
the theodicy problem of natural evil. David Fergusson puts the problem like this: how does
one explain the presence of natural evil in a universe that God has declared both 'good' and
'very good' at creation?54 Natural evil means the presence of death and destruction in the
natural processes of the universe, apparently present even before humanity's creation. How
can all the death, predatory violence, and extinction revealed by the fossil record, pre-dating
humanity by millions to billions of years, exist in a 'good' world? Rahner, Moltmann,
Polkinghome and others have proposed various related solutions to make room for
evolutionary processes in the creation account.55 Zizioulas' solution, based on creatio ex
nihilo, is to suppose a naturally mortal, yet nevertheless good, universe. The creation is
'good', but this does not mean it is good in any final, unsurpassable sense. Levels of
desirability are evident in the progress of creation. For instance, with the creation of
humanity, the creation moves in God's judgment from good to very good. The Orthodox
insight is that even as 'very good,' neither creation nor humanity is perfect. If there was a
potentiality, it was lost as humans failed to eat from the tree of life; instead, they have fallen
into rebellion and corruption. The 'very good' only gives way to the 'perfect' in Christ, in
whom mortality is decisively overcome.
Although the Genesis creation narrative hints at the possibility of immortality in the
tree of life, the actual meaning of the tree is veiled. The promise of immortality is only
realized in the incarnation, when the offer of life in Christ, the 'true vine' (John 15:1), is
renewed. If the tree of life symbolizes the life of God, and of choosing relationship with
God and life over relationship with self and death, it is the later that is temporarily chosen in
the Genesis narrative. Mortality is not overcome until Christ appears as 'the way, the truth,
and the life' (John 14:6), in whom all creation will be perfected and live.
Rybarczyk notes that the Orthodox tend to define human beings as they were before
the fall, and thus to have a more 'positive view of human personhood' than the West. They
do not view pre-Fall human nature as perfect; instead, the Orthodox emphasize the need for
and potential for growth, present in both pre-Fall humanity - but frustrated by their rebellion
54
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- and after the Fall as humanity is united with Christ. This is illustrated by the Orthodox
concept, held since the patristic era, of the difference between the image and likeness ofGod.
"We have been created in God's image; it remains that we become like him."56 Thunberg
maintains that'the very concept of image contains a dynamism. Image represents not only a
status but also a potentiality, and this potentiality blossoms only when human beings are set
free by Christ from enslavement to sin and are able to develop the potential capacities given
at creation to their full maturity'.57 This human potential ofbecoming like God - the
Orthodox concept of theosis - was subverted until Christ. Now humanity again has the
opportunity of growth towards God as it is united with Christ, made possible by 'deifying
grace'.58 This union of life and growth means life for the whole creation.59
A cosmos that is intrinsically mortal is more easily reconciled with certain aspects of
evolutionary theory, and resolves a number of scriptural motifs that do not fit neatly with a
perfect and deathless pre-Fall world. The command to 'subdue the earth' (Gen. 1:28) is
stronger than dominion, suggestive of aworld in need of subjection, filled with chaos.60 The
anti-mythical character of the creation account, in polemical opposition to pagan myths that
divinize the world, portrays the world as neither alive nor divine on its own apart from God.
God alone is the source of life.6' The service of subduing (HEED) is a uniquely human task,
a hint that the non-human creation can only be fulfilled or completed with humanity. The
natural evils of the earth are not included as consequences of the fall in Genesis 3; these
consequences are directed to people and the serpent.62 Romans 8:20 describes the subjection
of the cosmos to futility as being a result ofGod's positive will, rather than a negative result
of human rebellion against God. The subjection to futility is part of the plan of God,
established before the foundation of the universe, long before the first human beings appear
in the created order. The will ofGod, not ofAdam and Eve, subjects the creation to
frustration; its groaning did not commence with the human fall into sin in Eden, but has been
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present from the beginning of creation. Entropy, mortality, and predatory death are in the
essential created nature of the cosmos prior to the arrival of humanity, rather than being
consequences of human rebellion against God.
The divine subjection of the cosmos to mortality transcends human history,
including the Adamic Fall, except insofar as humans are the context of the incarnation.
Mortal from the beginning, the creation is predestined from its beginning towards the
incarnation (Rom. 8:29). Rybarczyk notes the Eastern Christian preference for this cosmic
predestination towards incarnation, unlike much ofWestern theology, which has tended to
see the incarnation as an emergency rescue measure.63 It is the incarnation, planned 'before
all ages', that leads to eternal life and the liberation of all things. Stephen Duffy agrees,
noting that 'the original plan for creation is not scrapped only to be replaced by a divine
contingency plan that entails a Christ as its agent. There is but a single creative design,
which intends the divine self-communication'.64 The universal process of the rise and
interrelations of living beings is ultimately oriented to the incarnation, so that all created
reality has an incarnational grounding.65 The process is only partially complete with the
arrival ofnot-yet-perfected humanity. All creation is longing eagerly for the revelation of
the children of God, for only then will it be liberated from death and brought into freedom.
Thus the drawing of the cosmos into communion with its Creator is part of a unified plan
that includes creation, incarnation, and redemption. Robert Jenson notes that 'God's
overcoming of death is not, therefore, only his overcoming of something intruded into his
creation. It is simultaneously his transformation of creature's natural temporal finitude, and
just so his achieving of his original end for the creation in one of its defining aspects'.66
This is why the creation of humanity is 'very good'. The only way to overcome the
problem ofmortality is to find a link between nature and God that at the same time does not
erase the differences between Creator and created. Where can such a link be found?
Zizioulas insists, 'It is in the human being that we must seek the link between God and the
world, and it is precisely this that makes Man responsible, in a sense the only being
responsible for the fate of creation'. This is humanity's responsibility and its mission. As a
result of this cosmic responsibility, Zizioulas follows Irenaeus in declaring that with good
reason, 'Man is the glory of God'.67
One implication of the mortality of the cosmos is that human personhood cannot be
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realized apart from a sharing in the divine life. There is no potentiality for this fullness of
personhood inherent in human nature; it is only received as it enters into communion with
Christ. As a result, there is no possibility for the authentic person to emerge gradually in the
cosmos as a result of evolutionary processes, whether biologically via Darwinian means, or
historically via Marxist means.68 This is similar to Barth's position that humanity is not
itself divine, nor does it have capacity for God in and of itself, but may only receive it by the
act of God. It is not because ofwhat it is or may do, 'but because of what it has to suffer and
receive - and at the hand ofGod', that human nature may receive into itself the incarnation
of God.69 Rybarczyk summarizes the Orthodox perspective: 'the very mystical-personal
experience of communion that the triune God enjoyed from eternity was the driving force
behind why God created us after his image and likeness and why he became incarnate.'70
John Meyendorff notes this line of thought in the fourteenth century Orthodox divine
Gregory Palamas, who held that 'communion with the living God' is 'the only means of
salvation for man, combating the conception of salvation as an extrinsic justification which
leaves man free to live independently ofGod'.71 The development of authentic persons
through the life of the church is made possible only through union with the authentic person
of Christ. Authentic persons cannot arise anywhere in the natural universe without some
move on God's part, some bestowing of the divine life. Zizioulas calls this 'ecclesial
hypostasis.' Only when God is united with his creation does authentic personhood appear in
the creaturely realm. This has begun to happen through Christ in the life of the church, in its
communion with God. This ecclesial hypostasis will find its fulfillment in the future.
Humanity appears in this church identity not as it is, but as it will be eschatologically.
4.4.2. The Cosmos' Human-Centered Destiny
For Zizioulas, cosmic redemption is human-centered, in the sense that the entire
cosmos is brought to immortality through ecclesial humanity. The verification will be
eschatological, but the essential Christian position is that in a naturally mortal cosmos,
mortality will be the condition of every creature in the universe apart from the incarnate
human work ofGod. In this sense, redeemed humanity is responsible for the fate of the
cosmos. Only in the messiah will creation be finally liberated from its mortality, when
relations of life and peace will be established with God and between all creatures.
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Thus a level of responsibility is established both at the beginning and end of the
human story in regard to human relations with the cosmos. This is not a primacy for
humanity at the cost of the cosmos, the world, or the animal kingdom, as if God were
blessing human self-centeredness. Rather it is to the cosmos' benefit, calling the cosmos to
something greater than it was before the arrival of the image of its creator, although the
fulfillment of that calling is delayed until humanity's eschatological salvation and
realization.
It is only when humanity is fully redeemed, when the priestly role of the church is
realized in its eschatological fullness, that the new creation will arrive. Scripture describes
this as 'a new heaven and a new earth', in which 'death will be no more; mourning and
crying and pain will be no more, for the first things have passed away' (Rev. 21:1-4). Christ
in God is responsible for this redemption: 'See, I am making all things new... I am the alpha
and the omega' (vv. 5-6). This new heaven and earth, in which the city of God in bridal
imagery recalls the church (vv. 9-10), is the place where God makes his home with humanity
and lives among them, present in his fullness to creation and making all things new.
This is an ecclesiological fulfillment, because the city of God is built upon the
foundation of Jesus Christ and the twelve apostles (21:14). This dual fulfillment, God with
humanity, is at the heart of the new creation. There the wolf and the lamb will lie down
together; the lion eat straw like the ox (Isa. 11:6-9). There, death will be vanquished,
suffering ended, eternal joy inaugurated. Since it is both a Christological and an
ecclesiological fulfillment, humanity is unified with God in establishing the new creation.
Only when God and humanity are united, not merely in the incarnation of Jesus but in the
fullness of redeemed humanity, will the new creation be realized. There is no wedding party
without both bride and groom. This is what it means to say that the destiny of the cosmos is
dependent upon the destiny of humanity.
This does not mean that humanity, even redeemed humanity, is an independent
contributor to the salvation of the cosmos. As Barth observed, the anthropocentrism that
takes humanity as its starting point without reference to God is dead. He insisted that the
correct source of theology is not from humanity reaching upwards to find whatever might be
god-like, but rather from the transcendent God reaching downwards to reveal himself to
humanity in the incarnation.72 So the children of God stand in their place of glory by grace
because God has elected them. If there is an anthropocentric character to the cosmos and its
fulfillment, it is only because God has willed it to be so, because the cosmos is centered on
Christ in God.
72 Barth, HG, 48-49
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Zizioulas does not pursue a theology of extra-terrestrials in his short corpus of
works. However, his thought suggests that even if extra-terrestrials were found in the
universe, they also would be disbarred from authentic personhood without an incamational
union with the Creator. This is because if such creatures were a normal result of the
universe's evolutionary life, they also must have the same natural limitation of mortality.
Zizioulas' view of the necessity of ecclesial hypostasis suggests that other incarnations of
God will be unnecessary, since God has already decisively united with his creation in Christ.
Every potential world in creation is already taken up in this redemptive work (see §3.4.3).
Prior to its eschatological fulfillment, humans are called now in Christ to be priests
on behalf of the created order. As humans becoming - but not yet fully realized as -
persons, they already have a measure of freedom in Christ to transcend mortal nature with its
inevitable moral brokenness, to forgive and be forgiven, to die to the demands of sinful flesh,
even to take responsibility for the non-human creation. Pannenberg observes that in Christ,
God's kingdom is 'already here,' as 'a power that shapes the future.'73 While creation
continues to groan, and humanity along with it, it is human beings that have 'the first fruits
of the Spirit', the present seal of divine adoption (Rom. 8:23). The results of forgiveness and
divine-human reconciliation are already manifesting themselves in the life of the church.
The Holy Spirit is actively bringing the kingdom ofGod among human beings and, to a
certain extent, through humans to the non-human creation. Humans have the power to
destroy nature, yet also to express now some of their future saving activity. They may in
Christ renew the call of stewardship, shepherding and caring for creation. In this their efforts
will only be partial, shadows of the fullness to come in the new creation, even as their own
natures are now mere shadows of what they will one day be in glory.
Zizioulas highlights the Eastern Orthodox faith's approach to the hallowing of not
just the sinner in the Eucharist, but also of the whole creation. The bread and the wine are to
be recognized not just as the body and blood of Christ, but as elements and symbols of the
non-human created order. The sacrament is a taking up of the whole creation into the
worship of God.74 As priests of Christ, humans may literally bring the creation to God in the
midst of the service ofHoly Communion, interceding for whatever aspect of brokenness in
the created order needs redemption. Typically, Western theology has often limited this
intercession to human sins and needs75, but the Orthodox perspective encompasses what is
already tme in principle - Christ's redemption is for all creation, not just for human beings.
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Creator is taking place eucharistically through ecclesial humanity on behalf of all creation.
H. Paul Santmire speaks of the 'cosmic meaning of baptism and eucharist', pointing to these
liturgical acts of praise as rooted in an eschatological awareness of completed creation,
underlining the 'mighty acts of God' in cosmic history.76
Zizioulas' conception ofhumanity's cosmic priesthood is not a simple return to
Enlightenment hubris or its accompanying elevation of human rationality. The world is an
event ofhistory, not simply a self-explainable process, but its survival depends upon its
referral back to God the creator in Christ. 'It is at this point that the responsibility ofMan as
the one who refers the world back to the Creator arises and forms the basis of... his capacity
to be the "Priest ofCreation".'77 There is no necessary conflict between a humanly activated
(in Christ) cosmic redemption, and an understanding of humanity with rather than set over
and apart from the rest of creation.
The uniqueness of human personhood does not relegate the non-human cosmos to
secondary and trivial status, because in incarnational perspective, human service and human-
centered cosmic redemption actually elevate the status of the non-human creation. Zizioulas
reintroduces a cosmos-centered rather than a 'soul- or spirit-centered' worldview to
sacramental theology.78 His vision of cosmic redemption is human-centered in the sense of
agency rather than ultimate purpose: humans are the agent for the redemption of the cosmos,
not the sole purpose or beneficiary of its redemption. Thus an end human goal ofGod's
creative processes need not conflict with the worth of the non-human cosmos, as the former
guarantees the ultimate life of the latter in Christ (see also §4.6.3 & chapter 8).
4.5. Issues in the Dialogue with the Natural Sciences
Zizioulas' thought suggests several areas of dialogue with the natural sciences.
Many believe that theology ought to embrace as the whole picture of reality the naturalistic
vision offered by science. Zizioulas suggests otherwise, with his mystical and sacramental
view of the cosmos, with spiritual and transcendent aspects of creation manifest in such
things as the nature of Christ, the virgin birth, and the power of the Eucharist. Some insist
there is more congruence than contrast between human and animal natures, a perspective to
which Zizioulas is not altogether unsympathetic. He emphasizes certain aspects of human
76 H. Paul Santmire, Nature Reborn: The Ecological and Cosmic Promise ofChristian Theology





uniqueness such as freedom and creativity, yet couples this with a non-substantive approach
to human significance, which is to be found in relationship to God rather than in particular
substantive aspects of human nature. Some contend that the doctrine of original sin can no
longer be maintained in an evolutionary context. Zizioulas' approach to creation helps
integrate some otherwise disparate threads in the scriptural and scientific worldviews. These
issues will be addressed here, with a more complete analysis given to some questions in the
chapters that follow.
4.5.1. A Sacramental worldview and the limits ofEnlightenment rationality
Zizioulas sees in the rationality of the Enlightenment the culmination of a problem
long brewing in Western thought: the elevation of rationalism to an idolatrous place in
human knowledge.79 A. Plantinga agrees that Enlightenment naturalistic rationalism has had
profound and destructive consequences when taken over from science into theology.80 A
brief retrospective on the three theologians of this thesis shows that Pannenberg, Rahner, and
Zizioulas all believe naturalism has limits. They believe God acts in the cosmos in both
natural and miraculous ways, through nature's laws and in supernatural miraculous events
like the resurrection of Jesus. Zizioulas in particular emphasizes the divine entering into the
cosmos to bring redemption and liberation from death. Jesus' virgin birth, his human and
divine nature, and his resurrection are all aspects ofZizioulas' sacramental vision of reality.
Whether Zizioulas is justified in abandoning the hegemony ofWestern rationalism
for his sacramental vision of reality81 will be addressed in chapter 5. A preliminary
evaluation of the rationalities of both worldviews might help to establish some








4.5.2. Human Uniqueness in the Animal Kingdom
Are human beings unique in the animal kingdom? Like many others, Zizioulas
believes that the difference between humans and animals are a matter of degree rather than
kind; that rationality, language, and morality are observable within the other animals, though
in a lesser degree.82 Yet he places heavy emphasis on the concept of the person as valid in
light of the modem investigation of animal and non-human cognition. While various
attempts have been made to redefine the concept ofperson to include many animals83, his
non-substantive approach avoids the dilemma altogether. This approach allows him to avoid
the natural sciences and substantive definitions of human nature, and focus instead upon the
communal relationship to God as source and meaning ofpersonhood. This human being
comes uniquely into existence in the social and bodily context of freely given love.84
Jenson agrees that while there may be physical and neurological differences between
humans and animals, the distinctive of the human image of God must be found in our
relation to God. This approach is not necessarily at odds with actual substantive differences
between human and non-human creatures. But highlighting the transcendent orientation of
humans towards God shows the ontological distinction between humans and animals. We do
not have the same hopes for ourselves as we do for the 'beasts of the field'.85
While modem science has closed some of the gap separating human beings from
other creatures, it has also illuminated how wide and fixed the gap remains. It may well
be that some of the human distinctives observed by modem natural science ground
Zizioulas' understanding of human personhood in creativity, freedom, and responsibility.
Definitions of personhood that ignore these elements would seem to be inadequate.
Theology need not rely solely on such substantive approaches, but the scientifically
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observable substantive differences do help underline the unique nature of human
personhood. The emerging scientific portrait, far from undermining Zizioulas' larger
position on the uniqueness of human personhood as imago dei, actually strengthens it, since
the capacities science recognizes as unique also serve to make human-divine personal
communion in creativity and freedom possible. Chapter 6 wrestles directly with the
scientific question of whether humans are different in kind or only in degree from other
creatures.
4.5.3. Original sin in an evolutionary context
With the rise ofDarwinism, some thinkers have rejected the traditional Christian
account of original sin and the 'fall'. Patricia A. Williams says the Genesis fall story is a
'Hebrew myth' that when misread as 'human alienation' can become deeply misleading,
since we are 'of the earth'.85 Jonathan Clatworthy sees the fall myth as pitting humanity
against nature, and contributing to the ecological crisis.87 Peacocke insists that in
evolutionary context,
There is no sense in which we can talk of a "Fall" from a past perfection. There was
no golden age, no perfect past, no individuals, and no Adam and Eve from whom all
human beings have now descended and declined and who were perfect in their
relationships and behavior. We appear to be rising beasts rather than fallen angels -
rising from an amoral (and in that sense) innocent state to the capability ofmoral and
immoral action.88
Can the scientific and biblical accounts of original sin be reconciled? Is there a necessary
conflict between the two?
Perspectives on the Genesis narrative may vary without necessarily jeopardizing the
meaning, unless one believes there is only one possible historical or 'factual' meaning that
must exactly coincide with the symbolic or theological meaning. The question relates to the
purpose of the text. Regarding the creation ofhumanity, Claus Westermann observes that
'all exegetes from the church fathers to the present begin with the presupposition that the text
is saying something about people, namely that people bear God's image.... Scarcely one of
the many studies of the text asks about the process that is going on There can be no
question that the text is describing an action, and not the nature of human beings'.89
Polkinghorne calls such stories mythic because their purpose is 'to convey truth in narrative
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form', requiring 'story' to portray the depth ofmeaning.90 Whether an actual historical scene
lies behind the text assumes lesser importance in that the archetypal reality continues to
demonstrate itself to be true in every human life. The Darwinian rejection of the account is
all too often based on artificial 'process' readings of the text.
The doctrines of sin and fall do not necessarily depend upon the biblical account,
and can be constructed apart from special creation. We have already seen this doctrine re-
centered upon Christology and the cross in Rahner and Barth (§3.5.2).91 Williams and Duffy
agree that the doctrine is to be found 'in the contradiction between what humans are and
what they are called to become in Christ'.92 Alistair I. McFayden insists that we must retain
the concept of original sin because it captures our human situation: 'we have a fundamental
solidarity in sin'.93 Piet Schoonenberg agrees, noting that the fall story is not about a man
named Adam, but about the Adam: a 'corporate personality' representing all humanity.94
Alan Richardson notes, 'God is eternally making man and holding him in being and seeing
that his handiwork is good (Gen 1:31). And just as creation is an eternal activity, so the
'fall' is an ingredient of every moment of human life; man is at every moment 'falling',
putting himself in the center, rebelling against the will of God. Adam is Everyman
(emphasis added).' We are essentially broken before God and each other, and in solidarity
with the Adam's sin (Romans 5:12). With or without a historical interpretation, the doctrine
captures with 'amazing insight.. .the truth about human nature. Man desires to be as God'.95
Sin is often rendered as selfishness or the survival instinct in evolutionary context:
vestigial traces of our 'beastly' nature. For instance, Williams, Peterson, Philip Hefner, and
others see our sinfulness as resulting from our culturally and genetically inherited
evolutionary propensity for selfishness.96 In one sense, these approaches mesh with
Zizioulas' view that human and cosmic mortality are together part of a continuum. There
are, however, some limitations to such an evolutionary description of sin. Reinhold Niebuhr
observes that sin is fundamentally theological: human 'sin is defined as rebellion against
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God'.97 McFayden agrees, noting that 'sin is an essentially relational language, speaking of
pathology with an inbuilt and at least implicit reference to our relation to God'.98 Gordon
Graham insists that morality is robbed of its content if the transcendent is stripped away, so
that a truly moral choice implies God from the beginning. "Without the boundaries provided
by the Absolute of God, there are no limits that are ultimately conceptually binding." All our
moral choices imply such a divine background, otherwise words like 'wrong', 'evil', and
'impure' lose their meaning. In Protagorean terms, 'no boundaries can be enforced ifman is
the measure of all things that are and of all things that are not'.99
Regarding sin as a vestige of animal ancestry may be a type ofWittgensteinian
linguistic error.100 Sociobiological descriptions of evolutionary selfishness and altruism may
be utilitarian101, but they are not really talking about the category of sin102, since outside the
theological context, sin has no meaning, or at least not the meaning intended by a word that
connotes a broken relationship between humans and God.103 In this sense, no scientific
evolutionary theory of social or biological motivation could adequately discuss such a
condition, much less discover or repudiate it. Its linguistic models are made for something
different. Personal responsible moral relationship between God and creature only comes
into existence in human beings, because only they are free to choose. Animal survival
instincts are not selfish in the way human God-rejecting moral choice is both sin and
selfishness. Animals are amoral104: they cannot rebel against God. Attributing human sin to
instinctual motivation is to construe the source of human evil as something other than moral.
The evil of which humans are uniquely capable is only evil because it is freely chosen moral
evil, in contrast to the natural violence of the instinctually pre-determined predator, or of the
hypothetical pre-moral hominid ancestor.
Part of the scientific dispute with the Genesis account is in the supposedly archaic
forms of the fall narrative. Examining human origins is beyond the scope of this project, and
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is unnecessary for evaluation of original sin.105 The question of interest here is how could
the first humans, in moving from innocence to guilt, have led to the condition and
condemnation of the entire human race? We have already noted our 'solidarity in sin'. In
terms of our given nature, Peacocke describes the fall as 'not only individual but also
corporate and, in this sense, "original", i.e. consequent upon origins'.106 If our sinfulness has
an evolutionary origin in 'selfish' survival motivation, this makes it essentially corporate:
written into humanity's very genes and blood. This reintroduces the idea of corporate sin,
familiar to the Hebrew mentality, but frequently missed in the individualistic West.
Zizioulas notes that recent scholarship has rediscovered this central biblical theme, which
applies to both Adam in sin, and Christ as 'catholic' man.107 If humans have capacities and
propensities, including for sin, we share these in common with our ancestors, and are
universally and corporately united in our slavery to sin.
Can one believe the first humans fell from some state of innocent immortal grace?
Human free moral reasoning is arguably a universal characteristic that marks us as unique on
earth (see §6.2). However this free ethical and relational capacity originated, whether by
special creation or by gradual evolution, it is only with its emergence that we have what
Zizioulas defines as truepersonhood.]m Hefner sees in the fall story a mythical
representation of the move from amoral instinctual 'innocence' to self-conscious freedom.109
Watts agrees the story may be taken as 'roughly historical' in the sense of capturing in
'mythological form' the tmth about the acquisition of the knowledge of good and evil -
moral capacity - that must have occurred as Homo sapiens evolved.110
The fall amounts to an abuse of that newfound freedom. Without God's own self
within their nature to rightly direct this moral capacity, there is no reason to suppose humans
will always choose the right thing. At some point they abuse their freedom in relationship to
God: they fall. The moral capacity continues to be genetically inherited by their descendants,
and continues to lack the inner life ofGod to animate and rightly direct it. This is the
experience of every human. As continues to be the case in children today, innocence is the
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normal state of the moral disposition until choice is abused. The two trees in Eden can be
seen as the objectification of this choice for or against God. The forbidden fruit is not
'ethically arbitrary'111, but accurately represents what it means to reject God: an entry into
'personal intimate acquaintance' with both good and evil, and knowledge of what existence
is like without God. From this perspective, Christian theology must insist on the doctrine of
the fall not only for our first moral ancestors, but also for each person throughout history, as
the authentic description of human brokenness and estrangement from God.
The 'fall' is not the same as the entry of death into creation. Zizioulas' account of
the cosmos created mortal from its beginnings112 helps reconcile this part of the story with
modem science, and is actually more faithful to the biblical text. There is no suggestion in
the Genesis account that humans were created independently immortal. James Barr notes
that the tree of life offers the potential for immortality, but that Adam and Eve never actually
partook of it: they were not naturally immortal.113 Thus human potential for immortality is
extrinsic rather than intrinsic. There is no need to follow Augustine in his exaggeration of
the consequences of the fall.114 It is tragic because, according to Zizioulas, the potential
ability to unite the world with God is lost by the abuse of human freedom. The divine-
human relationship is broken, with the consequence of humanity being permanently unable
to unite with God - of being excluded from the tree of life. There is no escape from
mortality without a move from God towards humanity, a move in which God comes into
human moral life to redeem and straighten it - to release it from its captivity to sin, evil, and
death.115 Thus incarnation is intrinsic to the creation ofmortal humanity. For these reasons,
Zizioulas insists there is no possibility for the authentic person to emerge gradually in the
cosmos as a result of evolutionary processes.116 He rejects the evolutionary hope that
humans are gradually making their way upward towards God, the first animal to emerge into
consciousness, and now gradually heading for union with the divine, because it provides no
solution to the problem of death.117
Zizioulas' Eastern Orthodox concept of the mortality of the cosmos provides a
context that enables evolutionary thought to be coherent with biblical discourse. Sin is
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broken divine-human relationship and failed human potentiality, manifesting itself
individually and corporately, though sin will be 'visible' to natural science largely in terms
of secondary 'lateral' effects (e.g., selfishness, inordinate desire). The tension between the
moral relational capacity of humans for God and the possibility of a morally right choice
without the inner life of God is resolved by the predestination of the cosmos, including all of
human history, towards the incarnation and the promised indwelling of the Holy Spirit. The
possibility to transcend mortality appears in humanity, but is only finally realized in the
incarnation ofChrist, and through him in ecclesial humanity. In them, the universe receives
a communion of unity with its Creator that results in eternal life.1'8 Thus a doctrine of
original sin remains coherent with, though different from, evolutionary discourse about
human nature.
4.6. Relevant Problems in Zizioulas' Theology
4.6.1. Zizioulas' doctrine of the Trinity
Zizioulas' interpretation of the Trinity may have some weaknesses. His communal
doctrine ofpersonhood flows from his Trinitarian theology, in which he stresses the personal
nature of God while ignoring many of the other metaphors and analogies for God. This may
lead to an overemphasis on the divine nature as purely and ultimately personal without an
adequate backing, whether scriptural or philosophical. Daniel L. Migliore points out that the
classical objection to tritheism - the idea that there are really three gods in the Trinity - is that
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 'are not three gods but distinct personal expressions of the
one yet differentiated love of God.'119 This might lend itself to a different emphasis on the
ultimate nature of God - not of personhood, but of love. While these may not be
incompatible, in the sense that Zizioulas' concept of personhood includes communion and
love, it does suggest some vulnerability in his approach to the Trinity.
Zizioulas follows the Cappadocian fathers in positing the person of the Father as the
cause of the Son and Spirit. Alan J. Torrance wonders if this emphasis actually undermines
Zizioulas' overall attempt to make communalpersonhood central to the doctrine of God. If
God is primarily personal, and personhood automatically entails corporate interpersonal






causation when there are no other persons to whom he may relate? Since personhood has no
meaning apart from its corporate and communal context, it becomes problematic to speak of
God as personhood while using the language of causation in inter-Trimtarian relations. A.J.
Torrance is glad to have personhood properly emphasized in Western Trinitarian theology,
but suspects that if the Father is the source of the Trinity, this must make his personhood
quite different from that of the Son and Spirit, who are 'derivative and contingent'. He
believes 'this has the effect of reducing the unity of the Godhead to the personal singularity
of the Father'.120 Once the nature ofpersonhood becomes fluid in this apparently
individualistic way, does the idea of personhood itself become too fluid? How could God be
defined as person, his essence defined as communal personhood, in such a situation?
Can God the Father be understood as a person if ontologically he is prior to other
persons of the Trinity, and personhood is fundamentally a communion of ekstasis between
persons?121 Zizioulas does not require that all the individual members of communally related
persons must be absolutely identical in everyway (though identical in character). In this
sense, differences in personhood between the members of the Trinity are not problematic. If
various personal roles are possible in human communal relations - father-mother-son-
daughter, brother-sister, husband-wife - without endangering personhood, neither should it
be completely alien if found in God. Zizioulas can hold such a view since communal
personhood as the chief aspect of the imago dei in human beings is not merely metaphorical
of God's nature, but is God's nature. The key point is that personhood is realized
corporately and communally, but need not imply sameness among the members of the
community.
However, it might be suggested that God was not Father 'before' he caused the Son
and Spirit, since causation entails priority and contingency. Then what was God's essence
prior to this ontological causation? T. F. Torrance notices this flaw in the Cappadocian
fathers, arguing that the derivative quality of the Son and Spirit destroys the unity of the
Godhead.122 Zizioulas could even be taken as supportive of a type of non-Trinitarian
monotheism, since he explicitly claims, "God = the Father in the Bible." This suggests he
really believes there is only one monad God, God the Father, so that when he speaks ofGod,
he is really speaking only of the Father, or at least of an over-subordination of relationships
within the Trinity.123 This seems to de-personalize God and further endanger the primacy of
120 Alan J. Torrance, Trinitarian Description and Human Participation (TTC, 1996), 290-292.
121 A. J. Torrance, Persons in Communion: an essay on trinitarian description and human
participation (TTC, 1996), 293; Zizioulas, HCI, 408.
122 T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (TTC, 1988), 238-239.
123
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personhood in the divinity, which is problematic given Zizioulas' insistence on that primacy.
Some theologians have suggested that a sole focus upon personhood as constitutive
of the Trinity overlooks other aspects of the nature of God. For instance, Sarah Coakley has
attempted to show that the emphasis on the personal nature of the Trinity is not as critical to
the thought ofGregory ofNyssa, an inspiration for social Trinitarianism in Eastern
Orthodoxy and Zizioulas, as first appears. She suggests that this is one analogy among
many used by Gregory for understanding the Trinity.124 In answer, LaCugna argues that
relationality must be more than merely the face of God, as God appears to us; it must be the
essence ofGod's inner being, or we are left with a unitarian God incompatible with what is
known ofGod's complete giving of himself to us in the cross.125 A Trinitarian
understanding of God, especially as revealed in Christ, is a God who is definitivelyfor us,
whereas a unitarian version ofGod, such as might be suggested by Zizioulas' emphasis on
the Father, with Christ as a kind of appendage or reflection, may or may not be for us; such a
god might ultimately be only for himself. Without the proper emphasis upon personhood,
some other characteristic of the godhead becomes primary, e.g. power, will, or love.
Yet the divine love is not contrary to personhood. This seems to be what LaCugna
sees in Zizioulas when she claims 'love causes God to be who God is'. For her, 'love is
constitutive ofGod's being as a predicate ofperson, not substance' (emphasis added).
God's personhood is what it is because 'God is towards another', hence the intra-
communitarian nature of God's personhood.126 It is the Father's love which gives rise to the
Son and the Spirit, hence to the Trinity itself, which in turn extends love to the world and
humanity. Thus Zizioulas claims, 'what causes God to be is the person of the Father'.127 T.
F. Torrance suggests that this Cappadocian thought needs to be corrected by rejecting causal
relations and incorporating Cyril of Alexandria's idea of the 'coinherence in the one identical
being ofGod, according to which the Father, Son and Holy Spirit mutually indwell and
contain one another while remaining what they are'. What God is inherently, indivisibly and
eternally in the 'consubstantial Trinity', he is toward us in the incarnation of his Son Jesus
Christ and in the Spirit. Thus God's being is not isolated in the Father, but is one in nature
and being, activity and will, sovereignty and power, perfectly expressed in 'each divine
person.. .of the Consubstantial Trinity'.128 A. J. Torrance agrees, believing this would re-
124 Sarah Coakley, '"Persons" in the "Social" Doctrine of the Trinity: Gregory ofNyssa and Current
Analytic Discussion', Feb. 8, 2001 (?) http:/'www.bostontheological.org/colloquium/bts/btscoak.htm
125 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, 'The Baptismal Formula, Feminist Objections, and Trinitarian
Theology', Journal ofEcumenical Studies 26 (1989), 243; esp. nl69.
126
LaCugna, God for Us, 260-261.
127
Zizioulas, 'CCCT', 32.
128 T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith, 338-340.
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center God's rule ('Monarchia') on the Trinity as it relates to the creation and humanity,
rather than upon internal Trinitarian relations.129 This seems prudent since, as Migliore
reminds us, any ontology of divinity must be purely speculative.130 The problem may be that
humans can only think of causation in material terms, but that such terms are inadequate to
describe what happens within the Trinity (T. F. Torrance observes awareness of this in
Gregory ofNazianzus131). The twin notions of the Son's 'begottenness' and the Spirit's
'procession' are metaphorically rich, but it would be inadequate to read what we know of
these notions directly onto inter-Trinitarian relations.
A. J. Torrance sees a further problem for anthropology in Zizioulas' distinction
between human biological and ecclesial personhood (hypostasis). He wonders whether this
gives an adequate account of those whose personhood is undeveloped or damaged, such as
the very young and the mentally handicapped or infirm. He is also concerned that Zizioulas'
brand of salvation is limited to the church.132 However, it would be a mistake to take
Zizioulas' description of the move from biological to ecclesial hypostasis as quite as
dependent upon cognitive categories as this. The Eastern Orthodox Church believes in
infant baptism, which sacrament is the sign for Zizioulas of entry into the eucharistic
ecclesial life of God. Further, the Christian hope of redemption draws a clear contrast
between this corruptible mortal nature and the incorruptible nature of the resurrection (1 Cor.
15:35-50). Short of that fulfillment, every human is fraught with the infirmities ofmortality,
some more than others, but all equally pale in comparison to the glory to be revealed in the
children of God.133 Cognitive limitations are therefore not ultimately relevant to human
fulfillment in the Kingdom of God.134 Further, Zizioulas' theology of eschatological hope is
not an isolationist salvation. Since even non-human creatures find salvation in the
Eucharistic redemption, there is no reason to believe it excludes those persons whose
cognitive capacity is impaired through either ignorance or infirmity. Zizioulas' Eucharistic
ingathering sweeps the entire creation up into God's life, yet takes seriously the doom of
those who actively reject that communion.
129 A. J. Torrance, Persons in Communion, 294-295.
130
Migliore, FSU, 61.
131 y p porrance) The Trinitarian Faith, 239.
132 A. J. Torrance, Persons in Communion, 30If.
133 "So it is with the resurrection of the dead. What is sown is perishable, what is raised is
imperishable. It is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power.
It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body" (vv. 42-44).
134 Recall Matt. 18:3-'unless you change and become like children, you will never enter the kingdom
of heaven'.
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4.6.2. Personhood and competing non-human versions of the imago dei
Several competing non-human versions of the imago dei have been offered in recent
years that attempt to answer various critiques of traditional theology, and might be a foil to
Zizioulas' emphasis on personhood. Lucy Larkin attempts to define the image of God
simply as relational capacity, so that various relations in the animal kingdom might represent
the image.135 Peacocke and Sally McFague suggest a move from a human-centered to a
creation-centered version of the image: 'the world is to God.. .as our bodies are to us as
personal agents'.136 While God's ontology is distinct from the world, the symbolism is of
God as the Mind of the universe. Langdon Gilkey argues that the whole creation, rather than
just human beings, should be viewed as the image ofGod.137 Peterson agrees, noting the
advantage of such a perspective is that it acknowledges 'not only our relation to God but our
relation to the rest of creation'. He goes further, suggesting that consciousness and cognition
is key to the image ofGod. "It would be better to say not that nature is in the image of God,
but that nature is in the process of imaging God and in humans that imaging is, though not
exclusive, most manifest."138 Celia Deane-Drummond wonders if the image can really be
confined to humans, since every creature of creation has 'the imprint of the trinity'.139
Others offer differing Trinitarian and non-Trinitarian alternatives to Father-Son-Spirit that
may be non-personal. To put the problem a bit crudely, ifGod is 'the Rock', do rocks image
God wherever they are found? Perhaps the image is unknowable to us. We may infer mind
in the cosmos by the universe's intelligibility, the apparent rationality of law-like regularity
in nature, perhaps even by the information-rich environment of the biosphere. But is it our
own human minds that we see thus reflected, since only by analogy with our own inner
nature do these facets of the universe come into focus?140
Previous discussions (§2.5, §2.7.3; see also §6.3) have shown some of the problems
with ascribing God's image solely to relationality, creativity, Nature, or mind. The image of
135
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(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 175-192.
138
Peterson, 'Are We Unique', 159, 177; MG, 147-150; 'Nature as the Image of God: Reflections on
the Signs of the Sacred', Zygon 29 (1994), 489-505; 'The Evolution of Consciousness and the
Theology of Nature', Zygon 34 (1999), 300-304.
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God is much richer in meaning, and such functionalistic approaches are not enough to
capture the scriptural picture of either human or divine nature. While Noreen Herzfeld
argues that the biblical material is too scant to found a robust doctrine of the image141, the
New Testament Scripture in particular gives a full-bodied depiction, fully illuminated in the
person of Jesus (§2.5). The heart of the issue is what Jesus himself, as the being clearly
closest to God, reveals about God's nature and being. Lossky agrees, noting that because of
the fall, the image of God is covered in humanity. For this reason we must start with
Christology, and then move to human being in order to understand the imago dei.142 The
incarnation means the imago dei is inseparable from humanity. The relational, sovereign,
bodily, and moral dimensions of the image in Jesus Christ and in the church highlight the
uniquely human quality of the imago dei. Neither inanimate nature nor any other living
material creature is capable of exercising freedom and love in relationship, moral judgment,
or dominion.143 Contrary to Gilkey's contention, we might end up with a very different
picture of God if the created cosmos 'red in tooth in claw', subject to natural imperatives,
mortal and mired in death, were taken as normative of the image. The essential humanness
of the imago dei is not invalidated by its brokenness in mortal and fallen humanity, because
its reality and perfection are only revealed for what they are meant to be in Jesus Christ.
Some object that God's fatherhood may be overstated in classical Christianity.144 Its
eclipse would seem to imply a change in status for personhood as well. But many insist both
are indispensable, since they are in Jesus the highest revelation of God.145 This is not to say
'Father' is the only name of the first person of the Trinity, but that it does remain essential.
Pannenberg insists the church may not surrender language about God the 'Father' as a mere
image among other images. Rather, it is the name - the highest personal name - whereby
Jesus addressed God, whether in prayer, or in expressions of his mission, or as the God of
the kingdom ofhis preaching. "In its function as a name, the name of God in Jesus' own
teaching and prayer, the word "Father" cannot be replaced by another one. It would no
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Chapter 6 will examine the extension of 'person' status to animals, and deny the claim that
personhood can be extended in this way beyond human nature without losing its meaning (§6.2.3).
Creaturehood is not enough to capture the image of God.
144 Janet M. Soskice, 'Can a Feminist Call God Father?', in Teresa Elwes, ed., Women's Voices:
Essays in Contemporary Feminist Theology (London: Marshall Pickering, 1992), 15-29; Elizabeth A.
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108, in LaCugna, ed., Freeing Theology (San Francisco: Harper, 1993).
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used."146 Jesus himself, in his life and teaching, is the most significant revelation of God's
fatherhood and nature - 'whoever has seen me has seen the father' (John 14:9). He shows
that the fatherhood ofGod is deeply personal, relational, and sacrificial. The biblical
description of divine father encompasses Ian McFarland's concept of surrender, support, and
love, as in the father in the prodigal son story, and in Christ's sacrificial love of the
church.147 Moltmann insists we must see the brokenness of the cross as 'the pain of
God...the divine co-suffering' of compassion. Through Christ's 'surrender God seeks out the
lost beings he has created, and enters into their forsakenness, bringing them his fellowship,
which can never be lost'.148 T. F. Torrance concurs:
By revealing himself in the Lord Jesus Christ as his dear Son, God reveals that
Fatherhood belongs to his eternal Being, and in giving his Son to be the Savior of the
world, he reveals that he loves us to the uttermost with an eternal fatherly love.149
He and others suggest the problem is not in God's fatherhood, but in its pale and broken
reflection manifested in human fatherhood.150 Jesus shows that God's fatherhood does not
mean isolation, patriarchal abuse, and distance, but rather the opposite. He gives of himself
out of love, rescuing his lost children, providing for, caring for, and disciplining them so that
they might become all they are meant to be.
It seems that Zizioulas derives his view ofGod's personhood largely from his
Christology and anthropology: the Son ofGod could become a human being, and human
beings made in God's image are personal. It is not clear that the fullness of a reality can be
grasped by analogy with its image, nor that a full description of the nature of the Son ofGod
may be obtained from the data that he was incarnate as a human being. Simply put, there is
probably a lot more to God than we can see in ourselves or even in Christ. We are not sure
what parts of the divine nature Christ put off in becoming incarnate besides his power and
glory, but we do know he 'emptied himself, taking the form of a servant' (Phil. 2:7).
On the other hand, the fact of the incarnation does seem to indicate something
fundamental and inescapable about God's personal nature. The Son ofGod has become
incarnate as a human being, and chosen to retain this human nature - albeit transformed in
146
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the resurrection - for all of eternity. Jesus' revelation of the personal nature and name of
God casts into doubt efforts to re-characterize God, abandon the traditional Trinitarian
formulation, or exchange 'personhood' in the imago dei for some other central motif.
Substance or function understandings ofGod's name and image, based on his activities and
characteristics in such names as 'creator', 'mind', 'ground ofbeing', 'rock', 'sustainer', or
even 'parent', are simply inadequate as holistic terms for God.151 Christ reveals that both
human and divine natures are best understood in terms ofpersonhood, rather than substance
or function. When theologians de-emphasize God's personal names and personhood, such as
in the redefinition of the imago dei to non-personal terms, or the feminist rejection ofGod's
fatherhood, important features of revelation are lost.152
Jesus reveals that God is not primarily something, nor some action, but someone.153
Indeed, Athanasius in his dispute with the Arians noted that when Philip asked Jesus to
'Show us the Father', "He said not, "Behold the creation," but, He that hath seen Me, hath
seen the Father".154 Zizioulas' contentions that personhood is fundamental to the nature of
God, and his image is revealed clearly in creation in human beings, are credible in light of
the incarnation. The incarnate divine person Jesus Christ establishes an irrevocable bond
between human personhood and God's personhood. Human personhood is therefore of
infinite worth. People are not things (cf. Rev. 18:13).
4.6.3. The limits ofhuman cosmic priesthood
Several authors note problems with the type of human cosmic priesthood proposed
by Zizioulas, suggesting the idea is exaggerated. Stephen Clark suggests the priestly model
is flawed because it exaggerates human power over nature. The notion of cosmic
redemption is not implicit in nature, nor is it to be expected apart from divine revelation.
Apart from the 'good will' ofGod, there is no reason to believe that life, including human
life, will 'win' out in cosmic history, nor any reason to believe 'our works will last' or the
151 A 'rock' is a thing. 'Parent' is too generic and non-particular: too impersonal. I am not simply my
son's or daughter's 'parent'. I am their father!
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victory of life will be in a form that humans hope for.155 It is just as likely that we humans
will bring about our own destruction, as well as that of the ecosystems in which we live.156
Given the realities ofprimordial mass extinctions, and the present human capacity for total
self-destruction as possibly the medium of its own future fiery judgment (in either a nuclear
or scriptural apocalypse, or both), the priestly model offered by Zizioulas, Andrew Linzey,
and others exaggerates human capacity to affect and save creation as a whole. The Orthodox
picture of the cosmos encompassed in the Eucharist may show our bodily solidarity with
creation in the bread and wine, but at the most it can be symbolic of the salvation we hope
for eschatologically in Christ, not our own capacity to affect that salvation.
This has the net effect of underscoring the proper theocentric focus of theology.
Only God can redeem the cosmos. John Cobb agrees that the salvation of all things in the
cosmos comes 'in Christ', not simply in humans. The highest natural efforts of humans to
save the endangered and abused animal kingdom still end in death. Only 'in Christ' are all
creatures truly and forever reconciled and redeemed - 'slaughtered and slaughterer, tortured
and torturer - to one another and to God'.157 The chief anthropocentrism here lies in the fact
that God's salvation is 'in Christ'. Here, the claim that the animal kingdom is dependent
upon humanity for its salvation can only be substantiated tangentially. While it is God's
plan of redemption to bring all creation to glory with the children of God, it is God, in the
human Jesus Christ, who is the primary actor, not the bulk of the human race. With the rest
of creation, we also groan while waiting. Humans are as dependent upon God for salvation
- perhaps more so for their willful sin - as the rest of creation. Zizioulas' concept of human
cosmic priesthood exaggerates the responsibility of the human race, including the redeemed
church, although this criticism does not affect the status of the incarnate Jesus Christ.
Zizioulas might well answer that Clark and Cobb have failed to understand the
mystical power, responsibility and destiny of the body of Christ, the Church. It is precisely
because it is Christ's body in the world that the Church continues to have a priestly role in
creation. So Paul says God's intent was that 'through the church the wisdom of God in its
rich variety might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places.
This was in accordance with the eternal purpose that he has carried out in Christ Jesus our
Lord' (Eph. 3:10-11). To forget this role may be a failure to understand the true nature of the
church. The idea of human cosmic priesthood will be revisited in chapter 8, §8.3.2.
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4.7. Summary of Zizioulas' Perspective
Zizioulas' theology highlights human significance in several important ways.
Humanity is unique in all creation in that it is the imago dei - more precisely the imago
Trinitatis. Humans alone of all creatures in the cosmos are created as persons with
personhood, capable of theosis - potentially being made into the likeness ofGod in Christ.
They alone are capable of transcending the given nature of the cosmos in freedom, creativity,
and love. Because of the person and work of Jesus Christ, they are offered a share in divine
personhood, to be fulfilled eschatologically. The cosmos is prepared from its foundations for
the incarnation of the Son of God, which takes place in creaturely and hypostatic humanity.
Thus humanity is the fulcrum that unites the nature ofGod with the cosmos. Christ, in
whom the communion of the divine and human natures is restored, turns the cosmos into a
realm where God is present rather than absent. His divine life is extended through the
redeemed humanity of the church, his corporate body, so that 'the church becomes ...the
very core and nucleus of the destiny of the world'.158
This elevated view of humanity is not at the expense of the non-human creation, for
Ecclesial humanity is priest in Christ for the creation, able to represent the cosmos to God,
and God to the cosmos. It brings the cosmos into communion with its Creator. The church
is thus the focus of unity between God and the creation. This finding is not compromised
even if the priestly responsibility of humanity is exaggerated in Zizioulas. Only in humanity,
and specifically the humanity of the church, does the creation unite with its Creator, and so
transcend its mortality and find eternal life. The fate of the entire universe rests upon
humanity in this sense: in them it will be released from death and renewed with immortality.
Thus humanity is the hope of the whole creation. Only in and through them does God finally
unite with his creation and the new heaven and earth appear. Thus 'man...is the only being
responsible for the fate of creation'.159
In conclusion, it is evident that Zizioulas' theology is deeply and intrinsically
anthropocentric. This Trinitarian and incarnational perspective places humanity at the heart
of cosmic destiny in Christ. Though embedded in an explicitly sacramental worldview, his
theology is neither irrational nor unable to interact with modernity. Insofar as Zizioulas
represents the Orthodox Christian Tradition, it would seem that stream of Christianity
contains a high view of human significance, correlating divine and human personhood at the
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PART II
Chapter 5
Some Boundary Issues between Science and Theology
"The 'supernatural' can only designate the reality essentially distinctfrom
the creature, the divine life itself" - Gregory Palamas1
5.1. Introduction
Before moving into the discussion of what science says about human significance, it
is appropriate to establish some basic boundaries for dialogue. This is necessary in order to
protect the integrity ofwhat each discipline claims to be true in its own domain, and to
discover what the boundaries of those domains are. The particular problem relevant to this
thesis is that many have attempted to isolate theology in a realm ofmeaning and value, and
given science, through the doctrine of materialistic naturalism, carte blanche for describing
the full content of reality. Is this a fair move?
Materialistic naturalism serves as a fairly standard boundary of the scientific
enterprise. There are many who would extend this boundary to include theology, moving in
the positivist direction of denying the possibility of miracles, access to the transcendent, and
knowledge ofGod. This is evident in scientific polemicists like Sagan, Richard Dawkins, or
Daniel C. Dennett, and also in those engaged in the science/theology dialogue, such as in
Willem Drees' 'naturalist account'2, Page's 'sub-deism'3, or Peacocke's non-interventionist
version of 'emergentist monism'.4 This naturalistic program is held by some to undermine
incarnational theology, to reduce the status of Christian revelation to irrelevance, and thus to
refute the inherent anthropocentrism of Christian theology. If naturalism holds as the
ultimate boundary description of reality, there could not be a real incarnation, a real
resurrection, or indeed any kind ofobjective divine revelation. Therefore it is important to
assess the claims of naturalism if theology is to maintain belief in supernatural or miraculous
1
Meyendorff, Gregory Palamas, 163.
2 Willem B. Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism (CUP, 1996), 268. Drees' naturalism is
particularly unsatisfying. To such basic metaphysical questions as 'why is there anything?', 'why is
there order?', or 'why is the universe fine-tuned?' his answer is, "Reality is assumed, rather than
explained. This applies also to my naturalist account."
3 The term is used by Clare Palmer, review of God and the Web ofCreation by Ruth Page, Journal of
Theological Studies 48 (1997), 750. See chapter 8 for an extended critique.
4
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capacity to become what it might be'. Jesus' resurrection, as in Page, seems to be an exception.
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Christian claims. The critical anthropocentrism evident in Zizioulas, Pannenberg, and
Rahner seems in each case to be dependent upon such transcendent claims, so this
assessment is necessary to establish the coherence of Christian anthropocentrism in modern
context beyond purely metaphorical uses.
Pannenberg, Rahner, and Zizioulas all believe naturalism has limits. They believe
God acts in the cosmos in both natural and miraculous ways, through nature's laws and in
supernatural miraculous events like the resurrection of Jesus and the eschatological
redemption of the cosmos. Pannenberg emphasizes the resurrection, and Rahner emphasizes
human openness towards transcendence, while Zizioulas emphasizes the divine entering into
the cosmos to bring redemption and liberation from death (Jesus' virgin birth, human and
divine nature, and resurrection). Zizioulas sees in the rationality of the Enlightenment the
culmination of a problem long brewing in Western thought: the elevation of rationalism to an
idolatrous place in human knowledge.5 A. Plantinga insists that Enlightenment naturalism
has profound consequences if taken over from science into theology.6
Naturalism is an aspect or product of Enlightenment foundationalism (EF). The
scientific enterprise and worldview that so dominates modem culture has been deeply
naturalistic since its rise in EF philosophy. From Hume and Spinoza to Sagan and Dawkins,
many influential thinkers have believed in Enlightenment naturalism. There has been a
growing critique of EF in recent philosophy.7 Many philosophers hold that Enlightenment
and modem foundationalism has collapsed.8 A brief evaluation of their arguments is in
order. If they are right, then EF's contingent naturalism is also suspect, and remains so even
in the nonfoundationalist postmodern setting. This has wide-ranging implications for
theology - especially for protecting the objectivity of events like the incarnation and
resurrection and for defending the rationality ofGod's ongoing relationship with the cosmos
- even while naturalism continues to be useful in science.
5 Zizioulas, 'PGC1', 1-3.
6 A. Plantinga, 'Methodological Naturalism', 198-204.
7 Alistair McGrath, The Foundations ofDialogue in Science and Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998),
11-13.
8 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason Within the Bounds ofReligion, 2nd Ed. (WmE, 1984); A. Plantinga,
'Reason', 48-63; George A. Lindbeck, The nature ofdoctrine: religion and theology in a postliberal
age (London: SPCK, 1984); Dirk-Martin Grube, 'Religious Experience after the Demise of
Foundationalism', Religious Studies 31 (1995), 37-52; D.Z. Philips, Faith afterfoundationalism:
Plantinga-Rorty-Lindbeck-Berger; critiques and alternatives (Boulder: Westview, 1995); Michael
Williams, Problems ofKnowledge: a Critical Introduction to Epistemology (OUP, 2001).
158
5.2. Definition and 'Basis' of Enlightenment Foundationalism
EF naturalists hold that just as science seeks to understand reality without reference
to a supernatural or transcendent realm, so all approaches to reality, including theology, must
operate within those same limits. If there is a God, he does not or cannot intervene in the
chain of secondary causation. Miraculous and 'supernatural' events are ruled out of bounds,
a priori. RudolfBultmann summarizes the perspective neatly: reality is a 'closed
continuum... that cannot be rent by the interference of supernatural, transcendent powers'.9
Thus miraculous events like the resurrection are seen as inherently impossible, to be given
nonrealist interpretations as symbolic, metaphorical, or mythological in meaning or value.
5.2.1. The 'properly basic'
EF is primarily an empirical belief structure. It accepts as foundational only beliefs
that are empirical: those that are 'intrinsically credible or self-evidencing',10 A basic belief
in this structure (x):
(.x) Refers 'solely to the content of a single experience', and must be self-evident,
incorrigible (indisputably related to one's own sense-experience), or evident to the
senses.11
E-foundationalists were skeptical about beliefs built outside this basis. The boundary of
experience came to be seen as a priori excluding the miraculous and the supernatural. As
Enlightenment science flowered, the world came to be seen as autonomous, self-sustaining,
and without the need of transcendent properties or orientation.12 The emerging naturalism
claimed that the miraculous and supernatural were neither examples of nor derivable from
empirical grounds. In this way, religious belief in miracles and the supernatural came to be
seen as irrational.
9 RudolfBultmann, Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings ofRudolfBultmann, ed. Schubert M.
Ogden (London: Hodder& Stoughton, 1960), 291-292.
10
Williams, PK, 83.
11 A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth & Logic, 2nd Ed. (London: V. Gollancz, 1946), 10; McGrath, FDSR, 12;
Williams, PK, 84.
12 Graham Ward, 'Introduction', in Graham Ward, ed., The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), xx.
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5.3. The collapse of Enlightenment Foundationalism
Philosophers suggest that EF has collapsed for three reasons. 1) It is self-
referentially incoherent. 2) Its empirically based system is local and cultural rather than
universal. 3) It provides the wrong analytical technique for supernatural events or
experience.
5.3.1. Self-referential incoherence.
EF claims its belief structure is rational 'all the way down' to the ground of
incontestable empirical experience: the 'properly basic.' Its claim to ultimate rationality is
contingent upon the definition and rational validity of the 'properly basic' (x). However,
there is no way to prove that this understanding of (x) is itself 'properly basic' to knowledge.
The intuition that this is the final ground of knowledge seems to require a defense of reasons.
But, as Shults points out, once such a defense is offered, then the intuition itself is no longer
foundational: rather the reasons are foundational. Then the reasons must be justified, and so
on ad infinitum.13 Furthermore, as Plantinga demonstrates, the basis is logically incoherent.
EF's 'properly basic' cannot be shown to be 'self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the
senses'. It is not self-evident or evident to the senses that the only things that may be
rationally believed as foundational are those that are self-evident or evident to the senses.
Since EF's 'properly basic' is not itself 'properly basic', therefore EF's foundations are self-
referentially irrational: 'the modem foundationalist violates... the condition of proper
basicality he himself lays down'.14 EF is thus a circular belief system, rather than being
rational down to the ground, and can make no claim to ultimate rationality.
5.3.2. Culturally local, not universal.
Besides its self-referential incoherence, EF's claim for the universal rationality of its
perceptual orientation cannot be justified. This is due to the inherent limitations ofhuman
empirical perceptions. While the Enlightenment wanted to claim some kind of direct link
between human perception and reality, in fact every act of perception is wrapped up in a host
of cultural and linguistic assumptions.15 Van Huyssteen says that 'because we relate to our








always in a relationship to what is known, and thus always limited in perspective, in focus,
and in experiential scope'. Beliefs interpret experience, and experience shapes belief. "Our
interpreted experience thus becomes the matrix within which meaning and knowledge arise."
This is true for the religious believer as well as the scientific researcher.16 Denying this, EF
suffers from what Wilfred Sellars pejoratively calls 'the Myth of the Given.'17
Cultural anthropology has shown that what one culture and time take as common
sense, another culture and time may regard as nonsense. "What is "obviously true" seems to
many to depend on the inherited assumptions concerning evidence and warranty on the part
of the thinker, including a cluster of beliefs that may not be consciously articulated."18
Clifford Geertz points out that the process of enculturation leads to the selective evaluation
of experiences based on deeply and often subconsciously held cultural expectations. The
perceptual filtering process is part of the template for understanding reality formed during
the enculturation of the individual. Human 'notions, however implicit, of the "really real"
and the dispositions these notions induce in them, color their sense of the reasonable, the
practical, the humane, and the moral'.19 Reality simply cannot be known outside the
limitations of cultural perceptual capacity: absolute perceptual objectivity is a myth. Terry
Winograd and Fernando Flores note that concealing the commitments of a given person
situated in their given worldview leads to an 'illusion of objectivity'. The result, however, is
not real knowledge, but blindness.20 So Margaret Archer notes that cultural pressure applied
to protecting the consensus rather than 'finding the truth' is evident even in science and
academia.21 The Enlightenment belief that the experiential bounds of naturalism are
universal and objective is therefore an illusion. Scientific worldviews, including that of
naturalism, are necessarily limited, prone to revision, and even to radical paradigm shift with
the accumulation of anomalies.22
Plantinga, Gunton, and Richard Rorty all notice the limitation ofEF's perceptual
claims.23 It is fatally dependent upon human sense experience, granting absolute authority
16
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17 Wilfred Sellars, 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven,
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and confidence to the human ability to know reality. This is fatal, not just because it is a
poor kind of anthropocentrism, but because it shows that a disguised form of naive realism is
hidden at the roots of the Enlightenment vision, elevating human perceptual capacity to
absolute godlike status. William Alston calls this 'epistemic imperialism.'24 It is absurd to
claim that any particular human culture is able to know all there is to know about reality.
While there have been continuing eyewitness experiences ofmiracles in EF culture,
these have been regarded as untrustworthy, since they seem contrary to the EF version of
common sense and do not seem to be happening at all times and all places.25 The continuing
Roman Catholic practice of confirming sainthood by the occurrence ofmiracles in the name
of a deceased believer, miraculous healings at religious shrines such as at Lourdes, France,
or 'enthusiast' experiences at religious revivals such as in the Wesleyan holiness movement26
have usually been dismissed without serious investigation.27 Only naturalistic evidence is
admitted. Evidence for the miraculous and supernatural is ruled out of bounds tout court,
even where it claims empirical justification.
While naturalism is supposed to be objective, it is in fact no more rational and
objective than supernaturalism. So Pannenberg insists, 'the so-called methodological
atheism ofmodern science is far from pure innocence'.28 In light of cultural limitations, it
can no longer be taken for granted that the evidence of the transcendent is really absent.
Many modem cultures, including subcultures in the Western world, continue to include
perception of the supernatural and miraculous in their experience of reality, like Cone's
insistence on the present experience of Jesus Christ in the black American church,29 or the
fact that many modem religious believers continue to report that some kind of answer to
prayer or miraculous healing or intervention is part of their religious experience. Just
because adherents of naturalism disregard these experiences does not automatically
invalidate them or render them less rational than naturalism: such rejection is to be expected
given naturalism's filtering template.
24
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5.3.3. Wrong analytical techniquefor evaluating religion
Alston observes that just because transcendent experiences do not have the type of
universal repeatability and predictability as those observable by the natural sciences does not
make them irrational.30 Since naturalism's analytical techniques are all geared to
accommodate its own worldview, it may not offer the best technique for evaluating past or
present events with transcendent elements. As Michael Williams puts its, 'procedures are
reliable only given a range of circumstances in which they are supposed to operate, which is
something for us to determine in the light of our needs and interests' (emphasis in original).31
Alston concludes that it is unwarranted to take features of the checking and prediction
systems typical of scientific perception 'as the norm for all perceptual belief forming
practices.'32 Holwerda adds that history as the realm of the particular is likewise outside the
investigative system of universals-seeking science.33 If with Palamas the supernatural is
taken to be the reality distinct from the creature, then a study of the creaturely world
(science) will not necessarily even see supernatural reality.34
For example, one reason for naturalism's rejection ofmiracles is that they are not a
part of everyday experience. This checking system misses an important feature of scriptural
miracles in the traditionalist worldview: they serve as signs that point to an unusual
revelation ofGod. While some cultural supernatural claims, such as those for magic, manna,
or similar animistic constructs, might be candidates for scientific assessment because they
allege observable relations of law-like regularity in the world, miracles, in contrast, require a
backdrop of natural-law regularity against which they become apparent; they cannot be
everyday affairs, or they would not qualify as unusual enough to draw attention to a unique
message from God. Science cannot evaluate them even in principle, because miracles are
neither repeatable scientific events, nor an expected outcome of the normal flow of nature.
Thus Michael Polanyi observes, 'It is illogical to attempt the proof of the supernatural by
natural tests, for these can only establish the natural aspects of an event and can never
represent it as supernatural.'35
The incommensurability of religious with other verification systems is particularly
evident in Christianity's faith claims. Christianity claims its version of faith comes from a
transcendent source, as a gift from God (Eph. 2:8). For those following Pannenberg's
30
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approach, Jesus' authority is confirmed by an inherently supernatural event: the
resurrection.36 Though making prepositional and historical truth claims, Christianity
maintains that its ultimate foundation is a person: Jesus Christ (1 Cor. 3:11). Testing Jesus'
veracity requires both personal believing commitment (not so different from Polanyi's claim
for the scientist's personal commitment) and action. Jesus said, "If you continue in my
word.. .you will know the truth" and "Anyone who resolves to do the will ofGod will know
whether [my] teaching is from God."37 These are matters that can only be investigated from
the 'inside', promising confirmation to those who are willing to abide in Christianity's
verification system. It is therefore unwarranted to expect that the revelation of religion - the
Christian religion in particular - will be reducible to or understandable in terms of the
naturalistic method of science.
DZ Philips calls the prevailing dominance of naturalism a philosophical scandal:
"we are asked to accept as the only appropriate philosophical method for establishing the
rationality of religious belief, a method which actually distorts the character of religious
belief." He sees part of the problem as being linguistic, after Wittgenstein: using the
language of science to describe religious knowledge confuses the independent character of
these epistemic and linguistic domains.38 These domains are cultural constructs based on
'the conventions of the community' that use them, but have themselves no deeper rational
foundation.39 Naturalism is a local linguistic construct that is particularly useful to the
scientific community to describe the material dimension of reality, but it is not a facet of
universal reason nor does it necessarily provide the fullest apprehension of reality. To rely
on it as such is to fall into the trap that Mikael Stenmark pejoratively calls 'scientism':
making the scientific claim to discover things about the general nature and features of the
world an authoritarian decree that only what science can discover about the world is real.40
Neither can the problem be reduced to the community linguistics of the Dilthey-Gadamer
dichotomy, with science as 'explanation' versus religion as 'understanding'.41 That
dichotomy depends upon the E-foundationalist model of rationality. The irrationality of
naturalism means that religion's account of experience cannot be confined to a 'meaning'
36 So those who continue to adhere to naturalism will be unconvinced by events such as resurrections.
E.g., Buss, 'The Meaning of History', 150-51.
37 John 8:31-32, 7:17, emphasis added.
Philips, Faith After Foundationalism, 12, 115ff.
39
Nancey Murphy, 'Introduction', in Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy, & Mark Nation, eds.,
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Abingdon, 1994), 15.
40 Mikael Stenmark, Scientism: Science, Ethics andReligion (Burlington: Ashgate, 2001), 21.
41 James Barr summarizes the dichotomy in his Floly Scripture: Canon, Authority, Criticism (Oxford:
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role: religion may have things to disclose about objective reality that move between
explanation and understanding. As van Huyssteen observes, 'both the scope and content of
theological explanations may set them apart from explanations in other areas'. The collapse
of foundationalism 'dispels the common myth that science is about reason and theology is
about faith'.42
The EF naturalist has been guilty of using what Alston calls a 'double standard',
accusing the traditionalist ofhaving a circular belief system, which is exactly true for
naturalism.43 Descartes' excessive faith in human perception, Spinoza's cultural aesthetic
preference for a self-contained cosmos, and Hume's forced delineation of the problem in
terms of unbreakable natural laws44 resulted in a cultural blindness to other options, other
possibilities that were equally rational. Interestingly, the Enlightenment scientific paradigm
of a closed, mechanistic, and eternal universe of Euclidean regularity has given away to a
contemporary paradigm of quantum indeterminacy, relativity, energy-for-matter, and multi¬
level explanation. The laws ofmodern physics have changed dramatically from those upon
which EF naturalism was built.45
5.3.4. Implicit naturalism in postmodern thought
Many philosophers recognize the collapse of EF.46 But the tacit view ofmuch
modem theology has been to continue to assume that naturalism is still valid; this is so even
where EF is explicitly seen as passe, as in much postmodern and nonfoundationalist
theology. Ernest Gellner observes, 'the hermeneutic relativists do not really treat all cultural
visions as equally valid. Their accounts of alien systems ofmeanings as they present them
are still, deeply and inevitably, located within a natural milieu conceived in terms of current
Western science'.47
For instance, the collaborative effort The Postmodern Bible: the Bible and Culture
Collective explicitly acknowledges the fall of historical-criticism to postmodern critique,
along with the Enlightenment illusion of 'dispassionate objectivity and psychological
distance', but is completely blind to its own continued adherence to foundationalist
42
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naturalism.48 In fact, as R.W.L. Moberly observes, the writers of The Postmodern Bible are
not even interested in the question of God, much less God's potentially real activity in
history.49 The same situation is evident in other works, where the postmodern worldview
supposedly 'does not dictate one perspective and approach', and yet naturalism is the tacit
exception.50
The postmodern enterprise is sometimes seen as built on the 'ontology of absence'51,
not least of the 'absences' being that of the transcendent. But this analysis shows that a
belief in the absence of transcendence is itself a form of cloaked foundationalism. It is
naturalism itself, as the hidden element of foundationalism, which must be set aside as the
dictating worldview, and which post-modernity must recognize as a limited and non-binding
cultural construct. Further, absolute relativism is no longer tenable once the realm of the
transcendent is admitted back into epistemology. With the transcendent comes the
theoretical plumb line of absolute truth. Whether or how humans access this theoretical
transcendent truth is a different question from admitting its possible existence. The fact that
science operates by at least tacitly admitting this plumb line (e.g., in assuming the
intelligibility and regularity of the cosmos) shows the hidden poverty of an 'ontology of
absence'.
While some will attempt to re-cast naturalism in nonfoundational terms, this does
not suddenly revive its claim to universal rationality. The burden of proofwill be upon them
to show what non-foundational system gives warrant for belief in naturalism beyond its
boundary function in science. 'Coherentist' systems alone will not do the job, as naturalism
cannot be shown to be anything more than part of an exclusively 'belief-by-belief structure,
based upon internal relations rather than an empirical relation to the world.52 Almost by
definition, 'postmodern' systems are unable to ground naturalism as universal, and are not
justified uncritically assuming its truth.
48
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5.4. Critical Realism in Science and Theology
The collapse of EF is really about the limitations of human epistemology. It does
not imply that there is no objective reality, or that there is no relationship between aspects of
human knowledge and that reality. The E-foundationalist will point to the technological
successes of the natural sciences as an indication of their validity. Their mastery of nature
seems to transcend cultural boundaries and capture part of reality as it is. Thus natural
scientists often disdain the post-modern position as irrelevant.53 The post-foundationalist
insight is to deny that there are universally rational foundations for human knowledge. But
Rom Harre and Michael Krausz insist that Rorty and the relativists have not shown 'that a
progressivist, world driven conception of the improvement of knowledge is not viable'.54
The increasing success of science surely indicates, according to Harre, that the references of
scientific discourse are 'about something other than one's own states': they are about reality,
hence the position of scientific realism.55 W. H. Newton-Smith agrees that the progress of
science is best understood as the improving approach to 'verisimilitude': it captures more
and 'more truth about the world'.56
Sciences' success, while real enough, is also epistemologically restricted. Scientific
theories never perfectly and fully explain or describe reality. There are always new
anomalies that accumulate, with the possibility, as Kuhn showed, of new paradigms
replacing older ones.57 Further, Stewart notes the social limitations and elasticity of the
'scientific horizon' of research: individuals and groups 'can be actually concerned with only
a small part' of that horizon.58 Newton-Smith observes that while iterations of the scientific
process bring improvements in verisimilitude, modem science has moved away from the
'necessary truths' and deterministic assurance ofNewtonian physics, and been forced to
accept 'the probabilistic character' of uncertainty and quantum indeterminacy. Such modem
worldviews preclude absolute determinist understandings of reality. The scientist is also
often reliant upon his own judgment without explicit grounds - he cannot even produce
those grounds, as they are rooted in his perceptions, his intuitions, and in his aesthetic
sensibilities. Even what scientists consider valuable and appropriate to the theoretical
description of reality evolves over time. "This means that a rational representation of
53
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science should consist not of a single model but of an evolving series ofmodels... [each
based] by reference to the model which articulates the beliefs of the scientists of the time
concerning what makes a good theory a good one."59 Hence most modern scientists believe
an objective reality exists (realism), but also admit that our human ability to fully apprehend
this reality is limited, provisional, and in need of constant correction (it is critical)60
Harre and Krausz note that modem scientific realism does not entail an exact
correspondence of theories with reality. But it does posit that the models of reality science
constructs can be compared with the world as it is, and become more adequate as the
mapping from one to the other is refined. Hence, 'we can leave the logicist myths behind us
without adopting post-modernist anarchism'.61 Scientific knowledge is provisional, not
absolute, and most practicing scientists accept a position of critical realism.
Van Huyssteen points out that critical realism is not a 'theory about truth', but rather
'a theory about the epistemic values that shape scientific rationality'. A theological critical
realism, though different from the scientific version in that the objects of its interest are
different, is similar in that it acknowledges human limitations while maintaining the
existence of objective reality. Religious language is not just a 'useful system of symbols' for
guiding action and giving meaning to the believer, but can be about an objective reality
which is independent of our linguistic models, experienced on different terms than that
described by scientific rationality. Theological critical realism admits to provisionality, and
like much of scientific rationality, also claims the possibility of making 'reliable cognitive
claims about domains of reality that lie beyond our experience, but to which interpreted
experience is our only epistemic access'.62 Under the condition of such limited access, the
language of simile and metaphor is the natural mode for both science and theology.63
Theology can accept the transcendent realm as a given of faith, or with Aquinas take as basic
that the existence of God is self-evident64, while admitting the ultimate Mystery ofGod is
beyond finite human grasp. Our openness to transcendence does not entail our complete
comprehension of it. Thus its own form of critical realism is appropriate to theology.
The success of science has sometimes blinded culture to its epistemological
limitations. This is probably nowhere more evident than in various anti-theist polemics that
59
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ignore the indebtedness of science to metaphysics.65 In these, science's normal
methodological reductionism is inflated into claims for ontological reductionism. Yet
science's success is ontologically unrelated to the possibility of a transcendent realm or
supernatural events. Naturalistic science is simply the wrong medium for investigating those
aspects of reality, which are perceivable in a worldview alien to and incomprehensible in
naturalistic terms. They are beyond the domain of natural science to either confirm or
disconfirm.66 When the mutual humility of critical realism is combined with the awareness
that some religious claims will be unavailable for evaluation by science, this leaves room for
the two disciplines to exist separately, but with mutual respect. Theology will have its own
things to say about reality, even in a critically realist mode, that may not be challenged or
falsified by simple appeals to 'scientific truth'. Science may have things to say about reality
that may or may not correspond to theological data. Since the belief structure of naturalism
is neither rationally compulsory nor universal, a fair approach to topics transcending that
boundary will be open-minded, rather than disregarding some options on a priori bases.
5.5. General Conclusions
It may be suggested that the critique of naturalism cuts both ways, and demonstrates
that religious claims to foundational truth are also ultimately irrational, at least in
foundationalist terms. The critical realist position has no trouble admitting this: it
acknowledges the general limitations of all human knowledge. But the injustice of
philosophy has been to allow the knife to cut only in the direction of transcendence, rather
than admitting that it cuts equally in the direction ofnaturalism. To this degree, the most
reasonable conclusion is to admit what van Huyssteen and Shults call the 'fiduciary
rootedness' of all knowledge.67 This position realizes that a scientific or theological
dismissal of the supernatural is a type of fideism: a pre-committed faith position unrelated to
rationality. It serves as an EF filter or mirror that views reality in its own anti-supernaturalist
image. This may be an appropriate filter for examining the regular behavior of the material
world, but it is not suited for noticing aspects of reality that transcend those bounds. It
cannot claim its naturalistic conclusions about scriptural miracles and transcendent reality
65 See Chapter 7. E.g., Sagan, Cosmos (London: Macdonald Futura, 1980), 4; Richard Dawkins, The
Blind Watchmaker (Penguin, 1988); Peter Atkins, Creation Revisited (Penguin, 1994), 23.
66 R.J. Berry, 'Divine Action: Expected and Unexpected,' Zygon 37:3 (2002), 725.
67 Van Huyssteen, Essays, 44; Shults, PTT, 81.
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are a result of scientific or historical investigation.68 Contrary to long-held notions of
naturalism's ultimate rationality and superiority, belief in the transcendent realm and
miracles is just as rational as belief in naturalism.
In light of the discussion, Pannenberg, Rahner, and Zizioulas all have grounds for
accepting the openness of full reality to the transcendent.69 This type of realist respect of the
transcendent protects the epistemic rationality and objectivity of the incarnation, the
resurrection, and other significant aspects of theology. This analysis ofEF naturalism shows
the equal rationality of such transcendent or sacramental epistemologies.
There are real boundaries between science and theology, and these are not
necessarily reducible to 'explanation vs. understanding'. Theology may have things to say
about both physical and transcendent reality (e.g. miracles) that are unobservable to science.
Theology does not have to bow to the ultimacy of science, but is independent and
authoritative in its own right. If one accepts the rootedness of science in metaphysics in such
things as the intelligibility and regularity of the universe, there may even be grounds, as
Pannenberg observes70, for claiming that science is indebted to theology. On the other hand,
science is a domain with its own legitimacy on the material level. Though bounded by
methodological naturalism71, it may legitimately claim to be discovering things about the
natural world that theology cannot simply ignore. Theology may seek to be coherent with
the findings of science at an appropriate level, even while being aware that 1) these findings
are provisional and subject to correction; 2) they are limited by the artificial (for theology)
boundary of naturalism, and 3) they are unable to see the transcendent dimensions of reality
available to religion.72
Given the mutual respect that science and theology ought to exercise with regard to
each other, it is time to turn to the natural sciences. In the chapters that follow,
contemporary natural science is taken seriously, and an effort is made to discover what it
says about human significance, and whether this is coherent with incarnational theology.
68
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Chapter 6
Human Uniqueness in the Natural Sciences
"The walls ofhuman uniqueness are in pretty good shape after more than a century
ofDarwinian battering." - Robert Foley1
6.1. Introduction
Are human beings really unique, and if so, in what sense? These are the first
questions for the natural sciences. Pannenberg, Rahner, and Zizioulas all emphasize the
uniqueness ofhuman nature and personhood, albeit in different ways. Can this emphasis be
maintained in light ofwhat contemporary science reveals about human 'distinctives'.
Darwin himself insisted his theory implied the continuity of animals with humans: he was
sure the differences between them were a matter of degree, not of kind2 There are many
similarities between humans and animals, such as physical features, possible common
ancestry, and possession of a type of reason, emotion and even relationships. Perhaps these
indicate a closer link between humanity and the animals than Christianity's imago dei
doctrine has room for. Perhaps personhood is not only for humans and God. Humans share
almost 99 per cent of their DNA with apes and chimpanzees.3 Many species of animals live
in communities and have relationships with each other that bear striking similarities to
human relationships. Whales and dolphins have strong kinship bonds and what may well be
friendships with one another, including elements of communication and commitment.
Recent studies seem to indicate that even sheep develop friendships and have cognitive
recognition capabilities.4 Some animals display aspects of friendship towards human beings,
so that the loyalty and faithfulness of dogs is proverbial. Do we extend Christ's words, 'No
one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends' (John 15:13), to the
dog that dies defending its master, or to the animal mother that fights to the death defending
her offspring? Do similarities to human qualities in animals mean they must be accorded
human dignity?
Some, like Zizioulas or Hall, prefer a relational approach to the imago, perhaps to
1 Robert Foley, Another Unique Species: Patterns in human evolutionary ecology (Essex: Longman
Scientific & Technical, 1987), 1.
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avoid altogether the substantive issues. Larkin goes so far as to ask whether relational
capacity images God wherever it occurs.5 Kevin Laland, following Darwin, argues that the
difference between human and animal intelligence is one of degree rather than of kind, 'since
rudimentary forms of that which has traditionally been regarded as exclusively human are
consistently found in animal populations'.6 Peterson agrees, believing modem theology
would be better served by viewing the whole creation as the image of God, rather than
confining that honor to humanity.7 Peter Singer, with ethical rather than theological interest,
wants to redefine personhood to include the animals. He argues that limited rationality, self-
consciousness, and communication in many non-human creatures should lead us to treat
them equally as 'persons'.8
6.2. Human Uniqueness in the Animal Kingdom
6.2.1. Animal Intelligence
How reasonable are these claims about the boundary between humans and animals?
Are the substantive differences so small that the traditional uniqueness of the imago
effectively disappears? These differences will be evaluated in terms of communication,
intelligence, culture and ethics, summed up in the concept of the human mind. It is clear that
many animals - not just the primates - have some type of inter-individual communication.
E. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh insists that studies of apes, 'dolphins, parrots, sea lions, elephants,
and wolves', undermine the human notion of separateness. Since the closest approximation
to human language and intelligence has been unveiled by primate research, this study will
focus on that field.
Savage-Rumbaugh claims that captive ape language studies bring down 'the
boundary wall' between humans and apes.9 She and Duane M. Rumbaugh taught a now-
famous bonobo chimpanzee named Kanzi a repertoire of several hundred signs, which the
bonobo was even able to manipulate in simple (two-word) sentences. Kanzi was tested at
the age of eight against a one and a half-year old human child, Alia, and found to exceed her
5
Larkin, 'Douglas John Hall - The Stewardship Symbol and the Image ofGod', 19.
6 Kevin N. Laland, 'The Evolution ofCulture', in Takeru Akazawa, Kenichi Aoki, & Ofer Bar-Yoser,
eds., Neanderthals andModern Humans in Western Asia (New York: Plenum, 1998), 433.
7
Peterson, 'Are We Unique?', 177; 'ECTN', 300-304.
8
Singer, Practical Ethics, 110-119.
9 E. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh & Roger Lewin, Kanzi: the Ape at the Brink ofthe Human Mind (London:
Doubleday, 1994), 253,280.
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capabilities in many aspects of language.10 Rumbaugh was so confident about primate
language capacity that he declared, 'the chimpanzee language projects allow us to state that
neither the public production of language nor the cognitive prerequisites for this production
are uniquely human. For a completely unique trait, we shall have to look elsewhere.'11
Kanzi's teachers were so optimistic that they suggested language was 'the inevitable
outcome of the social interaction of intelligent creatures'.12
What are the implications ofKanzi's abilities? Fie has shown aptitude for certain
aspects of language, such as symbol mastery and simple two-word sentence construction13,
but this may not really be what we mean and achieve with human language. His symbol
mastery is close to that of a two-year old human, but as the research of Jean Piaget and
others on human cognitive development shows, the potential for moral development and
other cognitive capacities present in two-year old human brain and intelligence is simply
absent in other primates.14 Kanzi surpassed 1 lA year old human Alia at some aspects of
language15, but Alia rapidly eclipsed Kanzi's language skills - without the aid of artificial
enhancements (keyboards and voice simulators) - and developed cognitively and morally in
a way that is impossible to Kanzi. Even this comparison is misleading, because as Noble
and Davidson note, human brain development is still ongoing at this early age, and so we
should not expect a young child's abilities to match those ofmore mature humans, even
while containing their potential. "Humans, of all primates, have the longest period ofbrain
growth outside the mother. In consequence, human infants are dependent on caregivers for a
higher proportion of their infancy, and much brain development takes place during this
critical period."16 Gordon G. Gallup, Jr. and Steven M. Platek note that children only learn
to recognize themselves and only begin to show evidence of 'prosocial and altruistic
behavior' after 18 months of age, commensurate with brain development underlying self-
10
Savage-Rumbaugh & Duane M. Rumbaugh, 'Ape Language Research: Past, Present and Future', in
Savage-Rumbaugh, Ape Language: From Conditioned Response to Symbol (OUP, 1986), 404; 'The
emergence of language', in Kathleen R. Gibson & Tim Ingold, eds., Tools, Language and Cognition
in Human Evolution (CUP, 1993), 92-99; Peterson, 'ECTN', 297
11
Rumbaugh, Language Learning by a Chimpanzee: the Lana Project (London: Academic Press,
1977), 305.
12




14 Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment ofthe Child (London : Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1932); see
also Peter K. Smith, Helen Cowie & Mark Blades, Understanding Children's Development, 3rd Ed.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 218.
15
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(and hence other-) recognition.'7 Peter K. Smith, et al, note thatpremoraljudgment is
present in human children up to the age of 4 or 5.18 While by age 8, Kanzi did indeed have
over 150 vocabulary symbols, and could string them together in two-word sentences, Steven
Mithen observes:
By the age of three a child frequently strings ten words together by the use of
complex grammatical rules. By the age of six a child will have a vocabulary of
about 13,000 words. Young children are constant commentators on the world
around them and on what others say. Almost the entire sample of Kanzi's utterances
is demands for things; his comments on the world are extremely rare.19
So Savage-Rumbaugh, et al, admit that 'near the completion of [their] test, Alia began to
produce complex multiword utterances, and, across the next 6 months, her productive
capacity leapt dramatically ahead of that of Kanzi, who failed to improve noticeably'.20
Terrence Deacon comments that despite years of such intense primate language research,
neither Kanzi nor any other animal or species has shown more than a human toddler's grasp
of symbolic communication.21
Savage-Rumbaugh and Rumbaugh want us to note that apes are capable of some
aspects of language, but they are aware this is not fully developed language as humans
have.22 This slippery re-imagining of the meaning of language may be a sliding-definition
mse, since real language in humans involves a suite of features, all of which are present in
human beings, including speech, 'vocabulary, grammar, reference, representation, and
syntax.'.23 William Noble and Iain Davidson list the linguistic capacities of various non-
human primates, including Kanzi, in terms of the design features of language outlined by
Charles F. Hockett and Stuart A. Altmann, summarized in Table 1 (next page). They
suggest the key differences between human and non-human primates are the lack in the later
of 'four sets of features: (1) semanticity and arbitrariness; (2) discreteness, productivity, and
duality ofpatterning; (3) displacement; and (4) (probably) traditional transmission'.24 If
some of these features are absent or severely truncated in all primates, can claims for sharing
17 Gordon G. Gallup, Jr. & Steven M. Platek, 'Cognitive empathy presupposes self-awareness:
Evidence from phylogeny, ontogeny, neuropsychology, and mental illness', BBS 25:1 (Feb. 2002), 36.
18 Smith, et al, Understanding Children's Development, 3rd Ed.
19
Stephen Mithen, The Prehistory ofMind: A search for the origins ofart, religion and science
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20
Savage-Rumbaugh, et al, Language Comprehension in Ape and Child (Chicago: Society for
Research in Child Development, 1993), 98.
21 Terrence Deacon, The Symbolic Species: the Co-Evolution ofLanguage and the Human Brain
(Penguin, 1997), 254-255.
22
Savage-Rumbaugh & Rumbaugh, 'Ape-Language Research', 398-404.
23 Ibid. 398.
24 William Noble & Iain Davidson, Human Evolution, Language and Mind: a Psychological and
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Table 1. Vocal utterances of some primates classified by design features of language.25
25 Noble & Davidson, HELM, 47 {light grey shading addedfor emphasis). Explanation of categories:
Vocal - 'vocal auditory channel'; Broadcast/directional - transmissions are broadcast with
'directional reception'; Rapid Fading - speech sounds do not 'hover in the air'; Interchangeability —
members of 'speech community' are interchangeably transmitters and receivers of linguistic signals';
Feedback - 'speaker hears everything relevant of what he says'; Specialization - 'direct-energetic
consequences of linguistic signals are biologically unimportant; only the triggering consequences are
important'; Semanticity — associations 'between signal elements and features in the world' allow
language signs to 'function to correlate and organize the life of the community'; Arbitrariness - the
meaning and symbol are independent - there is no 'physical or geometrical resemblance between the
two'; Discreteness - 'possible messages in any language constitute a discrete repertoire rather than a
continuous one'; Displacement - language can refer to things 'remote in time, space, or both';
Productivity - 'new linguistic messages are coined freely and easily, and, in context, are usually
understood'; Traditional transmission - language is 'passed down by teaching and learning', not
biologically; Duality of patterning — patterning in language takes place in 'arbitrary but stable
meaningless signal-elements' and also in 'a minimum meaningful arrangement of those elements'.
See Charles F. Hockett & Stuart A. Altmann, 'A Note on Design Features', in Thomas A. Sebeok, ed.,
Animal Communication: Techniques ofStudy and Results ofResearch (IUP, 1968), 63-64.
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language with them really be maintained?
Savage-Rumbaugh admits that apes are unable to speak because they lack the proper
vocal anatomy.26 Primate communication does not allow vocal instruction, discussion of
previous experience, or future planning, as human language does.27 Other animals have
forms of communication, but the differences between language and all those other forms are
vast. Chimpanzee vocalizations are emotive rather than cognitive, being controlled by the
limbic system and brain stem rather than by the 'higher' brain centers. While empathic
responses have been observed in many types of animals28, these responses are in humans
'extensively under cognitive control'.29 Animal communication is not just a different kind of
language, as in Dr. Dolittle\ it is different from language, closer to human non-verbal
communication.
Ian Tattersall concludes that contrary to the hopes of the most dedicated researchers
involved in the most successful ape language experiments, apes do not have even a
rudimentary form of language as we know it, nor the 'cognitive abilities that could be called
prelinguistic'. They 'show no ability to comprehend grammar or syntax, can master no more
than a handful of signs, and have no linguistic learning curve - or rather one which rapidly
trails off to nothing. In sum, they do not have language, as we know it.'30 Barbour agrees,
noting that chimps have 'remarkable communicative abilities, but they fall far short of
human symbolic language'.31 Tattersall concludes, 'Human beings are truly unique in
having language and in possessing the apparatus that permits them to acquire and express
it... [Our linguistic ability] with all the mental apparatuses of abstraction and association that
involves, does appear to represent a quantum leap away from any other system of
communication we can observe in the living world'.32 Deacon also insists linguistic capacity
is a difference in kind of communication from that which takes place in all other creatures,
not merely one of degree. Language is an 'evolutionary anomaly, not merely an
evolutionary extreme'.33
26
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Humans can only have language because of their unique vocal tract and their
anomalously large brain.34 The human cerebrum is larger in proportion to body size in
humans than in any other animal, and the cerebellum is larger than that ofmost other
animals.35 Noble and Davidson note that while analogs to human communication centers are
present in other primate brains, specific and unique areas of the human brain are 'specially
related to speech production and perception' (e.g. Broca's area).36 Paul Mellars notes that
'there is no doubt that modem human brains are significantly more complex, highly
structured, efficient and intelligent than those of even the most intelligent great ape.37
Deacon comments, 'human brains are not just large ape brains, they are ape brains with some
rather significant alterations of proportions and relationships between the parts.' These
alterations reflect an adaptation to the heavy cognitive demands of symbolic and
representational learning. Language and the human brain are uniquely fitted to each other -
they appear to be 'coevolved'. Humans are automatically adapted to leam language in a
social environment, and language is developed by the brain, but conditions the brain to
develop in particular ways. While there may be an unbroken continuity of evolutionary
brain development from other animals to human beings, there is a 'singular discontinuity
between human and non-human minds'. Human mental experience is qualitatively different
from animal experience because only language opens the door of the symbolic and
representational 'virtual world.'38
These qualitative differences are discontinuous with previous existent animal
behaviors, possibly as a result of emergence. Harold Morowitz notes that unpredictable
novelty seems to be generated throughout nature through processes of 'emergent
complexity', which 'lead to a whole that is different from the sum of the parts', with
otherwise unknowable system properties. Language and the human mind may well be an
example of such emergence. If so, then its unique differences from animal mentality should
not be surprising, even given physical evolutionary continuity, because such 'discontinuities'
have occurred throughout the history ofnature, unpredictable and unknowable until they
arrive on the scene.39 Peacocke comments, 'the concepts needed to describe and understand
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Mary Midgley rightly points out that language cannot be 'the only source of
conceptual order', or else all other animals 'would live in a totally disordered world'.41
Animals are certainly intelligent, and likely have some type of self-consciousness or self-
awareness, as evidenced by survival and self-defense reactions and more famously in mirror
experiments, red-spot recognition by dolphins & chimpanzees, and animal self-grooming
practices. Some primates deceive one another for survival, and some researchers even
believe apes might show partial aware of other's mental patterns.42 Do animals - particularly
apes — recognize other's minds, or understand another's mental state? Do they have a
'theory ofmind'?
This is a key question. While it is difficult, as Thomas Nagel observed, to 'get
inside the minds' of other species to discover exactly how they experience reality43,
observation suggests that animals generally lack a theory of mind. Dorothy L. Cheney and
Robert M. Seyfarth note that even in chimpanzees, 'there is very little evidence that [they]
recognize a discrepancy between their own states ofmind and the states of mind of others....
They show little empathy for each other, and they do not explicitly teach each other'.
Chimpanzees grieve at the loss of close friends, and have their own mental states, but do not
seem able to empathize or be aware of others with similar mental states. "Monkeys and apes
do occasionally act as if they recognize that other individuals have beliefs, but even the most
compelling examples can usually be explained in terms of learned behavioral contingencies,
without recourse to higher-order intentionality." Monkeys see the world in terms of action,
not thinking and feeling.
Although they are acutely sensitive to other animal's behavior, they know little
about the knowledge or motives that cause animals to do what they do. In a
monkey's world, the knowledge possessed by an individual exists in a kind of
vacuum: the individual does not know what he knows and cannot recognize
knowledge (or lack of it) in others.44
Rumbaugh also admits that 'the so-called learning set skills of apes and monkeys are
remarkably brittle.. .something one would not expect if there were really a knowledge base
of a human type underlying the mastery manifested by the animals.... Animals are not
humans. Their cognitions, if extant, are surely both different and more circumscribed than in
40
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humans.'45 Daniel J. Povinelli, et al, have found no 'evidence that chimpanzees reason about
intentions as internal states'. In cooperation experiments, even trained chimpanzees, 'when
trained with ignorant partners.. .do not respond by demonstrating the needed actions, or even
by directing their ignorant partners behavior to the relevant features of the task - perhaps
because they do not conceive of knowledge and ignorance to begin with'. Povinelli, et al,
conclude that great apes and chimpanzees lack reasoning about other's internal mentality.
They can solve very many problems, but 'low-level models that envision chimpanzees as
intelligent empirical generalists have consistently generated more accurate predictions about
their behavior than have high-level models that envision them as making inferences about
unobservable mental states'.46
The development of a theory ofmind and higher order intentionality has long been
recognized as a 'watershed in children's cognitive development'.47 Michael Tomasello
argues that human mental life uniquely involves understanding social intentionality and
physical causality, both of which contribute to cultural cognition and social learning. He
sees this social nature ofhuman cognition, more than anything else, as unique to the human
mind. Human enculterated learning is based on the ability to understand behavior as
intentional. Children learn to use artifacts, tools, 'symbols and other cognitive amplifiers of
their culture by attempting to reproduce adults' intentional relations to them' or to the world.
Children by age one are engaging in 'all kinds ofjoint attentional interactions with others'.
Because other primates do not understand conspecifics intentionally, they do not
engage in cultural learning of this type, and, as a consequence, their societies do not
follow the trajectory of human cultures in which the cognitive achievements of
individuals accumulate and become embodied in artifacts over time - so that
developing children are able toparticipate in the whole cognitive history of their
species (emphasis added).48
Povinelli, et al, conclude that 'Darwin's view of psychological continuity' has
severely limited our perceptions in analyzing nonhuman primate psychology, and held
theories hostage to a theoretical framework that does not allow the animals to show both
their similarities and differences from humans. This has resulted in models of cognitive
development in which new mental abilities are 'tacked on to the end of the developmental
sequences of ancestral species.. .ultimately leading to the [false] idea that chimpanzees' have
45 D. M. Rumbaugh, 'Animal Thinking - by stimulation or simulation?', in James G. Else & Phyllis
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achieved the psychological development of two or three year old children. While there is
continuity at some levels of human-animal psychology, Darwin 'was wrong in assuming that
introspection could reveal the nature of this similarity'. Evolution of the ability to interpret
behavior in mental 'terms (our so-called theory ofmind) may simply turn out to be a
specialization' of the uniquely human hominid line. Humans and chimpanzees thus
understand 'nearly identical behaviors in radically different ways'. The evolution of second-
order intentional reasoning 'allowed humans to reinterpret existing, extremely complicated
social behaviors that evolved long before we did'. Once this new mental representation 'was
in place, there may well have been cascading effects on larger aspects of the system - in this
case, material and social culture including pedagogy and ethics, to name but a few'.49
Noble and Davidson agree that symbolic-linguistic behavior is responsible for the
social construct of the modern human mind.50 Dennett agrees language plays an enormous
role in the structuring of the human mind, and says we should not expect the other animals to
have minds that are similarly structured. Since they lack language and have no need for
language, their consciousness will be very different from ours: they will have no 'Center of
Narrative Gravity', no regrets, no nostalgic reminiscences, no complex yearnings, no self-
reflection on what it is like to be themselves.51 In fact, language so structures the human
perception of reality that in a real sense, 'nothing exists except through language'. This is
not to advocate a type of 'linguistic solipsism that denies our embedding in a world outside
of our speaking'. Rather, it acknowledges the unique language-shaped qualities of the
domain of human interaction and commitment.52 Merlin Donald notes that 'our genes may
be largely identical to those of a chimp or gorilla, but our cognitive architecture is not'.53
Even the basic level of symbol mastery achieved by Kanzi only takes place in the
context of an intensely human social environment.54 Andrew Lock and Michael Colombo
argue that ape intelligence may not just be revealed as 'upgraded' by these various
experiments; instead it may be the case that their intelligence is 'scaffolded' on the support
structure of human culture.55 The fact that no kind of symbolic representation or linguistic
mastery ever arises in other animals' natural condition56, is difficult at best to inculcate even
49 Povinelli, et al, 'Towards a Science ofOther Minds', 533, 535-536.
50 Noble & Davidson, HELM, 84-87, 212-227.
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for immature primates (when learning is apparently most easily accomplished57), and never
reaches the level sufficient for moral reasoning, is indicative of the deep gulf between human
and non-human intelligence. Tattersall insists that human intelligence is unique: we are not
just more intelligent - we are differently intelligent, in a manner that allows us to view
ourselves, but also to manipulate the environment around us, in a qualitatively different way
from other creatures. Peterson admits that human intelligence is different. "It is not only the
case that chimpanzees are less intelligent or less self-conscious than we are but also that they
are differently intelligent, with their own drives, abilities, and emotional repertoire."58
Tattersall concludes that while the 'perceived cognitive gulf between primates and humans
has narrowed, it 'is far from closed, and obviously never will be'.59
6.2.2. Neanderthal Intelligence
Did Neanderthals, who appear to have been our closest relative in the hominid
family tree, have language, as we know it? Avraham Ronen argues for three distinct
capacities evident in the paleontological/archaeological record that mark the uniqueness of
humans: the presence of controlled fire, the elaborateness of burial customs, and the presence
of symbolic representation, such as in art and burial objects. Controlled fire is 'strictly and
uniquely human', and Ronen concludes that it must have required language because of the
level of social group cooperation, recognition of opposites (the beneficial hidden in the
dangerous), and mathematical abstraction required for its maintenance.60 Noble and
Davidson agree, noting that 'general control of production of fire' is unlikely prior to the
modem human.61 Mellars attributes the extinction ofNeanderthals at least in part to their
inability to fully harness fire. When human population pressures where already
marginalizing the Neanderthal, a period of sharply colder climate at approximately 33k years
ago was overwhelming to the remnant Neanderthal population.62
Tattersall notes that while Neanderthal brains were as big as ours, they were shaped
differently, particularly in the area where much of our own thinking is done. Their skeletal
remains bear witness to short and difficult lives, and the cultural traces they have left behind
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symbolic thinking in cave paintings over 28k years old, as well as elaborate burial practices
and grave goods indicative of belief in an afterlife, no such 'represented symbolic activity
[beyond] the simple expression of grief and loss' is evident at Neanderthal sites.63 They
appear to be foragers rather than collectors, with an absence or lesser expression of forward
planning such as that displayed by modern humans.
Jeffrey T. Laitman, Raymond C. Heimbuch and Edmund S. Crelin have
reconstructed the vocal tracts of various extinct and extant hominids and primates, and
believe that Neanderthal vocal tracts were incapable of the vocal range available to modem
humans. While which particular sounds Neanderthals could make is conjectural, they
'probably had a different, narrower, range ofvocalization available to them than do modem
humans'.64 Tattersall concurs, noting their fossils generally show the wrong type of
laryngeal descent for the complexity of adult human linguistic articulation.65 Noble and
Davidson argue that while limited physical linguistic potential might or might not have been
present in Neanderthals, the real indicator of its absence is the lack of symbolic cultural
remnants at Neanderthal sites.66 Mellars and Tattersall agree that this is the most telling
indication of all.67 Tattersall notes that they have left no trace of such artifacts, found in
modem human sites already at 30K years and indicative of the kind of grasp of'art, symbol,
music, notation, language, feelings ofmystery, mastery of diverse materials, and sheer
cleverness' demonstrated by modem humans. He concludes:
Symbolism lies at the very heart of what it means to be human... if there is one
single thing that distinguishes us from all other life forms, living or extinct, it is the
capacity for symbolic thought: the ability to generate complex mental symbols and
to manipulate them into new imaginative and creative combinations.68
Mithen notes the distinctive evidence in the archaeological record that marks the first
manifestation of the modern human mind is the explosion of culture, what he calls the 'big
bang' of human mental capacity evidenced by symbolic artifactual remains. Evidence for
something like the human mind is absent from Neanderthal sites, and is one of the reasons
that it is much more difficult to imagine what it was like to be a Neanderthal (like Nagel's
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proverbial bat) than to be like the earliest modern humans.69
Some have argued for a multi-regional model of human evolution, theorizing that
Neanderthals were a related but different 'population within a single evolving species',
having contributed to the gene pool of modern humans. Such models propose a close
evolutionary link between Cro-Magnon and Neanderthal, suggesting their coexistence in
many times and places lead to cross-breeding and a significant Neanderthal contribution to
the modern human species. But new research into the mtDNA ofCro-Magnon (23k-25k
years ago) and Neanderthal (29k-42k years ago) by Giorgio Bertorelle and colleagues shows
such sharp differences in the two species that crossbreeding is highly unlikely. Cro-Magnon
DNA is almost indistinguishable from modern human DNA, while the genetic differences
between modem humans and Neanderthals are noticeable and abrupt. While the multi-
regional model predicts no major discontinuity if modem humans and Neanderthals are a
single population observed at different times, the actual data and analysis of the DNA is
inconsistent with such a theory. Bertorelle and his colleagues conclude:
These results are at odds with the view whereby Neanderthals were genetically
related with the anatomically modem ancestors of current Europeans or contributed
to the present day human gene pool. .. .The sharp differentiation among them
represents a problem for any model regarding the transition from archaic to modem
humans as a process taking place within a single evolving human lineage.70
These findings are significant in that they demonstrate the real genetic distance between
modem humans and Neanderthals, even during a time when they co-existed (Cro-Magnon -
middle/upper Paleolithic). If interbreeding had been present, at least some mtDNA lineage
relationship should be apparent, but it is not. The findings also give weight to the single out-
of-Africa model for anatomically modem humans71, and undermine the contention that
Neanderthal nature and intelligence is a closely evolved or intertwined 'cousin' in the
modem Homo sapiens lineage.
It appears from these findings that popular images ofNeanderthals as our 'close
cousins'72 are perhaps misleading, conveying a closer sense of genetic, natural and
intellectual kinship with modem humans than is actually present. It seems from the
paleontological record that Neanderthals did not have language or culture, as we know them,
did not contribute to the human family tree, and likely did not relate to one another in the
69
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mode made possible by the symbolically structured human mind.
6.2.3. Human ethical capacity and responsibility
One key aspect of human intelligence is ethical capacity or moral reasoning.
George Gaylord Simpson called humans the 'moral animal', arguing that humans represent
not only a new phase of evolution, but also a new kind of evolution, possessing social,
spiritual and intellectual capacities to an 'incomparable degree'. He claimed that human
distinction is an 'absolute difference of kind and not only a relative difference of degree'.73
Yet some argue that ethics are not uniquely human. Singer sees a type of ethics in certain
primate behaviors, such as helping behavior or dominance structure.74 Frans de Waal sees a
kind of precursor to morality in 'chimpanzee justice': behaviors of reciprocity and retribution
that seem to suggest chimpanzees are 'governed by the same sense ofmoral Tightness and
justice' as in humans.75 Is morality really shared by other animals?
While recent research reveals the common ground shared by humans and primates, it
also confirms human moral uniqueness. Christopher Boehm notes that human conceptual
capacity is not present even in our closest living primate relatives, the chimpanzees, who
appear to lack 'an implicit conceptualization of death...and of killing as the immediate cause
of death.' Chimpanzees have no 'morally induced positive and negative social incentive
system that motivates individuals'. Their 'prey animals are killed incidentally in the process
ofbeing consumed,' and strangers that are 'savagely attacked are abandoned wounded.'76
Jane Goodall noted the extreme gap between chimpanzee and human emotional capacity. "I
cannot conceive of chimpanzees developing emotions, one for another, comparable in any
way to the tenderness, the protectiveness, tolerance, and spiritual exhilaration that are the
hallmarks of human love in its truest and deepest sense. Chimpanzees usually show a lack of
consideration for each other's feelings which in some ways may represent the deepest part of
the gulf between them and us."77
Sociobiologists and evolutionary philosophers like Dawkins, Dennett, and Edward
O. Wilson maintain human moral behavior is an instinct or illusion - for Dennett, the very
self is an illusion - a product of physical systems, natural laws or the quest for genetic
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survival.78 Others like Elliot Sober, David Wilson, and Holmes Rolston point out the
diversity ofmotivations that are apparent in human behavior, some of which include self-
interest, others altruism. It is too simplistic to regard such action as subconsciously
motivated by survival or procreation; it simply does not fit the reality ofMother Theresas,
self-sacrificing soldiers, and the practice of hospitality to strangers.79 Rolston points out the
category confusion in even attributing moral qualities like 'selfishness' or 'altruism' to non-
human life forms that have no moral power to choose. Human moral capacity may be the
product of natural selection, but once present, it is independent of the genes and endows
humans with real freedom of choice.80 So F. Watts notes the difficulty Dawkins has
justifying or explaining altruism in his reductionist system.81 Further, Leon Eisenberg insists
that 'theories that human behavior is based on instincts violate the findings of developmental
biopsychology'. Human intelligence 'permits the conscious choice of goals and so
differentiates [humans] from the rest of animate existence'.82
Michael Leahy agrees that animal communication and related 'rational' activities
take place within a wholly determined instinctual limit.83 Philip Hefner says, 'the creatures
who precede Homo sapiens.. .live almost entirely on the basis of preprogrammed genetic
information', relating 'to the basic rhythms and requirements of their nature'. As 'the
decisively cultural animal', humans remember their own rootedness in the age of
predetermined instinct, and so have a sense of longing for that simple past, but are freed
from necessity by their neo-cortically mediated mind and culture.84 Peterson admits humans
have a type of freedom shared by no other creature: only humans have the ability to override
'what would in other species by inviolable biological drives'.85 Only human beings are
capable of this type of free moral choice and action independent of instinctual imperative,
and are thus able to engage in genuine open-ended inter-personal relationship. There is no
such ability to choose available to the animals, whose behavior is largely determined by
instinctual limitations.
Deacon notes that symbolic reasoning makes possible 'a new level of self-
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determination' in the exploration of alternative futures and self-representation.86 Morowitz
suggests the capacity for such mental and linguistic mapping is also an emergent feature of
the human mind, rooted in cellular and neuro-biology.87 Ayala notes the implications for
ethics: ethical behavior is dependent upon human linguistic capacity, including abstract
thinking and self-awareness, and 'is not causally related to the social behavior of animals,
including kin and reciprocal "altruism"'. He notes three sufficient and necessary conditions
for moral reasoning: 1) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; 2) the
ability to make value judgements; and 3) the ability to choose between alternative courses of
action. Being able to anticipate one's actions requires the ability to connect means and ends,
to anticipate imaginary potential futures. Being able to make value judgements requires the
capacity for abstraction, 'the capacity to perceive actions or objects as members of general
classes.' Being able to explore and choose between alternatives requires being released from
instinctual imperatives, and understanding both the capacity for and consequences of our
choices. Rudimentary forms of anticipation are present in earlier hominid tool-making, but
our ability to mentally explore complex future alternatives and to compare classes at the
moral level is contingent upon abstract symbolic intelligence. Our moral free will is
dependent upon our well-developed intelligence and the capacity to explore multiple paths of
possible action.88 De Waal agrees that human ethical capacity depends upon its linguistic
ability, and concludes that proto-moral behaviors are not moral in the sense of the deliberate,
free, cognitive choices normative in human ethics. "Members of some species may reach
tacit consensus about what kind of behavior to tolerate or inhibit in their midst, but without
language the principles behind such decisions cannot be conceptualized, let alone debated."89
Rolston suggests that 'chimpanzee justice' is at best 'preethical', as there is 'no
sense of holding chimpanzees morally culpable or praise-worthy'. He concludes that only
humans are capable of ethics, ofmoral reasoning. Moral considerability (or worth) is not the
same as moral capacity, which is present only in human beings.90 So Deane-Drummond
insists that it is a category mistake to ascribe moral reasoning to animals, 'because they do
not have a deliberative capacity. They do not participate in reason and so cannot have moral
virtues'.91 Animals may be morally considerable, but only to humans, not to themselves.
Leahy notes we sometimes attribute to animals purely human characteristics, leading to
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confusion about their capacities. Dogs are said to look guilty or sycophantic, foxes sly, owls
wise, and apes cheeky. This is Wittgensteinian linguistic fuzziness, which leads to wrong
conclusions about the subjects of discussion. In reality the ability to choose or defy a natural
path on a moral basis, to engage in self-referential mental subterfuge, or to externally defy
internal standards of behavior is simply not present in any creature except human beings.92
Animals often display survival and predatory characteristics that could be interpreted as
natural evil, yet these actions have no moral content, and so cannot be regarded as morally
evil in the sense that is applied to human behavior. Animals uniformly act within a
framework dictated by and consistent with their nature, in contrast to the human being, who
alone seems capable of willful evil, ofwillfully violating its own nature and nature around it.
The moral and rational freedom ofhumans is a difference not merely of quantity, but
of quality from the animals. This quality is what enables humans to have the highest form of
relationship with each other and with God. They can be in free 'I-Thou' relationship, rather
than live out their lives in perpetually pre-determined limits. This capacity for socially
mediated symbolic representation, ethical freedom in relationship, and self-determination not
only marks humans as unique, but also fundamentally underlies the essence of their
personhood. Symbolic and representational thinking and communication are a pre-requisite
for moral reasoning, for meaningful choice and freedom in relation to the other, and for
openness to the full reality of the other, including the transcendent God. Only a severe
contraction of the concepts of personhood and morality will allow us to follow Singer.
Although Zizioulas cautions us to beware of substantive definitions of personhood, it seems
reasonable to suggest that at least in part, it is these substantive capacities that underlie what
makes human beings persons, rather than simply animals or things. We are the symbolic
species and the moral species, and this is why we can relate to each other and to God in the
unique way that we do. This is what we mean by calling ourselves persons.
Human moral freedom and symbolic reasoning enables the exercise of
responsibility. Emil Brunner highlighted this uniquely human capacity, believing it
differentiates humans from both the animal kingdom and God. Humans are capable of
responsibility because they have freedom, a limited freedom that flows from their creation in
the image of God, who has ultimate freedom.93 Only humans have the capacity for
responsibility, and are therefore capable of receiving a charge to care for the world. Only
they have the potential capacity to exercise responsibility beyond themselves, and to call the
creation to more than itself. Leahy maintains that Singer has emasculated the concept of
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personhood because he has failed to incorporate this notion of responsibility. Though Singer
wants to grant equal 'human' rights at least to the class of animals that are minimally self-
conscious and rational, he stops short of attributing to them responsibility, 'because this
would allow them to be punished for wrongdoing ... ofwhich all are agreed they can have
no conception' (emphasis in original). By lowering the criteria for what we mean by
personhood to incorporate animals, Singer's concept 'forfeits profitable comparisons with
the treatment of human persons.'94
The capacity for responsibility is thus a hallmark not only of the biblical picture of
the imago dei, but also of the scientific portrait of human uniqueness. Humans are free in
relation to the world and can transcend it, be creative within it, master it, and be responsible
for it. To follow Larkin in maintaining that the capacity for relationship might image God
'wherever it occurs', is to conflate the radically different types of relationships that are
possible between and among humans, animals, and God. Such an understanding of
relationship does not take into account the unique realities of human personal, mental, and
social life. It would be better to say that relationship is part of, rather than being, the image
of God.
6.2.4. Conclusion
While modem science has closed some of the gap separating human beings from
other creatures, it has also illuminated how wide and fixed the gap remains. Rolston insists
that we 'may welcome any continuity with animal life, while resisting reductions and
rejoicing in the distinctively novel phenomena when humans arrive. Quantitative differences
add into qualitative differences' that exceed previous evolutionary achievements.95 Tattersall
insists that the argument that Homo sapiens only did what its ancestors had done, only a little
better or a little differently, is simply not true. Modem humans are a new kind ofhominid,
'qualitatively distinct in highly significant, if limited respects'.96 Donald concludes that
'having reached a critical point in our cognitive evolution, we are symbol-making,
networked creatures, unlike any that went before us.... This much is not speculation: humans
are utterly different. Our minds function on several phylogenetically new representational
planes, none ofwhich are available to animals'.97 Ayala summarizes humanity's uniqueness
as 'embodied in a suite of features' that includes religious beliefs, ethical behavior, and
94
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enhanced intelligence.98 Christian de Duve concludes 'one must be either deranged or
dishonest not to view as immensely important and significant' humanity's unique creativity,
rationality, and spirituality.99 Thus these aspects of human uniqueness appear to be coherent
with scientific data.
The common conviction that the difference between human and animal intelligence
is one of degree rather than of kind overlooks the unique features of human symbolic,
referential, social and moral intelligence. While levels of communication, rationality, and
consciousness are present in the animal kingdom, the human linguistic, social and moral
mind is unique, opening humans to freedom, responsibility, and a hitherto impossible depth
of inter-personal relationship. Human symbolic reasoning, language, and moral capacity are
not even potentially present in the rest of the animal kingdom. The further orientation of the
human mind towards the transcendent, evident in worship, in wonder, in religion, and
perhaps in mathematics, also appears to be absent in other material creatures. If it exists, it
leaves no trace or observable symbolic artifact of itself. So Braine observes, 'the order
exhibited by human knowledge and understanding seems to exceed any of the kinds of order
which materially precede it'.100 It is precisely because the human mind cannot be nailed
down and predicted that it continues to elude scientific explanations. It is not one object
among other objects, nor does it behave as essentially every other object does.101 No other
material creature discloses this indication of transcendence. Humans are not just different in
degree from the animals. They are a different kind of creature.
6.3. Artificial intelligence and human nature
Another modem challenge to human uniqueness and significance has arisen with the
development of computer science, and particularly with the quest to create artificial
intelligence (AI). Barbour remarked that Darwin threatened human dignity by leveling us
with animals, and now at least in the minds of some, 'human uniqueness seems to be
threatened by our resemblance to computers'.102 Zizioulas specifically questions the
'substance' approach to human uniqueness because of the 'growing prospect' of the creation
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ofAI.103 Will AI equal or surpass human intelligence? Some scientists argue that human
intelligence is a result of complex organic brain circuitry that will eventually be mimicked
and surpassed by the evolution of computers. They regard humans as 'very sophisticated
computers, [whose] self-conscious selves [are] a sort of sophisticated software that runs on
the advanced neural circuitry of our brains'.104 Minds and brains are regarded as
complicated machines, 'composed of smaller things that cannot think at all.'105 The triumph
of advanced IBM computer 'Deep Blue' over Gary Kasparov in a game of chess in 1996 was
widely hailed as a precursor to the AI future.106 The 2001 Stephen Spielberg (& Stanley
Kubrick) movie A.I. - Artificial Intelligence dramatized such a future, in which humanly
designed AI beings eventually evolved and replaced humans as the highest 'life' forms from
the Earth. The movie concluded with these AI beings searching a frozen, dead Earth for
clues about their now-extinct creators. In a related twist on the 'cosmic anthropocentrism'
theme, Tom Stonier suggests that 'the cosmic function ofHumanity is to act as the
evolutionary interface between Life and Intelligence'' (italics in original).107
Noreen L. Herzfeld notes that the goal of much AI research is to create an ' imago
hominis, a machine that is in some way created in the image of the human person'. That
image is 'more or less loosely defined' with various aspects of human nature, particularly
intelligence. Herzfeld notes two questions at the center of the pursuit ofAI. What is human
intelligence? Second, how would we know if something sufficiently like it were present in a
machine? She notes three different approaches to solving this problem. 1) Symbolic:
construction to achieve the capacity for reason and rationality. 2) Functional, in which
certain (not all) human tasks are successfully emulated by machines; successful single
function emulation is said to represent weak AI, while a full production of human nature
would be strong AI, after John Searle's nomenclature. 3) Relational: in which the machine
is able to successfully produce the features involved in human relationships. The goal of
each is to discover what it would take to ascribe to a machine the imago hominis, to create a
machine capable of being a true friend to human beings.108
6.3.1. The symbolic approach
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The symbolic approach has produced computers capable of some kinds of rational
activity that have already surpassed human capacity. Complex mathematical calculations
and proofs, and Deep Blue's chess-playing ability are examples. However, as computer
science has developed, the divergence between computer 'intelligence' and human
intelligence has become ever clearer. Peterson points out that while computers are excellent
at algorithmic functions, following established sets of rules and logic to accomplish tasks, it
is clear that their capacities 'are quite modest when compared to human capabilities'.109
Initial hopes of surpassing this aspect of human intelligence, such as Marvin Minsky's
prediction in 1970 that soon there would be 'a machine with the general intelligence of an
average human being'110, have given way to pessimism. The symbolic reasoning research
has shown itself to be subject to the law of diminishing returns, giving ever less than its
initial promise. The problems have included the difficulty inherent in encoding a huge
general background database, in making gigantic visual and sensory input streams digestible,
and perhaps even in the nature of human rationality itself.
Winograd, Flores, and Hubert Dreyfus argue that human intelligence is not just 'a
process of symbol manipulation', but includes bodily experience of the world and intuition
not reducible to 'symbolic manipulation'.111 The rationalistic mistake has been to view
language purely as the vehicle for the transmission of data and information, and to overlook
its deeply social role, including its central place in the structure and capacity for
commitment. "To be human is to be the kind of being that generates commitments, through
speaking and listening.... We treat other people not as merely 'rational beings' but as
'responsible beings'." Computers built on the rationalistic model are good as tools of
language, 'but they are incapable ofmaking commitments and cannot themselves enter into
language'.112 They conclude that it is unlikely the symbolic approach will produce 'full,
human-like intelligence'.113
T. F. Torrance believes it is absurd to suppose AI can replicate the human mind
because it is an attempt to replicate in machine structure a 'mathematically impossible
idea.. .that logical-deductive systems can be consistent and complete... [since] they are open
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to verification only beyond themselves'.114 Douglas Hofstadter, himself expecting to
overcome this problem, traces the idea to J. R. Lucas, who insists that a machine must be
subject to Godel's incompleteness theorem, because a machine is by definition a 'concrete
instantiation of a formal system'. Because of this limitation, 'no machine can be a complete
or adequate model of the mind. ..minds are essentially different from machines'.115 Andy
Clark argues that we must abandon the Cartesian notion of 'the mental as a realm distinct
from the body', and capture the essential embodiedness of human nature and intelligence -
'spread.. .across brain, body, world, and artifact' - if true artificial intelligence is to be
achieved.116 The modem understanding of the human person as a holistic embodied entity
shows that the isolated creation of abstract mind will not be the equivalent of human nature.
Our tendency to glorify mind has tempted us to dumb-down human nature and complexity,
and even to misunderstand the nature ofmind itself. Herzfeld reminds us that our minds are
fundamentally social-and communal. "Rationality or Intelligence, by itself, is not the
defining characteristic of being human. It [(being human)] cannot, in fact, be captured as an
isolated quality."117
6.3.2. The functional approach
The functional approach has also produced limited success, such as in industrial
robots, in Deep Blue's chess playing capacity, or in the ability to compose music. David
Cope created a computer program that emulated the musical style of famous classical
composers, using principles of deconstruction, commonality ('retain that which signifies
style'), and recombinancy ('recombine into new works'). Cope notes that 'the works have
delighted, angered, provoked, and terrified those who have heard them'.118 The music so
created is convincing enough to fool even professionals.119 Today's parallel processing
machines are said to Team', to be programmable as 'expert systems', and are used to encode
vast amounts of information to provide analysis and solutions in specialized fields.
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But does the capability to mimic certain human roles make a machine artificially
intelligent? The claim for weak AI is successful, since a narrow and specific human
function is effectively replicated. However, the claim for strong AI has not been met. John
McCarthy points out those expert systems are only expert in a very limited domain of
expertise. Outside this narrow domain they are 'brittle': they crack and break down.120 The
creators ofDeep Blue insist its capacity is not artificial intelligence, since its parallel
processing and standard programming do not in any way imitate real human thought.121 As
David G. Stork notes, 'chess is far easier than innumerable tasks performed by an infant,
such as understanding a simple story, recognizing objects and their relationships,
understanding speech, and so forth. For these and nearly all realistic AI problems, the brute
force methods in Deep Blue are hopelessly inadequate'.122 Others such as Barbour, Herzfeld,
Winograd, and Flores insist that human intelligence is essentially embodied, social and
cultural, and cannot be realized in AI without such dimensions.123 Rodney Brooks insists
that now 'human-level intelligence is too complex and too little understood to be correctly
decomposed into the right subpieces', or to delineate the proper relationship between
subpieces.124 What looks at first like AI, such as Cope's musician's mimic, turns out to be a
complex but limited program rather than true intelligence. Despite his program's success,
Cope believes the computer is ultimately 'just a tool with which we extend our minds'.125
As extensions, they are not independent competing minds. Indicative of the change in
attitude towards strong AI's likelihood, McCarthy notes that formerly optimistic timelines
projecting success in 50 years have changed to 500-year projections.126
6.3.3. The relational approach
The relational approach has likewise met with limited success. Initial optimism
suggested computers could be taught to successfully imitate humans in conversational
relationship. Alan M. Turing proposed the 'imitation test': if a human judge in blind
conversation with a computer could be fooled into believing it was a person, the computer
120 John McCarthy, 'Some Expert Systems Need Common Sense', Annals ofthe New York Academy
ofSciences 426 (1984), 129-35.
121
Herzfeld, IOI, 43.
122 David G. Stork, 'The End of an Era, the Beginning ofAnother? HAL, Deep Blue and Kasparov',
http://www.research.ibm.eom/deepblue/learn/htmFe.8.1 .html.
123
Herzfeld, IOI, 47; Barbour, NHNG, 87; Winograd & Flores, Understanding Computers, 6-68
124
Rodney A. Brooks, 'Intelligence without Representation', in John Haugeland, ed., Mind Design II:
Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, rev. ed. (MIT, 1997), 395.
125
Cope, http://arts.iicsc.edu/facultv/cope/Emmv.html.
126 John McCarthy, public lecture, Stanford University, March 10, 1999, quoted by Herzfeld, IOI, 41.
193
was deemed to be thinking.127 To accomplish this task, algorithms for conversation
emulation have been thoroughly, though not altogether successfully, programmed into
computers. But is this really what we mean by 'intelligence'?
The nature of human consciousness is central to the issue. Anne Foerst, working
with the MIT robot COG (which has both embodied and social learning aspects in its
assemblage), notes that many AI researchers consider consciousness to be illusory, and so
adopt a functionalist view of both human and robot capacities.128 Dennett, for instance,
believes all human thought, from self-consciousness to decision-making, is ultimately
computational and reproducible.129 However, Foerst also notes that the AI research model of
intelligence is not a comprehensive model, and does not take into account typically
theological elements of human nature such as intuition, emotion, and spirit.130 While some
researchers insist cognition and emotion can be separated, and analogues to emotion
programmed into machine software (e.g., fear and anger as self-defense programming),
others point to the holistic nature of human consciousness that includes thought, emotion and
intuition rising in interrelated unity within the socially embodied person.131 Nicholas
Humphrey similarly suggests that human intelligence is incomprehensible without these
fundamental aspects of sensation, emotion and intuition. He is among those pessimistic
about AI research pursued on purely symbolic grounds.132
Further, it is unclear that computer Teaming' is the same as human learning, even
when embodiedness is incorporated and relational aspects simulated. Searle argues that this
is not truly human intelligence, because it confuses semantic understanding and
intentionality with simple grammatical and syntactical competence, and simulation with
duplication.133 The machine is doing a programmed task without knowing it is doing it.
Syntactical and grammatical competence may increase, but the machine does not 'know that
it knows' that it is learning; it is not truly self-conscious. As Rosalind Piccard notes,
'biological processes may be simulated in a computer and we may construct computational
mechanisms that function like human feelings, but this is not the same as duplicating
them'.134
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6.3.4. Some deeper issues in the questfor A.I.
Peterson believes the real question, beyond the form artificial intelligence might
take, is whether it is even possible, in particular because the nature of human consciousness
is still not understood.133 Even material reductionist Francis Crick admits, 'what may be
difficult or impossible to establish is the details of the subjective nature of consciousness,
since this may depend upon the exact symbolism employed by each conscious organism'.136
Nagel agrees that the problem of subjectivity is central to the mind-body question.137 This
question is at the heart of the AI quest. A successfully strong AI machine would have to at
least have symbolic, functional, and relational capacities equivalent to human nature,
including real subjectivity. But Piccard concludes that because human consciousness is still
not understood, we simply cannot yet tell if it can be duplicated, rather than simply imitated
in a computer. Perhaps our biology is 'uniquely able to generate' human subjective
feelings.138 "Scientists have not yet foreseen any means of bridging the deep chasm between
what machines can do and the kind of experience, emotional or not, we as humans have
continuously."139 Barbour suspects that human consciousness 'requires forms of organized
complexity or properties of neural cells and networks that have no parallels in silicon-based
systems' and therefore computer consciousness is an empirical (though not metaphysical)
impossibility. He leaves the question open on the grounds of our current ignorance.140
The dominant paradigm in modem natural sciences is that human nature is entirely a
product of the physical world. Mind is understood as essentially a phenomenon of brain
states, an emergent property of a complex physical system, although various levels of
complexity and relatedness between the mind, brain, and body are recognized.141 For
instance, Crick openly declares, 'You're nothing but a pack ofneurons', after rejecting body-
soul dualism in favor ofmaterialistic reductionism.142 Owen Flanagan opts for a non-
reductive materialist model as the best explanation of the human mind.143 Both models are
monistic in holding to a purely physical description of human nature. However, there is no
guarantee that the monistic view is correct. As both de Duve and Peterson observe, the
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mind-brain problem has yet to be solved. Human consciousness still has 'only a
phenomenological account but no objective explanation.'144
If human intelligence is just an emergent property of a sufficiently complex neural
network, linguistically expressed by a suitably embodied social and cultural apparatus, then
it may well be possible that in "x" years, scientific advances will replicate the necessary
conditions for self-aware AI in a machine of some type, perhaps on an organic rather than a
silicon substrate. If such were to happen, Barbour suggests that AI beings would have to be
included in our sphere ofmoral concern, just as are animals at their level of intelligence.
Human dignity would nevertheless not be fundamentally jeopardized, because AI status
would be based on its similarity to ws.145 Then humans might look on themselves, as Stonier
suggested, as the cosmic Adam of intelligent beings, their original ancestor and creator.
Peterson agrees with Barbour that the Christian doctrine of the imago dei has caused us to
emphasize our uniqueness rather than our similarity with other creatures, and the creation of
such AI would offer occasion for a debate like that surrounding the moral status of
animals.146 Foerst suggests that the success ofAI, while keeping us humble, need not be
taken as negative or threatening to human dignity, because AI is 'yet another story about
humanity', about our created nature and our own creativity, and can help us understand
ourselves without challenging our status as imago dei. For Foerst, the image ofGod is not
the same as the imago hominis. The imago dei is not something that marks us as
qualitatively different from other creatures, including potential AI. It is not to be found in
unique 'skills and abilities', but is rather performative, found in the promise of a relationship
between God and humans.147
There remains the real possibility that human consciousness and intelligence are
more than physical constructs, more even than emergent properties of non-reductively
understood natural systems. Because the consciousness problem has not been solved, the
possibility of an immaterial or 'spiritual' dimension to human nature cannot be eliminated.
There may be some evidence of a more complex relationship between the mind/body
/brain/spirit than that offered by the monistic materialist view, in medical research into near-
death experiences (NDE). People who have had NDE report many phenomena suggestive
of some type ofnon-corporeal aspect to human nature. These reports include out-of-body
experiences, meeting deceased persons, moving through a tunnel, communication with light,
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observation of colors, observation of a celestial landscape,148 and observing objects or people
(often medical personnel) in their surroundings that they should not have been aware of in
their unconscious or 'dead' state.149 Dr. Pim van Lommel in a famous thirteen year study of
NDEs at various hospitals in Holland, comments:
How could a clear consciousness outside one's body be experienced at the moment
that the brain no longer functions during a period of clinical death with flat EEG?
Also, in cardiac arrest the EEG usually becomes flat in most cases within about 10 s
from onset of syncope. Furthermore, blind people have described veridical
perception during out-of-body experiences at the time of this experience. NDE
pushes at the limits ofmedical ideas about the range of human consciousness and the
mind-brain relation.150
Van Lommel is not alone, as many medical researchers report similar findings.151
Some suggest that consciousness is a quantum mechanical phenomenon, after Roger
Penrose's idea, and may continue to exist in the quantum sphere for a time after death,
independent of the body.152 While Penrose's suggestion is controversial and speculative, it
does point to the real issue. Susan Blackmore says the crux of the argument is whether
NDEs are a result of the dying brain or are indicative of the afterlife or a non-corporeal
aspect to human nature. While Blackmore attributes these experiences to the dying brain,
her position is not the majority position among NDE researchers even by her own admission.
Interestingly, in her own out-of-body experience ('inspired' by drugs), Blackmore reported
seeing her disembodied self connected to her physical body by a silver cord (see Eccl.
12:6.).153 Others, like neurologist Bruce Greyson of the University of Virginia, suspect there
is more to it than brain states. As Paul Badham puts it, 'people who report near death
experiences sometimes "see" things that it would be impossible for them to see if they had
148 Pim van Lommel, et al, 'Near-death experience in survivors of cardiac arrest: a prospective study
in the Netherlands', The Lancet 358:9298 (2001), 2039-45.
149 'Life After Near Death', BBC News, February 4, 2000,
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been unconscious on an operating table'.154
It would be foolish to claim too much for NDEs. As Elizabeth L. Hillstrom
observes, NDErs from variant religious backgrounds seem to have experiences of the
afterlife that reflect their own expectations. This suggests that at least some NDE content
'may tell us more about the NDEr's cultural and religious expectations than about the
afterlife'.155 But NDEs are at least suggestive of a component of human nature that
transcends modern physicalist and non-reductive materialist interpretations.156 This evidence
at the frontiers of medical research is even more compelling given the failure of current
paradigms to solve the consciousness problem.
There are other good reasons to believe that monistic naturalist approaches to the
world and human nature are inadequate, despite their dominance. Watts notes 'the scientific
tradition is actually more confused on these matters than attention to neuroscience alone
would suggest'.157 At least some, like Penrose and Polkinghorne, suggest that our human
perceptions ofmathematical truth indicate a connection to a non-material 'noetic' realm of
reality.158 Penrose believes modem physics has not progressed far enough to even
understand this consciousness of 'the Platonic world ofmathematical forms'.159 Peter
Dodwell notes that 'old-fashioned materialism is the way things are in cognitive science'. It
still subscribes 'to a view of the material basis of the world... that was abandoned by physics
no later than the 1920s'. Dodwell believes this older view may provide 'too severe a
constraint on the possible ways of understanding mind'.160 This may help to explain the lack
of success in solving the mind-body problem and in reconciling a host of theological and
scientific perspectives on various related issues, since expectations can blind perceivers to
actual and viable alternatives (§5.3). Super-string theory in astrophysics already suggests
that there are multiple dimensions to reality beyond the four (3 space + time) normally
perceived dimensions of human experience. With perhaps even as many as ten dimensions
154 'Life after near death', quoting Paul Badham of Lampeter University,
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/health/629710.stm
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needed to reconcile quantum physics with relativity161, theoretical physics intimates the
limitations of basic human experience for accessing a complete understanding of reality.
The transcendent aspect of human nature suggested by NDE might indicate that no
purely materialistic AI project could be completely successful. De Duve's insistence that our
view of material reality must be enlarged to encompass what was formerly called 'spirit'
might be instructive in this regard.162 The current paradigm seems likely to be too limited to
explicate the human mind. If the human spirit is nonmaterial, then it is a category error to
suppose it could be empirically evident to or reproducible by the natural sciences. That this
appears to be a form of dualism does not automatically invalidate it.163 Piccard notes that
while the belief in 'something in humans beyond duplicatable mechanisms - something akin
to an elan vital - is derided by many of today's philosophers, their derision is not based in
science. It is a valid possibility that there may exist some aspect of humanity that we cannot
. duplicate, short of procreation'.164 Then the best AI might be expected to achieve would be
the reproduction of something perhaps analogous to animal intelligence165: weak AI.
6.3.5. Conclusion
Current AI research cannot produce a machine or robot that is self-conscious,
emotive, intuitive, 'willful', capable of personal bodily relationship, moral choice, or
personal responsibility, and seems unlikely to do so in the near future. Since science is still
far from solving the mind-body-brain problem, there is a real element of the unknown that
may prove to be forever insurmountable. In theological perspective, ifAI were to be truly an
imago hominis - strong AI - there would need to be a true 'I' within the machine capable of
moral responsibility, of 'I-Thou' relationships with humans, perhaps even possibly with
God. Even given the success of a strong AI project, human status may still not be
jeopardized, since it would be AI only by virtue of human genesis and genius.
Finally, a theological appraisal of both weak and strong AI will be aware of the
differences in the scientific and theological perspectives on reality. Even if science
161 Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Questfor the
Ultimate Theory (New York: WW Norton, 1999).
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succeeded in creating what it deemed to be strong AI, it might, as Foerst notes, still be far
from a theological understanding of human nature as the imago dei. 'If one could reduce
human personality and subjectivity to computational and mechanistic processes, one would
interpret humans... as objects'' (emphasis added).166 In this sense, the imago hominis is not
the same as the imago dei; the two should not be confused. Barbour agrees that AI 'is not a
threat to human dignity unless we start to think of ourselves as only information processors
and symbol manipulators'.167 This is the advantage ofZizioulas' insistence that human
nature must be understood in terms ofPersonhood, not substance. Such an understanding
moves us beyond issues of'capacity and incapacity'.168
Scripture is essentially silent on the issue of artificial intelligence, outside of one
intriguing passage in Revelation 13:14-18 that may just refer to something like AI. There,
the 'image of the beast' is given breath so that it 'could even speak and cause those who
would not worship the image of the beast to be killed'. This is placed in the same context as
the 'mark of the beast', which is given to the inhabitants of the earth who cannot buy or sell
without it. This image has been a popular apocalyptic icon in our computer-saturated market
culture.169 Does the 'mark' represent computer labeling? Does the 'breath' and 'power to
speak' represent some type of artificial intelligence? Whatever this may mean about the
future possibility of AI, the passage does point to humanity's idolatrous temptation to self-
worship, to know themselves as other than persons made in God's image. It also points to
theology's responsibility to call all human quests for knowledge to account before God, for
the beast is the beast precisely because it utterly rejects God and puts humanity in the place
of God.
6.4. Human Uniqueness and Extraterrestrial Intelligence
While data on animal, hominid, and artificial intelligence is readily available from
the natural sciences, the same cannot be said of evidence concerning extra-terrestrial
intelligence (ETI). For this reason, most of the discussion on the subject is speculative and
philosophical, dealing with probabilities, theories, and potentialities, rather than concrete
facts. There are some scientific data that are relevant to the discussion, particularly related
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to Earth's suitability for life, which may shed light on the probability ofETI. After
reviewing the speculative and philosophical views, this data will be investigated for its
implications, and conclusions drawn on the probability of ETI and the significance of human
existence from a strictly natural science perspective.
6.4.1. Extra-terrestrial life - the unanswered question
A review of the ETI perspectives already uncovered in the three ecumenical
theologians illustrates the diverse conclusions also present in the natural sciences.
Pannenberg notes the basic facts concerning the current scientific data on extra-terrestrial
intelligence (ETI). These may be summarized succinctly: there are no facts. With no hard-
data available to decide the case, there is no agreement as to whether non-terrestrial life and
intelligence will ever be found, some researchers supporting, others refuting the
possibility.170 Rahner is more open to the possibility ofETI due to his incorporation of
evolutionary processes in the center of his theological program, and he is ready to
downgrade human cosmic uniqueness to the point of speculating on multiple incarnations.
He is also ready to include the biblical angels in the ETI category, since he believes angels
might be creatures that have arisen in the earlier history of the universe's evolutionary
processes. Some of the problems in these views have already been examined, including their
internal inconsistency and lack of supporting evidence. Without repeating those arguments,
angels will be set aside from ETI consideration as speculative and currently inaccessible to
the natural sciences. Zizioulas is essentially silent on the topic ofETI, although a neutral
but human-centered position may be inferred from his emphasis on cosmic Christology.
Without any concrete data from SETI or other sources on the existence of
extraterrestrial intelligence, some believe objective science is best served by remaining open-
minded - unconvinced without hard data but open to the possibility. Others insist that ETI
will be ubiquitous in a universe governed by laws of emergent complexity, and that we are
justified in putting our faith in their existence. Still others are skeptical, insisting evolution is
a series of strung-together lucky chances, unlikely in the first place, and unlikely to be
repeated elsewhere. A divide is apparent, which will now be examined more closely.
6.4.2. The theoreticalprobability ofETI




as it is supposed to be a result of evolutionary processes, is sufficient to show the divide in
the debate.
Jacques Monod thinks life's rise on Earth was by chance, a freak accident that has
never happened again.171 Ernst Mayr concludes that 'an evolutionist is impressed by the
incredible improbability of intelligent life ever to have evolved'.172 Stephen Jay Gould
agrees, noting the improbability and contingency of all evolution, including human.173
Rolston points out that while intelligence in general may be favored by evolution, the type of
intelligence in 'self-conscious personality sufficient to build cumulative transmissible
cultures' has only appeared once in Earth's evolutionary history. This is so despite the fact
that there are 'five to ten million species' alive today, and 'five to ten billion species that
have come and gone over evolutionary time'.174 In a similar vein, Deacon notes that we tend
to think that given enough time, the Earth will inevitably have Planet ofthe Apes scenarios:
something like language is prefigured into evolution. We expect the same thing of the rest of
the universe, hence the enthusiasm in SETI. However, he believes this is a subconscious
kind of teleology. Once the concept of design is eliminated as a subconscious reading of
evolution, then in fact only the budding of evolution into unfilled niches makes any sense,
and the niche representing massive brain function is 'near the extreme of the distribution'.
He maintains that 'there is no evidence in living species that some inevitable progressive
trend leads to us'. Humans are not the trend, but the exception.173
Dawkins offers something of a bridge perspective: "The essence of life is statistical
improbability on a colossal scale. Whatever is the explanation for life, therefore, it cannot be
chance." He suggests that single step cumulative selection, by 'slow and gradual degrees',
has driven the evolutionary process toward inexorable diversity.176
De Duve and others take neural evolution as likely because 'a more effective brain'
is a survival advantage. They point to the gradual increase over time of brain size in
animals, and particularly in hominid fossils, as evidence of this contention. De Duve holds
that 'the emergence of humankind or, at least, of conscious, intelligent beings, appears as
much less improbable than many maintain. Contrary to what Monod stated, the biosphere
was pregnant with man.'177 Peacocke is hopeful that in light of laws of emergent
complexity, life and higher life forms are an essential part of the universe's potential. Since
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no part of life is a result of special creation, but rather is everywhere a result of purely
natural processes, ETI are likely given the in-built potentiality of the universe.178 Simon
Conway Morris agrees that evolution inevitably moves towards increased complexity,
believing the wonderful proliferation of life in the world suggests a process rich with
potentiality and possibility. Mathematically bounded complexity in seashells and other
creatures, and convergent evolution in divergent species towards eyes, limbs, brains, and
other organs, suggests to Conway Morris inevitability in the process.179
While Deacon sees the question as essentially dysteleological, de Duve takes an
opposite position, ready to see the divine hand behind the evolutionary scheme. If Deacon is
right, then his observations highlight human uniqueness in a strictly reductionistic scientific
sense, even without teleological considerations. If de Duve is right, this seems to place
humanity in a richly spiritual context that gives meaning and significance to human existence
based on this relationship to the divine, even without human uniqueness.
However, the problem with both views is that they remain philosophical and
speculative on the SETI question. They are representative of the wider philosophical divide
as to whether evolution is a quirky chance process of dumb luck, or an inevitable outcome of
universal laws. Life is either unique to Earth or present everywhere. The universe
demonstrates teleology or it doesn't. ETI must exist, or cannot exist. The divide seems
immense. Is there some objective means for deciding which view is correct?
6.4.3. The 'rare Earth' hypothesis
Perhaps a middle way between the two extremes may be found that takes account of
physical data and might allow for a more fully supported answer to the SETI question. The
natural sciences are aware of the anthropic conditions that are necessary for the universe to
develop conscious life. But these initial conditions are not the only conditions needed for
life. There are ongoing, very specific and contingent conditions needed to explain the rise of
intelligent life locally, on planet Earth: conditions that might or might not be the inevitable
results of cosmic processes. These are what might be called 'local fine-tuning' features,
which are as necessary and important for the development and existence of life specifically
on Earth as those anthropic conditions are for the general rise of life in the whole universe.
Peter D. Ward and Donald Brownlee examine and catalog some of these conditions,
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formulating their so-called 'rare-Earth' hypothesis as a conclusion.180 A representative
sample gives a general feel for the type of unique boundaries Earth's bio-system requires.
Among these are:
1) The nature and location in the galaxy of Earth's star Sol: too close to the center of the
galaxy, and there is too much radiation; too far from the center, and there aren't enough
heavy elements.
2) The age and location of our galaxy in the whole cosmos. If our galaxy is too young and
'metal-poor', there are not enough of the elements needed for life; too old, and the
galaxy's shape may be disastrous.
3) The presence and circular orbits of the gas giants Jupiter and Saturn. Without such
'sweepers' in perfect orbit, catastrophic, life-terminating asteroids would hit the Earth at
too frequent intervals, and life would never have gotten off the ground; if their orbits
were too elliptical, the gas giants would tear Earth apart by tidal forces.
4) The location, dimensions, and content ofEarth and its moon. Earth is the optimal
distance from the sun for carbon-based life-forms, has its own internal heat source, is
large enough to retain an appropriate atmosphere, and has tidal forces that are essential
to make an appropriate life environment, but not so strong as to tear the Earth apart.
5) Various mass extinction events have formed contingent boundaries for significant
changes in the history of life on Earth. Evolution took some far from predictable
turnings - so far as to put human intelligence at the extreme outside of any curve of
evolutionary probability - at least in part due to these extinction events. 181
Ward and Brownlee have combined the work of others to draw their conclusions.
For instance, George Wetherill and Ray Jawawardhana observe the special role Jupiter plays
for life on Earth, and its rarity in the universe.182 Andrew D. Fortes and others have noted
the importance of Earth's magnetic field in supporting and protecting life from destructive
solar and interstellar radiation. Planets without a circulating iron core like Earth's do not
generate such fields. This may be one reason why Mars has no full atmosphere and no
unambiguous evidence of life: smaller than Earth, its molten core, the source of its ancient
magnetic field, has solidified long ago. Without magnetic protection, the solar wind has long
since ripped away much of the atmosphere (referred to as 'scavenging'), including large
amounts of oxygen and nitrogen and much of the water, and killed most potential for life the
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planet may once have had.183
There are a host of similar conditions that have bounded the development of life on
Earth. Taken separately, each condition might be distributed throughout the universe.
Taken together - the requirement for life on Earth - they may converge extremely rarely. It
is also clear that Evolutionary complexity is contingent upon local time-bound conditions.
Life's history on Earth shows vast periods of evolutionary stasis: for 3 billion of the last 3 14
billion years, most life has been limited to the simplest of single-celled organisms.
Evolution does not have to give rise to just any outcome or other, including higher life
forms. Rapidly advancing evolution is therefore by no means a foregone conclusion. Carter
suggests an anthropic reason for believing sentient evolution is far from inevitable. In our
case, it only happened halfway through the typical life of a stable hydrogen-burning star,
and there are many reasons to believe the 'typical time taken for biological evolution is much
greater than stellar ages'.184 Conway Morris notes the rarity of habitable Earth, and agrees
sentience may be equally rare, even if evolution progresses inevitably once started.185 A
unique constellation of life-supporting features has come together in this comer of the
galaxy, in this solar system, and on this planet Earth, that may well never have happened
anywhere else in the cosmos. Earth is at the least very rare and possibly unique in its
suitability for the development of life, as we know it.
6.4.4. Conclusions
We are now in a position to tentatively apply this data to the question of ETI. Based
on the evidence, Ward and Brownlee conclude that while lower life forms might be common
in the universe if laws of complexity hold, higher life forms are probably much rarer, and
suggest that sophisticated intelligence like humanity's may be so rare that it has only had
time to happen once in cosmic history. While universal laws of evolutionary development
might readily move matter from states of lower to higher complexity, including into actual
forms of life elsewhere in the universe, this is no indication or guarantee that ETI equivalent
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to human intelligence has ever developed or could ever develop without a host of contingent
and together highly unlikely conditions. Conway Morris concludes that while the richness of
the process of evolution on Earth makes the appearance of something like humans inevitable,
it seems that Earth-type planets may be vary rare in the universe -'much rarer than hoped'.
Although the laws of the universe are 'tailor-made' to enable the development of such living
complexity, they operate only in suitable conditions, conditions possibly unique to Earth or
likely to be found only rarely in the universe. 'Inevitable humans, yes, but in a lonely
Universe'.186
From the preceding discussion, it seems that there may be scientific grounds to
believe that ETI either do not exist at all, or are vanishingly rare in the cosmos, such that we
may expect never to find them. From such a perspective, until concrete evidence emerges of
higher life in other solar systems, it seems prudent to remain skeptical about its existence.
6.5. Conclusion
In conclusion, the modern natural sciences have converged to recognize those
aspects of human nature that are unique not only on the Earth, but also probably in the
universe. Human intelligence, linguistic capacity, moral and relational freedom, spiritual
nature and awareness, and social and cultural creativity are unique in the world, and - as far
as we know - in the cosmos. There is no creature in the animal kingdom with comparable
capacities and potential. Artificial intelligence is unlikely to copy human nature anytime
soon. In fact, it may well be impossible practically and theoretically to establish true human¬
like self-consciousness and volition in a machine. Extraterrestrial intelligence also appears
unlikely to challenge human uniqueness. Although it may not be theoretically impossible -
depending on one's position on evolutionary inevitability - ETI may be statistically
improbable, especially in light of Earth's uniqueness.
As the one creature in the cosmos made in the image of the Creator, this is not a
surprise to theology. Christianity has long recognized the divide between humans and other
creatures that is now apparent in certain aspects to science. So Barbour concludes that the
picture of human uniqueness emerging from 'our knowledge of evolutionary history' is
consistent with the Scripture that draws 'an absolute line between humans and all other
186 Ibid.
206
creatures'.187 Ingrid Shafer observes human linguistic uniqueness 'has been intuitively
grasped since ancient times', preserved 'in Judeo-Christian tradition.. .in such images or
stories as God revealed/concealed in the four letters of the Tetragrammaton, as Adam
naming the inhabitants of Eden, as the importance of the Holy Scrolls in Judaism.. .and in
the definition ofChrist as the divine Logos, the Word ofGod'.188 Since language and
symbolic reasoning form an essential part of relational personhood, it is revealing that the
person of God the Son incarnate is described as the Logos, God's word. Linguistically
mediated personhood appears to be in the nature of God's own personhood.
The uniqueness of human symbolic reasoning and second-order intentionality
enables them to relate to each other face-to-face in 'I-Thou' relationship, to open up to not
only imaginary worlds, but to the transcendent realm, ultimately to have the capacity to
relate to God, all underlined in the biblical distinction given to humans made in the image of
God.189 The emerging scientific portrait of human uniqueness, far from undermining a
Christian insistence on human personhood as imago dei, actually strengthens it, since the
capacities science recognizes as distinctive also serve to make human-divine personal
communion in creativity and freedom possible. This does not require us to rely upon purely
substantive approaches to human nature in theology, but the scientifically observable
substantive differences do help to underline the unique nature ofhuman personhood, and
under-gird the non-substantive approaches taken by some theologians. We are unique - the
most complex life form in the cosmos - summarized theologically in the concept of the
imago dei, but also noticed by the natural sciences in terms of the free, symbolic, social,
ethical, and transcendent nature that make personhood possible. What is meaningful in this
context is the coherence of the two disciplines in their understanding of human being.
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Chapter 7
Cosmic Evolution and Human Existence: Providence in Science and Theology
"The more I examine the universe and study the details of its architecture, the
more evidence Ifind that the universe in some sense must have known we were
coming" - Freeman Dyson1
7.1. Introduction
The theological contention of this thesis is that human existence is a divine goal in
the creation of the universe, and that the cosmos' ultimate fate depends upon humanity in
Jesus Christ. Is this in any way coherent with scientific discourse? The stereotypical view is
that science teaches humanity is not central to the universal order of things. For instance, P.
Davies observes, 'The revolution begun by Copernicus and finished by Darwin had the
effect ofmarginalizing, even trivializing, human beings'.2 Other prominent scientific voices
insist there is no meaning or purpose to existence, human or otherwise. Sagan declares, 'the
Cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever will be'.3 Dawkins insists that despite appearances
to the contrary, there is no evidence of divine design in life or human existence.4 Peter
Atkins proclaims, 'everything is driven by motiveless, purposeless decay'.5 Must one
conclude this from the scientific data? Do modern science, Darwinism, and the processes of
'cosmic evolution'6 prove that human existence is a cosmic accident with no purpose or
ultimate meaning?
This chapter will attempt to answer this question by revisiting the cosmological
argument and the argument from design. Here, the intention is to 'defeat the defeaters' (to
use A. Plantinga's terms) of a teleological view of human existence rather than give any
single 'knock down' proof of it. An overview of the scientific data of cosmic evolution will
be coupled with metaphysical analysis of its meaning with reference to human existence,
teleology, and providence. This will require sensitivity to the boundary of science with
theology. While metaphysics is native territory for theologians, it is not the natural domain
1 Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (London: Pan, 1981), 250.
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of science.7 It is therefore important to discern and test the metaphysical character of (anti-)
teleological statements claiming to be the automatic result of science. It will be argued here
that the highly metaphysical and anti-teleological views of Sagan, Dawkins, Atkins, and
others, are not contained in the scientific data.8 Recognizing the partial separateness (§5.5)
of science and theology, what is sought is a level of coherence between the two perspectives
on reality.
It might just be worth asking, by way of connecting the medieval view to the
present, whether our geographical position in the universe has any bearing on human
existence. The Hubble Space Telescope reveals a 'universe that looks the same whichever
direction we look'. Stephen W. Hawking notes that 'it might seem that ifwe observe all
other galaxies to be moving away from us, then we must be at the center of the universe....
There is, however an alternate explanation: the universe might look the same in every
direction as seen from any other galaxy too... We have no scientific evidence for, or against,
this assumption. We believe it only on grounds of modesty: it would be most remarkable if
the universe looked the same in every direction around us, but not around other points in the
universe!" 9 While it is a legitimate possibility to suppose that the reason we see uniformity
in every direction is because we are at the center ofthe universe, this is unverifiable. In
particular, if everything came from a central 'big bang', then in one sense, all parts will
register the same ultimate age and initial location. A geographically central location is, in
this perspective, meaningless.10
On the other hand, there may be non-geographical ways of assessing human
centrality and cosmic significance. The anthropicprinciple stands at the heart of this
discussion, since it somehow seems to tie human existence to the essence of reality. In it, the
cosmological argument shades into the teleological argument, suggesting to some evidence
7
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8
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9
Stephen W. Hawking, A BriefHistory ofTime (New York: Bantum, 1996), 45, 130-131.
10 Given the age of the universe and the speed of light, the size of the universe in light years is X=ctu,
where c is the speed of light and tu is the age of the universe. If the universe is about 17 billion years
old (plus or minus 3 billion years), and we observe 17 billion light years distance to stars and galaxies
in any particular direction, then we are halfway between the farthest ends of the universe. Does this
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Malcolm S. Longair, Our Evolving Universe (CUP, 1996), 17-18, 108, 133f; Barrow & Tipler, ACP,
384.
209
not only for the existence of God, but also for cosmic design. The principle represents
significant scientific discovery and insight, cataloging the requirements for life and
consciousness, as we know it, illuminating the connection between the small and large-scale
structures of the universe, and noting the unusual cosmic position of human consciousness.
Humans are frequently spoken of as the being in whom the universe has 'become aware of
itself", possessing in the human brain 'the most complex object in the known universe'.12
Some versions of the principle even suggest that consciousness had to come into existence -
though it might not have been in human form.13 Since we could not exist without anthropic
fine-tuning, perhaps the universe is 'tailor-made' for human existence, and humans are the
'goal of creation'.14 This last statement is especially contentious. Some believe the principle
supports the idea, while others vigorously deny it.15 What is a reasonable conclusion?
A brief review of the anthropic principle is in order before considering whether it
can be thought of in teleological terms, or what bearing it has on human existence. The
general consensus in contemporary science is that the big bang marked the beginning of the
universe, as we know it. The anthropic principle observes that the initial conditions and laws
that have governed all matter in the universe since the big bang are exactly right for the
production of intelligent life.16 These parameters have been catalogued to some extent, as
this small sample list illustrates.17
1. The Smoothness Problem: Large regions coming out of a big bang could be expected to
have erratic differences in density, but instead it is remarkably smooth. The density of
matter would have had to be tuned to within 1 in 106° of its present value at the Planck
time (10 43 sec) following the start of the bang to achieve such smoothness.18
2. The Inflation Problem: If an initial inflation after the big bang gave rise to the present
11
Polkinghome, The Faith ofa Physicist, 12.
12
Polkinghome, SAT, 49; Peterson, MG, 20.
13 This is the strong version of the principle. The scientific rationale is that intelligent life must evolve
in order for the universe (or quantum effects) to be observed. This is a bit like the riddle about the tree
falling in the forest: if no one hears it fall, can a sound be said to exist? If there are no observers, can
the universe be said to exist, or be known to exist? See Barrow & Tipler, ACP, 15-23; George F.R.
Ellis, 'The Theology of the Anthropic Principle', in Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, & Christopher
J. Isham, eds., Quantum Cosmology and the Laws ofNature, 2nd Ed. (Vatican City State: Vatican
Observatory; Berkeley: CTNS, 1999), 374.
14
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15 P. Davies, MOG, 200.
16 Or the privilege ofbeing observes. Carter, 'Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic
Principle in Cosmology', in Malcolm S. Longair, ed., Confrontation ofcosmological theories with
observational Data (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), 291-298.
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general homogeneity of the universe, the initial conditions of inflation would have to be
tuned to within 1 in 10123 of the present cosmological constant to drive such expansion.
A change in the force of either gravity or the nuclear weak force of 1 in lO100 would end
the effectiveness of this constant.
3. The Flatness Problem: The expansion of the early universe would have to be fine-tuned
to within 1 in 1055 in order to arrive at the remarkably flat space of our universe. In the
absence of such flatness, or regularity in the curvature of space, the spatial structure of
the universe would be vastly different, possibly collapsing all matter within a short time
of the big bang.
4. The Expansion problem: A speed decrease of 1 in 106 when the big bang was a second
old would have produced a re-collapse of the universe before the universe's average
temperature fell below 10,000 degrees.19
5. The nuclear strong force must be within 1% of its present value, or carbon will not be
formed within stars.
There are a host of such parameters, with more being discovered each year. So far,
these observations are merely descriptive. Even at a descriptive level they are fascinating,
since without something very nearly exactly like these initial parameters, neither galaxies,
stars, planets, oceans, atmospheres, organic compounds, nor life as we know it would have
been possible. However, the questions of interest to theologians arising from this data are
metaphysical. Can one extrapolate directly from the 'big bang' to a design principle? Why
was the big bang so 'loaded' towards life? Does the big bang correspond in any meaningful
sense with the Judeo-Christian idea of creatio ex-nihilo? Is life in the universe inevitable or
highly unlikely? Is it unique to Earth or ubiquitous? Chapter 6 assessed the likelihood of
ETI in light of'rare Earth' conditions, but does human 'cosmic loneliness' equate to human
significance? Are human beings included in the 'why' of the universe, or are they simply a
contingent accident? Is human existence providential and part of a teleological 'cosmic
plan', or is it an unintentional throwaway?
In order to evaluate the metaphysical questions, several related areas in the science-
theology dialogue will be explored in order to build a 'sequentially persuasive' argument. 1)
The cosmological argument will be revisited in light of the big bang and the anthropic
principle. 2) The anthropic principle will be examined for considerations in the range from
cosmology to teleology. 3) The relationship between the anthropic principle and human
existence will be explored. 4) The scientific portrait of the process leading to human
existence will be evaluated in terms of providence. The key question to be answered is: Is it
fair for the theologian to assert, with reference to the evidence from science, thatprovidence
has guided cosmic evolution to its human end? This must be a summative overview of the
19
Leslie, Universes, 3, 29; W Bradley, 'The "Just So" Universe', Touchstone 12: 4 (1999), 75.
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material, rather than an exhaustive review, sufficient to support the argument.
7.2. The Cosmological Argument Revisited
The cosmological argument for the existence ofGod has re-emerged in the last few
decades because of two previously non-existent conditions in the natural sciences. The first
involves Edwin Hubble's research into the motion of distant stars and galaxies in the 1920s,
which has lead to the wide acceptance of an initial 'big bang' at the beginning of the
universe. The second condition involves the theoretical and technological advances that
have made possible the observation of the anthropic conditions. Until general relativity,
quantum mechanics, atom smashers and high-powered telescopes came on the scene, it was
not practical to research many of these ultra-fine life-enabling tolerances.
Many in the science-theology dialogue believe that God is the best explanation for
the existence of the anthropic universe. Peacocke, Polkinghorne, and others believe the
coincidences are too unlikely to have happened by chance, and attribute the existence of the
universe including its potentiality for life to God.20 Others, like Stephen Hawking or
Willem Drees, suggest these data can be explained without reference to God. For them,
teleology and providence appear to be out of the question. A brief look at the cosmological
argument in light of contemporary science will ground further discussion.
7.2.1. Steady State vs. Big Bang
Prior to Hubble, the widely accepted scientific view was that the cosmos was in a
steady state - neither expanding nor contracting. The status quo in astrophysics was that
matter was immutable, nothing being able to come from nothing, and therefore matter was
necessarily eternal.21 The universe was believed to be infinitely old, with laws and
governing principles or constants which were a given of the system. Albert Einstein even
adjusted his relativity equations in order to fit a steady state universe, because the alternative
of an absolute beginning of space and time seemed too metaphysically non-scientific.22
Hubble's findings were so traumatic for the dominant paradigm that some, like Fred Hoyle,
20 Peacocke, 'CSET', 89; Polkinghome, 'Friendliness'; Science and Creation (London: SPCK, 1988),
27-31,38.
21
Pope Pius XII, 'Theology and Modern Science', Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists 8 (1952), 165,
referring to Svante Arrehnius & Plate.
22 Steven Weinberg, Dreams ofa Final Theory (London: Vintage Books, 1993), 178.
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even suggested the universe was forever replenishing itself from within: a continual creation
ofmatter in the empty stretches of space could account for the observed motion of galaxies.23
Prior to Hubble, theologians could avoid metaphysical problems with the static universe by
claiming that the important thing was not that God had done something at a particular time,
'but rather that at all times he keeps the world in being'.24 This ontological approach was not
satisfying to everyone, and steady-state theory was used by some as grounds for dismissing
the notion of divine involvement altogether.25
Hubble's data revealed that the universe is expanding.26 He observed that almost all
stars and galaxies show a characteristic red-shift in their light spectra, as a result of the speed
at which they are receding from us.27 Their velocity is directly proportional to their distance
from us: the further away, the faster they are receding.28 The implication of this expansion is
shown by theoretically running the universe's clock backwards, which reveals the universe
contracting to a singularity at its beginning: a point at which all matter was compacted into
an area of incredibly small size and nearly infinite density. Such events are called
singularities because at such size and density, all the known laws of physics break down.
Penrose and Stephen Hawking gave theoretical weight to this finding by proving
mathematically that a universe with the amount ofmatter which we observe must have an
origin at a huge explosive singularity, given the laws of general relativity and the condition
that gravity continue to hold its attractive power under the initial conditions of the universe.29
Further confirmation came from observation of the microwave background radiation left
over from the explosion by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson in 1965, and from data
collected by the COBE satellite in 1992.30 These findings also put to rest modern steady-
state theories like Hoyle's.31 The initial explosion of all matter out of a singularity -
popularly called the 'big bang', and now widely accepted as the best physical description of
cosmic genesis - has resulted in the universe in which we live.
7.2.2. Big bang, quantum cosmologies, and metaphysical problems
23
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For many, the 'something from nothing' nature of the big bang seems to be
compatible with the cosmological argument for God's existence. For others, such
metaphysical solutions are inherently non-scientific and unsatisfactory. Some suggest a
quantum fluctuation at the beginning could account for the appearance of something from
nothing, since matter and energy must be conserved, and a quantum fluctuation would
balance potential and kinetic energies with matter to maintain the laws of conservation.32
This is supposed to do away with the need for an interfering hand of God to account for
initial energy input. Others, like James Hartle and Steven Flawking, propose quantum
models that seek to eliminate an initial moment, t=0, in an effort to get around a beginning,
which Flawking says 'smacks of [the] divine'. He claims that while time is limited in the
past, there is neither a precise boundary nor a singularity that requires abandoning the laws
of physics and 'hopelessly giving up' in the face of the something-from-nothing problem.
'The universe would be completely self-contained and not affected by anything outside
itself. It would neither be created nor destroyed. It would just BE', with 'no edge of space-
time at which one would have to appeal to God'.33 This is clearly a metaphysical claim
despite protestations of disinterest about metaphysical questions, and is Hawking's attempt
to get around a divine beginning.
However, such quantum models, when carefully examined, have some serious
metaphysical flaws.34 For one thing, it not clear that quantum models are appropriate for
singular events, since they are by definition designed for probabilities of ensembles of
particles.35 Further, Hawking admits that quantum cosmology is speculative, and incomplete
in any real sense. In fact, general relativity and quantum mechanics are as yet mutually
incompatible, and cannot both be applied to the same system.36 Scientists speculate that they
are part of a greater theory that unites them - a quantum gravity theory. Preliminary
suggestions have been proposed such as string or super-string theory, but no complete
unifying theory yet exists.37 Polkinghome maintains that any such theory will have to be
conjecture, because the very high energies present at the big bang are 'beyond our certain
32 P. Davies, MOG, 62.
33 J.B. Hartle and Hawking, 'Wave function of the universe', Physical Review D 28 (1983), 2960-75;
Hawking, BHT, 49, 141, 144; Russell, 'Introduction', in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws ofNature,
10.
34 P. Davies, MOG, 61.
35 Isham, 'Quantum Theories of the Creation of the Universe', 56, 79-80.
36
Rees, Our Universe, 29.
37
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knowledge'.38 Hawking says he takes an instrumentalist view of the kind of theory he and
Hartle are devising in their quantum cosmology: it 'is just a mathematical model we make to
describe our observations'. He takes 'the positivist viewpoint that a physical theory is just a
mathematical model and that it is meaningless to ask whether it corresponds to reality. All
that one can ask is that its predictions should be in agreement with observation'.39 On an
instrumentalist basis it need not correspond to reality at all except to make testable
predictions, and so the actual beginning has not been eliminated. Such a description might
be explanation at one level, but it does not claim to be full ontological explanation. Whether
any kind ofmetaphysical conclusions could or should be drawn from partial or
instrumentalist quantum cosmologies is therefore debatable.
Even if such problems are ignored, quantum cosmologies as divine substitute do not
really give something from nothing. John Leslie says of the Hartle-Hawking model, '.. .a
zero volume with three-dimensional geometry and sufficiently subject to the laws ofquantum
physics to allowfor talk of 'tunneling 'from it can look interestingly different from pure
nothingness'.40 Polkinghorne agrees, pointing out that the quantum vacuum out ofwhich the
universe originated 'is not an empty nothingness but an active medium full of fluctuating
energy'.41 Other quantum origination theories, such as those ofAndre Linde or Alex
Vilenkin, also assume the presence of this mathematical superspace.42 Perhaps without
realizing the ontological predicament in which it will place his theory, Hawking innocently
admits that 'in order to predict how the universe should have started off, one needs laws that
hold at the beginning of time'.43 Eliminating the first temporal moment leaves the question
unanswered: from whence came the basic forces, the unlimited laws, the 'highly ordered
mathematical domain'? Even in models that supposedly begin with absolutely nothing,
this overarching governance of pure mathematics is still in play. In other words, something
has not really come from nothing: there is no 'free lunch' for cosmological physicists. The
explanatory problem is simply moved back a causative generation: where did these laws and
foundational mathematics come from? Therefore, it is clear that physical theories of the
Hawking-Hartle variety have not eliminated the need for a deeper explanation to reality.
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The current scientific understanding suggests that the universe's particular anthropic
form is astronomically improbable: effectively impossible.45 The weak form of the anthropic
principle states that this should not be surprising, because if it were not so, we would not be
here to observe the universe. While some use this line of reasoning to dismiss the need for
God, this approach does not really account for the order that exists. Even if there are no
observers such as ourselves in the universe, the orderly arrangement of laws and matter that
make life possible demands a philosophical explanation.46 As Richard Swinburne observes,
'the fact that this peculiar order is a necessary condition of the [order] being perceived at all
makes what is perceived no less extraordinary and in need of explanation'.47
Another theory that claims to eliminate the need for God as creator is the idea that
this universe is just one of a huge collection of universes - perhaps even an infinite number -
a multiverse. There are various versions of this theory, from quantum branching, to
innumerable inflationary bubbles, to infinite 'breathings' of a big-bang - big-crunch cycle.48
Whether in serial, parallel, or contiguous form, the main argument simply suggests the
eternal existence of an 'ensemble' of worlds. According to Barrow and Tipler, this
ensemble involves 'either hypothetical other possible universes possessing different sets of
fundamental constants or different initial conditions'.49 One among this vast ensemble of
universes just happens to have the right conditions for carbon-based life.
Does the multiverse solution eliminate the need for God? Perhaps more to the point,
is it a valid scientific explanation for the anthropic principle? The crucial issue is the need
for a real ensemble of choices from which the one living anthropic universe might have been
selected. To use an illustration inspired by Leslie, ifwe have won the lottery, we might not
be surprised, since someone had to win sooner or later. But if gunmen rush into the room
just before the draw shouting, 'you are dead if your ticket isn't drawn!' we might be very
surprised indeed to find ourselves alive a few minutes later. We would want an explanation.
Two possibilities present themselves: either someone is on our side, or else gunmen rushed
into every other ticket-holder's home with the same threat and we are the only ones left
45 One estimate of the odds of cosmic matter emerging in its present arrangement by chance from the
Big Bang is given by Barrow & Tipler as only one in 10 to the 103° power (ACP, 448); cf. David J.
Bartholomew, God ofChance (London: SCM, 1984), 37ff.
46 Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy ofReligion (OUP, 1993), 117.
47 Richard Swinburne, The Existence ofGod, Rev. Ed. (OUP, 1991), 138.
48
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standing. In order for the later possibility to be real - for our universe to have been
'selected' by process of elimination as an observer-rich universe - there must be other
universes that could have been materially chosen from. If there are infinitely many
universes, then perhaps ours just happens to be the one with the otherwise statistically
impossible array of anthropic conditions. But in order for any multiple-worlds theory to
work, there must be actual other universes which could have been selected, or the selection
effect cannot operate. Given a billion tickets and a billion contestants: if lottery tickets are
given to all contestants, someone must be a winner. Given a billion tickets and one
contestant: since the contestant receives only one ticket, there will probably be no winner.
As Leslie puts it, 'No Observational Selection Effect without Actual Things fromWhich to
Select!'50
The postulate that there are other universes is unverifiable by science, and as such is
inherently metaphysical.51 There is no empirical evidence for their existence; they are by
definition unobservable. This is perhaps the most devastating critique of the multiverse
theory - it is a metaphysical rather than a scientific explanation. The choice between
infinitely many universes, one of which is bound to produce intelligent beings like us, or one
universe, extremely fine-tuned by the will ofGod, may ultimately be a matter of faith. The
multiverse theory at least has the same handicaps as the metaphysical assumption ofGod,
and perhaps even a few more. Polkinghorne argues that since there are no observable ways
to test related phenomena such as might be done in principle for the religious alternative, the
multiverse option is inferior.52 God's existence can theoretically be verified using religious
experience, answered prayer, the historical investigation of faith claims such as the
resurrection, or other metaphysical or philosophical considerations.53 Alternate universes are
completely inaccessible except to the imagination. Finally, even where multiple universes
are posited, these are not in necessary conflict with the existence of God, since the
ontological aspect of their existence remains a problem: the question remains why there is
something - a multiverse - rather than nothing. God remains as a satisfying and
50
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7.2.4. Ontology, causation, andcreatio ex-nihilo
Some refuse to ask the 'why' question altogether54, claiming such questions are
beyond the bounds of science and need not be pursued. But this tactic is either arbitrary or
self-referentially incoherent if a full account of reality is sought. For instance, the multiverse
theory is generally seen as the only robust competitor to the idea of God to account for the
anthropic universe. But the multiverse is itself a purely metaphysical answer to the 'why'
problem, and so is an incoherent option for the 'avoider of whys'. Others likeWillem Drees
take the anthropic universe as a brute fact - 'reality is assumed, rather than explained'.55 But
this is arbitrary, since explanation and connection is sought at every other level of reality.
As P. Davies observes, 'you don't explain something by simply declaring it has always been •
there'.56 The theological account of reality, moving as it does between explanation and
understanding, is fuller because it wrestles with the 'why', at least attempting to make the
existence and structure of the universe intelligible.
Polkinghome and others believe the ontological aspect of creation is a key
theological insight. Just as the existence of a multiverse would still require an explanation
for its being, so the general existence ofsomething rather than nothing requires a cause.57 P.
Davies recognizes the ontological problem when he admits, 'the fact that the universe might
have no origin in time does not explain its existence, or why it has the form it does'.58
Efforts to discover a 'theory of everything' that would make all features of the universe
inevitable products of basic underlying laws, even if successful, would still not render the
universe as 'accident' or 'brute fact' solution satisfying. The existence of the laws and the
intelligibility of the universe would still require explanation. Does such a cause have to be
God?
There are traditionally two types of causation: natural and intentional. While
natural causation works to explain some levels of reality, a final explanation for laws that
govern cosmic processes must automatically exclude natural or material explanations, since
these would by definition be themselves natural, and thus in need of further explanation.
54 B. Davies, Philosophy ofReligion, 118.
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Intentional causes, on the other hand, have the advantage of being free from logical
necessity, and thus offering an order of causation that is outside such necessity. Aquinas
gives the argument to intentionality or personal agency as follows: "Now whatever lacks
intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with
knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some
intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we
call God."59 Brian Davies notes that if we allow that the vast temporal regularity 'is not
explicable scientifically, we could account for it in terms of something analogous to
decision'. So it is reasonable to believe in intelligent agency when confronted with non-
logically necessary order, unless good reason is given to dismiss it.60 Neither natural laws
nor a 'mathematical superspace' suggest logical necessity, so it is reasonable to believe an
intentional, intelligent agent, God, is responsible for their existence.
Perhaps another mysterious means of causation exists which is simply beyond our
thought and experience, which could account for the origin of temporal and spatial order.
Let us call this third means 'Mystery', since we seem unable to know what it is. Then we
have in fact returned for explanation to God, who is, in Rahner's words, the 'absolute
mystery'.61 It is appropriate to admit that comparing original or ontological causation to
human intentional causation has its limits. If the source of the universe were some kind of
hypothesis that could be completely known, verified and delineated by our finite and limited
science, then that source would not be worthy of being called God, who must as Infinite
Mystery transcend the finite realm of human experience.62 Such a perspective is coherent
with the 'provisional and fallible' nature of human knowledge.63
Some take an ontological perspective, accepting that God is responsible for
everything and holds creation together from beginning to end, not just at one particular finite
moment in space and time called the big bang. So Polkinghome says, 'theology is concerned
with ontological origin and not with temporal beginning. The idea of creation had no special
stake in a datable start to the universe'.64 Here, the initial instant fades in importance, since
God's role is to sustain the cosmos in being at all times, not just to act once in the beginning.
The doctrine of creatio ex-nihilo then stands for the existence of something - a universe - by
divine fiat, where the existence of nothing was also a logical option. Others regard the initial
moment of history as critical to a theological understanding. Pope Pius XII saw the big bang
59
Aquinas, Summa Theologica I. Q2, A3.
60 B. Davies, Philosophy ofReligion, 118.
61 Karl Rahner, Till, 105.
62 Rev. Raymond Santos, personal conversation.
63 Michael Fuller, Atoms and Icons (London: Mowbray, 1995), 31.
64
Polkinghome, Science & Christian Belief, 73.
219
as so friendly to faith that he said it confirmed the universe's contingency and the 'epoch
when the cosmos came forth from the Hands of the Creator'.65 Peters insists the doctrine of
creation is disappearing when God's providential and preservational roles are recast as
'continuing creation'. He believes the big bang singularity is consonant with a theological
position based on revelation and is equivalent to creatio ex nihilo.6b
Perhaps a middle way is more helpful. Robert J. Russell argues for subsuming the
temporal explanation within the broader ontological one.67 On the one hand, the pure
'ontologists' seem indifferent to the implications of big-bang cosmology, and are too eager
to establish a dichotomy between ontological and empirical, perhaps because pinning one's
theological colors to then-current scientific theories has been disastrous in the past.
Likewise, the temporalists may be in danger of one-day losing their empirical base, for
instance if quantum cosmologies such as the Hartle-Hawking model are accepted. Their
position might be in danger of reducing theism to deism, and may not account for all the
ways in which God might act in the cosmos.68 Yet the temporalists can claim to be
extrapolating from empirical rather than purely theoretical bases. The directness of
correspondence between the big bang and the theological idea of creatio ex-nihilo is
attractive partly because it is simple and empirical, not merely philosophical. In either case,
God appears as the best current explanation for both the causal and ontological aspects of the
big bang, and for the anthropic fine-tuning of the universe.
7.3. Teleology and Cosmic Evolution
7.3.1. The meaning and scope of teleological explanations
What is meant by a teleological explanation? Teleology in philosophy is
'explanation of phenomena by purpose they serve'.69 The traditional arguments have posited
that the best explanation for the structure and order of the universe is intention or
intelligence. The idea is that the universe appears to be designed at various levels, from its
law-bounded beginnings to its culmination in living systems, and that this design needs
65
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explanation. B. Davies offers two versions of design, the argument from purpose, and the
argument from regularity. In each case, aspects of the world are suggested to be as they are
- designed as purposeful or regular - because of the existence of an intentional immaterial
agent - the minimum qualifications for God.70
William Paley's example of a watch found 'in crossing a heath' illustrates the idea of
design. It is known to be purposive because it is composed of parts that operate together to
accomplish a goal. It is orderly and regular. Showing such purpose and order, we are bound
to attribute its creation to an intelligent agent, unlike the apparently purposeless stone lying
randomly next to it. Paley calls such goal-directed or purposive objects 'teleological
systems'. They are teleological because they have a purpose - in the case of the watch, the
goal of telling time.71 Paley's thesis is that such goal directedness is observable in living
systems - for instance in the eye, the heart, or the muscles, each ofwhich is built
appropriately for, respectively, the goal of seeing, pumping blood, or moving a body. He
argues that such goal-directed objects or processes must be more than accidental. Since the
only other known purposive objects or processes are created intentionally by human beings,
some type of intentional intelligent being must also be responsible for living teleological
systems. Aspects of this argument will be examined later, since some believe that non-
intentional causation is sufficient to explain life.
The purpose of this section is not simply to revisit the classic teleological debate, but
rather to examine the relationship between the anthropic universe and the teleological
argument. The case for divine design at the basic level of governing universal laws behind
the big bang and anthropic fine-tuning has already been made. In the anthropic principle, the
cosmological argument shades into the teleological argument; this may be stated thus: God
has designed the universe to make life and consciousnesspossible. This also implies
purpose', it is a divine purpose for the universe to produce life and consciousness. Notice
that this initial apprehension of design is independent of anthropocentric bias, in that
conditions are defined in terms of 'fitness for life' rather than fitness for human life.72 There
may be other purposes, but the apparent anthropic design suggests that the production of
conscious life is at least one such purpose.73 The anthropic principle is therefore coherent
with a teleological view of reality. The question is whether or not design exists at other
70 B. Davies, Philosophy ofReligion, 94, 109, 114.
71 William Paley, Paley's Natural theology: or, Evidences of the Existence andAttributes ofthe Deity,
Collectedfrom the Appearances ofNature (London: R. Faulder, 1803), 1.
72 See Neil A. Manson, 'Anthropocentrism and the design argument', Religious Studies 36 (2000),
175.
73 K. Ward says, 'Every new scientific demonstration of the precision of the mathematical structure
needed to produce conscious life is evidence of design'.... Even the process of entropy has 'a very
clear purpose'. God, Chance & Necessity (Oxford: Oneworld, 1996), 52.
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levels in the universe, ordering its unfolding at atomic, stellar, galactic, planetary, molecular,
living, and ultimately neuronal levels. In short, is there evidence of teleology in those levels
of cosmic evolution most closely associated with human existence? Is such 'further up'
teleology coherent with the scientific evidence, and metaphysically sound?
At one level, the answer seems obvious, since it is clear that universal anthropic laws
and conditions are in operation at every level, enabling the increasing complexity that leads
from the simplest sub-atomic structure to the most complex object in the universe: the
human brain. But not everyone agrees the logic can be thus extended. Two problematic
aspects of cosmic evolution will be examined for possible evidence of design: first, the
unique boundary conditions for life on Earth; and second, the local evolution of life. Can a
reasonable case be made for a teleological reading of all natural processes, including those
leading to human existence? It will be argued that such a position is reasonable, that human
existence cannot be regarded as accidental or arbitrary in the ultimate sense, and that
'scientific' claims to the contrary are metaphysical rather than scientific. This is not an effort
to redo something like Teilhard's evolutionary Christology, but is rather less ambitious: to
examine whether the scientific evidence is consistent with a teleological view of reality.
7.3.2. Teleology and the 'rare Earth' hypothesis
How far 'up' in cosmic processes does design extend? Classically, the anthropic
principle has focused on the initial conditions of the universe necessary for the rise of
conscious life. The initial conditions are not the only necessary conditions, as the rare Earth
hypothesis investigated in chapter 6 makes clear. Ward & Brownlee, Conway Morris,
Martin Rees and others note that without those special 'rare Earth' conditions, higher life
could never have evolved on Earth, or, for that matter, anywhere else.74 These local
conditions might or might not be the inevitable results of cosmic processes.
Do the rare Earth conditions have any teleological meaning? While it is logical to
conclude that God designed the universe's global fine-tuning, this is not necessarily true of
Earth's fine-tuning. Taken in isolation, the local situation might be the result of a cosmic
dice game, since there are billions of galaxies, and within each, billions of stars. In Leslie's
terms, there may be a sufficiently large selection pool for the selection of a 'rare Earth' to be
attributed to chance.
There are some who argue for a goal-directed process as the best explanation for
74 P. Ward & Brownlee, Rare Earth, Conway Morris, Life's Solution-, Martin Rees, Our universe: the
tenth Leverhulme Memorial Lecture (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), 9; Gribbin &
Rees, Cosmic Coincidences, 289-291.
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Earth's success in producing rational beings. For instance, Keith Ward believes natural
selection could not accomplish the goal by itself. "A continuing causal activity ofGod
seems the best explanation of the progress towards greater consciousness and intentionality
that one sees in the actual course of evolution of life on earth."75 Rolston agrees, believing
Earth's situation and living complexity is powerfully suggestive of a special focus of divine
inspiration.76
Christopher Southgate et al argues that there is no parallel possible between local
and universal fine-tuning, and that Ward has 'overestimated our knowledge of the
probability,' as well as misunderstood it. 'Evolution had to give rise to some outcome or
other', and since the experiment has only run once that we know of, we cannot make further
extrapolations about local divine activity.77 While Southgate is dubious about what can be
learned from the 'one experiment', the local constraints illuminate many boundaries that
must apply for life to exist anywhere in the cosmos. These include sufficient gravity,
atmosphere, chemical composition, molten iron core, magnetic field, lunar tidal forces, solar
radiation, orbital regularity, planetary companions, inter-galactic location, etc. It is debatable
in light of these data that the evolution of life will even begin in most parts of the universe,
much less proceed very far beyond beginning. Further, the contention that evolution must
'give rise to some outcome or other' is also debatable, especially since most of the almost
four billion years of life's history on Earth have shown stasis in evolution in the form of
simple bacteria (§6.4.3). This does not disprove the one-in-a-billion-billion prize draw
approach to Earth's success at the game, but neither does it disprove Ward's position.
The nature of God's ongoing causative role in cosmic evolution is part of the issue.
While many consider that God must have built both chance and natural law into the cosmos
to allow it the type of freedom and creativity needed for life to arise, perspectives on God's
further causative role vary.78 Peacocke, Page, Rudolf B. Brun, and others believe God gives
possibility and freedom to cosmic evolution, but is not otherwise involved beyond holding it
in being.79 Earth's situation is a fortuitous outcome of closed cosmic processes, and the
particular form human beings have taken is so highly contingent that they could have turned
75
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out any number of ways.80
Others oppose this view of 'creation as abandonment', to borrow a phrase from
Simone Weil.81 Joseph Ratzinger insists, 'a mere "first cause," which is effective only in
nature and never reveals itself to humans, which abandons humans - has to abandon them -
to a realm completely beyond its own sphere of influence, such a first cause is no longer God
but a scientific hypothesis'.82 Rolston and K. Ward think the billion-billions-odd chances
against human life make local inspiration more likely. These thinkers generally suppose that
while God has limited his interference out of love, this would not be contrary to some types
of divine intervention. Polkinghome, who seems ambivalent but not unfavorable to the idea
of local divine intervention, observes that it might be in ways that 'would be scientifically
indiscernible'.83 Rolston agrees that detecting or limiting God's causative influence upon the
universe is beyond the capacity of science: 'chance is an effective mask for the divine
action'. Thus if the rare Earth conditions involve a more direct form of divine guidance,
there is no reason to expect such guidance will be evident scientifically.84 From a
theological perspective, beyond creation, God's intervention in the history of Israel and Jesus
Christ give precedent for his intervention at other points in the process. Ward and Rolston's
contention is therefore reasonable and coherent with the current scientific data, though
empirically unverifiable.
For purposes of teleology, do we need to choose sides on this question of causation?
What if the local conditions are a purely contingent outcome of the universal conditions and
Earth has won the cosmic lottery? Does God's hand have to be actively involved in the local
conditions for these to be understood as teleological? Even if chance is operating from one
perspective, it cannot be said to operate from the ultimate perspective. Pannenberg's
observation on the connection between the large and small-scale structures of the universe is
illuminating.83 There is every reason to see a correlation between the universal and local
contingencies of nature required for life and particularly human life to have emerged. The
universal and local cannot be isolated from each other, since the former conditions the latter.
At the very least, Earth's conditions are the particular expression of the general potentiality
of the universe. Put another way, the structure ofthe universe is evident both universally
and locally. That matter can move from sequentially lower to higher levels of complexity,
80 This position does not seem entirely coherent, since all three believe in the resurrection, which
clearly represents profound intervention by God.
81 Simone Weil, La Connaissance Surnaturelle (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), 49.
82
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from subatomic organization ultimately to the most complex object in the universe, is
possible because of the same universal laws that govern the entire set. From a teleological
perspective, it is artificial to separate the two domains. If God is responsible for the
cosmos' general structure and fine-tuning, then he is responsible for that structure at all
levels.
7.3.3. Teleology in the evolution oflife on Earth
There are divergent views on the theoretical probability and meaning ofevolution, as
discussed in section §6.4.2. Some, like Monod and Mayr, see life and intelligence on Earth
as incredibly improbable accidents.86 Monod is convinced there is no God overseeing the
process. Rolston and Deacon suspect that humans with their unusual intelligence, having
appeared only once in the evolutionary history of the billions of species to have lived on
Earth, are not the trend, but the exception.87 Deacon believes only mistaken teleology makes
human existence look inevitable, while Rolston perceives divine inspiration in the process.
De Duve takes evolution toward human-like complexity as likely given our current
knowledge ('the biosphere was pregnant with man') and is ready to see the divine in the
evolutionary scheme even without intervention.88
Paley's design argument provides a useful reference point for a teleological
assessment of evolution in light of these divergent interpretations. According to Paley,
living systems show an orderly, purposeful complexity that can only be explained by
intelligent agency. Dawkins insists that non-intentional Darwinian processes can account for
living purpose-manifesting systems. Like Monod, who insisted an essential quality of living
beings was their endowment with a purpose orproject*9, Dawkins does not dispute the
appearance of design in the systems - they do function with limited goals bounded by
evolutionary and environmental constraints - but insists that purely natural forces - random
mutation and natural selection - have worked together over vast amounts of time to produce
these purposive systems. Since he thinks he has shown that living systems appear purposive,
but not intentionally so, he claims that there is no ultimate divine design or purpose behind
their appearance, and hence no need for God.90
Dawkins also claims that a truly intentional and intelligent designer would have done
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things differently in the history of life, appealing to aesthetics. These arguments are less
convincing because they are too open to subjectivist charges. Southgate notes that horror
before the spectacle of animal activities such as parasitism and infanticide is 'a negative
aesthetic response in us', but doubts whether this is a greater burden to theodicies than the
general presence of pain and death in the world. Our aesthetic perspectives are by nature
particular and limited. "Horror is part of some human beings' reaction to the process but is
not part of the process itself."91 Michael J. Behe also notes that what appears to some to be
dysteleology or poor engineering may turn out on closer examination to be engineering for
higher-level efficiency or a solution to an unrecognized or generalist problem (fingers are
suited for many general problems, though perhaps not ideally suited for every particular
problem - cutting paper, for instance).92 Behe observes that the dismissal of so-called 'junk
DNA' as non-functional and redundant may really be premature, based on an inadequate
understanding of the natural processes. One example: recent research by Shinji Hirotsune, et
al, has shown a previously unknown function for genes formerly labeled 'pseudogenes'.
"The peril of negative arguments is that they may rest on our lack of knowledge, rather than
on positive results. The contention that unintelligent processes can account for complex
biological functions should, to the extent possible, be supported by positive results, rather
than by intuitions ofwhat no designer would do. Hirotsune et al's work.. .has forcefully
shown that our intuitions about what is functionless in biology are not to be trusted."93
Even without emotional, aesthetic, or intuitive judgments on the suitability of
particular designs, the heart ofDawkins argument remains. He claims natural processes
imitate intentionality in the production of purpose in living systems. Eyes are made to see,
and muscles are made to move by the interaction of chance and relentless natural laws. Like
Dawkins, both Dennett and E. O. Wilson believe the evolutionary rise of life is a result of
'mindless, motiveless mechanicity'.94 Natural laws represent, according to Dennett,
mindless activity 'all the way down' in cosmic processes. Do such natural explanations
effectively eliminate the need for God?
The question may be phrased in terms of the problem of information. Monod noted
that living structures 'represent a considerable quantity of information whose source has still
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to be identified: for all expressed - and hence received - information presupposes a
source'.95 The mystery is to explain the increase of information, not only in the fine-tuning
of the universe, but also in the entire process of evolution. The development of life on Earth
represents information's vast and continual increase, particularly evident in the increasing
complexity ofDNA in species over geological time. Some suppose that information can
increase based on the interplay of chance and natural law. Others believe only intelligent
agents can account for information.
Stuart Kaufmann suggests that laws of emergent complexity are responsible for the
presence and vast increase of information. He speculates that these laws, analogous to those
governing crystal formation or water flow, are responsible for the ways in which DNA has
mutated into new species patterns during the course of evolution. Chaos theory already hints
at a type of order that arises in the midst of apparently chaotic systems. Perhaps the chaos of
genetic mutation is also bounded by such order, leading to the emergent complexity of
speciation.96 Such laws are thought to obviate the necessity ofGod: shades ofDawkins,
Dennett, and Wilson.
The increase of information suggests to others the presence of 'mind' rather than
mindless chaos. Freeman Dyson believes that 'the peculiar harmony between the structure
of the universe and the needs of life and intelligence is a ... manifestation of the importance
ofmind in the scheme of things'.97 Evolutionary information seems to Rolston to be as
'plausibly .. .mindlike as mindless mechanicity'. He believes Earth may represent a special
focus of mind: 'An "information explosion" on our Earth, rare in the universe, might be a
clue that "inspiration" is taking place'.98 Proponents of intelligent design (ID) theory like
Behe and William Dembski suggest that it is precisely from the existence of so much
information on Earth that we can infer an intelligent designer. In ID theory, 'specified' or
'irreducible' complexity is given a formal and technical definition based on information
theory. DNA, like letters, words, and language, is a repository of information, and often
produces results that are irreducibly complex (e.g., blood-clotting, cellular molecular
machines).99 Such information is found to increase in the rest of the world only with
reference to intelligent intentional agents, so its presence and increase in living systems
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suggests to ID theorists the analogous influence of intelligence.100
A third option combines both perspectives. De Duve, Peacocke, and others suppose
that laws of emergent complexity are in play, but the existence of these laws is coherent with
the idea of divine design.101 Their position points to the key issue for teleology, which is not
whether the causal intermediary step of natural Darwinian laws can explain teleological
systems, but can the natural laws themselves be explained without reference to intelligence.
While the results ofDarwinian processes may or may not evade the need for intelligent
causation, the laws governing those processes do not. Swinburne puts it like this: the world
may be a 'machine-making machine', but its ultimate machine-constructing capacity must
have a non-machine explanation.102 So Anthony Kenny observes that if the argument from
design in living systems works at all, it is not refuted by the Darwinian claims. "The
ultimate explanation of such adaptation must be found in intelligence; and if the argument is
correct, then any Darwinian success merely inserts an extra step between the phenomena to
be explained and their ultimate explanations."103 Penrose agrees that there may be teleology
behind phenomena like consciousness, but discussion of these 'in terms merely of the ideas
of natural selection would miss this purpose completely'.104
In other words, this is the same problem encountered with metaphysical explanations
to the anthropic principle. Why is there Order in the universe? Kaufmann's laws of
emergent complexity return us to these same arguments for the divine designer, since such
order also requires ontological explanation. The level at which that order is found extends
from the big bang and the anthropic fine-tuning all the way through cosmic evolution to the
human mind. Atkins sees in the laws of entropy only 'purposeless decay'.105 But K. Ward
notes that entropy is actually necessary to the temporal order of nature, and 'enables local
concentrations of energy to form the vastly complex and intricate structures needed to enable
consciousness to emerge'.106 Dawkins sees only natural laws at work, and Dennett claims
that the operation of these laws represents mindless activity 'all the way down' in cosmic
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processes.107 But it is the orderliness itself that demands explanation, and which these non-
theistic accounts are unable to provide. Unless one is content with 'assuming its
existence'108, the order of the universe evident 'all the way up' in cosmic processes is
unintelligible without reference to transcendence. As K. Ward observes, 'the whole history
of evolution seems superbly well designed to lead to the existence of consciousness. It is
designed, in other words, to lead to levels of explanation and reality beyond itself.109
Conway Morris agrees, noting that phenomena like convergent evolution (§6.4.2) show 'that
life "navigates" to inevitable solutions through a hyper-dimensional landscape [of functional
morphospace] that in itself determines the available routes'. Consistent with a Creation, he
thinks convergence indicates the final outcome is 'in some sense preordained'.110 It seems
the evolution of life on Earth, however it has taken place, is goal directed, and this is
coherent with mind, intention, and divine design. Such design warrants a teleological
reading of the process.
7.3.4. Conclusion
Brun suggests the term teleomorphic to describe a cosmos created with properties
that evolve naturally towards ever-greater complexity. The process is subject to chance and
contingency and free to become what it will, but the form of the process is the synthesis of
ever-greater complexity. This idea of 'chance and necessity' as the driving interplay of
increasing complexity is fairly common. Peacocke calls this the 'potentiality' of the cosmos,
which results in it having the property of 'emergent complexity'. Brun supposes the
'teleomorphy' is in the universal engineering towards complexity, towards 'sequential
synthesis', rather than in any specific details or interference. The evolutionary processes
show that 'there is an inherent drive towards complexity (notprogress/) in nature' (emphasis
added). Both he and Peacocke believe the universe is not predetermined towards a specific
outcome (so Brun claims it is not teleological), but is given freedom to develop towards
ever-greater complexity, finally sufficient to support reciprocal relationship with the
creator.111
Brun suggests that God's saving activity in Christ occurs in the midst of the free and
contingent cosmos, though there are some inconsistencies in his model. It is a paradox that
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the freely evolving universe enters a phase of history in Jesus Christ in which, despite the
world's freedom from God's interference, God's plan for the universe's salvation is exactly
fulfilled. The political and religious leaders execute the Son of God according to their own
free will, and at the same time fulfill God's greater will for the universe by enabling Jesus'
sacrificial death and triumphant resurrection, which promises to redeem the cosmos from
death (Acts 4:28 - they 'did whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take
place'). The same paradoxical perspective can be applied to the entire history of the cosmos.
The free teleomorphic history of the universe actually unfolds according to God's perfect
will, throughout the development of stars, galaxies, planets, life, conscious life, humanity,
human history, and climactically in the person and work of Jesus Christ.112 This reading of
the world's freedom is problematic: the resurrection looks like something very different from
'freedom from God's interference'. The leaders may enable the resurrection by killing
Jesus, but they certainly do not cause the resurrection.
Further, Brun's teleomorphy really is a form of teleology. If the universe is given
potential for 'emergent complexity' and has an in-built drive towards 'sequential synthesis',
such that an end goal of reciprocal relationship with the creator is eventually likely or even
possible, then the process is clearly a goal-oriented process. It is difficult to see how the
fulfillment of a 'drive towards complexity' in such a system is not progress. By definition, if
the design or 'teleomorphy' of the system is sequential synthesis, then the successful
appearance of increasing complexity is progress. The appearance of beings capable of
reciprocal relationship with God can hardly be thought of as a 'happy accident', an
unexpected but fortuitous outcome for an otherwise indifferent creator. It seems unlikely
that God, having designed the universe to make life and consciousness possible, perhaps by a
combination of chance and necessity or in 'teleomorphic' form, was then pleasantly
surprised to find it developing beings that are capable of relationship with him. The local
accidental occurs within the horizon of the planned, and so is not finally accidental.
The 'teleomorphic form' of the universe, even conceived in these deistic terms,
looks very much like a 'driving order'. Giving a system potential and placing within it a
drive for something is the equivalent of engineering and design. It evidences both purpose
(increasing complexity; support reciprocal relations with the creator), and regularity
(necessity; the interplay of chance and necessity, e.g., chaos theory): this is teleological in
the fullest sense. Deism has its own problems both theologically113 and scientifically114, but
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a teleological conclusion is warranted whether God has simply enabled the universal process
of sequential complexity, or has specifically engineered and/or intervened in the local
conditions and systems to make human life possible. This need not imply that emergent
consciousness and something like human existence is the only goal or purpose of the
creation, but it does imply that it is a goal of the creation.
The argument has tried to show that the best ontological explanation for the origin,
existence and fine-tuning of the universe, and for its consequent development in the direction
of organized complexity, is divine design. Further, purpose and teleology can be discerned
from some perspectives on the universal processes of cosmic evolution. For these reasons,
'naturalistic' accounts of local and cosmic evolution fail to defeat the argument from design.
This is so whether one prefers ID theory, laws of emergent or sequential complexity, or some
other as-yet-unnamed theory of life's genesis. The exact method whereby causation or
'inspiration' might be occurring is less important theologically than the realization that God
is ultimately responsible. Sagan, Dawkins, and Atkins have made ideological and
metaphysical rather than scientific claims that are not warranted by the evidence. Once the
structure of the anthropic universe is understood as designed, then even if the rise of life has
a local contingent and accidental character, it cannot be regarded as ultimately accidental,
since it is an expression ofGod's will for the increasing complexity of the cosmos. A
theological analysis may well conclude more, but a reasonable metaphysical position could
not conclude less.
7.4. Providence and Human Existence
Those who observe the amazing correlation between the order and intelligibility of
the universe and the order and rationality of human consciousness would appear to be seeing
not just a coincidence, but a possibility intrinsic to cosmic evolution, a potentiality that
theology can coherently hold was conceived by the Creator. So T. F. Torrance sees in the
'astonishingly improbable but effective laws' that make life possible in the cosmos 'the
hallmarks of a personal Author'. He supposes that human personhood that comprehends the
intelligibility of the cosmos is reflective of the personal God whose authorship is stamped
creaturehood and contingency are destroyed. He believes the deistic approach eviscerates the doctrine
ofprovidence (in his Creation and Providence (B&O, 1970), 203).
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upon nature.115 Pannenberg insists the scientific analysis leaves room for the truth revealed
by the incarnation, that humans are the goal of creation.116
That science 'leaves room' does not mean such inherently theological data as the
incarnation are 'scientific'. It does suggest, however, coherence between the two domains.
Science points to the metaphysical 'blank spaces' in its own perspective, for which theology
may give fuller ontological explanation.117 As Freeman Dyson puts it:
Being a scientist, trained in the habits of thought and language of the twentieth
century rather than the eighteenth, I do not claim that the architecture of the universe
proves the existence ofGod. I claim only that that [it] is consistent with the
hypothesis that mind plays an essential role in its functioning (emphasis added).ui
Science observes the boundary conditions of human existence and leaves considerable room
for theology to interpret these without violating the scientific data. The scientific review
could not evaluate the meaning of human existence, or prove that the universe was designed
for specifically human life. Nor does the evidence prove that human life is a cosmic
accident, or that the universe was not designed with specifically human life in mind. As
Peacocke observes, science cannot explain why there are cosmic laws, or anything else for
that matter.119 The fact that science is unable to decide whether biogenesis and human
existence are incredibly improbable or inevitable may point to such a 'blank space'. Only
metaphysical or theological explanations can give coherence to the existence and
intelligibility of reality, and explain the place of human beings within it.
As a te/eological statement, the verification of an anthropocentric universe is a
metaphysical task, but on that level, the data offered by science is suggestive. The anthropic
principle and processes of cosmic evolution show the whole universe structured to engender
increasing levels of complexity. The highest known level of such complexity is human
being. The theological analysis suggests that the best explanation for universal order and
complexity is the divine economy at work: God's providence guiding the cosmos towards
the minimally apparent goals of complexification [sic]120 and consciousness.121 So de Duve
maintains that the 'emergence of life and mind are such extraordinary manifestations that
their existence can only be a telling revelation of ultimate reality.' The human mind can, for
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the first time in at least this Earth's evolutionary history, see beyond the veil, 'to the reality
behind appearances;' it can perceive there not only the laws and structure ofmatter, but also
beauty, goodness, truth, and love. That ultimate reality is what 'many give the name of
God.'122
One can maintain this providential care regardless of one's position on God's
ongoing causative relationship to creation. The history of creation leads to the fulfillment of
God's will. This is so even when some of that will is accomplished through the medium of
other processes (teleomorphic ones) and persons (the leaders who crucify Christ). In
theological perspective, the human climax of 'complexification' is capable of a unique type
of relationship with God, so that in the human being Jesus Christ, God himself enters into
and unites the cosmos with himself. The process thus shows the divine economy at work
through the whole creation to bring forth the incarnation of the Logos.123
7.5. Conclusion
The scientific data of the big bang, the anthropic principle, and cosmic evolution are
coherent with the cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence ofGod. While
it is not the task of science to 'find' evidence of teleology, it does in its own indirect way
confirm the findings of theology. The development of the cosmos from its beginnings to the
present has manifested remarkable order, the propensity to develop in the direction of
sequential complexity, and the potentiality for and actualization of life. These features of the
cosmos are strongly suggestive of teleology. Science by its methods might be unable to
detect God's activity at a certain level, but could not circumscribe ultimate divine causation,
including such causation or inspiration on Earth. Debate on the nature ofGod's involvement
may continue on other grounds, but the scientific data does not exclude it as a possibility,
and might indirectly witness evidence of it in the universal and local anthropic conditions
and in the tendency towards sequential complexity. Theology may go further and describe
these data as the natural residual evidence of God's providence. What science describes as
the processes of cosmic evolution may in theological perspective be aspects of God's care
and guidance of the cosmos.
The concept of sequential complexity suggests a place of convergence between
theology and science. Science notices the end result of the sequential processes of cosmic
122
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evolution in the transcendentally oriented intelligence of human beings, who are oriented
towards unbounded possibilities and capable of a unique degree of freedom. Theology
observes that this species, as the pinnacle of complexity in the known universe, appears to be
capable of a unique degree of conscious relationship with the Creator: they open up towards
the infinite in their thoughts, their yearning, their experience, and in their responsible
worship. If specially created by God, humans can think of themselves in teleological terms.
But even ifhuman existence is an emergent result of non-predetermined natural processes,
these processes are also in theological perspective ultimately teleological. In this case,
human existence could be regarded as accidental only in a limited sense. Its providential
appearance would be an outcome of possibilities built into the cosmos by God the creator,
and therefore ultimately intentional and thus teleological. The doctrine of providence can
encompass either interpretation. If extra-terrestrial intelligent life were ever found, this
conclusion would still hold, but God's providential preparations would be shown to have
wider ranging scope than is currently evident.
Whether or not the universe has been designed to culminate simply in a conscious
being or in human being, it is in humans that the universe is finally prepared to relate to and
receive God's being. It is a theological datum of faith that the universe has been designed to
culminate in the incarnation, but the idea that humanity might be thus a goal of creation is
coherent with scientific discourse. Contemporary science observes the process and result of
sequential complexity in human nature, which observation is coherent with and perhaps even




Critical Anthropocentrism and Ecological Concerns
"His eye is on the sparrow, and I know He watches me. " — Civilla D. Martin'
8.1. Introduction
Does critical anthropocentrism give an adequate account ofNature and the animal
kingdom? Does an emphasis on the uniqueness and significance of human beings relegate
the non-human cosmos to secondary and almost trivial status? To many, it has seemed that
the kind of anthropocentrism represented in this thesis must automatically lead to the
disregard of animals and the non-human creation, the rape of nature, and ecological
catastrophe (see §2.3.2). While Judeo-Christian tradition insists the world is not divine,
opinions differ on whether this 'desacralises' the world. Hall insists the world is still sacred
in Christian faith because it is God's creation.2 But others insist Christianity turns the world
into an object, a 'back-drop for the human play', a view they believe is no longer tenable in
an era of ecological awareness.3 Others argue that sensitivity to the modem natural sciences
and a more penetrating examination ofChristian theology and tradition ought to lead us
away from any anthropocentric conclusions and elevate our regard for the non-human world.
This chapter seeks to provide a fuller engagement with the general critique of
anthropocentrism by those who are sensitive to some of the contemporary ecological and
ethical issues in the relationship between the human and non-human creation. Ruth Page and
Andrew Linzey provide a focal point for the analysis, as they present some substantial
objections to any anthropocentric account ofGod's relationship with creation. Page insists
that all of creation, not just humanity, praises its Creator.4 She also believes humans are not
necessary for communion between other creatures and their Creator.5 She regards the claim
for human cosmic priesthood as anthropocentric arrogance. Linzey rejects anthropocentric
theologies for their tendency to promote 'instrumentalist' views of animals. He attempts to
rescue Christian theology from such views and find alternatives within the tradition that
provide a basis for an ecologically sensitive ethics.6 While others have argued along similar
1 Civilla D. Martin, 'His Eye is on the Sparrow', (1905).
2 Hall, IGDS, 48.
3 Buller, UNHP, 151; Ian L. McHarg, 'The Place ofNature in the City of Man', in Western Man and
Environmental Ethics, 174.
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lines, Page and Linzey provide enough material to demonstrate that ecological and 'world-
centered' concerns do not necessarily defeat the claims of critical anthropocentrism.
Despite their assurances to the contrary, a type of anthropocentrism is still evident either
between the lines of their ideological program, or above and beyond their individual critique.
This analysis will suggest that critical anthropocentrism can interact with and remain
sensitive to ecological issues without surrendering its objective claims.
8.2. Ruth Page and the Cosmos' independence from humanity
8.2.1. Overview ofPage's position
If there is an anthropocentric reality at the heart of Christianity, is it inimical to the
good of the rest of creation? Page seems to believe this is the case. She has rightly pointed
out that the non-human creation already praises God without the help of humanity.7 This is
evident in numerous passages of Scripture, from Psalm 19, 'the heavens are telling the glory
ofGod', to Isaiah 55:12, 'the trees of the field shall clap their hands', to Revelation 5:13,
'Then I heard every creature in heaven and on earth and under the earth and in the sea, and
all that is in them, singing [praise to God]'. Russell Stannard agrees, pointing out that the
universe may have been created for other reasons - for God's simple enjoyment, for instance
- rather than simply to produce human beings. God may have created humans in order to
have someone with whom to share his sense of joy at creation; 'however, the angels could
equally well fit such a description of persons with whom to share creation, and Scripture
even testifies somewhere that they rejoiced together when God created'.8 If praise is not
unique to humanity, in what sense might the rest of creation actually depend upon humans
for its worship? Humanity cannot simply be affirmed at the expense of the other creatures,
nor can anthropocentrism be affirmed by denying God.9
On the other hand, God's relationship to humanity in grace through Jesus Christ
occasions an increase of that praise. This relationship is such that even 'angels long to look'
into it (1 Peter 1:12). A tremendous change will take place in the non-human creation's
praise in consequence of its relationship to humanity. The fact that the non-human creation
praises, and is important to and loved by God does nothing to change this. The rest of the
creation praises, but is subjected to frustration (Romans 8:20), groaning until the children of
7
Page, 'The Fellowship of all Creation', 5-6.
8
Stannard, The GodExperiment, 195.
9 'Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World', 216.
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God are revealed. It is in humanity that the frustration of all creation is satisfied and
fulfilled. To isolate the non-human creation's praise thus seems an unrealistic assessment of
the quality of its relationship to God apart from humanity.
Page also suggests that humanity should be demoted from its position of cosmic
priesthood. We are 'humans-come-lately' on the evolutionary scheme, and God had a
relationship with creatures prior to our arrival. Further, God and the animals were inter¬
related without us, and therefore humanity is not a necessary part of their communion with
God. Hence humans should not consider themselves to be priests of creation, and it is false
to hold that only humans can connect animals with God.10 Anthropocentrism should be
abandoned because we ought to celebrate the natural world's independence from humanity
under God, and express 'a fellow-feeling (rather than a management-feeling) for our fellow
creatures, since we are all part of the one creation'.11 Southgate also wonders whether a
theological focus upon the end result of creation in 'conscious reciprocal relationship with
God' can ultimately portray the other living creatures as anything more than 'means to the
divine end'.12 Richard Bauckham agrees with Page that the non-human creation has value
independently ofhuman beings.13 Peacocke concurs, insisting that we must 'escape our
anthropocentric myopia and affirm that God as Creator takes., .delight in the rich variety and
individuality of other organisms for their own sake'f The non-human creation cannot be
regarded simply as an appendage to human existence.
In order to provide a context for making sense of the non-human creation's
relationship to God, Page lays out a cosmology that circumscribes God's relationship with
creation. She holds that God has withdrawn from the evolutionary flow of the history of life
to enable possibility and freedom to the creation. God: 1) creates by granting possibility and
freedom; 2) accompanies all creation, not just humanity; and 3) God's presence is inherently
salvific, not just for humanity, but for all creation. This cosmology is thought to provide
further ammunition against the anthropocentrism 'so often criticized in traditional doctrine'.
She believes evolutionary theory demonstrates that God had nothing to do with the rise of
living creatures and ultimately humanity. She cannot accept that God would use a billions-
of-years process of continuously divinely directed evolution to create life, nor that as a
loving God he would allow mass extinctions such as occurred to the dinosaurs. She insists
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There are a number ofproblems in this cosmology. Page insists dinosaur extinction
refutes the active hand of a loving God, and as a natural evil poses too large a problem for
God's intervention in the world (theodicy). Page appears to be assigning an arbitrarily high
value to the dinosaurs (or other non-human creatures), and by maintaining an equality of
dinosaur and human worth has assumed what she is trying to prove (that dinosaur's or any
other fairly advanced creature's death is as evil as human death). She also interprets physical
death to be final and morally insurmountable, in contradistinction to much Christian teaching
on the greater importance of spiritual or eternal death. Jesus makes clear that it is not this
world's physical death we are to fear, but rather God, 'who is able to destroy both body and
soul in hell' (Luke 12:5); eternal damnation or spiritual death is what is to be dreaded.
For Page, physical suffering such as that experienced by the dinosaurs is supposed to
disprove that God's hand was actively involved in evolutionary processes, or could be
intentionally leading to the creation of humanity. But Mark Wynn points out that such views
of natural evil — fairly common in scientific polemics against the existence ofGod (e.g.,
Hume, Darwin, Gould, Crick) - fail to take into account the necessity of decay, predation
and pain as preconditions for various forms of flourishing. Such negative and contestable
human aesthetic value judgments on natural processes are examples of 'epistemic
anthropocentrism'. What is bad for humans may not be bad for the ecosystem as a whole.
An 'ecosystemic perspective' undermines the belief that natural evil is clumsy, cruel, or the
same as moral evil. A Christian account that combines an ecosystemic perspective with the
doctrine of the Fall and a Cross-centered redemption can answer this type of theodicy16, by
drawing a clear distinction between human moral and culpable evil and natural amoral
processes, and by offering a Creator who redeems his creation by entering into its suffering
and death on the cross and giving it life through the resurrection.
Page wants to distance herself from deism by the use of her concept of
'concurrence': God's withness orMitsein with creation: a type of ongoing mutual
relationship between God and the cosmos.17 But if anything, God's transcendence and
'otherness' from the creation are so emphasized in her view that God is effectively isolated
15
Page, 'AKKG, 6.
16 Mark Wynn, God and Goodness: A Natural Theological Perspective (London: Routledge, 1999),
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from his physical creatures. Clare Palmer calls this 'subdeism'.18 God is essentially a
spectator rather than an active participant in relationship to any part of the universe, since
otherwise he would be interfering with its 'freedom'. This type of isolationist deism is fairly
common in the science-theology dialogue. For instance, Brun insists God cannot interfere in
the process, even at the beginning, lest he interfere with freedom and become responsible for
evil.19 Peacocke talks about God's role as 'letting other be', and granting existence,
'freedom and possibility' to creation, but otherwise not interfering (and so also not
disappearing in the 'God of the gaps' problem).20 Polkinghorne calls this 'the free-process
defense': God allows freedom to the world to be, and supports it with love: he accords
natural processes respect in the same way he allows humans free will (Polkinghome does
make room for miracles).21
Whether or not this granting freedom/free process defense really works is debatable.
Leo Scheffczyk notes that the deist view of creation ultimately means that humanity 'is left
to itself in a world left to itself.22 At least as it appears in Page's position, this translates to
an essential problem for divine-creature relations. Southgate wonders how Page can talk of
God's encouragement and companionship with creation at the same time that God is isolated
from the cosmos.23 What does God's 'salvific presence' with creation mean when he has
completely withdrawn from the process and cannot interfere for freedom's sake? Freedom is
key in Page's model, but Gregersen wonders what benefit freedom is for non-human
creatures that have no ability to-accept or reject relationship with God?24 Further, Southgate
notes that Page's primary concern is to relieve the burden of theodicy, but even where only
the initiator, 'God is still responsible for the ontological aspect of the problem' - for the
existence of the world in which.. .suffering takes place'.25 How could creatures in her
version of history have any real type of communion with their absent Creator?
Page's use of freedom appears to conflate the type of intentional and moral freedom
available to human beings with the contingent 'freedom' of natural and biological processes.
While freedom of natural processes means indeterminism, Palmyre M.F. Oomen points out
that human freedom means 'self-determination': choice bound by one's own commitment.
18
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"That is why [human] freedom...clearly does not simply coincide with unpredictability'.26 A
rock crystal's growth or a DNA strand's mutation has no component of intentional or
relational freedom, no element ofmoral responsibility. To call contingency in natural
processes 'freedom', and then to judge this 'freedom' with the same standards applied to
human moral and relational capacity (or to impute that judgment to God) is to use a sliding
definition of freedom. God's respect of natural processes working inside of contingent
parameters is different from respect of human moral freedom in the same way that my
respect of a roulette wheel is different from my respect ofmy neighbor's personal
boundaries. One is indeterminate, non-personal, and amoral; the other is a matter of
intentional freedom and personal responsibility. God may or may not 'respect'
indeterminism. But to argue he must do so on the basis ofmoral equivalency is a non
sequitur.
Page believes that God shows no 'partiality either to humans or to animals, but
rather is equally open to all, at all times'.27 She also seems to assume the type of communion
between God and the animals in the past is static and can never be surpassed in the future. It
is true that humanity was not a necessary part of their past relationship with the Creator,
whatever that was. However, it is not clear that communion is the appropriate word to
describe her non-participatory God's relationship with any part of creation. In Christian
eschatological perspective, God's past and present relationship with creation is a shadow of
what it will be in the resurrection, and human beings are a necessary part of any future
communion with Creator. The wolf does not now lie down with the lamb, but one day it will
through the medium of human incarnate redemption. To be sure, this is eschatological
humanity, completed in Christ. But as such, humans are priests in the highest sense of the
word: making the difference between life and death for the rest of creation. Thus we are not
simply fellow creatures. Not only are we ofmuch more worth than the sparrows (Matt
10:31); we can take responsibility for the sparrows and their brethren, while they cannot.
The non-human cosmos is subjected to frustration, groaning until the children ofGod are
revealed. The liberation of the creation from its bondage to decay only takes place through
human and incarnate agency: through Jesus Christ. To deny this aspect of human destiny is
to be blind to what exactly we are in the Christian God's economy of salvation.
Further, Page wants to look to Jesus as some kind of divine revelation, and even
talks of the resurrection. But how ifhe exceeds other forms of God's self-revealing is there
not a human aspect to God's universal salvific work? Further, Jesus is for Page the
26
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incarnation of God 'because in his words and actions (his concurrence)' God's Mitsein
became visible and effective. Yet she insists that there is 'no special divine aspect' to his
being.28 This is the type of degree Christology critiqued by Gunton and others that
approaches Jesus only from below.29 One wonders from where Jesus got his amazing power
(e.g., to heal, deliver, confront) and righteousness, and how he was even able to rise from the
dead, without God acting in the cosmos - and in some very special ways - both in and for
Jesus. Page, Brun, and Peacocke all have God interfering in the cosmos in the life of Jesus,
at least in his resurrection, while insisting God cannot interfere with the cosmos for
freedom's sake.30
While Page claims her cosmology downgrades human significance, in fact her
isolation ofGod from creation makes the need for a 'local representative' ofGod in creation
all the more poignant. Humanity is the ideal candidate for a materially present image of the
Creator, with both transcendent and immanent capacities. This is what Zizioulas, Moltmann,
and others indicate is part of the meaning of the imago dei. There is no sharing on the part
of the non-human creation in God's mode of love or knowledge, or in God's mode of life,
until humanity in the incarnation bridges the gap. Without that bridge, the distance between
Creator and creation remains infinite in a way that Braine describes as 'incompatible with
friendship or any kind of companionship'.31 This is not to say that a level of relationship is
not present between God and animals, or between humans and animals. It is to acknowledge
that a new depth or level of friendship and companionship become possible with human
beings. For this reason Adam finds 'no suitable companion' among all the rest of the animal
kingdom in creation (Gen. 2:20; Hall says, 'in this creature the inarticulate (though never
silent) creation becomes articulate'.32). This rings tme not only of the interpersonal human
situation, emphasizing the unique quality of human relationships, but also of the human-
divine situation, especially as illuminated in the life of Jesus and his followers.33 Personhood
and personal relations only appear on the scene fully in human beings. At both the human
level and the God-human/God-creation level, relationships are stunted until the incarnation
and redemption. The history of the cosmos reveals stages of preparation in God's
relationship to the cosmos, leading up to the appearance of the Son in human flesh.
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Humanity's arrival in the cosmic drama is at 'just the right time' in God's plans (Romans
5:6), so that finally in Christ, communion with the whole creation becomes possible.
Zizioulas notes the type of freedom shared by the persons ofGod is shared in
measure by humanity, and thus in them by the rest of creation.34 This freedom and
independence is modeled upon the type of freedom the divine persons have in relationship to
each other in their unity. The incarnation decisively ties and extends this freedom to the
creation, as the creator becomes creature. Page would like to give to the creation a similar
freedom in the name of the freedoms of nature supposedly guaranteed by modem physics.
However, her version of God's interaction with natural law cannot maintain this freedom. If
the laws of physics are self-sustaining apart from God, and God's sole function is to preserve
or uphold the laws, then freedom must ultimately disappear, because the cosmos has no
possible real referent or connection to God's infinite life. Without that life, the cosmos is
doomed to finiteness rather than ultimate freedom. It cannot transcend its mortality. Death
is what finally undoes Page's argument: for death is everywhere clearly present and reigning
in the cosmos, and death is what ends the communion of the non-personal creation until
salvation comes in human form. Southgate thus wonders why Page's distant deistic God
'should be the object ofworship or the recipient of prayer', and maintains that her view is
'not a basis for a Christian theology of creation and involvement with the cosmos'.35
8.2.3. Conclusion
In conclusion, there appear to be significance problems in Page's cosmology. While
making what appears to be a deistic move to solve the problem of evil in the non-human
creation, God remains responsible for the ontological aspect of what Page believes is a
naturally 'evil' world. God is supposed to be 'with' the creation in companionship, but the
value of that companionship is questionable without any type of real personal relationship or
interaction between creature and Creator. She conflates moral freedom with natural process
indeterminism and contingency, and judges the two separate concepts as if they are one and
the same. In her thought, God's interaction with the cosmos is inconsistent, since God is
supposed to be unable to interfere with his creation, but does so decisively in the person and
work of Jesus Christ. Finally, and especially since she posits Christ as God's revelation, she
has failed to show that human beings do not have a central role in fulfilling the non-human
creation and in offering it real life-filled communion in Christ that has eternal dimensions.
34




8.3. Andrew Linzey in defense of animal rights
8.3.1. Overview ofLinzey's position
Andrew Linzey critiques aspects of Judeo-Christian tradition for its 'instrumentalist'
view of animals. He and Dan Cohn-Sherbok note that those in the West have been too
inclined to treat animals purely as objects for human use, and to disregard their moral status.
Scripture and religious tradition condoned the use of animals for food, for ritual sacrifice,
and for hard labor.36 Humans are prioritized ahead of the animals, and animal well-being is
subservient to human well-being. While the killing of animals is allowed in Scripture, the
murder of humans is forbidden and punishable by death, because 'in his own image God
made humankind' (Gen. 9:6). Even though death is inevitable after the human rebellion,
God clothes the first humans with animal skins, the first sacrifice of an animal's life to cover
the effects of human sin (Gen. 3:21).37 Though prior to the fall animals are not for food,
after the fall they are accepted as sacrificial substitutes and later as food 'destined to perish
with use' (Able - Gen 4:4; Noah - Gen. 8:20; Col. 2:22). Jesus encourages his disciples:
"Do not be afraid; you are ofmore value than many sparrows" (Matt. 10:31; Luke 12:7).
Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok also maintain that philosophers and theologians such as
Aristotle and Descartes, Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin demarcated characteristics
of'non-rationality, non-community and intellectual inferiority' in the animals, and gradually
defined them 'out of the moral picture'. Animals have been regarded as machines without
true sentience, moral capacity, soul, or ultimate worth, and as undeserving ofmoral status.
Their sufferings were irrelevant and they were to be used and experimented upon without
pity.38
Yet Linzey suggests that many Scriptures show that the animal kingdom does have
real value to God. From commands for animal compassion in the Torah (Leviticus 24:18,
21), to proverbs on the proper treatment of animals (Proverbs 12:10), to God's concern for
the cattle ofNineveh (Jonah 4:11), to his warning that the sacrifice of animals will be
regarded as just as reprehensible as the murder of a human (Isaiah 66:3), it is clear that God
36
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loves the non-human creatures of his creation. In the eschaton, the lion and lamb lie down
together, and little children will play with deadly serpents (Isaiah 11:6-8). Too often, God's
care for humans has eclipsed the basic truth that 'his eye is [also] on the sparrow'.39
Linzey insists the creation is endowed with what he calls theos-rights, borrowing a
concept from Dietrich Bonhoeffer intended solely for human affairs. Linzey says these
rights are given intrinsically to all creatures independent of animal relations to human
beings, because God is 'for' his creation, and the creation is for God. By reverencing
creation, we are reverencing God because of 'God's own rights in creation': true worship of
God entails respect for all of God's creatures.40 He insists that we must 'abandon our sharp,
sometimes arrogant, separation of humankind from nature'. Christ is Lord not just of and for
human beings, but of and for all creation.41 On the other hand, humans are the priestly
mediators of this divine prerogative. Linzey and Cohn Sherbok believe the positive strands
in the religious tradition, uplifting the status of animals and emphasizing their value and, for
Linzey, their implicit joining within the Eucharistic redemption of all things, even hint at the
possibility of their ultimate fellowship. The paradoxical scriptural perspectives are unified in
the redemption, when there will be life and peace between all creatures in heaven and earth.
Death comes to all creatures this side of the eschaton, but death's reign over all creatures is
likewise doomed in Christ.42 As a result of this reassessment of animal status in theology,
Linzey would like to do away with all instrumental use and mistreatment of animals, or at
least ofmammals, including their use as food and for experimentation.43
8.3.2. Critique
Deane-Drummond believes Linzey's logic is insufficiently rigorous, and maintains
his reading of both Aquinas and Descartes is simplistic and sometimes false.44 As a
caricature, it serves the critique of human abuse of animals, but is factually inaccurate.
Leahy notes some problems in Linzey's thought, ofwhich Linzey is himself aware. 1) There
seems to be a clear 'psychic hierarchy' in the Old Testament. 2) In the natural world,
animals kill and eat each other regularly for survival, so that Linzey notes 'to posit notions of
animal rights in a creation that hardly admits of them is theological fantasy'. 3) In the New
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Testament, Christ probably ate meat (e.g. paschal lambs), and certainly ate fish45, even in his
resurrected body (Luke 24:42). Linzey later attempts a more robust defense of rights
language, arguing 'the Christian tradition has historically inspired, if not pioneered, some
kinds of rights language'.46 Bauckham agrees that Jesus in his teaching and action valued
animals, but 'in principle.. .human beings are ofmore value'. Jesus elevates the worth of
animals in many of his stories and parables, but elevates humans even further.47 His diet and
use of the foal on Palm Sunday as a beast of burden demonstrate that non-human animals
also have divinely ordained servant roles in creation, which may include service to humans.
Perhaps the most severe criticism is leveled at Linzey's idea of human priestly
responsibility on behalf of non-human creatures (see §4.6.3. on similar in Zizioulas).
Bauckham critiques this as 'top-down' and 'anthropocentric'. He insists that there is not a
trace of such arrogance in the Scriptures, and rejects the idea that 'the rest of creation can
only be itself in relation to God' through 'human mediation'. He insists the
'anthropocentricity that treats humanity as the summit and goal of all things rose not from
the traditional Christian worldview, but from the Renaissance exaltation ofhumanity above
the angels and the Enlightenment rejection of both angels and God'. He insists that humans
only praise God together with the other creatures, and do not somehow enable their praise.48
Bauckham's case may be overstated in that the Scripture does, in fact, clearly elevate
humanity, especially in the incarnation (see §3.4.3.1; also Gen 1:28; Ps. 8:5, 139:13-14;
matt. 10:31).
Deane-Drummond agrees the top-down view as condescending. Animals are
together with humans in their mutual submission to God's natural law, so that some type of
theocentric focus must be maintained. Bauckham even suggests that the best thing humans
could do is to leave parts of nature alone, as 'wildernesses'. 'Creation praises God very well
without us', and it is to be valued by us as God values it for the way it glorifies God in
itself.49 Rolston agrees, noting the need for wilderness zones, not just rural and urban zones.
He believes it is morally naive and obsolete to continue 'living in a reference frame where
one species takes itself as absolute and values everything else relative to its utility'.50 With
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Gruen, we can agree there is no need to defend such 'pernicious anthropocentrism'.51
We have already seen Cobb's and S.R.L. Clark's critiques of the exaggeration of
human priestly responsibility in Zizioulas, which highlights the properly theocentric focus of
theology.52 Theology must recognize that God in Jesus Christ is the principle actor in
salvation, not the rest of the human race. As Isaiah prophesies: 'I looked, but there was no
helper; I stared, but there was no one to sustain me; so my own arm brought me victory'
(Isaiah 63:5). The place of humans in this scheme is grateful receptivity, not exaggerated
claims of self-importance.
8.3.3. A Middle Way
A middle position may be more reasonable than either excessive or abdicatory
claims for human cosmic priesthood. Michael Northcott notes that Judeo-Christian faith
does not focus on rights one way or the other, but upon duties and responsibilities, including
those of humans to their fellow creatures.53 On a mundane level, Linzey's focus on theos-
rights to effect a better treatment of non-human creatures highlights the inevitably
anthropocentric aspect of any effective ecological policy. Katherine V. Kortenkamp and
Colleen F. Moore note that on a practical level, anthropocentric ethics are as likely as
ecocentric ethics to promote pro-environmental responses in the ecologically sensitive.54
Tony Lunch and David Wells believe 'the 'non-anthropocentric' stream of environmental
ethics' is unable to provide moral motivation, because it disintegrates the foundation of
moral choice by removing the human distinctive. Assigning 'equal moral worth' to all
creatures leads to an ethical impasse, because it does not take human moral capacity
seriously. Such a leveling ethical principle is 'ecopathy', because it has destroyed its own
moral underpinnings. Whether or not this leads to the charge of 'human chauvinism' is
irrelevant, because it is humanity itself that is the 'fundamental modality of moral concern'.
Rejection ofmoral justification on the basis of 'special relationship' (e.g., a human rescuing
a fellow human from an attacking predator) is a refusal of the moral, 'rather than a demand
for its purification'. Lunch and Wells suggest 'aesthetic reverence' is a more stable platform
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upon which to defend the environment than such anti-anthropocentric ethics.55
Since the ascription of significant moral status and value to animals is only
meaningful to and for humans, the attempt to evade 'anthropocentric condescension' ends up
highlighting uniquely human capacities and responsibilities. Page agrees, noting 'those who
plead for animal rights are appealing precisely to the moral conscience and the intelligence
of human beings concerning animals who lack these superior features'.56 Ariansen concurs
that even among the animal rights activists, all 'positions agree that only humans can take on
moral responsibility and that inter-animal action does not trigger morality at all'.57 As
Deane-Drummond notes, recognizing that all rights come from God does not diminish
human responsibility, because only humans have the rational power to understand and obey
God's commands, to discuss and implement natural law rather than just being subject to it.58
While humans are incapable of ultimately saving the cosmos, and may even
contribute to earth's destruction, nevertheless, they alone are capable of consciously
cooperating in the at-least partial mediation of God's love and care for the earth. Cosmic
priesthood may find its actual realization and fulfillment only in Jesus Christ, but the church
is his body on the Earth, and shares that priesthood in some measure as it calls people
everywhere to repentance and responsibility.
8.4. Conclusion
In theological perspective, humans must beware of exaggerating their own place in
creation, or of valuing nature only relative to themselves, rather than to God. Creation's
praise of God is independent of humans. Indeed, some of God's greatest 'human' praise is
only passively expressed: God's glory is revealed in them because they are the recipients of
his gracious love.
Yet efforts to eliminate anthropocentrism from practical solutions to the ecological
crisis and evaluations of the worth of the non-human creation seem to ignore some
fundamental realities of the human situation vis-a-vis the world. The non-human creation's
moral status is fundamentally an anthropocentric reality, ascribed by humans, though this is
55
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not incompatible with a more basic theological reality: all worth comes from God.
It might seem that Pannenberg, Rahner, and Zizioulas' treatment of human nature
and personhood gives inadequate moral status to animals. However, their incarnational
perspective on human service to God and creation, and their similar approach to cosmic
redemption actually provides a fuller foundation upon which the insights on positive animal
status may be grounded. Pannenberg highlights stewardship as a feature of human God-
given dominion in creation, properly imaged in the life and ministry of Jesus Christ. For
Rahner, the human realization of God in Christ is a realization ofservanthood on behalf of
the entire cosmos. Stewardship is the natural conclusion. Similarly, in Zizioulas' vision,
humans are the agent for the redemption of the cosmos in the person of Christ and in the
corporate Church, not the sole purpose for its redemption.
Not every aspect of their theological approach can be fully substantiated - e.g.,
exaggerated claims for human cosmic priesthood. Yet there need be no necessary conflict
between one goal ofGod's creative processes being something like human beings, and the
independent worth of the non-human creation. While humans have a call to mediate God's
will towards the Earth in more elaborate fashion than other creatures (we are not just to 'be
fruitful andmultiply', but are to 'have dominion' and 'subdue the earth': Gen 1:22, 28),
theology's essential anthropocentric claim in regard to the environment is the incarnation,
since in Christ, humanity guarantees the ultimate life of the rest of creation. Only because
Jesus is human, and the agent of God's cosmic salvation, can the theologian insist a measure
of anthropocentrism is appropriate in light of final ecological concerns and issues. In the
meantime, theology can highlight humanity's ongoing responsibility before God for the
animals, the earth and its ecosystems.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion: The Anthropocentric Cosmos
"What are human beings that you are mindful of them, mortals that you carefor
them? Yet you have made them a little lower than God, and crowned them with
glory and honor. " - Psalm 8:4-5
9.1. Restatement of Thesis
This thesis has proposed that human beings are of vital significance in the cosmos,
and that this significance is visible to both theology and science, in respectively different
though coherent ways. While modem science is supposed to have made the medieval
worldview ofhumanity at the center of the universe obsolete, a modem variation of that
medieval perspective is in fact still valid. While not every form of anthropocentrism is
defensible, such as those centered on human perspective, arrogance, prejudice, or
prioritization, critical anthropocentrism can be defended. It avoids the scientific naivete of
the pre-Copernican vision and certain other excesses and errors, but concludes that humans
are of key cosmic significance. The theological investigation shows that contemporary
Trinitarian and ecumenical theology, as represented by Pannenberg, Rahner, and Zizioulas,
continues to be deeply and irrevocably anthropocentric. This commitment emerges from the
doctrines of the imago dei and the incarnation. The natural sciences agree that humans are
unique and cosmically significant, especially as the unique human mind is seen to be a result
of cosmic evolution. Ecological concerns do not destroy the viability of the position and can
be encompassed within it. With provisos, critical anthropocentrism is valid both
theologically and scientifically. Human beings are cosmically significant as part ofGod's
holistic plan in Christ for the salvation of the cosmos, and this is coherent with contemporary
scientific thought.
9.2. The Theological Perspective
Recall the theological problems posed at the beginning. Is the Sabbath better
understood as the crown of creation rather than humanity? Is the image ofGod to be found
elsewhere than in unified human nature, perhaps in the human mind or in Nature? Is the
revelation of God in Christ just about our local human needs, or does it have larger scope?
Could extraterrestrial sentient creatures also 'image' God, and be in need of their own
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incarnation for salvation? Does the contemporary setting of theology and science really
destroy teleology? Is humanity just an artifact of nature, or is there evidence of providence
in its existence?
This study has shown that Pannenberg, Rahner, and Zizioulas each wrestles with the
subject of human nature in Trinitarian and incamational perspective, and each is sensitive to
related issues in the natural sciences. In turn, their thought answers some of these key
questions. Their position can be summarized as follows:
9.2.1. Wolfhart Pannenberg
According to Pannenberg, God has created the universe with the incarnation as its
chief goal and crown. The history of the universe is focused towards incarnation, and comes
to fruition in Jesus Christ. His resurrection confirms that he is Son ofGod incarnate. He
legitimizes the creaturely independence of reality from God, and is the model for creation's
dependence upon God. In his incarnate union with creation, Jesus is the means for the
cosmos to transcend its mortality, which will be realized in the eschaton. In light of the
incarnation, Pannenberg declares that 'we humans can be called the goal of creation'. In this
incarnational perspective, the history of the universe is 'a prehistory to the coming of
humanity'.1
The significance of the image ofGod in humanity, most fully realized in the
incarnate Jesus, is that it represents God's self in the cosmos. Though God is a mystery,
when he once and forever unites with his creation, it is as a human being. Thus with Barth,
the incarnation allows us to assert the humanity of God.2 As such, human nature as the
imago dei can only be understood holistically, in light ofChrist's own life. Humanity
represents God to the cosmos, and the cosmos to God. While the Sabbath rest may image
the completion of creation with God himself, humans are an essential part of that
completion. 'The destiny of all creation is at stake', because the whole creation waits 'for
the manifestation of divine sonship in the human race'.3 Only then will the corruptibility of
all creation end. Thus humanity is the key to the cosmos' salvation. Representing realist
Protestant Trinitarian theology, Pannenberg's thought, centered on the 'human-divine









For Rahner, human transcendentality and the incarnation give humanity crucial
cosmic importance. In them God has become incarnate into his creation once and for all
time. Human nature alone is ready and adoptable to become God in Christ, because it alone
is indefinable 'without transcendence.' Humanity is the material creature that transcends the
material cosmos, and who can be regarded - as both a material and spiritual being - as the
'goal of nature'. The incarnation shows that ontologically, transcendent causality has guided
the creation and evolutionary processes towards their human end from the very beginning.
The scientist may not admit this teleological and theological conclusion, but must admit the
distinctiveness of the end result of the natural processes in the rational consciousness of
humanity.
Rahner also believes that in humanity, properly located within the life of God in
Christ, the cosmos finds 'final consummation.'4 Thus humanity is of vital cosmic
significance. Human nature and the incarnation, as aspects of the life of the Triune God
occurring in and for cosmic destiny, confirm an anthropocentric universe. Rahner
sometimes seems open to de-anthropocentrizing possibilities, like extra-terrestrials and
multiple incarnations. However, theology seems unlikely at present to need to adapt to these
speculative possibilities. Rahner's overall program, representative of post Vatican II Roman
Catholic theology, remains in its human transcendent and incarnational focus deeply
anthropocentric.
9.2.3. John Zizioulas
For Zizioulas', humanity is unique in creation because it is the image of the Triune
God. Humans alone of all creatures are created as persons, modeled after God's
personhood, and capable of theosis - the Orthodox concept of potentially being made into
the likeness ofGod in Christ. Only humans are capable of transcending the given law-bound
nature of the cosmos in freedom, creativity, and love. As the imago dei, human nature is not
to be understood in substantive terms, but only in relation to God. Because of the person and
work ofChrist, humanity is offered a share in divine personhood, to be fulfilled
eschatologically. The cosmos is prepared from its foundations for the incarnation, so that
humanity is the fulcrum that unites the nature of God with the cosmos. Christ, in whom the




God is present rather than absent.
God's divine life is extended through redeemed humanity, his corporate body the
church, so that they become 'the very core and nucleus of the destiny of the world'.
Ecclesial humanity is priest in Christ for the creation, representing the cosmos to God and
God to the cosmos, bringing the two into communion. The hope of the universe rests upon
them because only in them will it gain immortality. So Zizioulas says, "Man.. .is the only
being responsible for the fate of creation."5 Insofar as he represents the Orthodox Christian
Tradition, that stream of Christianity remains deeply anthropocentric, correlating divine and
human personhood at the center of cosmic history.
9.2.4. Conclusion
Having critically considered Pannenberg's, Rahner's, and Zizioulas' thought on the
imago dei and the incarnation, and the interaction of their ideas with many other
theologians, a general theological position on human significance in the cosmos may now be
framed. The two doctrines work together to reveal, in a perspective that spans the work of
God across cosmic history, that humanity is made in and as the image of God, and that this
image finds its restoration, culmination and fulfillment in the incarnation of God in Jesus
Christ, the perfect image of God. Pannenberg, Rahner, and Zizioulas all agree on the
preeminent distinction revealed by the incarnation for humanity - of all creatures, only it was
prepared for and then did receive very God into its flesh and blood existence.
From this foundational understanding of the full imago dei, several things may be
inferred about human significance. Humanity is God's chosen vessel in the cosmos for most
clearly and openly revealing himself. While potentially present in created human nature, the
fullness of the image is only realized in the incarnate Christ. He reveals God's self to the
whole creation once and for all time in human form. It is humanity's role in the cosmos to
receive this incarnate union between creation and Creator, to reveal the transcendent God in
the created cosmos. For this reason, humanity can be called the goal of creation; in
incarnational perspective, the history of the universe is a 'prehistory' to the coming of
humanity.
Humanity is also vital to the universe's fulfillment. Human beings are God's
covenant partners, representing the entire cosmos. In them, the cosmos becomes conscious
of itself, conscious of God, and finally one with God. In Christ, humans are priest to and for
the cosmos. The destiny of creation is fulfilled through humanity's relationship to God in
5
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Christ. The whole creation waits — even longs - for the revealing of the children of God in
the human race, for only then will its mortality and corruptibility end. This focus on
humanity has limits, especially as only God can finally save the world, and humans are liable
by themselves to destroy it. However, it is the union of Christ with humanity that gives the
Cosmos its ultimate future, when its consummation at the wedding feast is eschatologically
realized. In that union, the cosmos will be liberated from its frustration and bondage to
decay, and brought into the glorious liberty of the children of God.
While nuances of approach are evident in these three ecumenical theologians, their
position, insofar as it is representative of Christianity in general, suggests that incarnational
and Trinitarian theology is intrinsically human centered. Humanity is the representative and
image of God, the focal point ofGod's fulfillment of cosmic history in the incarnation,
realizing in Trinitarian fellowship a goal of creation (there may be other goals), and acting as
the key upon which the redemption of nature depends. This significance can only be
understood within a properly theocentric horizon. All this shows that an anthropocentric
focus is more than just a passing feature of contemporary ecumenical theology. It is
embedded in its deep structure, part of its warp and woof, the inevitable result of Trinitarian
and incamational thought. Christianity believes humanity is at the heart of cosmic destiny in
Christ.
9.3. The Scientific Perspective
Recall the scientific questions and problems posed at the beginning. Does modem
science prove that foundational features of theology like incarnation and resurrection are
unreal? Is reductionistic naturalism the ultimate rationality it claims to be, so that human
significance is purely metaphorical or symbolic? Has science eliminated the absolute barrier
separating humans from the non-human creation? Does it prove that humans are only
different in degree from animals? Has it proved that humans are nowhere near the 'center of
the universe', either physically or metaphorically? Does it really destroy the belief that
God's providence has led to human existence, and show that human beings are a cosmic
triviality? Is bad anthropocentric theology at the root of the ecological problem? Is the
theological portrait of humanity just fluff on top of'what we know to be true' from science?
While science by definition is unable to answer 'meaning' type questions, the
analysis suggests that science nevertheless sees human beings as unique and significant.
This becomes clear not so much in light of the specifics of human origins, or a full scientific
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definition of the human person, as in what science sees as unique about human existence and
nature. Despite being unable to determine humanity's geographical place in the universe,
the evidence suggests some non-geographical ways of describing human significance.
Science supports at least three inter-related senses in which human beings are of central
significance on the cosmic stage. 1) The human mind is unique among all types of known
and speculative minds. 2) Humanity is the pinnacle of complexity in the known universe -
the final and highest result of the universal processes of sequential complexity. Finally, 3)
science reveals a universe in which Earth, and hence humanity, is likely to be extremely rare,
possibly one-of-a-kind. All these features are visible to science.
9.3.1. The boundary ofscience with theology
The collapse of foundationalism has shown that the materialistic naturalism of the
scientific method cannot claim epistemic hegemony in the theological realm: science cannot
describe the whole of reality. The revelation of religion is therefore not reducible to or
understandable in terms of the naturalistic method of science. It can say nothing about
events like the incarnation and resurrection. In this sense, theology is independent of
science, and yet may still say true things about physical and spiritual reality. Discovering
coherence between the two disciplines on the thesis of critical anthropocentrism helps
bolster its validity, and shows that it is more than just a metaphorical truth that is only useful
within a limited theological rationality.
9.3.2. Non-human intelligence
Does non-human intelligence cast doubt on human uniqueness? While it is true that
modern science has closed some of the gap separating human beings from other creatures, it
has also illuminated how wide and fixed the gap remains, and how truly unique the human
mind is. The fact that no kind of linguistic mastery ever arises in other animals' natural
condition, is difficult at best to inculcate, and never reaches the level sufficient for moral
reasoning, indicates the deep gulf between human and non-human intelligence. Only with
anatomically modern humans does the record show a sudden and massive mental explosion.
With our symbolically structured minds, human language supports a host of other uniquely
human characteristics, including art, culture, religion, moral reasoning, and responsible
interpersonal relationships. If this is what we mean by personhood (and this would seem to
be a minimalist definition), then science agrees that in all the animal kingdom, only human
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beings are truly persons. Human symbolic reasoning, language, moral-relational capacity,
and spiritual awareness are not even potentially present in other material creatures. Thus the
claim of human uniqueness appears to be coherent with the current state of scientific
knowledge.
Humans appear to be unique not only on the Earth, but also in the cosmos as a
whole. Artificial intelligence is unlikely to copy human nature anytime soon; in fact, it may
be impossible both practically and theoretically to establish true human-like self-
consciousness and volition in a machine. Extraterrestrial intelligence also appears unlikely
to challenge human uniqueness. Although it may not be theoretically impossible -
depending on one's position on evolutionary inevitability — ETI may be statistically
improbable, especially in light of the rarity of Earth's bio-friendly environment. Until
concrete evidence emerges of higher life in other solar systems, it seems prudent to remain
skeptical about its existence, and prudent to resist wholesale changes to our theology based
on speculation.
9.3.3. Cosmic Evolution, Human Existence, and Providence
Because the very existence of science depends on an orderly and intelligible
universe, science is rooted in metaphysics. The scientific data of the big bang, the anthropic
conditions, and cosmic evolution, have revitalized the cosmological argument. Other
explanations for cosmic order, such as multiple universes, lucky chance, or brute fact, fail to
have the same logical weight as the transcendent solution, so the best explanation seems to
be divine design. The development of the cosmos from its beginnings to the present has
manifested remarkable order, the potentiality for and actualization of life, and the propensity
to develop in the direction of sequential complexity. These features of the cosmos are
strongly suggestive of teleology. Science by its methods might be unable to detect God's
activity at a certain level, but could not circumscribe it, including such causation or
inspiration on Earth. What science describes in the anthropic principle and in the processes
of cosmic evolution may in theological perspective be aspects ofGod's care and guidance of
the cosmos.
The concept ofSequential complexity suggests a fruitful way to describe humanity's
place in the cosmos. Out of all observed levels ofmaterial reality, human being is the
pinnacle of complexity. The human brain is the most complex object in the known universe.
If specially created by God, humans can think of their existence in teleological terms. But
even ifhuman existence is an emergent result of non-predetermined natural processes, it
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could be regarded as accidental only in a limited sense. Its appearance would be an outcome
of possibilities built into the cosmos by God, and therefore ultimately intentional. The
doctrine ofprovidence can encompass either interpretation.
Whether or not the universe has been designed to culminate simply in a conscious
being or in human being, it is only humans, as Rahner observed, who open up fully to the
absolute transcendent.6 Only humans are able to relate consciously to God, and are the
beings in which the universe is finally prepared to relate to and receive God's being. It is a
theological datum of faith that the universe has been designed to culminate in the
incarnation, but this seems to be coherent with the scientific portrait of human complexity
and consciousness; even science sees that humans are uniquely oriented to the transcendent
realm.7 Thus the idea that humanity might be a goal of the creation, while theological rather
than scientific, is coherent with scientific discourse.
9.3.4. Ecological Concerns
Are Ecological Concerns damning to critical anthropocentrism? The relationship
between humans and creation highlighted in Pannenberg, Rahner, and Zizioulas points to the
ideas of stewardship and servanthood. These are only properly imaged and understood in
the life and ministry of Jesus Christ, who shows that loving stewardship is the proper mode
of that relationship. The incarnation is a realization of servanthood on behalf of the entire
cosmos. Further, humans are the agent for the redemption of the cosmos, not the sole
purpose for its redemption. All this suggests a role for the church in instructing human
stewardship of creation.
Furthermore, efforts to eliminate anthropocentrism from solutions to the ecological
crisis seem to ignore some fundamental realities. It is clear that ascribing significant moral
status and value to animals is only meaningful to and for humans. Animals cannot return the
favor. Regardless ofwhatever 'pre-moral' behavior animals are said to possess, no one in
the animal-rights discussion ever talks about giving animals moral responsibility, because
they are incapable of it. In this sense, the attempt to evade 'anthropocentric condescension'
ends up highlighting uniquely human capacities and responsibilities. This potential for
responsibility makes possible human efforts to protect and save the environment. Thus a
high view of human significance need not be seen as ecologically insensitive, and can in fact
support environmental concerns. Nevertheless, there are limits to the human priestly
6




relation to creation: only God can ultimately save the world. With such correction and
sensitivity, an anthropocentric position is reasonable, perhaps even necessary, in light of
ecological concerns.
9.3.5. Conclusion
The natural sciences are often presumed to show that humans are nowhere near the
'center of the universe', either physically or metaphorically. However, the scientific portrait
of human existence and uniqueness suggests a very different conclusion. While a
geographical center is meaningless, it appears that humans may occupy a place at the center
of the spatio-temporal cosmic stage in terms of their uniqueness, their complexity, their
socially and symbolically mediated mental capacity, and their orientation to the transcendent.
The natural sciences converge to emphasize human uniqueness on the Earth and in the entire
cosmos, and underline those feature that make human 'I-Thou' relationships possible. As
the one creature in the cosmos made in the image of the Creator, this is not a surprise to
theology. What is meaningful in this context is the coherence of the scientific understanding
with the theological understanding of human being. We appear to be unique, the most
complex material life form in the cosmos, and significant for that alone. The scientific
evidence is not just 'not inconsistent' with the theological position, but is in its own way
indirect confirmation. This approach integrates the findings of science and theology, and is
stronger than mere consistency without insisting one domain must prove conclusions in the
other. Together, they form a broader, integrated interdisciplinary perspective on the truth of
human significance.
9.4. Some Unresolved Issues
While a high view of human significance remains reasonable in the contemporary
setting, there are a number of unresolved issues and questions requiring further investigation.
For instance:
1) Given that theology is very much concerned with community in human, divine, and
human-divine relations, contemporary insights on human nature from the natural
sciences and anthropology ought to provide theology with some fruitful insights, for
instance in studies of social Trinitarianism, of Jesus' humanity and divinity, or in the role
of the church in relation to community.
2) The connection between the human body, mind, and spirit remains an open question for
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both science and theology. The mind-body problem deserves more careful attention.
Research into AI and consciousness still has much to discover, with perhaps as-yet-
unimagined paradigms opening the way for further insight.
3) The debate by evolutionary theorists about whether life is inevitable or improbable, a
result of chance, necessity or both, as typified by the approaches ofMonod vs. de Duve,
will likely continue. Theoretical laws of emergent complexity and so-called evidence for
intelligent design both deserve further exploration.
4) The extra-terrestrial life debate is far from over. Concrete exploration of space may be
the only definitive way to answer the question.
5) Worldviews heavily influenced by the scientific vision may well be tempted to idolize
the human mind and rationality. What correctives and responsibility towards culture
does theology have? What are the ethical implications ofcritical anthropocentrism?
6) In a world with seven-plus billion people, the human relation to the environment is ever
more critical. What should stewardship of the environment entail? What role ought the
church have in relation to the problem?
These deserve fuller unpacking, and there are no doubt other questions, but that is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
9.5. Summary and Conclusion
In conclusion, a high view of human significance is theologically reasonable and
coherent with contemporary natural science. Christianity, insofar as it is Trinitarian and
incamational, remains even in the modern ecumenical setting deeply and inevitably
anthropocentric. Such a conclusion is best grounded theocentrically, in God's action toward
the world in Jesus Christ, and can be sensitive to current ecological and justice issues.
Despite the stereotype, contemporary science agrees that something very special has
appeared in the universe in human beings. The human mind seems likely to be unique in the
cosmos; we are the one being 'in whom the universe has become conscious of itself, and
conscious ofGod.8 The two disciplines show a remarkable integration on human
distinctiveness and significance, though neither domain proves the findings of the other.
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